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A quarter of the world's people remain in severe poverty.
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reflecting shameful inequalities and inexcusable failures of 
national and international policy.
UNDP, 1997 Human Development Report ^
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Abstract:
Today, the credibility of the international development community is 
increasingly being called into question. At the root of the problem are 
the extremely unequal nature of recent growth, the end of the Cold War, 
economic recession in the North, and the lacklustre record of foreign aid 
in reaching those left behind.
By the 1990s, the notion of Sustainable Human Development (SHD) or what is 
sometimes called People-Centred Development (PCD) was being hailed as a possible 
framework for building a newly-invigorated system of international 
development cooperation based on genuine North-South partnership, holistic, 
equitable, participatory, empowering and sustainable development.
This thesis explores the implementability and transformational 
potential of the SHD/PCD paradigm by analyzing how a multilateral 
development agency (UNDP) and an international NGO (Action Aid) put it into 
practice both globally and in Uganda. Its main argument is that despite 
both agencies' contributions to service-delivery and training, and their 
genuine efforts to reorient their work towards SHD/PCD approaches, in the 
final analysis neither UNDP or Action Aid realize the more transformative 
goals of the SHD/PCD agenda or seriously challenge the status quo. This is 
partly due to the excessively abstract, unfinished, ideologically confused 
and contradictory nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm itself, (i.e., the Baroque 
Science Phenomenon) . However UNDP and Action Aid, both of which adopted 
SHD/PCD to enhance their profiles, must assume much of the responsibility 
blame for subordinating core SHD/PCD goals to their own organizational 
interests (i.e., the River Pollution Phenomenon) . The thesis also demonstrates 
how both agencies undermine their effectiveness by making a series of 
fallacious assumptions about both poor communities' and their own catalytic 
potential in an effort to reconcile the gap between their agencies' SHD/PCD 
aspirations and the real-life constraints facing their goals.
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Chapter 1: Introduction:
Sustainable Human Development 
The Way Forward or the 
Development Community Gone Astray?
A Rising Tide of Wealth is supposed to lift all boats.
But some are more seaworthy than others. The yachts 
and ocean liners are indeed rising in response to new 
opportunities, but the rafts and rowboats are taking on 
water--and some are sinking fast.
UNDP, 1997 Human Development Report ^
I. The Current Crisis in International Development;
A) The Crisis of Unequal Development and Growing Marginalization;
As we approach the twenty-first century, the world is becoming an 
increasingly impoverished and unjust one. Despite the impressive growth 
and progress achieved by some developing countries in the last two decades, 
the vast majority of the world's population remain poor and marginalized. 
There is considerable debate about the exact nature of global poverty 
today and whether it has been reduced or aggravated by structural 
adjustment, globalization and liberalization policies.  ^ Nevertheless, 
there is growing concern that, although the world economy as a whole has 
witnessed stellar growth in recent decades and significant progress has 
been made in improving the quality of life of many people, including those 
in developing countries ,^ it is mainly a sub-set of some 15 countries 
which have experienced the most dramatic surges in growth while the poorest 
countries in the world have lagged behind.  ^ There is also growing 
preoccupation that even the spectacular rates of growth achieved by the 
select few may be increasing existing inequalities and insecurity and, as 
such, may not be sustainable or worth sustaining.  ^ The consequence may be 
a world characterized by a growing divide between 'haves' and 'have nots' 
and, for those left behind, a precarious existence in what some have called 
"a world of shanty states." ® This suggests that there is 'a serious 
crisis in development' which the international community cannot ignore. ’
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Judging from the evidence above, the current crisis in development is 
perhaps not so much one of 'complete failure', since some progress has been 
made in improving the quality of life of many of those formerly considered 
poor ®, but rather a realization that we need to focus on those who have 
lagged behind. This preoccupation has been voiced by David Korten, who has 
warned that, if the world's imbalances in economic growth are allowed to 
continue, we will produce a world gargantuan in its excesses and grotesque 
in its human inequalities. ®
This thesis concurs that the biggest development challenge facing us 
today is that of escalating global disparity and marginalization. Its 
chief aim is to explore how these can be reversed through the use of 
Sustainable Human Development (SHD) and People-Centred Development (PCD) approaches.
B) The Crisis in Development Theory:
In addition to the crisis of growing disparity and marginalization, 
many development thinkers and practitioners fear that the development 
discipline may have also lost its theoretical bearings. At one of the 
times of greatest human need, development thinking may be in the midst of a 
conceptual deadlock. While development theory and policy during most of 
the 1960s and 1970s was strongly anchored in Keynesian principles of 
development planning and state-centred development and while in the 1980's 
it was primarily inspired by liberalization and market-led ideals °^, by 
the 1990s many felt that development ideas had entered an impasse, as it 
became evident that neither of the post-war development models could 
address the root causes of global poverty and inequality.
It is worth noting that some development thinkers question the 
existence of an impasse in development theory while others continue to 
debate the nature, origins and timing of the impasse. Hence, while
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academics like Robert A. Packenham attribute the impasse in development 
thinking to the utopianism, over-politicization, and excessive holism of 
the Dependency theories which predominated during the 1960s and 1970s 
Professor Colin Leys links the impasse in development theory to the 
predominance of neo-Liberalism and its excessive confidence in 'the market' 
and efforts to veil the political aspects of the neo-Liberal agenda. At 
the same time, writers like Stuart Corbridge and Frans J. Schuurman argue 
that development theory is not in an impasse at all. Corbridge has argued 
that post-Marxist thought had successfully moved beyond the 'economism',
'essentialism' and 'epistemological fiat' of classical Marxism.
Schuurman agrees but attributes the breakthrough to development studies' 
growing recognition of the diversity of development processes and the 
importance of non-economic factors other than class and emphasizing 
rigorous empiricism and praxis rather than just theorization.
What matters more than the exact nature of the impasse though, is the 
perception among many development scholars and practitioners that 
development discourse is in urgent need of a new development paradigm to 
fill the gaps left by the collapse of former models and to add clarity to 
the meaning of development which has been blurred by the recent surge in 
the nomenclature and in development concepts as the international community 
searches for alternatives. If anything then, the impasse in
development theory today may have less to do with a dearth of new ideas 
than it does with a search for an alternative shared development paradigm. 
The emergence of SHD/PCD addresses such needs by offering a paradigm which 
balances market, state and participatory approaches.
C) The Crisis in Development Cooperation:
The final crises of international development relates to the 
effectiveness of the existing system of international development
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cooperation itself. Originally, much of the disillusion with development
cooperation either focused on the perceived bankruptcy, bureaucratization
and fragmentation of the United Nations' network of specialized development
agencies or stemmed from development agencies themselves which
attributed their own ineffectiveness to decreasing foreign aid levels
(Refer to Table 1.1 in this Chapter) the growing commercialization of
aid, and pressures to do more 'contracting out' work. Today, nevertheless,
the disenchantment with foreign aid has become much more generalized, with
much of the criticism being directed at the system of international
cooperation itself and with the roots of the problem being traced to
factors as diverse as the lack of an 'enabling environment' or appropriate
'rules of the game' in developing societies themselves development
interventions which are overly rigid, top-down, and non-participatory a
system of development cooperation which is too concerned with self-
perpetuation and filling its own pockets and a development
establishment which uses foreign aid as a tool of neo-Imperialism and as
a way of imposing northern conditionalities upon the South. Either way,
many former supporters of foreign aid have become impatient with a system
of international development cooperation which seems to have lost its way
and proven ineffective at eradicating poverty or having long-term
development impact. According to Sachs :
The idea of development was once a towering monument inspiring 
international enthusiasm. Today the structure is falling 
apart and in danger of total collapse....Development has 
become a shape-less amoeba-like word. It cannot express 
anything because its outlines are blurred....The task then, 
is to push the rubble aside to open new ground.
Naturally, many development actors do not believe that the system of 
international development cooperation is on the verge of collapse, but even 
the OECD's 1996 Development Co-operation Report, warns that, if the OECD countries
are to avoid a severe development crisis, they will need to adapt to the 
changing global context by both becoming more adept at securing additional 
financial commitments from donors nervous about the sluggishness of their
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national economies, and, adopt a series of measures to correct their old 
weaknesses and become much more effective at meeting OECD's new development 
targets. As the Ministers and Heads of Agencies in the OECD's
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) put it in a communiqué released in 
early 1997, "We will need to change how we think and how we operate in a 
far more co-ordinated effort than we have known until now".^ ®
Of course, the feeling of 'impending crisis' is far from new in
development cooperation circles. As Smillie has pointed out, the Pearson
Commission Report expressed considerable concern in 1969 over what was seen
as dwindling public support for foreign aid and growing distrust and 
disillusionment with the system of development cooperation at the time. 
Nevertheless, a sense of malaise now exists as well as a perception that 
the system of international development cooperation is not performing as it 
should; that it has failed to fill the gap between its ideals and reality; 
and that it has lost support in the North and the South.
D) The Need for An Alternative Development Approach
It is in this difficult context that the ideas of Sustainable Human
Development (SHD) and People-Centred Development (PCD) have come to the fore as a
novel and audacious development model which offers a possible response to 
the triple crisis discussed above. The need to find a credible development 
approach of this kind is the driving force behind this thesis.
II. SHD/PCD; A Response to the Crisis in International Development;
A) Defining SHD/PCD Approaches
The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) defines Sustainable
Human Development (SHD) as "the process of enlarging peoples' capabilities
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and choices so as to enable them to better satisfy their own needs". This 
implies that people should not only be regarded as the "means" but also 
seen as the "ends" of development processes. In essence, SHD aspires 
towards what UNDP calls "the development of the people, by the people, for 
the people". In Initiatives for Change, UNDP's chief statement of intent for
the nineties, UNDP Administrator, Mr. James Gustave Speth, heralds SHD as a 
promising framework for building a newly-invigorated system of development 
cooperation based on genuine North-South partnership as well as for 
carrying out comprehensive policy and institutional reforms at the 
international, national and local levels. More concretely, Mr. Speth 
argues that SHD--or. People Centred Development (PCD), as it is sometimes
called--is a new development paradigm which should n<pt only generate 
economic growth, but also distribute its benefits equitably; regenerate the 
environment rather than destroying it; and give priority to empowering poor 
people by enlarging their choices and ensuring their active participation 
rather than marginalizing them. In sum, UNDP views SHD/PCD approaches 
as pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-jobs, pro-women, and pro-children. It stresses 
growth with employment, environmental protection, empowerment and equity.
B) The Importance of SHD/PCD Approaches and UNDP's Unique Contribution
Since the 1990s SHD/PCD approaches have been gathering tremendous 
momentum. At the global level, these notions have become an integral part 
of the development cooperation policies of the OECD and were given 
added impetus in the 1995 World Summit for Social Development at Copenhagen where
134 nation-states committed themselves to creating a framework of action to 
"place people at the centre of development". More recently, SHD/PCD 
approaches have made considerable headway regionally and nationally as 
well. For instance, in 1994, the UN's Economic Commission for Africa organized a
special Conference o f  African Ministers Responsible for Human Development to produce an
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African Common Position on Social and Human Development in Africa. Human Development
also figured prominently on the agenda of the Symposium on Asia-Pacific Cooperation
held in Hawaii in May 1990. A few years later, in Valparaiso, Chile, 
representatives from Latin American political parties, labour 
organizations, academic institutions and NGOs proclaimed their commitment 
to Human Development in The Valparaiso Report which was entitled: A  Government for
Human Development. In addition, 40 countries have produced national Human
Development Reports, many of them involving a wide range of governmental and
civil society actors in the process.
Clearly, SHD/PCD approaches have become very influential in 
development circles. Furthermore, while UNDP did not invent this approach, 
it has undoubtedly played a key role in presenting them as a viable 
alternative to the neo-Liberal consensus which had become the doctrine of 
the World Bank, and has actively promoted them through its annual Human
Development Reports (HDRs) and the speeches of its new Administrator.
C) SHD/PCD as an Alternative Framework for Development Cooperation:
This thesis will argue that SHD/PCD approaches introduce some 
innovations in the way we conceptualize development and will show that 
these ideas constitute a bona fide development paradigm, contain useful
insights into development problems, move beyond state-vs-market 
dichotomies or excessive economism, and offer an ambitious agenda of 
potentially very radical and promising policy and reform proposals. Having 
said this, we must then ask whether this insightful and promising 
development paradigm is sufficiently robust or realistic to be 
operationalized into effective development policies and practice. This is 
a critical question given that, translating development paradigms into 
practice has long been the Achilles' heel of the development discipline.
20
As Dennis Rondinelli rightly points out:
Although the rhetoric of development policy has changed drastically 
over the past half century....a substantial amount of evidence 
suggests that translating plans into action was, and continues to be, 
one of the most difficult tasks facing development administrators.
And, as David Moore and Gerald Schmitz remind us:
The buzzwords of development tend to have a relatively short product 
cycle and have usually been replaced by the time they are subject to 
any systematic critique.
It is the difficulty of filling the gap between paradigm and practice 
which produces the main challenge which I propose to take on in my thesis.
III. Key Research Questions and the Guiding Threads of the Study:
A) Three Core Research Questions Posed in the Study
In this thesis I address the challenge presented above through three 
core sets of research questions.
First, I am concerned with the conceptual soundness and practical 
feasibility of the SHD/PCD paradigm. Can SHD/PCD approaches be effectively 
operationalized? What constraints are likely to emerge from the 
paradigm's abstractness and diverse theoretical foundations and ideological 
tenets? What effects might they have on SHD/PCD's implementability?
Second, what motives do international organizations have for 
advocating a SHD/PCD approach? How have these agencies' motives and 
organizational interests affected the way they have interpreted and 
implemented the SHD/PCD paradigm? How far have they been willing to 
reform the existing system of international development cooperation, and 
indeed, their own practices, to realize the SHD/PCD agenda?
Third, how have different types of international development 
organizations gone about putting SHD/PCD approaches into practice? What
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kinds of obstacles have these organizations faced in carrying out SHD/PCD 
approaches? What impact have these agencies' SHD/PCD efforts had on the 
well-being and empowerment of the poorest? In this thesis I compare how a 
UN agency and an international NGO have performed in these respects.
Together, these questions should allow me to ascertain the extent to 
which inter-governmental development agencies and international NGOs are 
organizationally equipped to implement SHD/PCD initiatives; whether they 
are prepared to pursue the intra-organizational changes and broader 
institutional and policy reforms needed to realize the more transformative 
elements of the SHD/PCD agenda; and to test whether international 
development agencies can play a vanguard role in a paradigm shift.
B) The Guiding Threads of the Study; The Importance of Implementation,
Institutions and Organizations in Development Processes
The above questions all involve a shared preoccupation with the 
pivotal role which implementation processes, institutions and organizations 
play in filling the gap between paradigm and practice in development.
These concerns are the two guiding threads which stitch my thesis together.
'Implementation' refers to the process by which a paradigm is 
translated into practice. According to Conyers and Hills, it is an 
ongoing process involving an initial transition from concept (i.e., 
paradigm) to policy (i.e., commitments about the types of changes which are 
desirable); a transition from policy to plans (i.e., actual blueprints of 
the best way to bring about stated changes); and a final phase in which 
policies and plans are translated into concrete courses of action which, in 
development at least, normally take the form of specific development 
programmes or projects. To capture this continuum, I study SHD/PCD at
the conceptual level, while at the same time analyzing its impact at the 
policy, organizational, and programme/project levels. The four levels are 
the building blocks in SHD/PCD's translation from paradigm to practice.
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My focus on the role played by 'institutions' and 'organizations' 
draws inspiration from the growing influence of what has been referred to 
as the New Institutionalism. As a field and type of analysis, the New
Institutionalism is recent, diverse, and subject to considerable debate but
its key premise that institutions and organizations play a critical role in 
shaping societal values and behaviour and can serve as catalysts of change, 
is having considerable influence in development. The importance of the 
role played by institutions and organizations in development is the second 
guiding thread in my thesis. When I speak of 'institutions' and 
'organizations', I am following Douglass North, who defines 'institutions' 
as the formal or informal "rules, enforcement characteristics of rules and, 
the norms of behaviour that structure repeated human interaction" (i.e., as 
the "rules of the game") and 'organizations' as "the players in the 
game" as well as the "initiators of institutional change", since, it is 
members of organizations who invest in the skills and knowledge which lead 
to revised evaluations of opportunities and which induce alterations in the 
rules of the game. This distinction is very useful for my own research 
since it suggests that international development organizations are the key 
players to watch, as they are both the shapers of the rules and the 
vehicles for change, yet they are nevertheless, part of the much broader 
game and set of formal and informal rules which govern the broader system 
of international development cooperation and LDCs' own economic and 
political institutional arrangements. Hence, while international 
development organizations remain the focal point of my analysis, throughout 
this thesis, I make a conscious effort to show how these agencies' SHD/PCD 
efforts are themselves influenced and constrained by the rules and norms of 
the wider system of international development cooperation as well as of the 
existing institutional framework in LDCs.
There are three reasons for focusing my thesis on the role of 
international development organizations. Firs, as noted by institutionalists,
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organizations are actors in their own right and have their own momentum and 
potential for changing values, norms and rules rather than simply being a 
product of these. Second, despite declining levels of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), international assistance is still a crucial instrument of 
international cooperation as well as a substantial source of financial and 
technical resources. (Refer to Table 1.1) Third, in recent years,
international development agencies have themselves been making a case for 
'more aid' by arguing that they are beginning to introduce organizational 
reforms as well as new policies and practices which make them work more 
effectively. It is therefore critically important that we put these new 
claims and commitments to the test.
Finally, I should note that my thesis' focus on organizations does 
not mean that wider contextual or institutional factors which go beyond the 
aid regime are unimportant. As noted above, I will also examine the 
influence of contextual factors unique to Ugandan society (e.g., its 
history of tribal conflict, ethnic and religious tensions, and persistent 
war threats from neighbours, etc.); the effects of wider institutional 
constraints (e.g., limited access to markets or technical know-how and 
unequal and clientelistic power relations, etc.); and the implications of 
the Ugandan government's own development policies and plans (e.g., the 
Museveni government's heavy debt burden, unconsolidated democratic 
institutions, and weak civil service with poor planning capacity and a 
susceptibility towards corruption, etc. ) for the effective implementation 
of SHD/PCD in Uganda. My overall concern then is to explore the role which 
different types of factors play in influencing the implementation of 
SHD/PCD approaches, with a special emphasis on the interface between wider
contextual factors, institutional factors inherent to the aid regime as 
well as to Ugandan society, and the organizational features of the 
development agencies I have chosen to study.
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IV. Establishing the Parameters of the Study;
A) The Choice of Country and Organizations to be Studied:
I have chosen Uganda as my country example and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and Action Aid (AA) as my organizational case 
studies so as to analyze the impact of SHD/PCD in specific contexts.
I chose Uganda because I wanted to examine a country where the severe 
economic, social and political deprivation suffered by much of the 
population made the implementation of SHD/PCD especially urgent there. I 
also wanted to explore whether SHD/PCD approaches lend themselves to 
helping the 'poorest of the poor'. This meant that I would have to test 
the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches in a country with little or no 
experience of investing in people and where improvements in human well­
being are desperately needed. Uganda meets all these criteria because with 
a GDP per capita of only US$ 218 in 1994, it is one of the world's poorest 
LDCs, it has suffered almost three decades of repression and civil strife, 
and has a poor record of investing in peoples' well-being, being ranked 
155th out of 174 countries in UNDP's annual Human Development Index (HDI) .
However, Uganda is also a promising testing ground for SHD/PCD approaches 
because many of the indicators coming from Uganda show great promise. Not 
only has the Ugandan economy been growing impressively since 1986 but 
the democratic reforms and decentralization process launched by the 
Museveni Government in the mid 1990s are regarded as crucial steps towards 
creating an 'enabling environment' for Uganda's future Human Development.
Uganda's future success is not certain, but the international community has 
identified Uganda as one of the countries with the greatest development 
potential in Africa and made it a favoured recipient of foreign aid.
This makes Uganda an ideal environment in which to assess the impact of 
foreign aid and SHD/PCD.
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I have chosen the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
Action Aid (AA) as my organizational case studies.
UNDP has 132 field offices all over the world and an annual budget 
of US$ 1.7 billion. In addition to its size, UNDP is the UN agency with
the most flexible and widest-reaching terms of reference which also has a 
key coordination role among the specialized development agencies of the UN 
system. The importance of UNDP's coordination role was reinforced by UN 
Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, in An Agenda for Development.
Secondly, as a very large, hierarchical, bureaucratic, politically- 
constrained and largely managerial development agency, UNDP provides an 
excellent venue for determining whether international development agencies 
with such traits were properly equipped to carry out flexible, process- 
based, and long-term participatory SHD/PCD approaches. Thirdly, UNDP is 
the agency most closely associated with the SHD/PCD in the international 
system and has come to be regarded as the champion of this cause.
AA was chosen as an international non-governmental organization (NGO) 
which was pursuing development goals similar to those of UNDP but which, 
organizationally speaking, was structured very differently from UNDP.
Hence, like UNDP, by the 1990s, AA began to make a conscious effort to move 
beyond economistic definitions of development which equated poverty with a 
lack material resources. In Giving People Choices: Action A id and Development, AA
notes that because economic growth alone does not alleviate poverty and can 
even exacerbate it, AA's development objectives should not merely be 
economic growth, but rather "human development" and "giving people and 
their children control and choice over the processes of change which 
confront them." Like UNDP, AA has also been trying to shift away from 
traditional forms of service-delivery and to shift towards much more 
flexible, participatory, and self-reliant approaches which go beyond 
project-specific interventions and are sustainable over the longer-term.
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Yet, AA also differs from UNDP in important respects. As an NGO, AA has 
more political autonomy and is not directly restrained by the UN system 
and its member donor and recipient governments. AA has only 20 country 
programmes and its annual budget (US$ 57 million or, £38 million in 1994- 
95) is comparatively small compared to UNDP's. Thus, AA provides an 
opportunity for comparing whether a smaller and politically more autonomous 
development organization which considers itself grassroots, hands-on and 
less bureaucratic and hierarchical than UNDP is in fact in a better 
position to lead a major paradigm shift, to challenge the existing system 
of development cooperation, and to translate SHD/PCD into practice. My 
comparison of the two agencies was facilitated by the fact that both have 
major development programmes in Uganda which I was given access to.
B) Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Impact:
In 1994, UNDP's Inter-Bureau Task Force on Sustainable Human 
Development suggested five major criteria or guidelines which could be used 
to assess the effectiveness of UNDP's SHD/PCD programmes. These are:
i) Adopting a multidisciplinary and holistic approach based on 
interventions which build on cross-cutting themes (such as 
environment, gender, employment and sustainable livelihoods and 
poverty eradication) and in which innovation, flexibility, ongoing 
learning and effective evaluation are key to development;
ii) Contributing to 'Sound governance' by showing policy and 
institutional impact at both the Upstream and Downstream levels,
and helping countries develop sustained national and local governance 
capacity to increase their self-reliance over the longer-term;
iii) Fostering genuine North-South partnership by creating a sense of 
national ownership, serving as a neutral consensus builder between 
government and civil society and working towards enhanced aid 
coordination between government and the international community as 
well as between international donors themselves;
iv) Ensuring beneficiary participation in the identification, design, 
implementation and evaluation of development efforts, and empowering 
beneficiaries by ensuring that they acquire the confidence needed to 
assume control of their own destinies;
v) Promoting equity by fulfilling service needs of the disadvantaged, by 
ensuring their participation and building their capabilities, and by 
supporting organizations which might do so as well.
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I wish to use these gui de lines to assess the success of UNDP and AA 
in challenging existing institutional arrangements and in leading a major 
paradigm shift so as to be able to put SHD/PCD ideas into practice. 
Although, it is true that no other international development agency (or 
governmental entity that I ami aware of) has ever achieved such high 
standards, it seems fair to assess UNDP's and AA's performance on the basis 
of goals which they have set out for themselves and that we set out to 
determine whether like UNDP and AA actually measure up to their own ideals, 
and whether they are able to close the gap between their own rhetoric and 
reality. Table 1.2 outlines some of the variables, indicators and types of 
behaviour which I observed and the generic questions I asked in order to 
flesh out the above-stated guidelines in my own research.
C) The Main Features and Phages of the Research Methodology
My doctoral research was carried out over three years, from 1993- 
1995. Although the thesis traces the evolution of UNDP and AA during much 
of the nineties, the analysis contained herein is based on the reforms and 
policies carried out by both agencies during these three years and the UNDP 
and AA field programmes which I observed in Uganda during 1995.
The research involved four phases, including a review of the relevant 
literature and documents; a period of consultancy work and participant 
observation in UNDP's Human Development Report Ojfice (HDRO) in New York; a set
of unstructured interviews with key informants in the UK, New York and 
Washington; and, two periods of fieldwork in Uganda (from May-July 1995 and 
November-December 19 95) where I used unstructured interviews, focus group 
discussions and semi-participant observation to get information from 
Ugandan government officials, fellow donors, development experts and 
beneficiaries. A list of key informants and details of the four phases of 
my research can be found in the thesis' Appendix.
28
The research design is primarily based on 'qualitative research' and, 
as such, the findings are largely based on human perceptions, insights and 
interpretations of events as opposed to given facts, statistical 
correlations, or specific calculations of probability or direct causality.
The thesis does, nevertheless, rely on a multiplicity of data 
collection and interpretation methods--an approach known as 'methodological 
integration'--as a means of cross-checking information and improving 
objectivity. It also uses a 'grounded theory' approach influenced by 
the work of Glaser and Strauss. In practice, and in my research, the 
grounded theory approach is a reiterative process in which the researcher 
travels back and forth between data and theory as he/she ensures that the 
evidence available is properly grounded in existing theory and that the 
emerging theory fits the evidence on the ground. (Table A1 of the
methodological appendix shows the steps used to record, organize, and 
interpret my data using grounded theory).
In addition to using UNDP and AA as 'organizational case studies', my 
fieldwork in Uganda involved 'multi-site studies' of selected UNDP and AA 
programmes and projects. Within UNDP, this involved 20 visits to specific 
project sites, beneficiary groups, and individuals from three UNDP- 
supported programmes: th e  Africa 2000 Network, the Micro Projects Programme to Combat
Aids (MPP) , and the Community Management Programme (CMP) . Within AA, a one-day
visit was paid to the Kamuli (AKP) Development Area (DA) but the fieldwork
concentrated in the Buwekida (ABP) DA, where visits were made to 20
specific projects sites, beneficiary groups and individuals.
Overall, my doctoral research involved 211 interviews and visits 
chosen through 'non-probability sampling' techniques commonly used in 
qualitative research. Instead of selecting one's sample randomly or by 
calculating the exact probability of a respondent being chosen for one's
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sample, in non-probability sampling, the researcher uses his/her own 
judgement and research interests as the main criteria for their sample. In
my research I mainly used two non-probability sampling techniques:
'purposive sampling', where the researcher selects informants or projects 
on the basis of the chosen parameters and conceptual requirements of 
his/her study (e.g., informants known to be familiar with the work of
UNDP's HDRO or field projects known to have strong SHD/PCD components), and
'snowball sampling', where the researcher relies on one informant to lead 
to another (e.g. visiting beneficiaries known for their effective results 
or, interviewing local members of the community cited by beneficiaries as 
influential persons in their area.)
V. The Study's Two Major Hypotheses;
In this thesis, I aim to test two major hypotheses:
1. The Baroque Science Phenomenon :
One of the propositions which my thesis tries to test is whether the 
SHD/PCD paradigm is conceptually sound and, and if not, whether its 
conceptual deficiencies do not in fact complicate its operationalization 
into concrete development guidelines and programmes. In my thesis, I 
refer to this dilemma as the Baroque Science Phenomenon because, as it might
turn out to be the case with SHD/PCD ideas, the Baroque Sciences made the 
assumption that there was an implicit harmony and understandable link among 
all phenomena in the world; that corruption or self-interested behaviour 
which threatens harmony is an aberration; and that, ultimately, all things 
can fit together despite apparent tensions. The main attraction of Baroque 
Science laid in its all-encompassing nature, while its major drawback was 
that the ideas remained attractive only as long as the theory was left 
abstract and was viewed from a distance and tensions and contradictions 
inherent in ideas, policies or programmes were often left unattended or 
merely tampered with rather than addresses head on. Yet, as soon as one
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scratched beyond the surface and one's attention moved from abstract theory 
to actual implementation, the harmony in diversity threatened to become 
theoretical madness. And yet, scholars and development experts associated 
with UNDP's HDRs have never questioned SHD/PCD's conceptual soundness or 
fully addressed the implementational implications of possible conceptual 
deficiencies inherent in the paradigm.
2 . The River Pollution Phenomenon :
The second hypothesis which I will be testing in my thesis is the 
possibility that, it is the efforts of UNDP and AA to reconcile the 
tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD approach and the gaps between SHD/PCD 
aspirations and their own organizational interests, which cause the 
gradual displacement or erosion of the more ambitious elements of the 
SHD/PCD agenda. In my thesis I refer to this possible tendency as the River
Pollution Phenomenon because, like a running river which continually picks up
debris as it runs downstream towards its destination, SHD/PCD initiatives 
may be themselves being weighed-down by the SHD/PCD paradigm's own 
conceptual limitations as well as by UNDP's and AA's pursuit of their own 
organizational interests as the paradigm makes its natural progression from 
development theory, to policy doctrine at agency headquarters in New York 
and London, and finally, into concrete development policies and programmes 
at the national and local levels in Uganda. These organizational 
interests may be manifesting themselves in a number of ways, including: i) 
a tendency for these agencies to do what is easiest and most feasible:
(e.g., focussing on a narrow range of familiar options, working with easily 
accessible and trainable project beneficiaries, pursuing projects which are 
easier to implement, following existing rules and procedures about 
deadlines and fund disbursement); ii) a tendency towards self-perpetuation 
and do what is most likely to expand the mandate or power base of the 
agency (e.g. expanding the agency budget and keeping the money moving, 
increasing agency profile, adding on new functions, etc.); iii) a tendency
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to do what is least objectionable to the most powerful stakeholders (e.g., 
giving into the political pressures of influential stakeholders who can 
exert the harshest sanctions); and iv) a tendency for agency staff to 
simplify the complexities of development processes (e.g., by discounting 
wider institutional constraints or hiding errors) in order to safeguard 
staff's professional advancement and to guarantee a positive image for the 
agency. When speaking of organizational interests though, it is important 
to clarify that, in my thesis, I am in no way claiming that the pursuit of 
organizational interests is by definition harmful to development processes 
or to the realization of SHD/PCD. Undeniably, it is quite plausible to 
encounter situations in which organizational interests coincide with, and 
are even conducive to the SHD/PCD agenda. The crux of the problem then is 
not that development agencies pursue their organizational interests--this, 
after all, is inevitable. What the River Pollution Phenomenon is trying to
depict instead, is what happens when UNDP's and AA's pursuit of their own 
organizational interests are indeed in conflict with core transformational 
SHD/PCD goals and whether the latter get displaced in the process.
Another proposition to be tested in my thesis is whether, in an 
effort to deal with the Baroque Science and River Pollution Phenomena, UNDP and AA
have (consciously or unconsciously) chosen to deny the severity of the 
constraints facing them by maintaining series of contestable assumptions 
about the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches and the true nature of the 
existing system of international development cooperation and development 
processes themselves. The first assumption which they may be making is 
that international development organizations such as theirs, whose mandate 
is partly one of continuous self-generation and whose power base emanates 
from mostly external and influential stakeholders (e.g., nation-states in 
the UN system or, northern sponsors) with a stake in the status quo, may 
not be in a position to challenge existing power structures either globally 
or in LDCs, nor to foster empowerment and self-reliance among the poor. A
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second may be the supposition that development agencies with management 
structures as hierarchical, bureaucratic, managerially-oriented and 
sectorally-fragmented as UNDP's and AA's are capable of putting into 
practice SHD/PCD initiatives which require holistic, flexible, bottom-up, 
participatory, and collaborative modes of implementation. It may be 
especially unrealistic to expect these agencies to carry out development 
initiatives which simultaneously satisfy participatory and better 
monitoring and evaluation criteria--both components of the SHD/PCD agenda-- 
when the former requires flexible and bottom-up management structures, 
while the latter depends on top-down managerial monitoring and evaluation 
systems and highly specialized technical advice. The final misconception 
may be the implicit assumption by UNDP and AA that the existing system of 
international development cooperation and development processes themselves 
are harmonious and symmetrical and that beneficiary communities are 
solidaristic and have unlimited indigenous knowledge and free time.
Although I do not think that Baroque Science or River Pollution phenomena
offer precise predictions, I would hypothesize that, as a result of these 
two phenomena and the above-mentioned contestable assumptions, although 
international development agencies like UNDP and AA have managed to improve 
their provision of alleviatory social services and skills training (i.e., 
capability formation) , both have had serious difficulties transforming existing
institutional arrangements and putting into practice the more radical 
empowerment and power-sharing components of the SHD/PCD agenda (i.e., 
enabling the poor to put their newly-acquired capabilities into practice, 
or capability use) . As Diane Elson notes, although development agencies have
rediscovered the essential truth that people ought to be at the centre of 
development, the extent of the social, political and economic changes this 
entails may not be appreciated. These are the propositions I set out to 
assess here.
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VI. Overview of Thesis Chapters;
The Chapters which follow provide the evidence needed to test the 
above hypotheses. Chapter 2 , is the thesis' theoretical chapter and places 
the thesis' main questions and propositions in the context of the 
International Development Cooperation, SHD/PCD, Implementation and 
Institutional literatures. Even though my thesis does not invent a new 
'integrative theory' p erse , an eclectic conceptual framework allows me to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of the four relevant literatures 
studied and to use them in a complementary fashion. Chapter 3 provides an 
in-depth analysis of the conceptual soundness and coherence of SHD/PCD 
approaches and begins to build the case for the Baroque Science Phenomenon.
Chapter 4 is about Uganda's development potential. As such, it establishes 
what the Ugandan government has done to create an enabling institutional 
and policy environment for SHD/PCD and identifies the broader contextual 
and institutional factors which have undermined Ugandan development efforts 
in the past and which might do so today. Chapter 5 analyses UNDP's 
conceptual interpretation and operationalization of the SHD/PCD paradigm 
and traces SHD/PCD's implementation through the organizational, policy, and 
programme/project levels so as to substantiate the River Pollution and Baroque
Science phenomena. Chapter 6 explores the same issues as Chapter 5, with the
exception that the spotlight is on AA. Juxtaposing the experiences of the 
two agencies provides an ideal opportunity for comparing how an inter­
governmental development agency and an international NGO differ in the way 
they go about operationalizing and implementing SHD/PCD. Chapter 7 is the 
conclusion and highlights the thesis' key findings as well as their wider 
applicability and theoretical and their empirical implications. I also 
begin to reflect on how things could be done differently and suggest 
possible improvements. As an accompaniment to the thesis, I have added a 
Methodological Appendix which provides details about my research design as 
well as the validity, reliability and generalizability of the findings.
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Table 1.2: Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Progress and Impact
Selected SHD/PCD Guidelines 
(Independent Variables)
Components of the SHD/PCD Guidelines 
(Indicators of the Independent Variables)
Types of Behaviour and Trends Studied so as to 
Gage Changes in SHD/PCD indicators
Multidisciplinary/Holistic
Development
• Ability to do Work that incorporates 
c ross-cu tting  themes ( e .g . ,  Gender 
Equity, Environment, Employment and 
Poverty Eradication--sometimes called 
UNDP's four Es)
• Ability to work within a Programmatic 
Approach
• Ability to be innovative, to learn and 
experiment in development processes
1.Do most, or at newer, projects/programmes 
incorporate priority cross-cu tting  themes?
2. Are staff working in a cross-sectoral 
fashion? ( e .g . ,  in multidisciplinary working 
groups, in a programmatic fashion)
3 .Do agency staff and beneficiaries feel 
comfortable working across themes or in the 
form of programmes?
4 .Are agencies innovating by trying out 
programmes in new areas & with new actors?
5 .Arc programme erro rs  documented, openly 
discussed, analyzed and corrected?
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Selected  SHD/PCD Guidelines  
(In d ep en d en t Variables)
Components o f  the SHD/PCD Guidelines  
(Indicators o f  the Independent Variables)
T y p es  o f  Q uestions Used to Measure the  
Indicators o f  SHD/PCD
Genuine North-South 
Partnership
Donor Collaboratû.on
Ability to increase national ownership 
by government and to work within the 
framework of the national development 
vision and set priorities
Ability to enhance links and consensus 
between government and civil society
Ability to enhance aid coordination 
among donors as well as between donors 
and government
1.What organizational mechanisms/initiatives 
has the agency introduced so as to feed in 
national development goals/targets  set by the 
government & other development actors into 
its own work?
2 .What mechanisms/initiatives has the agency 
introduced to increase national government- 
civil society dialogue? Have any concrete 
collaborate efforts resulted from the dialogue?
3 .What efforts /in itia tives has the agency 
introduced to help the government's national 
coordination of aid?
4 .What mechanisms/initiatives has the agency 
introduced to increase its communications with 
fellow development donors at the national and 
global levels? Have any concrete collaborate 
efforts resulted from the dialogue?
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S e lected  SHD/PCD Guidelines  
( In d ep en d en t  Variables)
Components o f  the SHD/PCD Guidelines  
(Indicators  o f  the Ind ep en d en t V ariab les)
T y p es  o f  Q uestions U sed  to Measure the  
Indicators o f  SHD/PCD
Equity Ability to respond to the needs of the 
most disadvantaged and to ensure  
delivery of services to the poorest
Ability to s trengthen  the capabilities of 
the poorest, or to at least support 
organizations that help the poorest
1. What proportion of the agencies' 
projects/programmes are aimed at the 
poorest?
2a.Do the agencies' projects/programmes 
actually reach the poorest?
b.Who among the poorest do the agencies
manage to reach?
c.What services do the agencies give the 
poorest?
3a.What skills/capabilities do the agencies pass 
on to the  poorest?
b .A re  the poorest able to apply such skills 
on their own? i . e . ,  without the financial 
assistance of the agencies ?
4a.What organizations working with the poorest 
do the agencies support?
b.Has the assistance to such organizations 
made them more resp on sive  the poorest?
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Selected  SHD/PCD Guidelines  
(In d ep en d en t Variables)
Components of  the SHD/PCD Guidelines  
(Indicators o f  the Independent Variables)
T yp es  o f  Q uestions U sed  to Measure the  
Indicators o f  SHD/PCD
Sound Governance
The introduction of major development 
initiatives related to governance issues
Ability to have high impact on national 
policy and institutional arrangements 
( e .g . ,  influence upon government, 
Parliamentary, Military, Judicial and 
Market s truc tu res)
[Upstream influence]
Ability to s trengthen  national and local 
governance capacities 
[Downstream influence]
1.What new programmes/initiatives have been 
introduced in the area of sound governance?
2 .Does the agency have a well-funded, high- 
powered and experienced advocacy team with 
a clear advocacy s tra tegy  which identifies 
priority issues to influence both globally and 
nationally?
3 .Has the agency had global advocacy impact 
in the international community or influenced 
the system of development cooperation?
4.1s the agency try ing to influence issues 
which are of stra tegic  importance to sound 
governance at the national level?
( e . g . , democratization & accountability; 
rule of law & transparency ; decentralization; 
civil service corruption; market liberalization 
and other economic incentives; participation 
and access to resources for women and other 
groups who are marginalized)
5 .To What degree do operational and lower-level 
persons in the agency become involved in 
influencing/advocacy work?
6 .How do other development actors perceive 
the advocacy effectiveness of the agency?
7 .Has the agency s trengthened  the advocacy 
capacity of other national development actors?
8 .How has the agency contributed to the 
decentralization process?
9 .How has the agency s trengthened  local 
planning and technical capacities so that local 
local government officials and other community 
groups are equipped to address their own 
development and governance concerns?
10.How do national/local actors feel about the 
agencies' effectiveness in building 
national/local capacity and promoting g reater 
self-reliance?
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Selected  SHD/PCD Guidelines  
(In d ep en d en t  Variables)
Components o f  the SHD/PCD Guidelines  
(Indicators o f  the Independent Variables)
T y p es  o f  Q uestions U sed to Measure the  
Indicators o f  SHD/PCD
Participation
(Empowerment)
Ability to involve beneficiaries 
(including government and community 
beneficiaries) in project/programme 
planning, implementation & evaluation
Ability to enhance the capabilities of 
beneficiaries (including government 
and community beneficiaries) to 
organize & to develop the skills needed 
to protest against inadequate 
development initiatives as well as to 
launch & finance their own initiatives
la.Do project beneficiaries (including 
government and community beneficiaries) get 
consulted about their needs/aspirations early 
on in the development planning process?
b.How broad and all-inclusive is the process of 
beneficiary consultation? ( e . g . ,  are women, 
the poorest, neighbouring communities 
consulted? )
2a.Do project beneficiaries (including
government and community beneficiaries) get 
actively involved with project planning, 
implementation and evaluation?
b.How broad is the community involvement? 
( e . g . ,  are women & the poorest involved?)
c.How deep is the community involvement? 
( e .g . ,  Do people get involved only in 
carrying out menial tasks or do they 
participate in activities requiring 
considerable skill and decision-making?
3 . Are there  signs of communities carry ing  out 
their own business in a participatory fashion?
4a.What skills/capabilities have the agencies 
passed onto beneficiaries during the 
development process?
b .A re  there  instances of community members 
passing on learned skills to other community 
members?
c.A rc there  instances of community members 
either protesting against existing 
development initiatives, launching their own 
initiatives, or continuing an initiative on their 
own after the departu re  of the international 
development agencies?
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Chapter 2 :
The Theoretical Context and the Estate of the Literature: In
Search of Conceptual Insights
....It is important to do more to develop 'test sites' in 
which alternative approaches to understanding administrative 
phenomena are identified, juxtaposed and tested.
Christopher Hood ^
I. The Theoretical Context: Borrowing and Building on Insights
From Four Social Science Literatures
Because implementation processes and an institutional focus are the 
two guiding threads to my thesis, I will not only search for insights in 
the newly-emerging SHD/PCD Literature and the existing International 
Development Cooperation Literature, but also in the Implementation Process 
Literature in Public Administration and the wider Institutional Literature 
which spans all of the social sciences, since they all contain useful 
insights for my research questions and hypotheses. Combining these four 
literatures has enabled me to build on existing theory, while at the same 
time shedding new light on the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches. (Table 
2.1 provides a tabular illustration of the insights drawn from the four 
literatures in my thesis.)
A) The SHD/PCD Literature:
The SHD/PCD Literature can be divided into two main camps : those 
publications emanating from UNDP and its Human Development Report Office (HDRO)
and writings independent of the United Nations.
To this day, much of what is written about SHD/PCD is dominated by 
UNDP and can be sub-divided into two categories: Annual Human Development
Reports (HDRs) and complementary conceptual and policy-oriented think pieces
produced by the HDRO*s Eminent Panel o f  Experts or consultants  ^; and publications
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consisting of case studies and guidelines for the operationalization of 
SHD/PCD within UNDP. The latter are normally produced by other UNDP 
Departments  ^and have grown since Speth's appointment in 1993.
With respect to the SHD/PCD Literature produced by UNDP's HDRO, the 
flagship of the Office is its annual HDRs, published since 1990. Because 
the HDRO is staffed by a handful of professionals, the bulk of the 
conceptual and empirical analysis for the HDRs is done by the HDRO's Eminent
Panel o f  Experts or outside consultants hired to provide specific inputs. The
success of the HDRs lies not only in that they are written by top-level 
development experts but also in that they are edited by communications 
experts who translate the ideas into appealing language and a format which 
incorporates innovative policy proposals, success stories, and think pieces 
by renowned world leaders, scholars and activists. In short, the HDRs 
complement accessible writing with cutting-edge conceptual analysis on a 
wide range of themes useful statistical information and wide-reaching 
policy recommendations. By the mid 1990s, the HDRO started commissioning 
a series of specialized occasional papers on themes which were related but 
at the same time went beyond its annual HDRs. Examples of such papers 
include: Globalization and the Developing World by Griffin and Rahman Khan (1992),
War, Peace and the Third World by Dan Smith (1994) , Decentralization: A  Survey o f the Literature
from a Human Development Perspective by Klugman (1994), send Human Development: From
Concept to Action: A  10-Point Agenda by Kaul and Menon (1993). Finally, parallel
to the work of the HDRO, a couple of books by development experts 
associated with the HDRO have appeared, that echo the views in UNDP's HDRs 
and occasional papers. Griffin and Knight's Human Development and 
International Development Strategy for the 1990s (1990) and Mahbub ul Hag's 
Reflections on Human Development (1995) both fall under this category.
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Thus, the HDRO has been prolific as well as ambitious in terms of the
scope of its publications. However, I have three fundamental critiques of
its literature. Firstly, most of it does not sufficiently address the fact
that many of the more radical and transformative policy and institutional
recommendations proposed in UNDP's HDRs go against the vested interests of 
powerful elites and influential, yet traditional, LDC governments unlikely 
to cede their advantage in existing global institutional arrangements and 
national power relations. Nor, for that matter, do UNDP's HDRs say much
about how difficult and risky it would be for the poor and marginalized
members of society to fight for the radical reforms put forward in the HDRs 
given the oligarchic and repressive nature of the societies and 
institutional regimes they find themselves in. Yet, the political and 
potentially conflictive nature of Human Development is something which UNDP's
HDRs and related publications are conspicuously silent about.
Second, there is an absence of a lucid discussion about the
operationalization and implementation of SHD/PCD approaches. For instance, 
in their 10-Point Agenda for translating the Human Development concept into action
(Op. Cit.), Inge Kaul and Saraswathi Menon do identify some key policies 
and basic financial and technical capacities which must be in place before 
launching a SHD/PCD Strategy, but the authors never go beyond telling us 
the obvious: i.e., that Human Development should be country-specific, that
statistics need to be improved, that Human Development goals and targets
should be set, that resources need to be mobilized, and that public demand 
for Human Development should be encouraged. However, the most difficult
operationalization challenges surrounding SHD/PCD's implementation are left 
unattended. How, for example, will SHD/PCD be translated into clear yet 
comprehensive development strategies given the sheer breadth of the 
approach? How will implementors deal with the political pressures, 
organizational interests and both management and technical limitations
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plaguing their own development agencies? How realistic is it to assume 
that agencies facing the above constraints can effectively promote and 
implement the more radical and transformational components of the SHD/PCD 
agenda? Instead of addressing these challenges head on, UNDP's HDRs have 
tended to feature very brief (and usually positive) "boxes" on different 
country experiences which, although they provide uplifting reading 
material, ultimately skate over the harder questions posed above and fail 
to give us a frank account of the setbacks and development impact which 
particular SHD/PCD initiatives have had in those development agencies and 
LDCs which have tried to put SHD/PCD ideas into practice. Even Mahbub ul 
Hag's long-awaited memoir. Reflections on Human Development, reveals next 
to nothing about the political pressures and internal conflicts faced by 
UNDP as a result of its promotion of the SHD/PCD agenda.
My third inquietude is that the HDRO's publications are uncritical of 
either the conceptual soundness of SHD/PCD approaches or the feasibility of 
their policy proposals. For instance, its literature makes no mention of 
the implications of the abstractness, vagueness, or unfinished nature of 
the SHD/PCD concept for its operationalization. This literature also fails 
to put the SHD/PCD approach in its proper historical and theoretical 
context, and, as a result, not only ends up treating the SHD/PCD paradigm 
as though it evolved entirely from the small cluster of Economists 
associated with the HDRO, but makes little or no recognition of SHD/PCD's 
diverse influences and simultaneous borrowing from widely-ranging 
development paradigms and doctrines. This means that the critical 
contributions to SHD/PCD thinking made by grassroots NGOs a well as the 
possible tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm and the HDRs' policy 
proposals go virtually unnoticed.
As noted above, once Speth became UNDP Administrator in 1993, other 
UNDP departments began producing SHD/PCD mission statements, country-
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specific case studies, implementation guidelines and training manuals.
Most influential among these publications are: Speth's own treatise, With A
Soul and a Vision: A  New Approach to Development and a New UNDP; Sustainable Human
Development: from Concept to Operation: A  Guide for the Practitioner produced by Tariq
Banuri, Goran Hyden, Celestous Juma and Marcia Rivera; the Inter-Bureau 
Task Force on Sustainable Human Development's Sustainable Human Development:
Suggested Criteria, Concerns and Best Examples; Nadia Hijab' s Promoting Sustainable Human
Development: National Entry Points, a series of country-specific SHD/PCD strategies
and experiences written collaboratively by UNDP headquarters and country 
offices; and, the Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning (OESP's) 
series on Managing Change at UNDP.
Together, these reports make an important contribution to the SHD/PCD 
Literature in that they, for the first time, explicitly state that the 
implementation of SHD/PCD approaches is UNDP's chief mandate; provide 
useful information on how UNDP has carried out SHD/PCD approaches in 
specific countries; and propose ways in which UNDP could translate the 
SHD/PCD paradigm into workable development strategies and entry point, 
while at the same time outlining the more fundamental organizational 
reforms and attitudinal changes which must take place if UNDP is to fulfil 
its SHD/PCD mandate. These reports should also be commended for their 
efforts to tackle some of the challenges involved in putting SHD/PCD ideas 
into practice. On the other hand, their main weakness is that they too 
fail to question the conceptual soundness and implementability of the 
SHD/PCD paradigm, or to give a realistic assessment of UNDP's capacity to 
play a vanguard role in its promotion, or of the actual political, 
organizational, and societal constraints which have hindered UNDP's or 
others' efforts to put SHD/PCD into practice.
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As previously noted, there is a small yet growing SHD/PCD Literature 
which is independent of UNDP and the UN. Generally speaking, these works 
fall under three categories : those which address the topic of Human
Development within the context of a broader New Poverty Agenda} Econometric and
statistical contestations of the Human Development Index (HDI) and the data
used in UNDP's HDRs; and lastly but very importantly, newly emerging 
independent critiques of the SHD/PCD paradigm and of UNDP's treatment of 
it.The independent critiques have produced the most insights for my thesis.
Typical of the first category of independent SHD/PCD publications is 
Lipton and Maxwell's treatment of Human Development as one of the many
strands of what they consider a broad departure from the stabilization and 
adjustment policies of the 1980s and a growing interest in a New Poverty
Agenda ®--a trend which the authors trace to the World Bank's initial
awareness of the regressive social effects of structural adjustment 
programmes. By the early 1990s, studies such as Giovanni Cornia et al's 
Adjustment with a Human Face ^ and articles such as those by Lipton and Maxwell
were all pointing towards a 'rediscovery' of poverty issues within 
international development. My only reservation about these analyses is 
that they tended to treat SHD/PCD approaches merely as a variant of 
changing ideas within the World Bank rather than recognizing SHD/PCD as a 
development paradigm in its own right and with the potential to offer an 
alternative to the Bank's hegemonic thinking and practice. Today, of 
course, the World Bank has appropriated much of the SHD/PCD thinking and it 
is increasingly difficult to separate between the two doctrines.
A second rubric of the SHD/PCD Literature produced outside the U.N. 
consists of a series of econometric and statistical critiques of the 
imitations of the data and measurement of Human Development utilized by
UNDP's HDRO. Economists such as Mark McGillivray have questioned both the
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composition and usefulness of the HDI given its inability to provide 
country-to-country development level comparisons, its lack of year-to-year 
comparability, its inappropriate measurement of income, and the tendency of 
the variables comprising the HDI to be highly inter-correlated. According 
to McGillivray, the HDI furbishes little additional information that GNP 
per capita does not already provide. ® While some of the econometric 
weaknesses of the HDI identified above have been corrected by the HDRO over 
the years, more theoretical Economists such as T.N. Srinivasan still attack 
it on the grounds that the Index does not reflect the complexity of Amartya 
Sen's conception of 'Capabilities' which provides the theoretical basis for 
the SHD/PCD approach and the inspiration for the HDI. ® Critics such as 
Katarina Tomasevski have condemned the HDI for the absence of variables 
measuring human rights and political freedom in the Index and thus 
disassociating the political and economic developmental spheres despite the 
indivisibility of human rights. Finally, the literature in this area
has questioned the very quality and reliability of the data used in UNDP's 
HDRs. Officials in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs have noted that 
the budgetary expenditures proposed in UNDP's HDRs are speculative "rules 
of thumb" with little empirical basis.And, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra 
of Algeria, Chairman of the Group of 77, has criticized UNDP for publishing 
data which "do not jibe even with World Bank statistics". “
As might be expected, the main caveat of this literature is that, by 
concentrating on data and measurement issues, these analysts forget to 
question the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches or the capacity of 
agencies like UNDP (and indeed AA) to put these approaches into practice in 
the first place. Furthermore, while the best of these critiques allude to 
the gap evident between the SHD/PCD concept and the index, none of them 
enter into in-depth analyses of SHD/PCD's conceptual limitations nor do 
they provide empirical data on the impact SHD/PCD of efforts on peoples' 
well-being, either globally or in LDCs.
53
Fortunately, a few independent articles have recently subjected the 
SHD/PCD paradigm to closer scrutiny. This literature has alerted me to the 
sheer vagueness, as well as the unevolved nature ", divergent historical 
and theoretical roots and the hybrid nature of SHD/PCD approaches 
especially as interpreted in much of UNDP's Literature. Others have also 
noted SHD/PCD's lack of a solid theoretical foundation aside from Amartya 
Sen's 'Capabilities approach', and the absence within SHD/PCD of a coherent 
vision or set of analytical tools with which to explore the structural root 
causes of poverty These more theoretical analyses have managed to move
beyond questions of data and measurement by identifying possible tensions 
within the SHD/PCD approach and have thus prompted the development 
community to think more seriously about these issues. However, the debate 
still needs to go beyond generalities by anchoring these criticisms in 
concrete empirical evidence. Until this is done, it is difficult to assess 
how warranted the circumspection about SHD/PCD is, or what the implications 
the above critiques have on the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in 
particular settings or organizations.
Yet, to be fair, not all of the debate surrounding the SHD/PCD 
approach has been restricted to the realm of the purely theoretical. In 
the early 1990s, some independent development experts were already 
contemplating the prospects of operationalizing SHD/PCD and taking real- 
life implementational constraints into consideration in their analyses.
For example, V.V. Bhanoji Rao had pointed out as early as 1991 that, in its 
current form, the policy and reform proposals contained in UNDP's HDRs were 
all over the map and revealed a dangerous inability to develop a sharper 
policy focus or to identify and rank development priorities. Similarly, 
Michael Hopkins has noted that the SHD/PCD recommendations put forward by 
UNDP's HDRs are "far too superficial" to guide the formulation of 
achievable development frameworks containing concrete, practical and 
country-specific actions in the grasp of policy-makers and development
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practitioners alike. An independent assessment of UNDP's SHD/PCD 
effectiveness commissioned jointly by recipient and donor governments draws 
similar conclusions and points out that, because SHD/PCD approaches are 
being interpreted so broadly by international development agencies such as 
UNDP, in the final analysis, SHD/PCD has virtually no direct use for 
organizational priority-setting. Equally relevant to my own research 
are T.N. Srinivasan's assertions that none of UNDP's HDRs provide a 
sufficiently sophisticated institutional analysis or address what he calls 
"the political economy and sociology of the constraints which prevent most 
developing countries from replicating successful Human Development" .
What Srinivasan is denouncing here is essentially the inability of 
much of the UNDP Literature on SHD/PCD to address the more political and 
institutional dimensions of SHD/PCD, as well as the resistance and conflict 
inevitably involved in SHD/PCD transitions. This is an omission which 
neither Diane Elson or Katarina Tomasevski think should be taken lightly.
In her analysis of the cursory fashion in which political freedom and human 
rights issues are dealt with in UNDP's HDRs, Katarina Tomasevski condemns 
international development agencies like UNDP for using the language of 
political freedom and human rights in their policy recommendations without 
offering clear outlines for developing an enabling framework containing the 
financial investment, organizational, substantive, and procedural standards 
needed to tackle such issues. In her own critique of SHD/PCD 
approaches, Diane Elson rebukes those who claim to have rediscovered the 
importance of people-oriented development approaches for not paying 
sufficient attention to the need for a dramatic transformation in existing 
institutional arrangements and both socio-economic and political power 
relations in order to enable capability building to become capability use.
These latter writings have helped to focus my own research hypothesis by 
hinting at how, in addition to conceptual limitations, an inadequate 
consideration of institutional and political constraints can themselves
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obstruct the effective operationalization of SHD/PCD approaches. What is 
once again missing in this literature though is evidence from actual 
SHD/PCD efforts in specific development agencies or countries.
Lastly, it is important to point out that, a handful of independent 
consultancy reports containing empirical evidence about the implementation 
of SHD/PCD approaches in specific settings and organizations do exist.
These reports are normally not widely available to the public but I have 
gained access to some of them. For example, in their study of UNDP's 
implementation of SHD/PCD in 11 countries (including Uganda), Martin 
Godfrey and his fellow consultants argue that UNDP makes overly-optimistic 
assumptions about the viability of its SHD/PCD strategies and the technical 
capacity of its field offices to carry out SHD/PCD approaches and that, in 
doing so, ends up overlooking the confusion, lack of ownership and 
resentment which many UNDP field staff feel towards New York headquarters' 
imposition of SHD/PCD definitions and guidelines. Godfrey et al also 
reveal that, because of its tendency to over-direct its development 
efforts, UNDP has had difficulties strengthening existing national 
institutions or ensuring ownership, participation, empowerment and long­
term sustainability in its SHD/PCD initiatives. In another assessment, 
the Centre for Development Research looks at UNDP's SHD/PCD effectiveness in eight
countries (including Uganda) and concludes that UNDP's tendency to 
interpret SHD/PCD too broadly and its insistence on carving out a unique 
niche for itself in the international community and to pursue a leadership 
role in a constellation of sectors and at both the global and field levels 
at once has left fellow donors in the UN community full of wrath towards 
UNDP. The same study also notes that UNDP's long-held image as an 
uncritical supporter of government, coupled with its lack of highly- 
specialized personnel or resources for advocacy work have equally 
undermined the agency's promotion of SHD/PCD approaches. These 
empirical studies are most helpful in outlining the organizational
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constraints which can be expected to impinge upon the operationalization of 
SHD/PCD within specific development agencies. Nevertheless, because these 
studies are mainly empirical, provide an overview of many countries, and 
focus mostly on UNDP, they can neither provide in-depth analysis of the 
theoretical limitations of SHD/PCD approaches, fully trace the translation 
of SHD/PCD from paradigm to practice at the global, national and local 
levels, or tell us whether the above obstacles are applicable to NGOs.
The above review shows that the existing SHD/PCD Literature provides 
useful cues about possible conceptual and empirical impediments to the 
effective operationalization and implementation of SHD/PCD. As such, both 
the potentially debilitating effects of conceptual deficiencies and both 
political and organizational constraints feature prominently in my study's 
two key hypotheses, the Baroque Science and the River Pollution Phenomena. At the
same time, the above literature review also confirms the need for a study 
which puts the SHD/PCD paradigm to the double-barrel test of theory and 
practice and which makes the connection between the two using evidence from 
specific SHD/PCD efforts carried out by different international development 
organizations at the global level, as well as in an LDC country setting.
B) The International Development Cooperation Literature;
As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, in addition to 
deriving insights in the SHD/PCD Literature, I have looked to the 
International Development Cooperation Literature for clues as to what I 
should look out for in my thesis and how to further develop my research 
hypotheses. Within this literature, I found several useful analyses of the 
setbacks which international development agencies have experienced in their 
past implementation of empowering development initiatives, including 
accounts of the conceptual limitations of their development ideas, the 
obstacles they encountered in their implementation, and the negative
57
repercussions of the pursuit of self-interests in the process. The NGO 
Literature and the International Development Cooperation Literature at 
large are simultaneously discussed in this Chapter.
One of the first systematic investigations of the impact of 
development NGOs in LDCs was Judith Tendler's pioneering 1982 analysis of 
75 evaluation reports of NGO projects carried out on behalf of USAID.
It this ground-breaking assessment Tendler found that instead of reaching 
the poorest or carrying out participatory and empowering development 
efforts, many NGO projects were better described as decentralized decision­
making by NGOs and/or selected local elites which were often not even 
indigenous to the region. In addition, Tendler's analysis of the internal 
dynamics of beneficiary communities showed that, contrary to NGO 
assumptions that poor recipients were intrinsically harmonious, they were 
in fact plagued by persistent patron-client relations, extreme inequality, 
and intra-community conflict. As such, Tendler found that NGOs' 
development interventions were often appropriated by elites and failed to 
redistribute wealth or to challenge existing power relations. Many of 
Tendler's early findings have been confirmed and supplemented by subsequent 
studies of NGO effectiveness. For instance, Roger Riddell's and Mark 
Robinson's (1990-1992) comparative study of 16 different poverty 
alleviation projects carried out by four NGOs in Bangladesh, India, Uganda 
and Zimbabwe concludes that, although international development NGOs have 
alleviated poverty and fostered some participation, by and large, the NGOs 
in the study had serious difficulties reaching the poorest of the poor, 
helping beneficiaries develop a sense of empowerment and self-reliance, or 
assuring long-term self-financing and sustainability. In a joint study
carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on 'New Modes of 
Development Cooperation', Jean Bossuyt and Geert Laporte confirm that 
outside-driven development efforts in which different donors work with
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their own chosen sectors and beneficiaries while failing to strengthen 
recipients' self-reliance or ensure long-term sustainability are recurring 
problems in the EU's bilateral development programmes as well.
Another major concern in the International Development Cooperation 
Literature is the asymmetry of North-South relations, inadequate northern 
accountability towards beneficiaries, donors' bypassing of recipient 
governments and a consequent inability to significantly influence policies 
or institutional arrangement in the South. In their latest book. Beyond 
the Macic Bullet. Michael Edwards and David Hulme write at length about 
northern NGOs' lack of downward accountability towards aid recipients and 
the conspicuous absence of southern counterparts in northern NGOs'
Executive Boards. Moreover, according to Edwards and Hulme, far from being 
catalysts of social change, addressing the root-causes of poverty, or 
influencing broader policy and institutional reforms, NGOs are increasingly 
playing the role of "gap fillers" who provide an uneven "patchwork quilt" 
of social services for the poor in developing countries.
After conducting a survey of European, Canadian, and US NGOs' 
involvement in policy influencing work, Brian Smith drew similar 
conclusions and found that many development NGOs are apolitical and have a 
humanitarian approach and that, even when they do take on political issues, 
restrict their campaigns to narrow policy targets. As NGO analyst John 
Clark explains, although progressive development NGOs agree that policy- 
related work is important to for social transformation, in practice, this 
kind of work is pushed off the agenda by NGOs' day-to-day management of 
project activities and donor demands.
The dearth of agreed-on performance standards and of credible 
evaluations of development impact is another shortcoming identified in the 
International Development Cooperation Literature. According to Edwards and
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Hulme, aside from probity and some quantifiable measures of service 
provision, indicators of quality impact or of broader organizational and 
policy effectiveness are hard to come by in the NGO community. Alan 
Fowler and Kees Biekart are even harsher in their analysis and argue not 
only that most NGOs have yet to properly measure their development impact 
over the long-term, but that NGO's even lack a theory of the causes of 
change and are still incapable of identifying clear links between cause and 
effect in development processes. Colin Leys, David Moore and Gerald 
Schmitz take the above ideas even further and argue that the vagueness of 
the development theories on which we base our development aspirations today 
have not only impeded us from developing common impact evaluation methods 
but have led to tremendous conceptual confusion. The main concern here is 
that in trying to be all things to all persons (for example by promising 
growth, equity and environmental sustainability; by seeking to equally 
accommodate market, state and community interests; or by claiming to be 
participatory and managerially effective at once) the development community 
is making unrealistic and contradictory pledges--what Leys calls "an 
increasingly incoherent discourse of opposites." 3^
Also present in the International Development Cooperation Literature 
are a series of analysts who, like many of the critics mentioned above, 
concur that international development agencies have fallen short of our 
expectations that they would empower and foster a sense of self-reliance 
among the poor, but attribute these setbacks largely to these agencies' own 
risk-aversion and excessive preoccupation with blueprints, budgetary rules, 
time-frames and targets. According to Ian Smillie, for example, it is 
these types of bureaucratic rigidities which, in his view, are reinforced 
by the Logical Framework Approach, coupled with conflicting stakeholder
pressures, which have undermined NGOs development efforts in LDCs. In a
book entitled Development Projects as Policy Experiments, Dennis 
Rondinelli argues that recipient government administrations and bilateral
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and multilateral development agencies have also erred on the side of 
creating overly bureaucratic, technocratic, top-down, sectoral and rigid 
organizational structures which are much too focussed on quick and concrete 
outputs to be conducive to the implementation of comprehensive, multi­
sectoral and process-based development plans requiring experimentation and 
a flexible and participatory learning approach to development.
A related obstacle to effective development implementation from 
Rondinelli's point of view is that international development agencies have 
generally underestimated the analytical and administrative capacities 
required to effectively carry out comprehensive, multi-sectoral and 
process-based development strategies, as well as the political dimensions 
and often conflictive nature of implementation processes. Rondinelli's 
picture, in short, is not only about organizationally rigid and skills- 
deficient development agencies, but also about sometimes unknowing and 
conflictive beneficiary communities, an uncollaborative and divided system 
of international development cooperation riddled by sectoral factionalism, 
turf-protection, fiefdom-creation, and development processes propelled by 
competing stakeholder agendas, as well as conflicting goals and interests.
A final re-emerging theme in this literature is the tension between 
what Michael Edwards calls ' development imperatives' and ’institutional
imperatives’- - !  . e . , between what development agencies should be doing to
fulfil their core mission and development goals and what they think they 
have to do to survive in an increasingly difficult environment. Like
Edwards, in Compassion and Calculation. David Sogge and his colleagues 
lament the way in which NGOs' drive towards self-perpetuation--a tendency 
which the authors attribute largely to political pressures emanating from 
traditional stakeholders with vested interests in the status quo--has 
prompted NGOs to paint an unrealistically rosy picture of their 
achievements on the ground and made them unlikely candidates to empower
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the poorest or to pursue a transformational agenda. Other NGO analysts 
agree that, due to the above-mentioned tendencies, it may be erroneous to 
assume that international voluntary development agencies are capable of 
challenging the status quo.
The disruptive effects of organizational interests and political 
pressures is an issues which is further pursued in the wider International 
Development Cooperation Literature by the likes of Edward Clay and Bernard 
Schaffer, Graham Hancock, and James Ferguson. Although these latter authors 
recognizes that the obstacle to development are multiple and complex and 
would not deny the various constraints described above, what distinguishes 
their work from others is their emphasis on the primacy of organizational 
interests in defining the direction development programmes take. Hence, to 
long-time development analysts Edward Clay and Bernard Schaffer, 
institutional survivalism and organizational interests--or what they refer 
to as the Bureaucratic Paradox o r  Iron y--can derail promising development
initiatives in various forms. This may involve development agency staff 
resorting to a number of 'escape hatches', including narrowing down the 
agenda by working on projects which are easier to manage either because 
they reach a smaller and more easily serviced target group, they are 
sectoral rather than comprehensive in scope, and depend on measurable 
indicators or easily rewardable targets; sticking to well-known rules, 
procedures or counterparts; and doing what is least objectionable and most 
likely to please powerful stakeholders.
In his work, Graham Hancock also writes about the drawbacks of 
Bureaucratic Survivalism which he defines as the inclination of international
development agencies involved in the development business to constantly 
expand and perpetuate themselves and the desire of their staff to continue 
enjoying comfortable salaries and a privileged diplomatic lifestyle.
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James Ferguson offers yet another variant of the way in which 
organizational interests manifest themselves in international development 
cooperation. By focussing on the way in which development discourses 
evolve (i.e., the 'genealogy of development'), Ferguson aims to show that 
development agencies generate their own discourse and apparatuses and that 
they can cause unintended outcomes unrecognizable from their initial 
poverty-eradication and empowerment goals. In Ferguson's view, 
development agencies' need to "move the money" and to "sell their existing 
technical packages", is what leaves them constantly in search of "problems 
requiring a solution" and opting for already existing standardized, 
sectoral and technical (read apolitical) programmes which can be easily 
executed by development agencies and the established national government 
bureaucracies. In essence, says Ferguson, international development 
agencies favour development solutions which increase their chances of 
carrying out further interventions. Because this generally implies an 
emphasis on standardized and seemingly neutral technical solutions which 
can be executed by national government instruments as opposed to 
development work of a political nature, Ferguson believes that the kind of 
work normally carried out by international development agencies is more 
likely to further entrench state and bureaucratic power rather than to 
challenge existing power relations or institutional arrangements.
The above insights from the International Development Cooperation 
Literature have helped me to focus of my thesis' research questions and 
hypotheses in four important areas. First of all, at the conceptual level, 
the work of development thinkers such as Leys, Moore and Schmitz and of NGO 
analysts such as Fowler and Biekart contributed to the formulation of my 
own research questions and hypotheses by confirming my initial inkling--as 
depicted in the Baroque Science Phenomenon-- that the sheer broadness and
conceptual vagueness and ambiguity of newly-emerging development ideas such 
as SHD/PCD might render their interpretation and operationalization
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particularly difficult. Secondly, the writings of Edwards and Sogge et al 
in the NGO Literature and of Clay and Schaffer, Hancock and Ferguson in the 
wider International Development Cooperation Literature, helped me to 
amalgamate my own early suppositions about the potentially disruptive 
effects of multiple political stakeholder pressures and organizational 
interests into the River Pollution Phenomenon. Thirdly, the discoveries
discussed within the International Development Cooperation Literature 
provided many useful hints about the various kinds of implementational 
constraints which one might encounter in trying to implement ambitious and 
comprehensive participatory development initiatives similar to SHD/PCD.
In this respect, the International Development Cooperation Literature 
has proven particularly useful in alerting me to the difficulties of 
reaching the poorest of the poor; of achieving widespread participation and 
empowerment among the poor and the sometimes conflictive nature of 
beneficiary communities themselves; of the asymmetrical, top-down, 
welfarist, fragmented, territorial and overly rigid and bureaucratic forms 
which well-intended development initiatives sometimes take; and, the 
limited technical an administrative skills or performance standards 
available in many development programmes and projects. Lastly, the 
combination of the Baroque Science and the River Pollution Phenomena, along with
the various shortcomings in the development record described above, were 
useful in helping me to identify the series of contestable assumptions 
which international development agencies tend to make about the adequacy of 
their own organizational structures and their potential for empowering the 
poor and bringing about catalytic change; about the seemingly harmonious 
and symmetrical nature of the wider system of international development 
cooperation; and about the altruistic nature and amount of free time and 
knowledge available in poor communities.
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However, in addition to deriving insights from the International 
Development Cooperation Literature which helped to shape my own research 
questions and hypotheses, my thesis aims to contribute to this existing 
body of literature as well. First of all, by amalgamating the various 
contributions found in the International Development Cooperation Literature 
into a unified analysis threaded together by the Baroque Science and the River
Pollution phenomena, I hope to be able to add structure and coherence to this
literature, at least as it applies to the study of the SHD/PCD approaches. 
My second intention is to determine the applicability of the various claims 
of the International Development Cooperation Literature when, as in my 
analysis of SHD/PCD, they are tested at the conceptual, organizational, 
policy and programme-levels as well as from a global, national and local 
perspective. Finally, by comparing the SHD/PCD efforts an international 
NGO and a UN agency, I hope to move beyond the tendency of the 
International Development Cooperation Literature to write separately about 
NGO and other development organizations.
C) The Implementation Process Literature
The SHD/PCD and International Development Cooperation Literatures are 
not the only ones which contain useful insights for my research. There is 
also a branch of Public Administration, which I refer to here as the 
Implementation Process Literature , which addresses many of the 
implementability issues I am interested in exploring in my own thesis. In 
my thesis, I have chosen to focus only on the work of a few select thinkers 
who contribute important perspectives to understanding 'implementation 
processes', even though they might not recognize themselves as such.
Within the Implementation Process Literature, there are a number 
writings on implementation processes which are relevant to my own research. 
For example, Daniel P. Moynihan's view that policy-makers and implementors 
often oversell ambitious and ambiguous theories which they do not fully
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understand and lack the concrete data, as well as the technical and 
management skills to implement properly is directly related to the concerns 
I raise in my thesis about the conceptual limitations of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm. Similarly, Christopher Hood's notion of Information Distortion’
helps to understand why, in hierarchical agencies where interventions are 
highly technical and where the planning and implementation processes are 
very distant from one another--as is usually the case in development work-- 
implementors exaggerate successes or cover up errors as a means of 
protecting their professional interests. Peter Blau's findings that, 
due to their distaste for rigid bureaucratic rules, front-line welfare 
workers often failed to refer clients to needed training or services which 
would given them greater autonomy is helpful in understanding how, in 
development processes too, development workers that must adhere to strict 
bureaucratic demands can end up making programme decisions which slow down 
beneficiaries' progress or restrict their autonomy and thus ultimately 
reinforce their dependence. Each of the above thinkers offers discoveries 
relevant to my own research. Moreover, there are several other studies on 
implementation processes which are potentially related as well. However, 
in my thesis, I focus on two particular studies of implementation processes 
which influenced the formulation of my two core research hypotheses.
The first study is Eugene Bardach's The Implementation Game.
After studying US policy reform efforts and the launching of several new 
social programmes in areas such as mental health, Bardach observed that 
after new policy mandates had been agreed to, authorized and adopted, they 
consistently suffered from an underachievement of goals. This, asserts 
Bardach, is partly due to the fact that implementation processes are 
themselves inherently complex and unpredictable, involving numerous 
activities, many different hands, and a plethora of complications which 
need to be resolved along the way. Above all though, Bardach argues that 
it is the 'politics of implementation'--i.e., the process of persuasion,
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bargaining and manoeuvring by those stakeholders (e.g., clients, 
competitors, etc.) involved in the planning and implementation process 
which creates a constantly shifting set of political and organizational 
pressures which eventually result in the derailment of original programme 
goals. Bardach's conception of implementation processes as part of the 
larger 'game of politics' in which different parties obstruct the 
implementation of programmes by pursuing and negotiating for their own 
interests contributed immensely to the formulation of my own River Pollution
Phenomenon in which political pressures from a multiplicity of stakeholders
and the organizational interests of development agencies are believed to 
erode and eventually displace those core SHD/PCD goals originally 
undertaken by UNDP and Action Aid.
But the applicability of Bardach's work to my own does not end here. 
In The Implementation Game, Bardach also introduces a set of four 
'implementation games' which give additional insights on the kinds of 
implementation problems which I analyze in my own study of SHD/PCD 
approaches. As Bardach explains, because implementation is a political 
process involving constant negotiation and concession-making, the goals of 
a policy or programme usually undergo considerable change in the 
implementation process. This will especially be the case if the original 
goals are ambiguous or, if the consensus upon which they were based was 
weak to begin with. Under these circumstances, notes Bardach, a series of 
'Deflection of Goals' games can occur, including tactics such as 'Piling 
On' (i.e., when some stakeholders see a new programme as a political 
vehicle and use the opportunity to pile on their own goals and objectives, 
thereby causing the programme's original mission and goals to become much 
broader than anticipated). Other 'games' which shed light on the kinds of 
implementation setbacks which occur when carrying out complex and 
comprehensive social interventions such as SHD/PCD are what Bardach refers 
to as; 'Massive Resistance' (i.e., when a group of powerful stakeholders
67
explicitly resist and refuse to comply with some aspect of the policy or 
programme); 'Incompetence' (i.e., when the design of a policy or programme 
far outweighs the skills or competencies of those put in charge of its 
implementation); or 'The Budget Game' (i.e., a tendency for bureaucrats to 
constantly try to 'move the money'--often at the expense of quality 
monitoring or implementation). Each of these games helps explain the 
forces which cause the 'Displacement of Goals' in promising policies and 
programmes and thus help illuminate the logic of one of the core hypotheses 
in my research, the River Pollution Phenomenon.
Finally, Bardach also contributes to the other core hypothesis in my 
thesis, the Baroque Science Phenomenon h y cautioning that it is impossible to 
implement a policy or programme that is conceptually defective;
Any policy or program implies an economic, and probably a 
sociological theory about the way the world works. If this 
theory is fundamentally incorrect, the policy will probably 
fail no matter how well it is implemented. This is because 
implementation problems tend to exaggerate rather than 
ameliorate basic conceptual problems.
And, warning against operationalizing paradigms susceptible to
political pressures and organizational interests into complex programmes:
Programs predicated on continually high levels of competence 
on expeditious inter-organizational coordination, or on sophisticated 
methods of accommodating diversity and heterogeneity are very 
vulnerable.... They are not necessarily doomed to failure but 
they are aching for trouble.
Sam Sieber is the other analyst specializing in social interventions 
whose insights on implementation processes have greatly influenced by 
research focus and hypotheses. Like Bardach, Sieber is very much aware 
that, in many cases, social interventions produce counter-productive and 
even regressive effects, contrary to those originally planned. And, like 
Bardach, Sieber regards the implementation process as extremely complex and 
riddled with tensions and divergent interests and humans themselves as 
constantly resisting changes which threaten the status quo. Nevertheless, 
according to Sieber, because, the trade-offs in strategies for social
6 8
change containing multiple goals and contradictory interests are rarely 
recognized, their unanticipated and reverse consequences are overlooked.
It is in an effort to deal with such complexities that prompts those 
actors in the implementation process to resort to using what Sieber calls 
'Mechanisms of Conversion'. Sieber defines 'Mechanisms of Conversion' as 
those ways in which actors deal with and resist change in the existing 
order. They are also the source of regressive social interventions. In 
Fatal Remedies Sieber identifies seven Mechanisms of Conversion which 
lead to regressive interventions. Out of these, four are particularly 
applicable to my research, the most important among them being 'Goal 
Displacement', Sieber defines Goal Displacement as the process by which 
instrumental goals become a terminal value. In other words, the 
implementor becomes overly dedicated to the means--i.e., the rules, 
procedures and the bureaucratization process in his/her own organizations-- 
in the service-delivery process and is thus derailed from achieving his/her 
wider goals. Goal Displacement usually occurs when a bureaucrat tries to 
do things in the most efficient or official manner possible and ends up 
placing the means over the ends. It is especially prevalent when the goals 
of the organization are incompatible with an emphasis on bureaucratic forms 
of organizational efficiency and control. Other Mechanisms of Conversion 
pertinent to my own research questions include: 'Overcommitment' (i.e., 
interventions that try to achieve more than is realistically possible 
within the existing capacity); 'Placation' (i.e., interventions which are 
merely means of placating certain parties whose support is considered 
necessary or whose attacks require neutralization); and, 'Exploitation' 
(i.e., when certain groups manage to appropriate a set of interventions).
Sieber's Conversion Mechanisms offer useful insights for my 
formulation of the Baroque Science Phenomenon by highlighting that major gaps
between implementors' goals and aspirations and their organizations'
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capacities can render the realization of such goals extremely difficult, 
and by pointing out that, Goal Displacement is most likely to occur when 
bureaucrats are expected to operationalize ideas or to fulfil goals which 
are in tension with one another. Sieber's Goal Displacement model is 
equally relevant to my thesis' River Pollution Phenomenon. Most instructive in
this respect are Sieber's findings that organizational interests are most 
likely to overwhelm the initial goals of programmes and to exacerbate Goal 
Displacement in situations where either scarcity of resources or severe 
competition among agencies results in poor inter-agency collaboration and 
compels agencies to constantly build larger clienteles, to 'keep the money 
moving', and to apply more expedient (i.e., 'blueprint') solutions. In 
sum, by warning that ambiguous or contradictory goals and gaps between 
goals and real implementation capacity (i.e., the Baroque Science Phenomenon)
can perpetuate Goal Displacement and that the gradual displacement of 
policy and programme goals (i.e., the River Pollution Phenomenon) can be
exacerbated by organizational pressures, Sieber's work has helped me to see 
how the Baroque Science and River Pollution Phenomena might be inter-related and
propelled by a mix of conceptual incoherence, political pressures and 
organizational interests.
Clearly then, the Baroque Science and River Pollution Phenomena borrow many
of their insights from Implementation Process theorists. Still, there are 
three fundamental differences. First of all, when merged, the two 
phenomena developed allow us to construct a fairly detailed account of how 
it is both deficient or overly ambitious ideas and organizational interests 
which, when they occur together, seriously obstruct implementation 
processes. Secondly, while most of the ideas of the Implementation Process 
Literature apply to the State and public institutions, the two phenomena 
introduced in this thesis show that similar problems also evident in 
multilateral development agencies and international NGOs. And third, while
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the Implementation Process Literature concentrates its analysis at the 
national level and on developed countries, the phenomena developed here 
show how implementation problems manifest themselves in developing 
societies and at different levels, including in the international, national 
and local sphere.
Even though the Implementation Process Literature are not widely read 
in international development circles, the above discussion illustrates that 
this stream of Public Administration contains several lessons directly 
pertinent to my own research questions and hypotheses. The first 
pertinent lesson offered is that implementation is an intricately political 
process characterized by multiple stakeholder pressures and organizational 
interests. This particular finding is reminiscent of Sogge et al's. Clay 
and Schaffer's, Hancock's, as well as Ferguson's claims in the 
International Development Cooperation Literature. An additional revelation 
provided by the studies of implementation processes discussed above is 
that, these processes are inherently complex and, as such, even competent 
agencies are likely to encounter some difficulties translating even the 
most promising ideas into practice. A third and related insight and one 
which, again, is not as evolved as it could be in international development 
thinking, is the realization that, in life, there invariably tends to be a 
gap between those goals and ideals which we, as humans, aspire to and our 
real capacities to effectively put such ideas into practice.
Although this latter dilemma is also one indirectly alluded to by 
development scholars such as Leys and Moore and Schmitz, these thinkers 
seem to place most of the blame on the self-interest of development 
agencies and on the nature of those development ideas in vogue today rather 
than attributing any of the problems to the complex and sometimes 
unpredictable nature of implementation processes themselves. The final 
contribution of the Implementation Process Literature lies in its detailed
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look at the conditions under which the displacement and erosion of goals 
which I speculate about in my own hypotheses are most likely to occur 
(i.e., when theories are incomplete, goals are ambiguous, stakeholder 
pressures multiple, and pressures for self-perpetuation and the need to 
attend to organizational interests are the strongest) and the various 
forms of organizational interests which impinge upon social interventions.
In fact, by amalgamating insights contained in the Implementation 
Process Literature with those previously reviewed in the International 
Development Cooperation Literature it is possible to further fine-tune the 
River Pollution Phenomenon by identifying four different types of organizational
interests which might lead to a displacement of the SHD/PCD agenda and 
which should be carefully gauged. These include: i) a tendency to do what 
is easiest and most feasible (e.g., working within a narrow range of 
options, with accessible and trainable beneficiaries, complying with 
organizational rules, pre-set targets, etc.)--Clay and Schaffer's Bureaucratic
Paradoxflrony and Sieber's notion of 'Goal Displacement' both highlight this
tendency; ii) a tendency towards self-perpetuation (e.g., by seeking 
profile, constantly expanding one's programme and client-base, or by 
keeping the money moving)--a tendency reflected in Ferguson's account of 
how development agencies push pre-packaged technical solutions as well as 
in Bardach's 'Budget Games'; iii) a tendency to do what is least 
objectionable to powerful stakeholders who can exert sanctions--a tendency 
emphasized in Sieber's notion of 'Placation' and Bardach's 'Piling On', as 
well as in Smillie's, and Rondinelli's concern with influential stakeholder 
pressures, and; iv) a tendency to simplify the complexities of development 
processes (e.g., by overlooking wider institutional constraints, 
exaggerating successes or underplaying errors for the sake of a positive 
agency image or and personal job security)--tendencies reflected in 
Hancock's analysis of opportunistic development professionals and Sogge et 
al's exposure of the lack of impact evaluation standards in development.
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In sum, despite the fact that the analysts of implementation 
processes discussed in this section base much of their research on 
governmental programmes in Western developed nations, their insights about 
the inherent difficulties of implementation processes and their detailed 
knowledge of the types of obstacles (games) which one can expect to find in 
the implementation process provide useful cues for my own research, 
especially when amalgamated with insights from the International 
Development Cooperation Literature. It is for this reason that development 
studies should consider tapping into other literatures such as the 
Implementation Process Literature and to test the letter's pertinence to 
Third World contexts while at the same time using it to test the 
applicability of international development ideas beyond LDCs,
D) The Institutional Literature
There is one more literature which offers important insights for my 
study of SHD/PCD approaches : the New Institutionalism which I referred to in
Chapter 1. Because the Institutional Literature is extremely broad, in my 
thesis I focus on two branches of the literature which have greatly 
influenced development thinking: what in my thesis I refer to as the
Democratic Development (DD) and the New Institutional Economics (NIE). These two
streams of institutional thought are almost diametric opposites to one 
another both in terms of their emphases and core assumptions. Yet, I would 
argue that each one of them offers useful reflections on the problems of 
putting SHD/PCD into practice and that the two are complementary.
Rather than being a formal school of thought p erse , what I refer to in
this thesis as Democratic Development (DD) ideas are probably best described as
a loose grouping of like-minded thinkers who share a general set of beliefs 
and assumptions about the importance of promoting more democratic
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organizations. In the field of international development, prominent 
advocates of the DD include Robert Chambers, David Korten, Dennis 
Rondinelli, Michael Cernea and Stan Burkey. Even though there is 
considerable variance in their views, DD proponents agree on three key 
premises: Firstly, they share a conviction that social change requires the
replacement of hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational structures with 
much more equitable, decentralized and participatory ones. In essence, DD 
thinkers believe that it is the unequal distribution of resources and power 
which causes and perpetuates poverty and deprivation in developing society. 
However, given the difficulties of attacking the root causes of inequality, 
and especially of doing so in a non-violent manner and through short and 
medium-term development work, DD thinkers argue that we have to contend 
with first democratizing those organizations we work with. In development 
cooperation, this implies creating bottom-up, flexible and accountable 
management structures and development projects which promote equity, 
decentralization and beneficiary participation. The assumption is that, by 
taking part in democratic development projects, the poor will in learn 
organizational and consensus-building skills, gain a sense of self-reliance 
and, as a result, will in the longer-run be better equipped and empowered 
to address the root causes of inequality and injustice in their society. 
Their second conviction is the belief that, to be effective, development 
efforts must tap into indigenous knowledge and the local organizations and 
solidarity of the poor. The third salient characteristic of DD thinkers 
is the belief that rigid development blueprints must be replaced by a 
flexible and adaptive approach to development. This, the DD School
emphasizes, requires development staff willing to abandon many of their 
former biases (e.g., their urban bias, their penchant for technocratic 
solutions or bureaucratic procedures, a tendency towards over­
specialization and disciplinary territoriality, etc.).
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As is evident from the discussion above, the three key premises of 
the DD School reinforce one another and overlap with the development 
setbacks and implementation constraints identified by many of the authors 
already mentioned in this Chapter. At the same time though, there are many 
important impediments to development which the DD School does not 
sufficiently take into account. One critique of the DD School made by 
neo-Marxists, for instance, is that, by restricting its promotion of 
participation, decentralization and democratization to the organizational 
and project level, the DD School does not do enough to bring about social 
transformation in unjust LDCs, Deep-rooted socio-economic and political 
change, claim these critics, cannot bypass the role of the state and may 
well involve violent resistance by popular and even revolutionary 
movements. This brings me to a second deficiency of the DD School and 
that is its inability to provide a critical analysis of the conceptual 
soundness of the SHD/PCD paradigm which it closely adheres to. DD thinkers 
seldom consider whether the ambitious principles of the SHD/PCD paradigm 
might be in tension with one another or whether greater equity, 
accountability and participation can become a reality in class-divided and 
clientelistic developing societies. Equally disconcerting is that, even 
though DD advocates know that the development record and organizational 
capacity of international development agencies is poor, many still assume 
that these agencies will play a catalytic role in bringing about a 
paradigmatic shift in development and have, in this sense, failed to 
appreciate the gap between these agencies' development aspirations and 
their actual organizational capacities.
The DD School also romanticizes development processes and poor 
beneficiaries. In their literature, government officials and economic 
elites are often depicted as exploitative and corrupt, while poor 
beneficiary communities are painted as inherently wise and solidaristic. 
Mention is hardly ever made of the reality that, far from always being
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helpful or adaptive, indigenous knowledge and local traditions can be quite 
crude, parochial and detrimental to development processes; that internal 
community conflicts, limited local knowledge, and self-interested, 
exploitative and corrupt behaviour among the poor often renders 
participation and empowerment unfeasible; or, that building group
solidarity is far from the top of the priority lists of most poor
communities. This latter point is important in that mutuality and
broad participation in poor beneficiary communities is not easily 
achievable. This is not only due to inequities in wealth and knowledge (as
emphasized by the DD School) but also to the fact that, many poor people do
not share the altruism, participation and empowerment goals which SHD/PCD 
and DD advocates assume they do. The above shortcomings of the DD School 
mean that its advocates have wrongfully sustained a series of assumptions 
about the true nature of development processes and development cooperation 
and failed to question the likelihood of international development agencies 
empowering the poor and effectively implementing SHD/PCD. These 
criticisms are addressed by the New Institutional Economics (NIE), the second
branch of the New Institutionalism containing useful insights for my thesis.
By the time Douglass North was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics 
in 1993, the NIE had influenced most social sciences. Its appeal lay in 
NIE's long-awaited recognition of the role played by ideology, culture and 
history in human activity as well as in its challenge of neo-Classical 
Economics which had never explained the existence of human organizations. 
International Development analysts appreciated the NIE for its lucid 
analysis of the adverse effects of human opportunism and inappropriate 
institutional arrangements--both neglected in previous development models. 
The pioneers of the NIE were Economists Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. 
But it was Douglass North's Nobel Prize which gave the NIE recognition. In 
recent years, the NIE has been applied to Third World development problems 
by Elinor Ostrom, Samuel Paul and E.A. Brett.
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Although some worry that the NIE is a far cry from the 'grand theory' 
some claim it to be NIE thinkers do share core ideas and assumptions 
which characterize them as a distinct group. To start, NIE advocates 
concentrate their analysis on the behaviour of what they perceive to be 
rational self-maximizing individuals. NIE thinkers assume that people 
maximize their own rather than social interests unless incentives and 
sanctions are created to ensure otherwise. When such sanctions and 
incentives are not in place, rent-seeking behaviour (e.g., 'shirking', 
'free-riding') and a series of monitoring and imperfect information 
problems (e.g., 'adverse selection', 'moral hazard') can cause 
counterproductive development effects. To NIE analysts, the solution is 
to formulate institutional arrangements based on clear rules and rule 
enforcement, to maintain hierarchical organizations capable of effective 
monitoring, and to create controls and incentives against opportunistic 
behaviour. A second concern shared by NIE thinkers is the creation of 
institutional arrangements and organizations effective at generating growth 
and efficiency. In fact, according to NIE advocates, humans create 
institutional arrangements and organizations precisely to reduce the 
uncertainties of human exchange and to reduce those 'transformation costs' 
and 'transaction costs' involved in productive and exchange processes.
A third feature of the NIE School of thought is that, by putting the 
spotlight on the detrimental effects of high transaction costs, they have been
able to illustrate how excessive Statist regulation (e.g., redundant 
requirements for licenses, permits or complex bureaucratic procedures to 
carry out certain transactions), ill-defined laws (e.g., confusing rules 
about property rights or infinite accompanying clauses), and improper law 
enforcement (e.g., the use of legal loopholes and the acceptance of bribes) 
have produced anti-developmental institutional frameworks and widespread 
cynicism about the rule of law and contractual agreements. The last 
salient feature of the NIE is the assumption that human interactions are by 
nature hierarchical, efficient, and involve unequal authority and gains.
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Several of the assumptions of NIE thinkers provide insights useful 
for my own research. For example, the NIE School's finding that individual 
opportunism can produce various forms of rent-seeking behaviour among 
development staff, recipient government officials and poor beneficiaries 
influenced my own supposition that many of the more ambitious and loftier 
ideals of the SHD/PCD agenda may not be easily operationalizable by 
international development agencies and that it may be a fallacious to 
assume that development processes are predominantly harmonious and that 
poor beneficiaries are naturally solidaristic and altruistic. Similarly, 
NIE's insight that efficient development requires clear rules of the game, 
rule enforcement, appropriate incentives, and close monitoring helped to 
shape my hypothesis that SHD/PCD goals like broad participation and 
empowerment may not be easily implementable in LDC societies characterized 
by improper law enforcement, unaccountable and corrupt political 
institutions, high transaction costs, and a marginalized peasantry with 
little access to assets, power, education or free time. NIE's premise that 
some authority and specialized expertise may be needed for efficient 
development is equally pertinent to my work since it alerts me to the 
possibility that it may be unrealistic to expect the poor to resolve 
development problems relying mostly on their own resources and knowledge.
Judging from the discussion above, by factoring in the adverse 
effects of human opportunism and some of the technical requirements of 
efficiency, NIE injects some much-needed realism into many of the more 
utopian assumptions of DD thinkers. NIE' merits notwithstanding though, 
one should not forget that the NIE School is itself wrought with 
deficiencies. Four of these are particularly pertinent to my SHD/PCD 
research. The first caveat of the NIE Literature is that although it 
examines how opportunism generates transaction costs and perverse institutional
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arrangements detrimental to development, in actuality, development setbacks 
and costs resulting from opportunistic behaviour are only a small portion 
of a much larger array of development impediments, including, vague and 
contradictory development concepts, political pressures and organizational 
interests, extreme inequality, exploitation, and authoritarianism in LDC 
societies, etc.). However, because the NIE concerns itself mainly with 
opportunistic tendencies, the adverse effects of development constraints 
such as the ones mentioned above, are underrated in some NIE analyzes. The 
second weakness of many NIE advocates lies in their assumption that growth 
and efficient service provision are the chief aims of development. Hence, 
even though the SHD/PCD paradigm reminds us that development is more than 
material growth or efficiency and the DD School stresses that inequity in 
access to resources and power is one of the root causes of poverty and 
deprivation, the direct eradication of gross inequalities, exploitation, 
and the oppression of the poor by elites does not figure highly in NIE's 
economistic development vision. My third concern about the NIE is that 
much of it claims that the search for technological and economic efficiency 
makes hierarchies inevitable; the implication being that flatter, more 
democratic or participatory forms of organization are simply not an option. 
The NIE fails to allude to the reality that the highly specialized 
technical advice which creates much of the hierarchy in organizations is 
far from infallible. NIE advocates are equally silent about the regressive 
effects hierarchical management structures can have on development 
processes and how hierarchy itself generates the preconditions for both 
employer and worker opportunism by giving employers, experts and elites 
strategic advantages of information and power over their employees, 
beneficiaries, and constituents and leaving the latter marginalized, 
feeling exploited and with little recourse but to resort to malfeasance.
My last critique of the NIE School has to do with its inherent conservatism 
and reinforcement of the status quo. By choosing an analytical framework 
preoccupied mostly with efficiency, growth and the need for hierarchy, NIE
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thinkers end up generally approving of rather than questioning the justice 
of those political economic structures and relations which prevail in 
society. As such, they generally do not assign enough of a central role to 
questions such as who formulates 'the rules of the game' in the first 
place, who such rules benefit, and how institutional arrangements can both 
reflect and reinforce injustice and existing political inequities in 
society. In LDCs where democracy and civil society are weak, excessive 
regulation persists, exit options are rare, public accountability is unheard
of and the poor lack the resources, confidence or skills to exert voice, the
NIE may prove as difficult to bring to fruition as the lofty ideals of DD.
On the basis of the evidence provided in this section, it is obvious 
that both the DD and NIE Schools of thought offer insights useful for 
testing the potential of SHD/PCD approaches. Clearly, both institutional 
approaches have very different foci, and some might say even opposed 
visions of development. For instance, while DD thinkers are chiefly 
interested in promoting democratization, equity and mutuality within 
developing communities and in creating development organizations which 
embody these same principles, NIE analysts prefer to concentrate their 
efforts on generating growth, increasing efficiency in service delivery, 
and in finding means of controlling forms of individual opportunism and 
rent-seeking behaviour which result in unnecessarily high transaction costs and
inefficient institutional arrangements. If anything though, the discussion 
in this Chapter illustrates that both the DD School and the NIE Schools 
have legitimate concerns and offer useful insights about the feasibility of 
implementing SHD/PCD approaches in poor LDCs. Despite their differences, I 
would argue that the premises of the two schools are complementary and 
that, by eclectically borrowing from each, one can arrive at a deeper 
understanding of the implementability of SHD/PCD which recognizes the 
importance of both equity and efficiency in development processes. In
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fact, in an article about the New Institutionalism, Hall and Taylor express
surprise at how distant various schools of institutional thought have 
remained given that each reveals genuine dimensions of human behaviour and 
suggest that the time has come for greater interchange among them.
In my thesis I propose to achieve this balance by proposing that DD's 
belief that democratic, participatory and less hierarchical societies and 
organizations are helpful for SHD/PCD is quite likely accurate but, at the 
same time proposing that, DD's assumptions that development processes are 
harmonious, that beneficiary communities are naturally solidaristic, and 
that the poor have the trust, time and knowledge needed to foster broad 
participation are questionable. On the other side of the coin, I would 
propose that NIE's claims that development processes are undermined by 
opportunism and that close monitoring, incentives, rule enforcement, and 
technical authority are needed for efficient development are accurate but, 
that overly rigid, hierarchical and top-down management structures and 
outside expertise, even if efficient, also undermine core SHD/PCD goals.
I would further argue that complementing insights from the DD and NIE 
Schools of thought may not go far enough. As pointed out in the above 
critiques of both DD and NIE thinkers, both Schools of thought have a 
built-in conservatism. In the case of the NIE it derives mainly from the 
School's inability to analyze the political economy of institutions and to 
recognize that even efficient institutional arrangements may reinforce 
power and resource inequalities in LDCs and that organizations have a 
momentum and interests of their own. In the case of DD, although its 
advocates are aware that economic and power disparities aggravate poverty 
and uneven development, by concentrating on the organizational and project 
levels, DD analysts fail to provide an in-depth assessment of the 
conceptual and operational soundness of SHD/PCD or to question the 
catalytic potential of international development agencies to challenge 
existing power relations and the status quo.
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II• Towards Complementarity; Designing an Eclectic Conceptual Framework 
with which to Analyze SHD/PCD Approaches
This chapter has covered considerable conceptual ground. Its main 
message has been that there are as many as four social science literatures 
which offer useful insights for my research hypotheses and for testing the 
implementability of SHD/PCD. The SHD/PCD Literature, and especially 
publications independent from UNDP, have provided excellent critiques of 
the more conceptual foundations of the SHD/PCD paradigm (the Baroque Science
Phenomenon) . In addition to an overview of the impact of foreign aid in
SHD/PCD-related areas, the International Development Cooperation Literature 
explores the links between international, societal and organizational 
factors affecting development processes, including the displacing effects 
of a divided international cooperation community, top-down and bureaucratic 
management structures, multiple stakeholder pressures, organizational 
interests, and conflictive beneficiary communities. The Implementation 
Process Literature is undoubtedly at its best when analyzing organizational 
dynamics and the various ways in which political pressures and 
organizational interests erode initially audacious policy/programme goals 
during implementation processes (the River Pollution Phenomenon) . Finally, the
Institutional Literature, although split into two streams, when used in an 
eclectic fashion offers revelations both about the limits of overly top- 
down, technocratic and inequitable development efforts as well as about the 
unlikelihood of perfectly participatory and self-reliant development and 
the limited capacities, commitment and solidarity of beneficiary 
communities. The wisdom of each of these literatures points to the need to 
draw insights from each one of them in order to gain a fuller understanding 
of the implementability of SHD/PCD. This eclectic use of various social 
science literatures to determine the theoretical and practical feasibility 
of SHD/PCD and the introduction and testing of the Baroque Science and River
Pollution Phenomena through original research on SHD/PCD at the global,
national and local levels constitute my thesis' conceptual contributions.
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Chapter 3: Sustainable Human Development 
and People Centred Development Revisited: A Promising and 
Sound Alternative Development Paradigm or Baroque Science?
The concept of Sustainable Human Development is not clear and has 
many interpretations. The concept is still a tangled English garden 
and it will take a long time for it to become an ordered French 
jardin. This will be a long process and we should not expect miracles
Jean Claude Milleron ^
The conceptual soundness of the SHD/PCD paradigm cannot be taken for 
granted. And yet, as shown in Chapter 2, conceptual critiques of the 
SHD/PCD have been conspicuously absent from UNDP's HDRs and related 
publications and neither the international community or those development 
agencies which have adopted SHD/PCD as the chief pillar of their 
development strategies have seriously scrutinized the conceptual soundness 
of SHD/PCD ideas or fully drawn out the implications for SHD/PCD's eventual 
implementation. In this Chapter, I aim to correct this omission by 
providing a conceptual critique of SHD/PCD. The chapter starts by exploring 
whether SHD/PCD constitutes a bona fide development paradigm; it then
identifies the key features and greatest strengths of the SHD/PCD paradigm, 
including those potentially radical features which have prompted 
development scholars and practitioners to hail SHD/PCD as an alternative 
development paradigm; and culminates with a theoretical analysis of 
SHD/PCD's conceptual coherence and clarity and of the implications for 
SHD/PCD's translation from paradigm to practice.
I. SHD/PCD as a Promising Alternative Development Paradigm;
The first issue which I explore in this Chapter is whether SHD/PCD 
approaches are a bona fide development paradigm. To some development
scholars and officials, SHD/PCD is not a 'paradigm' in the Kuhnian sense 
since SHD/PCD ideas are not fully evolved and still need to be clarified 
and tested against empirical reality; SHD/PCD ideas represent more of a
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shift towards the use of new indicators rather than a substantive change in 
substantial thinking; SHD/PCD treats the symptoms but not the causes of 
the problem and offers no explanation of the root causes of poverty; and, 
it lacks a coherent vision, set of analytical tools or theoretical 
foundations of its own, other than what it borrows from Amartya Sen's 
'Capabilities approach. Although there may well be some truth to the 
comments made above, they do not prove that SHD/PCD approaches do not 
qualify as a bona fide development paradigm in the Kuhnian sense or that it
does not constitute an alternative development framework which offers 
useful insights and both promising and radical solutions to difficult 
development problems.
Kuhn defines a 'paradigm' as a 'world view' in which a constellation 
of beliefs, values and techniques are shared by members of a common 
community. Such a 'world view' addresses a particular set of problems and 
offers 'puzzle solutions' for such problems. ^. On the basis of this 
definition, SHD/PCD certainly qualifies as a bona fide paradigm. First of
all, SHD/PCD's adherents do share a number of common assumptions, 
including: i) a desire to escape the strait jacket of economic determinism
in conventional development by paying greater attention to environmental, 
gender, governance and cultural dimensions of development; ii) a belief in 
the centrality of institutional diversity and in the cultural 
distinctiveness of particular sub-groups ; iii) a commitment to 
strengthening civil society and promoting peoples' empowerment and self- 
determination ; and, iv) a pledge to simultaneously work 'downstream' (i.e., 
at the grassroots) and 'upstream' (i.e., at the level of global governance 
and national policy). These shared goals and values are what make SHD/PCD 
approaches a shared 'world view' of development. To those who argue that 
SHD/PCD approaches, especially as advocated by UNDP, fail to address the 
root causes of poverty, Kuhn might have pointed out that most paradigms 
focus on a selected sub-set of problems and that no paradigm solves all the
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problems it defines. ^. To appease those disturbed by the divergent focus, 
interpretations and tactics used by different adherents of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm, it is worth noting that there is nothing in Kuhnian logic 
dictating that there has to be a standard interpretation or agreed upon 
rules within a paradigm. Kuhn himself noted that while adherents of a 
paradigm usually shared core values, it was natural (and perhaps 
inevitable) that they would choose to apply them in very different ways and 
to offer a variation of focuses and explanations of their 'shared world 
view'. Finally, Kuhn also claimed that a paradigm normally either emerged 
out of a crisis in a particular discipline or it precipitated a crisis by 
offering an alternative interpretation or set of solutions to the hegemonic 
framework.® As seen in Chapter 1, SHD/PCD approaches themselves emerged out 
of a triple crisis in international development and, by challenging many of 
the assumptions of the hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine, has managed to spawn 
considerable debate about the way forward in international development.
Taking the above discussion a step further, I would argue that, in 
addition to being a bona fide development paradigm, SHD/PCD approaches offer
numerous welcome insights into development processes as well as a series of 
potentially radical and promising reform and policy proposals. Many within 
the international community have questioned the merits of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm, claiming that SHD/PCD is merely the latest fashionable slogan in 
development circles and that their own agencies (including the World Bank) 
had been investing in human capital and carrying out people-centred 
development approaches long before SHD/PCD's stocks soared. ® However, a 
closer examination of the key features of the SHD/PCD shows that the 
paradigm has many strengths; that although far from being novel, SHD/PCD's 
core premises do differentiate it from more economistic development 
doctrines; and, that SHD/PCD's ambitious reform and policy agenda have the 
potential to take the development discipline and profession in surprisingly 
radical and promising directions.
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The first positive feature of the SHD/PCD paradigm lies in its broad 
scope and ability to move beyond economistic development models based 
chiefly on income, purchasing power or consumption. SHD/PCD achieves this 
mainly by arguing that improvements in the health and education of 
disadvantaged groups, environmental conditions, and peoples' own freedom 
and security are equally important components of human well-being. As 
Keith Griffin and John Knight point out, economists have traditionally 
concentrated their analyses on either on rates of growth or the production 
of goods and services, assuming that, if these improved, so would human 
welfare. Accordingly, the merit of SHD/PCD and Amartya Sen's 'Capabilities 
approach which provides much of the theoretical foundation of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm, lies in that instead of being income, commodity or utility-based, 
SHD/PCD argues that it is people's capability to be or do certain things 
that truly matters. As Griffin and Knight put it:
Human fulfilment is about whether people.... are malnourished or 
starve, whether women lead healthy and tolerable lives.... whether 
people can control their lives at work,... whether people have 
access to work at all, whether people control their political 
lives, whether they have the education to be full members of 
society with some control over their destiny. These are all 
aspects of the standard of living--but only loosely included 
or not included at all in the measure of GNP per capita. ’
The passage above not only reminds us that well-being has components 
that money cannot buy, but also that, as Amartya Sen himself writes, "human 
beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress." 
Lamentably, claims Sen, development planners have often confused the 
'means' and the 'ends' in development by focussing on wealth creation and 
treating people as the means through which progress is brought about rather 
than as the ultimate concern of all development processes. ® Although the 
argument that people rather than income or things should be the ends of 
development may seem obvious, there is convincing evidence showing that 
advocates of the neo-Liberal doctrine seriously neglected the human 
dimension of development during much of the 1980s Moreover, although 
Keynesian Development Economists' Harrod-Domar model and their concern with
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full employment took into account the importance of investing in human 
capital, as did the UN*s First Development Decade Plan which spoke of 'government
of the people, by the people and for the people', during the most of the 
post-War years, the emphasis was more on growth, GNP (at the time a new 
measure) and labour productivity than on Human Development a.s an end in
itself. Today, notes Sir Hans Singer, even though advocates of SHD/PCD 
regard growth and income distribution as important vehicles for 
development, the emphasis has shifted in that the purpose of development 
itself is defined as the well-being of people. In this sense, the current 
Human Development approach is less economistic than the Keynesian growth
system which did not explicitly mention human driving forces.
SHD/PCD's second distinguishing feature is that, by placing the focus 
on 'people's empowerment', the paradigm has managed to transcend the 
dichotomy between market-oriented and state-centred development models 
which polarized development thinking and practice during the post-War era:
The central fallacy in the old ideological debate was that 
the state and the market are necessarily separate and even 
antagonistic--and that one is benevolent, and the other not.
In practice, both state and markets are often dominated by 
the same power structures. This suggests a more pragmatic 
third option: Both state and market should be guided by the
people. The two should work in tandem, and people should be 
sufficiently empowered to exert effective control over both.
The centrality of the notions of peoples' empowerment, of 
strengthening civil society participation by giving people the space and 
freedom to pursue their own initiatives, and of ensuring that both market 
and state institutions are accountable to the demands of the people, are 
viewed by some actors in the international community view as being among 
the most promising and radical contributions of the SHD/PCD paradigm.
Thirdly, SHD/PCD ideas are appealing because they apply to all 
countries (North and South), to all persons (poor and rich), to individuals
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and communities and, to present and future generations. SHD/PCD's 
universality and sustainability is aptly expressed in UNDP's 1994 HDR:
Human Development is thus a broad and comprehensive concept. It 
covers all Human Development choices at all stages of development.
 It is as concerned with the generation of economic growth as
with its distribution, as concerned with basic needs as with the 
entire spectrum of human aspirations, as. concerned with the human 
dilemmas of the North as with the human deprivation of the South.
....Universalism of life claims is the common thread that binds 
the demands of Human Development today with the exigencies of 
development tomorrow, especially with the need for environmental 
preservation and regeneration for the future.
SHD/PCD's strong environmental dimension and applicability to all 
countries and generations has been cited by scholars such as Prof. Paul 
Streeten as one of the greatest strengths of SHD/PCD approaches and 
recognized by diplomats like Ms. Ann Grant from the UK Mission to the UN, 
who has praised SHD/PCD for emphasizing the importance of "safeguarding the 
environment for future generations".
Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, the SHD/PCD paradigm has 
contributed greatly to development discourse and action by setting forth a 
comprehensive package of ambitious policy proposals aimed at dramatically 
altering the rules of the game in development cooperation and challenging 
existing power relations at the global, national and organizational levels.
Much of the policy and reform agenda promoted by UNDP's HDRs and 
related SHD/PCD publications at the global level is fairly moderate and 
contains uncontroversial proposals such as increasing levels of ODA, making 
aid disbursements more efficient and targeted through a 20/20 Compact under 
which 20% of LDC budgets and 20% of donor's ODA would be allocated to human 
priority expenditures, and the signing of a Human Development Compact in which
all nations would pledge to meet the most basic human needs of their 
populations. However, within the same agenda, there are a number of 
proposals which are quite radical in that they seriously challenge the
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hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine and seek to dramatically alter power 
relations in the existing system of international development cooperation. 
Chief among the more fundamental changes put forward by the SHD/PCD agenda 
is making the global trade, finance, and aid regimes more equitable, 
democratic and just. This involves redressing existing inequities in world 
trade by compensating LDCs for damages resulting from global pollution or 
industrial country protectionism and restrictions on migration; the 
introduction of a tax (i.e., the so-called Tobin Tax) on speculative
currency transactions; the creation of an Anti-Monopoly Authority to penalize
transnational corporations engaging in oligopolistic activity or 
environmentally unsound practices; and transferring money to LDCs in 
exchange for their efforts to reduce global human security threats such as 
drug-trafficking, terrorism or the spread of AIDS/HIV. Parallel and 
perhaps even more radical proposals include a plea to donors to forgive 
large portions of the LDC debt; to give the poorest countries access to an 
International Investment Trust which would allow LDCs to borrow on terms
appropriate to their respective levels of development; forming a World Central
Bank which would expand financial opportunities for the poorest nations and
an Economic Security Council capable of reviewing threats to human global
security and which would grant voting rights to more populous LDCs, and 
levying a compulsory income tax on the richest nations to create a Global 
Safety Net to help the poorest nations make Human Development progress.
The SHD/PCD agenda includes an equally ambitious set of policy and 
reform proposals at the national level. Admittedly, SHD/PCD proposals such 
as stimulating growth by privatizing inefficient public enterprises, 
decentralizing service-delivery, reducing taxes; and creating profit 
incentives for medium-small enterprises conform rather than challenge the 
neo-Liberal hegemony. At the same time though, the SHD/PCD agenda's
call for increased public spending in basic health and education and
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improved safety nets for the poor, though fairly tame and reformist in 
tone, do divert from the neo-Liberal doctrine by placing greater emphasis 
on reducing inequality and building the poor's capabilities. And, the 
UNDP's denouncement of arms spending and the military industrial complex 
and HDR proposals that the poor be given more equitable access to credit, 
land, and productive assets are undeniably quite audacious and do 
fundamentally challenge the status quo by calling for a redistribution of 
existing wealth patterns and power relations in society. In the political 
sphere, the call for elected government, the rule of law, freedom of 
expression, and equality of opportunity are among the more moderate 
elements of SHD/PCD agenda for 'Sound governance'. Yet, notions such as 
strengthening civil society organizations (including NGOs, Peoples' 
Organizations, advocacy groups and unions), fostering grassroots 
participation, and empowering vulnerable groups relative to governments am 
business elites so as to make both more accountable to the disenfranchised 
are all radical ideas with potential to alter existing national power 
relations. The anti-establishment fervour of some of SHD/PCD's political 
proposals are evident in quotes such as this one;
Changing the power equation requires the organization of 
countervailing forces, or even a revolution. Peoples' 
organizations--be they farmers' cooperatives, residents' 
associations or consumer groups--offer some the most important 
sources of countervailing power. And they often exercise it 
through the sharing of information and ideas--it is ideas, not 
vested interests that rule the world for good or evil.
Finally, even at the organizational level too, the SHD/PCD agenda 
puts forward a series of provocative proposals for change. In fact, in 
With a Soul and a Vision, UNDP Administrator Speth, calls for nothing less than
the adoption of "a fundamentally new approach to international cooperation
for development" and a major organizational overhaul of UNDP :
The world is changing and UNDP must change with it. We can 
be a powerful force helping countries achieve positive 
transformations, but we must also transform ourselves. We 
can help countries build their capacities but only if we build 
ours. The world.... is truly counting on us. So rise to this 
occasion. You have the potential to be magnificent.
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Since Mr. Speth's arrival in 1993 UNDP has been constantly changing. 
At the inter-organizational level, and largely due to increased 
international rivalry over diminishing funds, UNDP has been trying to 
elevate its public profile and competitiveness by carving out a niche in 
international development; improving the quality of its substantive 
expertise; entering into inter-sectoral areas related to SHD/PCD which are 
not covered by other UN agencies ; and seeking greater media exposure .
On a more radical and ambitious scale, UNDP has been playing a greater 
coordination, synthesizing and unifying role within the UN family and 
helping to enhance the influence and power of the UN vis-a-vis the 
hegemonic neo-Liberal influence of the World Bank. At the intra- 
organizational level, UNDP has responded to pressures from some donor 
governments (especially the US government) in its Executive Board to become 
a leaner and more efficient organization. This has entailed carrying out 
neo-Liberal and managerial-style reforms such as cutting administrative 
staff, creating closer links between staff performance and promotions, and 
introducing more diligent project/programme monitoring. Simultaneously 
though, left-leaning donors (especially Nordic governments) have prompted 
UNDP to pursue policies much more conducive to the more radical and 
transformative elements of the SHD/PCD agenda. These include putting UNDP 
squarely behind operationalization of the SHD/PCD paradigm, focussing 
UNDP's assistance on the human needs of the poor, replacing UNDP's 
bureaucratic culture and excessive number of projects with much a much more 
flexible and political approach to development which includes initiating 
dialogue on 'Sound governance' both nationally and globally, strengthening 
the indigenous capacity of LDC governments, and building a sense of 
ownership among UNDP field staff and beneficiaries by decentralizing 
decision-making, building North-South partnerships based on reciprocal 
responsibilities, and encouraging bottom-up and grassroots initiatives 
involving previously neglected and vulnerable groups.
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As is apparent from the vast menu on offer above, the SHD/PCD agenda 
takes on board a wide range of issues at the global, national and 
organizational levels. While some of these policy proposals are neo- 
Liberal in nature and others are at best reformist, some provide radical 
alternatives to the hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine and challenge existing 
institutional arrangements and power relations. Yet, what makes the above- 
mentioned proposals 'radical' is not so much that they are leftist as 
opposed to right-wing. For example, neo-Liberal ideas such as liberalizing 
global migration and labour movements or tying promotions to performance 
are themselves radical and probably beneficial for development. Thus, the 
left certainly does not have a monopoly on radicalism or anti-hegemonic 
ideas. However, what gives the SHD/PCD its radical edge is its 
recognition that poverty springs from an inequitable international order 
and unjust national power relations which marginalize the poor; that 
foreign aid alone is not enough; and that challenging existing 
institutional arrangements and power relations at the global, national and 
organizational levels is a prerequisite to building institutional 
frameworks conducive to core Human Development q o a .ls like holistic and flexible
development, 'Sound governance', North-South partnerships, greater equity, 
participation, empowerment, and self-reliance among the poor. This concern 
with the asymmetry of power and resources, exploitation and injustice is 
indeed inspired by leftist and neo-Marxist thinking. Far from shying away 
from criticizing hegemonic power, SHD/PCD's policy agenda attacks the 
exclusiveness of Western markets, the monopolistic and exploitative 
tendencies of big corporations, the undemocratic, hierarchical and 
bureaucratic nature of international institutions, and the unequal 
distribution of resources, opportunities and power in LDCs. As part of its 
mandate for change, SHD/PCD calls for nothing less than building 
countervailing forces in civil society to challenge vested interests and 
the status quo. As Ms. Cathy Corcoran from the Catholic Agency for Overseas
Development (CAFOD) has pointed out, if you take the proposals of the SHD/PCD
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paradigm to their natural conclusion, the ideas are extremely radical and 
powerful in that they incite people to fight injustice and to demand 
change: "Imagine if it were to happen here, in the UK?, she asked; If 
people demanded not to be excluded, to be empowered?"
II. In the Midst of the Tangled English Garden; The Conceptual
Deficiencies and Contradictory Nature of the SHD/PCD Paradigm
The discussion above illustrates that, contrary to the dismissals of 
some actors in the international development community, once explored in 
greater depth, SHD/PCD approaches meet the requisites of a bona fide
development paradigm, offer a refreshing perspective on many development 
problems, and advocate a remarkably radical policy and reform agenda which 
has the potential to seriously challenge the hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine 
and existing institutional arrangements and power relations at the global, 
national and organizational level. If this is indeed the case--and the 
evidence above is very compelling--then the one pending theoretical 
question is whether the SHD/PCD paradigm is sufficiently sound and coherent 
to be implemented in the form of a comprehensive yet clear development 
strategy. In the following section, I argue that despite its merits and 
promise, SHD/PCD's overly abstract, unfinished, vague, hybrid and 
incoherent nature make its effective operationalization an uphill battle.
A) The Abstract, Vague and Unfinished Nature of the SHD/PCD Paradigm
As shown in Chapter 2, assertions that the SHD/PCD paradigm is overly 
abstract and that many of its ideas are incomplete are not uncommon in the 
SHD/PCD Literature. What I attempt to do in this Chapter is to take these 
general critiques a step further by providing a detailed analysis of what 
exactly makes the SHD/PCD paradigm overly abstract and vague, why the 
paradigm too hybrid or unfinished as a usable development theory, and how 
this effects the operationalization efforts of those development actors 
trying to put the paradigm into practice at different levels.
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A careful examination of original SHD/PCD texts and Sen's related 
works, as well as a reading of secondary texts and the analysis of 
interviews with many of the pioneers of the Human Development approach
reveals that the first source of abstractness in the SHD/PCD paradigm lies 
in the intricately complex and philosophical nature of Amartya Sen's 
'Capabilities approach', which provides the theoretical foundations of the 
SHD/PCD paradigm. This is something which is immediately evident in Sen's 
writings. In his writings on the 'Capabilities approach', for instance.
Sen asks a series of extremely complex and epistemological questions 
about human nature (including different notions of utility, human morality, 
motives, altruism, agency, freedom, choice, power and control) draws on 
a wide range of disciplines and philosophers (including, among others, the 
work of Aristotle, Kant, Rawls, Dewey, Smith and Marx are only a few) 
and introduces the reader to a succession of brilliant, yet very difficult 
to understand theoretical distinctions and concepts (of which capabilities,
overall functionings, primitive and refined functionings, being well-off,
well-being, well-being freedom, agency freedom, agency information, overall 
entitlements, exchange and endowment entitlements, effective power, 
procedural control, counterfactual choice are only a few. This is not 
to critique the substance or to undermine the contribution of Amartya Sen's 
ideas to development. Far, from it. There is no denying that Sen's ideas 
have given tremendous theoretical depth to development ideas and inspired a
whole generation in the process. The point being here though is that the
sheer complexity and philosophical character of Sen's ideas has made them 
remote from development practitioners and difficult for them to know how to 
operationalize such lofty ideas into better development practice. This is a 
dilemma which Prof. Sen himself alluded to when he noted during our 
interview that, that because the SHD/PCD paradigm was build around a set of 
principles rather than an action, its implementation was very difficult
indeed. To paraphrase his words; "One cannot implement a set of principles
or an approach. "One can at best re-think and put weight on it".
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A related conceptual weakness of SHD/PCD is that the 'Capabilities 
approach' on which it is based is vague and incomplete. This is evident in 
Sen's own writings as well as in comments made by others in writing and in 
interviews. The first problem is that because to Sen, hoth. functionings
(i.e., peoples ' various ' doings ' and ' beings ' ) and capabilities (i.e. the
capability to do this or that, or the various combinations of functionings 
which a person can achieve) are infinite {n-tuples) in number ; are co-
realizable; vary depending on individuals' preferences and values, the 
characteristics of the goods in question, as well as on the environment and 
culture persons belong to and; are often unobservable and not numerically 
representable, it is not possible to fully rank, order or value human 
capabilities or functionings. In fact, according to Sen's writings, although there
may be some agreed valuations, "the 'natural' form of well-being ranking is 
indeed that of a partial, incomplete order"; it would be "quite wrong to 
expect anything like the complete ordering that utilitarians have made us 
prone to demand"... except under the artificial assumption of complete and 
unproblematic interpersonal comparability" and; at any rate,
"incompleteness is not (Sen's emphasis) an embarrassment." Although Sen
is right to resist pressures to concretize and quantify the notions of 
capabilities and functionings, this creates difficulties for development
practitioners who can not pursue all human functhningslcapabilities at once, but
must choose which human functionings/capabilities to address first, which 
persons are in most need, and how to measure progress in functionings/ 
capabilities expansion. In each of these cases. Sen's 'Capabilities 
approach' falls short of providing useful answers. As Srinivasan and 
Sudgen note in their critiques of the 'fuzzy' and 'unfinished' nature of 
Sen's ideas:
Given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be 
relevant, given the extent of disagreement among reasonable 
people about the nature of the good life, and given the 
unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is natural to 
ask how far Sen's framework is operational.
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To confuse matters even further, both Sen and the other development 
scholars associated with UNDP's HDRs have given confusing messages as to 
whether the SHD/PCD paradigm and the 'Capabilities approach' lends itself 
to prioritizing or valuing human Junctioningslcapabilities. For example, although
Sen himself has proclaimed (as he does in the quotes above) that human
functionings/capabilities should be co-realizable and do not lend 
themselves to observation, ranking, valuation or interpersonal comparisons, 
in his Tanner Lecture, Sen has written about the possibility of there being a
small number of 'minimum' capabilities^^ and both through his own and the
HDRO's publications on the Human Development Index (HDI), has condoned the use
of a few measurable variables to ascertain and rank human well-being. 4^ 
Lord Meghnad Desai who is most directly credited with translating the 
SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' into the HDI, has himself conceded that 
the theoretical structure of the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' have 
remained incomplete because Sen has left so many key issues unresolved:
Sen has never made a list of capabilities, nor has he ever 
explained whether there are some basic capabilities which are 
more imperative than others, a distinction which is essential
if one is to have an implementable concept and measure,
According to Prof. Frances Stewart, also an advisor to UNDP's HDRO, 
the relativity, lack of observability, and incompleteness of capabilities
explains why, in practice, advocates of the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities 
approach' have had little choice but to measure SHD/PCD and capabilities using
basic Junctionings which are almost identical to 'basic needs'.
Also missing from the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' is a clear 
explanation of how the various components of the approaches are interlinked 
or how it is exactly human well-being is achieved by individuals or within 
households. In his writings. Sen himself notes that when one is speaking 
of capability sets of refined Jurwtioning achievements where complex human values,
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agency, and priorities as well as varying individual and societal 
circumstances and opportunities are involved, one ends up having to deal 
with a "simultaneity of relationships" and "mutually dependent concepts" 
which are very intricate and sophisticated. As Desai elaborates in his
own writings on the 'Capabilities approach', there is no one connection 
between capabilities and commodities since one commodity (e.g., food) may 
be relevant to many capabilities (e.g., the capability to enjoy a prolonged
life, the capability of being well-nourished, the capability of ensuring 
reproduction,.... etc.) and since many commodities (e.g., food, water, 
medicine, .... etc. ) may be required to generate one capability (e.g., the
capability to enjoy a prolonged life). Similarly, a small set or even one 
capability (e.g., the capability to enjoy a prolonged life) can span a large
set of possible functionings (e.g., being well-nourished, being free of 
illness, being well-informed, being socially-integrated,.... etc.). In 
short, a capability does not readily yield a "shopping list" of definite
functionings or commodities. The discussion above is instructive
because it shows that, although capabilities, junctionings, commodities and human
well-being in general are intricately inter-related, as Prof. Paul 
Streeten, one of the advocates of SHD/PCD approaches in UNDP's HDRO, has 
pointed out, it is still not fully understood how exactly how the different 
elements of the SHD/PCD paradigm or of Sen's 'Capabilities approach' are 
related, or they affect one another or, what kinds of trade offs exist 
between them. It also means that although human well-being is highly
dependent on individuals' values, perceptions and circumstances, there 
still is no micro structure or SHD/PCD theoretical construct which can be 
applied at the individual or household level and which would enable Human
Development analysts to move beyond having to use of social averages (on
which the HDI relies) insensitive to distribution or to individual and 
cultural specificities to come ascertain Human Development performance. This
is yet another respect in which the SHD/PCD approach has remained overly
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abstract and which needs to be properly concretized. "No one has ever sat 
down and worked this out", remarked Lord Desai during our interview.
The abstract, vague and unfinished nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm and 
of the 'Capabilities approach' from which it draws much of its theoretical 
substance has direct implications for its operationalization. According to 
John Knight, co-author of a book on Human Development with Keith Griffin,
because Sen's 'Capabilities approach' "is framed at an extremely high level 
of philosophizing", its ideas are not only difficult to grasp, but it makes 
it very difficult for development practitioners to bridge the gulf between 
the philosophy of human capabilities and their need for concrete policy
proposals and programme priorities. In Mr. Knight's view then, the SHD/PCD
paradigm's operationalization is something which still needs to be properly
thought out and factored into SHD/PCD's theoretical framework:
There seems to be a gap between Sen's conceptualization
of Human Development and its operationalization Thus
far, we have Sen's highly theoretical approach and the 
nitty gritty practical material which lacks theoretical 
depth. The two have not been put together yet and there 
is a tremendous debate as to whether this is possible.
On the ground, senior managers like Dr. Francois Farah, Director of
the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) in Uganda, also expressed scepticism about
basing a development strategy on ideas as vague and abstract as SHD/PCD:
SHD/PCD is a vision and a set of goals rather than a development 
strategy per se . UNDP is wrong to treat SHD/PCD as a coherent 
development strategy which it can implement on its own when, 
in actuality, SHD/PCD approaches are like the human body which 
has many parts, each with their own purpose and functioning 
mechanism but which can not work unless there is a clear 
understanding of the links and harmony between the parts.
In sum, the evidence above shows that SHD/PCD and the 'Capabilities 
approach' on which it is based is a very abstract, vague and incomplete 
paradigm which needs to be concretized in many important respects, 
including: closing the gap between philosophical principles and concrete
policies/programmes by identifying those sectors, social groups and 
development interventions most likely to transform existing institutional
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arrangements and power relations so that they are more conducive to 
capability-building and capability-use; establishing the exact nature of the
connection and trade offs between different SHD/PCD components so as allow 
policy-makers and implementors to know how certain interventions help or 
hinder one another and what opportunity costs are at stake in making 
specific policy and programme choices; creating a framework for determining 
how human capabilities are built up at the micro level so as to allow
development policy-makers and development practitioners to promote SHD/PCD 
at the individual and household level as well as at the macro-economic and 
international levels; and, ranking, ordering and valuing human capabilities 
so as to enable development practitioners to monitor the impact of their 
programmes--all of these are aspects of SHD/PCD ideas which would need to 
be refined before the paradigm is translatable into comprehensive yet 
concrete and clear development strategies and programmes .
B) The Ideological Ambiguity and Hybrid Nature of the SHD/PCD Paradigm
Another conceptual deficiency and potential setback to the 
implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm lies with the hybrid theoretical 
roots and ideological ambiguity of the paradigm. In Chapter 2, we saw that 
in both the SHD/PCD Literature and the International Development 
Cooperation Literature there were concerns that newly emerging development 
discourses such as SHD/PCD lacked specificity, were theoretically and 
ideologically ambiguous, and tried to be 'all things to all persons'.
During my own research, I further learned that the ideological ambiguity 
and theoretical hybridity of the SHD/PCD paradigm was a very real problem 
for both its advocates and implementors. For instance. Prof. Frances 
Stewart, one of the scholars who helped to pioneer and promote the SHD/PCD 
approach, herself remarked that the meaning of Human Development was so
ambiguous that it was almost like motherhood in that there was nothing in 
it that countries could be opposed to while in the NGO sector. Dr. Ian
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Linden, Director of the Catholic Institute for International Relations 
(CIIR) in the UK, disapproved of SHD/PCD's politically ambiguous language 
in which the class base and ideological origins of development ideas were 
left intentionally vague in order to attract broad-based support from a 
wide range of stakeholders. **
Whether international development agencies like UNDP and AA have 
utilized and reinforced the ambiguity of SHD/PCD approaches for 
organizational purposes such as appeasing diverse stakeholders is an issue 
which will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. What I explore in this
Chapter is something which is missing from the existing literature and that 
is an actual analysis of what exactly makes the SHD/PCD paradigm 
theoretically and ideologically ambiguous and how this ambiguity is likely 
to affect both the views and development effectiveness of those actors 
working to translate SHD/PCD ideas from paradigm into practice. The 
section which follows illustrates that instead of being wholly intentional, 
the ambiguity of the SHD/PCD paradigm is largely the product of the very 
hybrid theoretical roots and ideological influences of the SHD/PCD paradigm 
itself. To appreciate this point, it is necessary to trace the diverse 
theoretical origins and ideological tendencies of SHD/PCD approaches.
SHD/PCD's Reformist and Social Democratic Inclination:
'Basic Needs', Sen's 'Capabilities Approach'--The Influence o f  Keynesian Development Economists
The centrality of human well-being and of investing in people dates 
back to the origins of modern development thinking. Even during the early 
post-war years, the Beveridge Report and Keynesian Economists recognized the
importance of full employment in giving people access to a decent income, 
of investing in human resources, and of building an effective welfare state 
to provide social safety nets for the poor. Furthermore, in the 
landmark 1974 book. Redistribution with Growth, post-war Economists already 
showed an awareness that growth without some form of income or asset
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redistribution was not enough to ensure the well-being of the poor.'*® Most 
commonly though, the theoretical roots of SHD/PCD approach are traced to 
the 'Basic Needs approach' propagated by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the World Bank in the 1970s and to Amartya Sen's 
'Capabilities approach'. *® Indeed, many of the Economists involved in the 
'Basic Needs approach' (Paul Streeten, Frances Stewart, Gustave Ranis, Hans 
Singer, Mahbub ul Haq and Keith Griffin) had by the 1990s become the 
intellectual impetus behind the SHD/PCD approach and UNDP's HDRs.
The strong links between SHD/PCD and the 'Basic Needs approach' is 
something which is evident in both the SHD/PCD Literature and the 
interviews which I conducted with proponents of both approaches. The 
'Basic Needs approach' had three main parts: First, it emphasized the 
importance of increasing incomes through efficient, labour-intensive 
production. Second, it assigned a key role in reducing poverty to public 
services. Thirdly, it encouraged public involvement in public service 
delivery. The overarching objective of the 'Basic Needs approach' then 
was that all persons should have the right to lead "minimally decent life 
defined in terms of levels of health, nutrition, literacy and basic need 
goods and services (e.g., food, health services, water, etc.). Mass 
public service provision was seen as the main way of achieving this, 
although increased levels of income, be it through efficient labour- 
intensive production or greater employment, was also regarded as an 
important means of people acquiring the basic goods and services necessary 
for a decent life. The 'Basic Needs approach's dethronement of GNP per
capita as the measure of well-being and its introduction of the idea that 
some goods are more basic than others for a 'minimally decent life' 
represented important steps forward in development theory and doctrine.
Over time, the 'Basic Needs approach' has come under considerable attack 
for having been (or having been interpreted as being) too concerned with 
commodity consumption (what some critics call 'commodity fetishism')
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for having been too focussed on state-led or reformist solutions; for 
failing to address the need for a redistribution of assets, a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) and the economic empowerment of the poor; as well as
for having been overly paternalistic in its treatment of the poor as 
'recipients' of public assistance rather than proactive change agents.
The problem, as explained in UNDP's 1996 HDR, was that, in practice, the 
'Basic Needs approach' was often (though wrongly) reduced by policy-makers 
and planners to "top-down state action" and a "count, cost and deliver" 
approach to servicing the poor. As early proponents of the 'Basic Needs
approach' like Paul Streeten and Frances Stewart have pointed out though, 
the 'Basic Needs approach' had always emphasized that the true end of all 
development was to give people the opportunities they needed to live full 
lives. This, along with the premise that GNP alone is not a
satisfactory measure of human well-being and that, in order to alleviate 
poverty, it is essential to give people access to the range of basic goods 
and services necessary for a decent life, is an idea which SHD/PCD and 
'Basic Needs' approaches undoubtedly share. This commonality is explicitly 
recognized by UNDP's HDR's which credit the 'Basic Needs approach' with 
"returning to the central purpose of development--promoting human well­
being, especially of the poor" And, pioneers of the 'Basic Needs
approach' like Stewart and Streeten themselves acknowledge that, although 
SHD/PCD draws much of its inspiration for promotion human well-being beyond 
income from the 'Basic Needs approach', SHD/PCD goes a step further in that 
it applies to all countries and to 'higher-level capabilities' as well as 
basic ones and has stronger environmental, governance and gender 
components. These latter features of SHD/PCD, of course, are influenced 
by Sen's 'Capabilities approach'.
In his writings. Sen argues that the 'Capabilities approach' is 
related to, but fundamentally differs from, characterizing development as 
either (i) the expansion of goods and services, (ii) an increase in
Ill
utilities, or (iii) meeting basic needs". According to Sen, human well­
being is best achieved by increasing people's choices so as to give them 
access to a wider spectrum of capabilities and functionings. At any time then,
given an individual's entitlements and constraints, he or she faces a 
capability set which represents that person's freedom to achieve various
combinations of functionings. Income is but only one of the conditions
necessary to achieve these capabilities and some capabilities (e.g., the 
capability to freely express one's views) do not require income at all.
The central idea in Sen's work then is that the ultimate purpose of 
development is to enhance peoples' quality of life and that social change 
must be assessed in terms of the richness of human life resulting from it.
Sen's 'Capabilities approach' makes a dramatic break from neo­
classical Economics not only because it rejects income as the chief measure 
of progress but because it rejects neo-Classical assumptions that all 
persons are the same and engage in utilitarian-maximizing behaviour. Sen 
instead believes that people have varying expectations and capabilities and 
that the traits of the environment and the availability of resources--none 
of which is given--also affect peoples choices and opportunities. Sen's 
work breaks from Welfare Economics as well since Welfare Economics makes no 
reference to the mental estate or value systems of individuals.
Finally, as noted by pioneers of the 'Basic Needs approach'. Sen's work is 
related to but, at the same time, builds on the 'Basic Needs approach' 
since it includes 'higher-level' capabilities and functionings beyond basic 
needs and since what truly matters in the 'Capabilities approach' is having 
the capability of being well-fed, whereas the ultimate objective of the
'Basic Needs approach' is minimal decent life characteristics (i.e., being 
well-fed). The latter distinction is critical because it gives individual 
choice--be it the ability to choose among various capabilities or to choose 
not to tackle deprivation at all--a primary position. The above
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differences notwithstanding, it is obvious that the 'Capabilities approach' 
has parallels with the 'Basic Needs approach and that SHD/PCD's key premise 
that development is about enhancing people's well-being and ability to 
choose to lead significant lives borrows heavily from both.
Ideologically, both the 'Basic Needs approach' and the 'Capabilities 
approach' are probably best classified as reformist Keynesian and social 
democratic ideas. Their platform is 'reformist' and 'moderate' in that 
instead of calling for a complete overhaul of existing institutional 
arrangements and power relations, its proponents accept the assumption that 
capitalism is currently the only means to achieving development, albeit 
with some regulation of the worst tendencies of the market to exacerbate 
inequality and exploitation and an expanded role for government in 
planning, redistributive fiscal policies, and social services and welfare 
for the poor. Development scholars like Lord Desai accept the 'moderate' 
and 'left-of-centre' ideological label and during our interview classified 
the SHD/PCD platform as "a revisionist programme" which, on the one hand, 
is pro-public expenditure and borrows from the UNCTAD and UNIDO progressive 
agenda of the 1970s but, which is perhaps "more market-friendly" and "even- 
handed." "One thing which SHD/PCD definitely is not", he asserted, "is the 
far-Left neo-Marxist and Dependency view 'a la Baran and Gunder Frank' 
which blamed Third World underdevelopment on the North."
The Keynesian influences and preference for a governmental role in 
development are evident in many of the writings of the best-known advocates 
of SHD/PCD. For example, in an article Development: Which Way Now?
Sen explicitly states that Keynesian Development Economists' assumptions 
that development planning and strong state activism led to growth have 
still to be proven incorrect. And, in Hunger and Public Action Sen and 
Dreze are adamant that social security cannot be left to market forces and 
that when thinking of 'incentives', we should not only think of those that
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offer profits in the market place, but also of those that motivate diverse 
forms of public action, including well-planned public policies for 
"support-led security" and direct state intervention in the form of full 
employment and income supplementation programmes, food subsidies and the 
regulation of private trader activities, and land redistribution. “ Other 
publications deriving from UNDP's HDRO have been equally supportive of 
Keynesian and reformist principles of public planning and state activism. 
For instance, Keith Griffin et al caution that, "if left to its own devices 
the global economy would operate in such a way that capital systematically 
would be transferred from poor to rich countries"; And that, "one 
institution: the state, must play a leading role in guiding the development 
process and intervening where necessary to ensure that the full benefits of 
Human Development are reaped." Although these authors do not necessarily
call for a larger state, they do advocate a state actively involved in the 
public provision of primary health, basic education and training programmes 
geared towards the poor as well as public compensation and regulation of 
the worst excesses of the market. At the national level, such measures 
might include a state-supported "social and economic security strategy" 
consisting of guaranteed access to minimum food (achieved through food 
stamps, food rationing, and food staples sold at subsidized prices); 
guaranteed employment and a subsistence wage; allowing government subsidies 
to state enterprises deemed to have social benefits (e.g., research, 
training) or redistributive effects not fully captured by their revenue; 
and a major redistribution of wealth through progressive land and income 
tax, sweeping agrarian and water reform, the creation of multi-purpose 
cooperatives and worker-managed enterprises, and even a once-for-all 
redistribution of assets. At the global level, regulation and compensation 
measures might include cancelling the foreign debt of the poorest LDCs, 
closer supervision of international commercial banks, compensating poor 
countries for the emigration of skilled labour, and compulsory taxation of 
rich countries to guarantee foreign aid for LDCs.
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The Radical and Activist Inclinations: Liberation Theology and Freire*s Notion o f Conscientization—The
Influence o f NGOs and Grassroots Actors.
Aside from Keynesian and reformist influences, there is a current of 
thought which has strongly influenced SHD/PCD thinking which does draw its 
ideological inspiration from neo-Marxist ideals: i.e., From Liberation Theology
and the Conscientization approach inspired by the Christian gospel and
Portuguese educator Paulo Freire, respectively.
These ideas have strongly influenced the DD thinkers described in 
Chapter 2 and have had a particularly strong following among NGOs, although 
several of its major premises have equally influenced UNDP's interpretation 
of the SHD/PCD paradigm. The first influential premise emanating from this 
stream of thought is in fact one of the cornerstones of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm: i.e., the idea that development cannot be measured simply in
terms of income or material wealth and that development involves the 
broader enhancement of human well-being. Although rarely recognized by 
economists, this premise has links to Vatican II and is a pivotal component 
of Pope Paul V i’s Populorum Progressio {The Progress o f  Peoples) , one of the innovative
papal documents produced in the 1960s which rejects "the reduction of 
development to mere economic growth" and advocates a notion of 'integral 
development' which involves the "realization of the fullness of human 
potential." The same idea also has strong roots in the work of Paulo 
Freire who, decades ago, was already proclaiming that "in order to 
determine whether a society is developing one must go beyond criteria based 
on indices of per capita income." Another SHD/PCD idea traceable to 
this stream of thought as well as to the grassroots work of NGOs in the 
Third World is the notion of viewing empowerment as means of 
'consciousness-raising' (i.e., conscientizacao in Portuguese) and of liberating
the poor from social injustice and the oppression of ruling elites. This 
conception of participation/empowerment as 'liberation' is heavily
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influenced by Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed and is 
ideologically very radical and neo-Marxist in its origins in as far as it 
denounces the privilege of established elites and makes a clarion call for 
collective struggle against oppression as opposed to being content with 
alleviatory social safety nets or individual self-enhancement. The last 
SHD/PCD premise borrowed from this radical stream of thought is the 
recognition that participatory community development projects are not 
enough and that, over the long-run, profound transformation is needed.
This belief in 'bold transformations' is often accompanied by calls, such 
as Pope Paul Vi's, for some 'regulatory world body', not unlike the NIEO, 
to resist monopolistic power by national elites and neo-colonialism,
This more leftist and neo-Marxist interpretation of SHD/PCD ideas is 
especially evident in the mandates of both secular and Christian NGOs as 
well as in the writings and views of NGO practitioners themselves. For 
example, OXFAM's latest Handbook of Development and Relief explicitly cites 
Liberation Theology and Conscientization as major influences and provides a
definition of 'empowerment' based not only on individual 'strength' and 
'confidence', but also on the need for 'collective action' to "challenge 
and overcome oppression and injustice" and to seek "a more equitable 
sharing of power and a higher-level of political awareness" for 
disadvantaged people. In recent years, NGO experts like David Korten
have written considerably about the catalytic role NGOs and People's 
Organizations have played in the evolution of the People-Centred Development
vision and cites the Symposium on Development Alternatives: The Challenge for N G O s , where
development professionals from 42 countries met in London in March 1987 to 
discuss the major development challenges facing the voluntary sector as 
early influences and articulations of such ideas. In the meantime, 
international officials like Dharam Ghai, former director of the United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) have carefully catalogued the
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way in which the radical conscientization and empowerment ideas mentioned 
above and the practical experiences of NGOs and grassroots organization 
such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA)
in India, and peasant groups and rural workers' organizations in the
Philippines, have contributed to the evolution of SHD/PCD ideas and 
practice. In each case, notes Ghai, there has been a process of capability 
expansion, conscientization and the empowerment of the poor.
As CIIR's Ian Linden, summarized it during our interview: "Originally 
it was Freire's notion that political conflict and struggle were inherent 
in all development processes which most shaped the beliefs and practices of 
NGOs." "For this reason, he noted, "the contribution of NGOs to the 
notion of SHD/PCD is very important, even if today there is a shift within 
NGOs to move away from the idea that NGOs should be confrontational. "
In addition to being evident in the NGO sector, the radical 
approaches to empowerment and conscientization described above are also 
evident in publications associated with UNDP's own HDRO as well as in 
statements made by UNDP officials themselves. Hence, although when asked 
about the theoretical roots and ideological influences of SHD/PCD ideas, 
those development scholars associated with UNDP's HDRO emphasized the 
influence of the 'Basic Needs approach' and the 'Capabilities approach' 
and generally distanced SHD/PCD ideas from those of the more neo-Marxist 
NIEO, there is little denying that some of the more radical global reform 
and policy proposals put forward by UNDP's own HDRs (e.g. compensating LDCs 
for global pollution or industrial country protectionism, creating an Anti-
Monopoly Authority, or, introducing a compulsory income tax for rich countries
in order to give more Human Development to poor ones--see Page 90 for
details) have obviously been influenced by the NIEO; while national 
proposals like a major redistribution of assets and organizing civil
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society and the poor to form countervailing power to vested interests (see 
Page 91 for details) are clearly influenced by Freirean interpretations of 
conscientization and peoples' empowerment. Radical interpretations of 
people-power are found in Sen's own writings. In Hunger and Public Action. 
Dreze and Sen write that, given the extreme deprivation, inequality and 
lack of leaders' "commitment to radical social change" in many poor 
countries, "radical transformation" may require a great deal more than the 
activities of the state or formal political rights--i.e., it may require 
strong popular activism, including a role for "adversarial politics" (as 
opposed to "collaborative" politics) by social movements and grassroots 
organizations. In their SHD/PCD writings, Griffin and McKinley echo a
similar message when they write that, in order to "alter the distribution 
of income, wealth and political power" and to "empower" people,...."it is 
not enough to design programmes which increase well-being".... or to ensure 
that the poor "actively participate in the formulation and implementation 
of development programmes". In addition, they argue, one must "strengthen 
civil society" and ensure that the poor and deprived organize around 
grassroots and local institutions; that they form wide supporting 
coalitions to overcome the resistance of those opposing change--most likely 
to be the middle and upper classes that prospered under the status quo, 
according to the authors; and that they develop "the capability to act in 
furthering their own interests". During my interviews, UNDP officials 
known for their radical interpretation of SHD/PCD concurred that 
strengthening civil society and empowering the poor to form countervailing 
forces against the state and elites was a key part of the SHD/PCD agenda.’®
The Market and Capitalist Inclination: The Influence o f the Neo-Liberal Doctrine
Lastly, SHD/PCD approaches, especially as interpreted by some of 
UNDP's annual HDRs, incorporate a number of the same neo-Liberal principles 
and policy prescriptions advocated by the World Bank.
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To be more precise, the SHD/PCD paradigm seems to borrow at least 
three premises from neo-Liberal doctrine. The first premise is the 
assumption that market liberalization is the most effective means of 
bringing about efficient growth, and that this will eventually bring about 
development. The idea comes from neo-Liberal economists like Deepak Lai, 
Peter Bauer and Bela Balassa, all of whom argue that it was the excessive 
regulation and protectionism popularized by nationalistic governments 
during the era of Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI) which dwarfed 
productivity, trade, and therefore development in LDCs. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, neo-Liberal economists worry that unwarranted 'dirigisme' by 
'omniscient central authority' runs counter to 'the economic principle' and 
inhibits competition, investment, efficiency and individual motivation for 
hard work by creating unnecessarily high transactions costs which make it 
impossible for LDCs to achieve their economic optimum and thus relegates 
them to perpetual mediocrity and 'second best welfare economies'.
Policy-wise, neo-Liberals' commitment to market liberalization translates 
into market deregulation, privatization, and the shrinkage of the state as 
well as its withdrawal from central planning, investment or redistributive 
activities. The second neo-Liberal idea evident in the SHD/PCD agenda 
is a preoccupation with establishing clear 'rules of the game' and proper 
rule enforcement so as to fight the rent-seeking behaviour which neo- 
Liberals view as the worse hindrance to development in LDCs. As Prof. Ann 
Krueger explains in her article. The Political Economy o f the Rent-Seeking Society, when
government restrictions proliferate in an economy, they in turn give rise 
to a variety of rents, both legal and illegal, which can take the form of 
bribery, corruption, smuggling and black markets. Such rent-seeking 
behaviour, notes Krueger, not only lead to economic inefficiency by 
escalating the prices of transactions and discouraging the adoption of 
innovative technologies but they also sap peoples' initiative and trust in
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the market and prompt them to themselves engage in rent-seeking in order to 
carry out their business, and ultimately breed unjust governments which 
favour those who can afford to pay rents and thus end up reinforcing 
inequalities in society. The third idea which the SHD/PCD paradigm has 
borrowed from neo-Liberal thinking is the notion that international 
cooperation must shift from being 'entitlement-based', towards becoming 
'performance and incentive-based'. The idea here is that the unilateral 
concessions demanded by the South from the richer North during the heyday 
of the NIEO in the 1970s should be replaced by a mutually beneficial North- 
South relationship based on reciprocal gains as well as the conditioning of 
foreign aid to LDCs' effective pursuit of policies and institutional 
reforms deemed desirable by Northern donors. The message that 'the era 
of entitlements was over' and that LDCs could no longer expect major 
economic concessions or 'blank cheques' without donors wanting to 'have a 
say on how such money was spent' was a view which was reiterated during 
interviews with Northern government representatives at the UN.
SHD/PCD texts, and especially those writings associated with UNDP, 
are full of evidence of support for the three neo-Liberal premises 
discussed above. In his later writings, for example. Sen himself has given 
considerably greater attention to "the rewards from greater integration 
into the world market" and to the importance of market incentives (as 
opposed to the incentives to public action which he emphasized in Hunger 
and Public Action) by highlighting that the "counterproductive nature of 
some government regulations and controls have been clear for a long time" 
and that these have "interfered with the efficiency of economic operations 
of modern industries" as well as failed "to promote any kind of real equity 
in distributional matters." A change in emphasis is equally evident in 
the later work of Keith Griffin which applauds "the benefits that come from 
competition, liberalization and increased efficiency, the greater use of 
market forces in the former centrally planned economies"... and highlights
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"the importance of moving beyond an emphasis on national sovereignty and 
state security". With respect to the neo-Liberal call for moving away
from 'entitlement-based' development cooperation', this view can be found 
in Dr. Mahbub ul Haq's own book. Reflections on Human Development, where he 
writes that, the sterile (NIEO) dialogue of the 1970s must give way to 
North-South relations built on "more open markets, not more managed 
markets" and to a more enlightened development cooperation dialogue based 
on "mutual interests" and "two-sided responsibility" rather than on "one­
sided accusations", and "unilateral concessions" and massive transfers of 
financial resources. And, as noted earlier in this Chapter, UNDP's 
HDRs themselves contain proposals which support a transition towards a more 
liberalized market economy through the privatization of inefficient or 
loss-making state enterprises, reduced and simplified taxation, and opening 
up to international trade and direct foreign investment. UNDP's HDRs also 
favour a shift towards a more efficient and competitive economy through the 
elimination of government tariffs, quotas or price controls, the 
introduction of "a legal system that protects property rights, both from 
illegal forced seizure in civil society and from capricious nationalization 
by the state" and the promotion of competitive business practices based on 
clear rules, open transactions, and legally enforceable contracts rather 
than on personal contacts, bribes or corruption which "sap initiative, 
reduce output and undermine productive investment." (Refer back to 
discussion in page 90 as well).
Finally, my own interviews confirmed that the SHD/PCD paradigm was 
viewed both by international development scholars and officials as sharing 
key premises with the neo-Liberal doctrine of the World Bank. While 
outside critics like David Korten explicitly refer to the SHD/PCD agenda as 
the "Washington Consensus with a Human Face" and those like Manfred 
Bienefeld condemn it for not sufficiently stressing the potentially adverse 
effects of globalization on those who lack the bargaining power to
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negotiate fairer terms when entering the market, even insiders like Meghnad 
Desai agree that although the SHD/PCD paradigm recognizes the shortfalls of 
asymmetrical access to markets, the paradigm ultimately accepts that free 
market capitalism has become the only game in town. **
From the above analysis, it becomes evident that, the SHD/PCD 
paradigm is extremely hybrid and draws inspiration from very diverse--and 
sometimes opposed--theoretical and ideological tendencies. (TaÜDle 3.1 at 
the end of this Chapter summarizes the radical, reformist and conformist 
elements of the SHD/PCD agenda drawn from the different theoretical and 
ideological influences as outlined in various SHD/PCD publications and as 
discussed above.) Delineating the hybrid theoretical origins and 
ideological tendencies of SHD/PCD ideas as I have done above illustrates 
that whereas some of the fuzziness of SHD/PCD approaches may partly be the 
result of the intentional veiling or manipulation of the paradigm's meaning 
by international development agencies themselves (an issue which will be 
explored in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6), much of the ambiguity of 
SHD/PCD's meaning undoubtedly also emanates from the SHD/PCD paradigm's 
eclectic origins and its marrying of a very mixed bag of often opposed 
theoretical and ideological influences.
Of course, the finding that the SHD/PCD paradigm borrows heavily 
from reformist, radical and neo-Liberal doctrines should not come as too 
much of a surprise given that one of the innovative features of the 
paradigm is precisely to attempt to transcend the dichotomy between state 
and market institutions by emphasizing the empowerment of poor persons and 
communities. Nor, for that matter, is the attempt at conceptual 
reconciliation undesirable given the mounting evidence in the International 
Development Literature that market and redistributive approaches are both 
valid and that state, market and community institutions each play an 
important role in development processes. What is problematic.
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nevertheless, is that the proponents of the SHD/PCD approach often make 
what seem like opposite or shifting statements about the role of different 
institutional arrangements. For instance, while Sen clearly places the 
emphasis on 'incentives for public action' and writes of the importance of 
the state's involvement in economic activities and regulatory measures such 
as subsidizing food prices, rationing, and even controlling trader 
activities in his publications from the late 1980s, by the mid 1990s he is 
writing instead about the importance of 'economic incentives' and warning 
against the counterproductive nature of governmental regulation and 
controls. Keith Griffin's writings can be equally perplexing. Hence,
while in some instances Griffin worries about rising inequality in the 
distribution of global and intra-country income and the inequitable 
tendencies which the global economy has when left to its own devices at 
other times, he praises the accelerated growth which has resulted from 
globalization and states that, contrary to widely held beliefs, 
polarization among peoples has diminished and global growth has in fact 
helped to reduce inequalities in the distribution of world income. ”
By similar virtue. Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, once deemed an ardent 
protectionist and supporter of the NIEO in his latest book. Reflections 
on Human Development, writes about the imperativeness of "economic 
liberalism so that people are free from excessive economic controls and 
regulation" In addition, the writings of different SHD/PCD authors 
sometimes contradict one another as well. For example, while in Development:
Which Way Now? Sen supports the systematic involvement of the state in the
economic sphere and supports the pursuit of planned economic development in 
countries like China, Sri Lanka and Romania, in the Canadian Journal of 
Development Studies. Griffin praises the greater use of market forces and 
the continuation of the global trend towards lesser use of administrative 
procedures to allocate resources in the former planned economies. The 
potentially negative implementational implications of the SHD/PCD
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paradigm's theoretical and ideological hybridity and of the confusion 
caused by the ambiguous positions of different advocates is a problem which 
respondents in the international community were acutely aware of and 
which later also became evident in the field in Uganda. Mr. Per Arne
Stroberg, a senior Human Development advisor at UNDP, was one respondent who
sounded alarm bells about SHD/PCD's ideological ambiguity and possible
adverse effects for its implementation:
SHD/PCD takes Socialist values and merges them with market
ideas and gets away with it  But as the tensions inherent
in UNDP's HDRs' policy recommendations become clearer, there 
is bound to be growing discord over these proposals.
What we seem to have here then, are a group of development theorists 
whose ideas have changed over time and who, through SHD/PCD approaches, are
striving to find 'a third way' which is a composite of old and new ideas
and which reconciles the left-right conflict in development thought. It is 
important to point out, of course, that it is natural (and indeed 
desirable) for theorists to modify their ideas over time. What creates 
difficulties in the case of the SHD/PCD paradigm though, is that the above- 
mentioned thinkers have still to provide a unified position or a clear 
roadmap on exactly how to reconcile possible tensions between the sometimes 
opposed ideas which comprise SHD/PCD.
C) Incoherencies and Tensions Inherent in the SHD/PCD Paradigm:
A final conceptual deficiency discussed in this Chapter are the 
incoherencies and tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm itself.
Although development scholars and practitioners have long suspected that 
newly emerging development approaches like SHD/PCD might be riddled with 
internal tensions and incoherencies (Refer back to Chapter 2), such 
criticisms have never been taken beyond the level of generalities and a 
detailed analysis of exactly how the SHD/PCD paradigm is internally 
contradictory and what implications this has for its implementation still
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remains to be done. This is precisely what I attempt to do in the 
following section in order to illustrate that, in addition to being overly 
abstract, vague, unfinished, and both theoretically and ideologically 
ambiguous, the SHD/PCD paradigm suffers from a series of tensions between 
its core components, as well as between its aspirations and the real-life 
constraints it faces in the system of international development cooperation 
and those developing societies in which it must be realized. Whereas the 
first set of these tensions are largely attributable to the vague, 
unfinished and ambiguous nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm itself, the latter 
set of tensions are largely a consequence of the series of contestable 
assumptions which international development agencies make about their own 
ability to meet multiple (and often conflicting) goals as well as their 
inattention to the contextual and institutional constraints facing them.
Tensions Between the Components o f  SHDIPCD Paradigm
Within the SHD/PCD paradigm, there are two major types of tensions 
present: tensions between the various policy and reform proposals put 
forward by the SHD/PCD agenda, and actual tensions between the core goals 
of the SHD/PCD paradigm, as discussed in Chapter 1.
As illustrated above, the SHD/PCD paradigm, especially as advocated 
by those associated with UNDP, tends to draw policy and reform proposals 
from diverse theoretical and ideological orientations espousing very 
different values, priorities, and institutional preferences for achieving 
development. In theory, SHD/PCD's simultaneous embrace of diverse 
ideological frameworks and institutional arrangements (i.e., state-market- 
and community) is not necessarily problematic since each of the 
institutional arrangements in question has a useful role to play in 
development processes. However, once translated into practice, tensions, 
trade-offs, and conflicts of interest can exist between such alternative
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institutional arrangements and visions of development. This leaves some 
very difficult choices for those who must translate SHD/PCD into practice.
One example which comes to mind is the tension and opportunity costs 
between SHD/PCD's Keynesian recommendations to increase public social 
spending and to enlarge safety nets and its simultaneous neo-Liberal 
proposal to introduce stabilization programmes and to reduce taxes. Here 
we clearly have two sets of policies in potential tension with one another 
since one proposes to strengthen the state's hand in the economy and 
therefore probably to generate additional revenue, while the other aims to 
roll back the state's economic activism and its expenditures. Another case 
in point are the tensions present between the SHD/PCD policy agenda's 
simultaneous call for greater equity and redistribution and for 
privatization and the observance of laws which guarantee private property 
ownership. Once again, although in principle, these two policy proposals 
are not by definition contradictory, in practice, because privatization can 
have enormous social costs (e.g., job losses, loss of social benefits) 
among vulnerable groups like women, ethnic minorities, youth and the 
elderly and because it is almost always elites or the established 
nomenklatura who have the money to purchase privatized public 
enterprises,®® privatization policies often end up aggravating rather than 
improving equity in society. Moreover, because in many LDC societies, 
public accountability towards the poor, law enforcement, and tax collection 
mechanisms are often ineffective, even when privatization leads to 
increased economic growth or efficiency, such gains may not translate 
themselves into increased public investment in basic services for the poor.
Similar tensions exist between the SHD/PCD policy agenda's 
simultaneous calls for protecting private property rights and for a major 
redistribution of society's productive assets. Once again, while these 
two objectives are not contradictory in principle, in practice, because in
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many LDCs the distribution of productive assets, and especially of land, 
is heavily concentrated in the hands of the few and social relations 
operate in a semi-feudal manner, it is extremely difficult to carry out 
major land or water reform without challenging the private property rights 
and arousing resistance among the landed oligarchy. The trade-offs between 
respect for private property rights and economic justice for the poor are 
inescapable in circumstances such as these.
A final illustration of policy tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD 
agenda is found in SHD/PCD's simultaneous espousal of neo-Liberal goals 
such as globalization and liberalized trade, of Keynesian goals like 
employment-intensive production, and neo-Marxist goals like stronger unions 
and guaranteed wages for poor workers. Once again, it is not difficult to 
see how conflicts of interest might arise between these objectives. After 
all, whereas the primary purpose of labour unions is to guarantee 
employment and improve workers' wages and rights, that of globalization and 
liberalization is to seek minimal production costs, which may imply 
replacing human labour with new technology, keeping wages down, or going 
elsewhere if workers are too demanding in their wages or work conditions.
Added to above-mentioned policy trade-offs is the problem that 
particular policy and reform proposals put forward by the SHD/PCD agenda 
themselves embrace contradictory principles. Take, for example, SHD/PCD's 
policy and reform proposals in the area of foreign development assistance. 
On the one hand, SHD/PCD advocates are adamant that foreign aid should no 
longer be viewed as an 'entitlement' and insist that foreign aid 
disbursements should increasingly take into consideration performance 
indicators and evidence of effective development impact on the ground. At 
the same time though, one the SHD/PCD agenda's chief policy proposals--the 
so-called, 20120 Compact which recommends that 20% of recipient government
budgets and foreign aid be guaranteed for priority Human Development
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programmes in LDCs, irrespective of varying recipient country needs, 
reverts into a universalistic entitlement logic.
Policy aside, there also exist tensions between the SHD/PCD 
paradigm's own goals. Some of these latter tensions are a result of
SHD/PCD's hybrid ideological tendencies (i.e., tensions created by 
SHD/PCD's simultaneous espousal of market efficiency, equity, and 
participation principles) but others derive from the unrealistic 
aspirations and fallacious assumptions of the very international 
development organizations which have adopted the SHD/PCD paradigm as their 
chief mandate. At least two tensions between the core goals of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm are worth noting. The first tension is that between effective 
policy advocacy and participation/empowerment. As Jane Covey explains in 
her analysis, these two SHD/PCD goals often end up at odds with one another 
and trade offs must be made between them because the quick and ever- 
changing pace of effective advocacy campaigning are very difficult to 
reconcile with the gradual and much slower learning process of fostering 
participation and empowerment (and indeed strong donor alliances or North- 
South partnerships). A second set of tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD
paradigm are those between SHD/PCD's simultaneous promotion of 'Sound 
governance' and national self-determination. The friction in this case 
results from the fact that although SHD/PCD encourages greater ownership 
and self-reliance among LDCs, it at the same time promotes a *Soundgovernance*
agenda with many pre-defined policy and reform options as well as stronger 
linkage of foreign aid to donors' preferred policy and reform agenda. 
SHD/PCD efforts to encourage LDCs to take control over their destiny but to 
at the same time support the international community's tendency to press a 
particular policy and reform agenda, are clearly at odds with one another.
The kinds of tensions between the various components of SHD/PCD 
described above are not particularly troublesome in theory or in the
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abstract. However, when it comes to operationalizing the SHD/PCD paradigm 
into practice, the trade-offs, opportunity costs and conflicts of interest 
involved are inescapable. Unfortunately, because of often mixed signals 
and ambiguous statements by SHD/PCD proponents themselves, the absence of a 
concrete SHD/PCD Action Plan, and the lack of a prioritization, ordering, 
or valuation of human capabilities, the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach'
offer little guidance to policy-makers or development practitioners 
grappling with the difficult choices described above.
Hence, although the SHD/PCD paradigm offers a wide menu of ambitious 
policy reforms with the potential to alter the status quo, neither the 
paradigm or its advocates clarify which human capabilities- - ± t any--matter
most, which components of the SHD/PCD agenda should be given preference, or 
which criteria policy-makers or practitioners should rely on to make 
difficult judgement calls. The point being made here is not that the 
different components of the SHD/PCD agenda need always be at odds with one 
another or that some components of the SHD/PCD agenda are more conducive to 
poverty-eradication than others. The message, is simply that, when 
translated into policy and practice, some of the SHD/PCD agenda's core 
goals and policy proposals may be at odds with one another. Moreover, 
since the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' do not offer many clues as to 
how to decide between difficult options but rather tell us that all the 
components of the SHD/PCD paradigm should be realized together, policy­
makers and practitioners are left making most of the difficult choices 
which must be made in order to produce a coherent whole. For example, 
when in tension, should be achieving equity be given priority over 
achieving efficiency? Should SHD/PCD goals and policies give priority to 
the human needs of landless peasants and poor women? How do different 
types of SHD/PCD interventions affect one another? and. Which 
interventions are most likely to help those groups deemed to be a priority?
The SHD/PCD choices made by policy-makers and development
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practitioners may not (and need not) always be anti neo-Liberal in 
inclination. After all, as noted earlier in this chapter,some neo-Liberal 
reforms (e.g., liberalizing global migration and the flow of labour) can 
themselves be radical moves which challenge the status quo and have high 
Human Development benefits. At the same time though, SHD/PCD advocates claim
that Human Development aims to challenge vested interests in the neo-Liberal
hegemony and to transform existing power relations and institutional 
arrangements so that these benefit the poorest. This means that, when 
equity and efficient growth or the interests of the poor and those of 
elites are at odds with one another, a truly progressive approach to 
SHD/PCD should favour policy reforms which directly redistribute power and 
assets to the poorest, even if such policies have been traditionally 
associated with the Left. In fact, in an article written for UNDP's HDRO 
Griffin and McKinley recognize that conflicts and trade-offs may result 
between faster growth and greater equity in the distribution of the 
benefits of growth. Under such circumstances they argue, value judgements 
must be made to resolve the conflict, from the perspective of the interests 
of the poorest since the indirect effects on poverty from a trickle-down of 
the benefits of growth seldom are sufficiently large to occur sufficiently 
fast to outweigh the direct benefits of redistributive policies.
Tensions Between the Aspirations o f the SHD/PCD Paradigm and the Reality o f  Constraints Present in The 
Existing System o f International Cooperation and Development Processes
As mentioned above, in addition to disharmony between some of the 
components of the SHD/PCD paradigm, a number of tensions may also exist 
between the overall aspirations of SHD/PCD and the reality of constraints 
present in the wider environment in which those aspirations must be 
realized. These latter tensions may be rooted in a series of fallacious 
assumptions made by international development organizations, including the 
contestable assumption that, despite their need for organizational survival 
and dependence on a multiplicity of powerful stakeholders, international
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development agencies are capable of leading a paradigmatic shift, 
empowering the poorest, and challenging existing power relations and the 
current system of development cooperation. Another possibly wrongful 
assumption is the belief that international development organizations which 
are hierarchical, bureaucratic, managerial, sectorally-based, and project- 
driven will be capable of carrying out development efforts which need to 
be holistic, flexible, and participatory in nature and involve strong 
substantive analysis and policy advocacy and, that such agencies can 
simultaneously meet the managerial and participatory demands of donors. The 
third contestable assumption worthy of exploration is the supposition that 
both the system of international development cooperation and beneficiary 
communities themselves are by nature harmonious and solidaire and welcome 
more democratic, power-sharing, and consensus-based development approaches. 
The purpose of the Chapters which follow is precisely to show how the 
aspirations of those agencies who have adopted the SHD/PCD paradigm have 
been at odds with the reality in the constraints present in the 
international community and LDC societies themselves.
Development experts have documented the adverse effects of a number 
of the contestable assumptions mentioned above (see Chapter 2). Yet no one 
has analyzed in depth either the tensions present between the policy 
proposals and core goals of the SHD/PCD paradigm or the gap between SHD/PCD 
ideals development agency aspirations and the extent of the environmental 
constraints facing them. And yet, the analysis in this Chapter confirms 
that, due to its vagueness and ambiguity as well as its attempts to 
reconcile policy recommendations and core goals at odds with one another, 
the SHD/PCD paradigm is riddled with inconsistencies and internal tensions. 
The chapters which follow explore how such tensions have affected the 
implementation of SHD/PCD approaches, whether UNDP and AA have been able to 
overcome these contradictions, and what the implications of these 
experiences are for SHD/PCD's implementation.
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III.SHD/PCD as Baroque Science; Confronting SHD/PCD's Conceptual Deficiencies
A) The SHD/PCD Paradigm as a Baroque Science
When speaking about the incoherencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm, it is 
very appropriate to speak of a Baroque Science Phenomenon. For, like Baroque
Sciences which assumed that there was an implicit harmony in all things no 
matter how diverse, SHD/PCD's proponents have also assume that despite the 
paradigm's abstractness, incompleteness, vagueness, and sometimes ambiguous 
and contradictory nature, SHD/PCD must somehow be coherent as well. I have 
borrowed the term 'Baroque Science' from Mack Walker's book, German Home 
Towns. In this book Walker identifies three traits which made German 
Cameralism in the 1600s and 1700s a 'Baroque Science' and which are 
directly applicable to my depiction of SHD/PCD as a 'Baroque Science'.
The first is the belief that all diversity can be fully comprehended 
and that there is inherent harmony among all the parts of a whole, despite 
vagueness or apparent tensions, trade offs or conflicts of interest between 
the parts or between the parts and the whole. As Christopher Hood and
Michael Jackson explain, German Cameralism was a vague administrative 
doctrine which incorporated a range of conservative and radical ideas at 
once, yet had no single definitive text encompassing the ideas of the 
school. The parallels with the SHD/PCD paradigm are inescapable. Like
the Cameralists and other advocates of Baroque Science, the proponents of 
SHD/PCD merge wide-ranging ideas and philosophies, have no shared text, and 
assume that all the components of their paradigm are co-realizable and that 
there is somehow an inherent harmony between the various parts of the 
paradigm despite the fact that the ranking, value, or links between 
SHD/PCD's various parts remain unknown. In short, like the German 
Cameralists, SHD/PCD proponents neglect the potential trade offs between 
the various components of their paradigm and possible conflicts of 
interests between what is beneficial for powerful elites and the poorest.
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The second feature which Walker attributes to Baroque Sciences is the 
belief that tensions, discord or distortions resulting from oligarchy, 
self-interest or corruption which threaten the harmony of the whole are 
aberrations rather than the norm and, as such, can be eliminated with 
minor tampering and adjustments. In the preceding pages we have seen
that, like the Cameralists, the pioneers of SHD/PCD approaches have left 
the SHD/PCD paradigm unfinished and its inherent tensions unresolved.
The third similarity between Cameralist Baroque Science and SHD/PCD is that 
the ideas involved in both are convincing only as long as they remain in 
the form of abstract theory. However, once the ideas are closely 
scrutinized and their implementability tested (as I propose to do in the 
following chapters) in terms of wider real-life constraints, the apparent 
"harmony in diversity threatens to become theoretical madness." As Hood 
and Jackson note, although the Cameralists constantly invoked 'science', 
their ideas were closer to generalizations based on 'rules of t h u m b ' . I n  
the case of SHD/PCD we have seen that, when it comes to designing concrete 
action plans or identifying values, priorities or links between SHD/PCD's 
various components, the SHD/PCD paradigm also falls short of expectations.
B) The Implications of SHD/PCD's Conceptual Deficiencies for its 
Operationalization and Implementation
This Chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the origins and 
conceptual soundness of the SHD/PCD paradigm. It has argued that, in 
addition to fulfilling the prerequisites of a bona fide development paradigm,
SHD/PCD approaches offer useful and refreshing insights as well an 
ambitious and sometimes radical policy and reform agenda with the potential 
to challenge the neo-Liberal hegemony and to transform existing 
institutional arrangements and power relations. The weaknesses of the 
SHD/PCD paradigm, therefore, lie elsewhere. As the Chapter illustrates, 
the main conceptual deficiency of the SHD/PCD paradigm lies in the sheer 
abstractness, vagueness and unfinished nature of the paradigm, as well as 
in its theoretical hybridity and ambiguous ideological tendencies, all of
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which have potentially negative implications for SHD/PCD's eventual 
operationalization. The implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm is further 
complicated by tensions present between the core goals and policy 
recommendations of the SHD/PCD paradigm as well as the gulf between SHD/PCD 
aspirations and the reality of the constraints present in the global 
environment and LDCs in which SHD/PCD must be put into practice.
Although some of the conceptual deficiencies mentioned above are not 
unfamiliar to development and SHD/PCD critics (Refer back to Chapter 2), 
this Chapter attempts to move beyond general criticisms and to draw out 
some of the implications of SHD/PCD's conceptual shortfalls for its 
eventual operationalization and implementation. The analysis contained in 
the Chapter tries to achieve this in three ways. Firstly, instead of 
uncritically declaring SHD/PCD a 'new development paradigm' or casually 
dismissing it as 'rhetoric' on the basis of general impressions, the 
Chapter collects testimony from those international development actors who 
have actively involved in the promotion and implementation of SHD/PCD 
approaches. The purpose of providing first-hand testimonies in this 
Chapter is to use interviews to confirm more general claims made in the 
literature, and partly to explore different development actors' 
perceptions of the conceptual soundness and implementability of SHD/PCD 
paradigm. Since my doctoral work is mostly based on qualitative research, 
it is important to realize that when I speak of different interviewee's 
views of the SHD/PCD paradigm, I am not suggesting that such comments are 
statistically representative, or that because certain actors voice them, 
that they must be true. The idea, instead, is simply to show that 
development actors are aware of the conceptual weaknesses of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm. This is in itself an important finding, not only because such 
research has not been done before, but because, as we will see in later 
chapters, development actors' perceptions of the conceptual usefulness of 
SHD/PCD do affect the way they interpret and go about translating SHD/PCD
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ideas from paradigm to practice. However, because development actors' 
views alone are not sufficient evidence of the conceptual weaknesses of the 
SHD/PCD paradigm, this Chapter complements interview material with textual 
analysis of key SHD/PCD documents in order to trace SHD/PCD's theoretical 
roots and ideological tendencies and to further assess SHD/PCD's conceptual 
soundness. Secondly, through the lens of the Baroque Science Phenomenon, the
Chapter tries to integrate dispersed critiques of the SHD/PCD paradigm. 
Thirdly, the Chapter tries to expose the implications of SHD/PCD conceptual 
deficiencies for its operationalization and implementation.
If I had to pinpoint the most significant lessons derived from the 
above discussion for the implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm, I would, 
first of all, note that, all ambitious paradigms with such high 
expectations and which address complex issues (which are often the ones 
most worth resolving) and which must be put into practice in heterogeneous 
societies with diverse ideologies and groupings (as is the case in most 
societies), and implemented through organizations with many of their own 
interests (as is the case with most organizations), there are bound to be 
difficulties in putting such ideas into action and at least some gap 
between paradigm and practice. However, when on top of these inevitable 
restrictions, one starts off with a paradigm as abstract, vague, 
unfinished, hybrid and ambiguous as SHD/PCD, the operationalization and 
implementation process are bound to be even more complicated and policy­
makers and practitioners even more confused. The second lesson to be 
learned is that if, in addition to a nebulous theory, its implementors 
undermine the discrepancies between the aspirations of their theory and 
their own capacities and the extent of the real-life constraints at stake, 
one can expect the implementation process to be even further complicated. 
While the first of these lessons has been shown in this Chapter, the second 
lesson will become evident in chapters to come.
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The above findings coincide with those of analysts of implementation 
processes such as Moynihan, Bardach and Sieber. For example, in his 
analysis of the botched implementation of participatory principles Moynihan 
advise against putting into practice theories which remain unproven and 
suffused with ambiguities, and reproaches policy-makers and implementors 
who oversell their ideas and undermine the limitations of their knowledge 
or the severity of the real-life constraints at stake. In The
Implementation Game. Bardach too warns that if the original goals of an 
approach are vague or ambiguous to begin with and if the consensus upon 
which they are based is precarious--as is the case with the SHD/PCD 
paradigm in which there is no consensus on clear ideological positions, the 
prioritization or valuation of capabilities or a blueprint for action--one can
expect a 'Deflection of Goals' during the implementation process. In 
Fatal Remedies. Sam Sieber relays a similar message by pointing out that 
'Goal Displacement' is most likely to occur when there are multiple or 
opposing goals involved in a doctrine or intervention. As we have seen in 
this Chapter, this is clearly the case with the SHD/PCD approach which has 
a number of goals which are in possible tension with one another. In his 
work Sieber also points out that 'Goal Displacement' is most likely to 
occur when the goals of an intervention are at odds with the reality of the 
situation in the particular institutions or organizations implementing such 
goals. Sieber's description parallels the discrepancies I found between
SHD/PCD aspirations and the reality of the constrains present in the 
international community, within specific development agencies and LDCs.
The Chapters which follow show how UNDP and AA have gone about 
putting the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice, including how both agencies 
have dealt with the conceptual deficiencies and tensions inherent in the 
SHD/PCD paradigm, the discrepancy between their SHD/PCD aspirations, wider 
contextual and institutional constraints, and their own organizational 
limitations and contestable assumptions about development.
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regarded to be at odds with one another and as tensions between self-interest 
and the common good (i.e., the 'collective weal') went unrecognized. The 
reality, however, was quite different as conflicts of interest did exist 
between Hometowns and the countryside, between Guild members and outsiders, 
and between the State and the Hometowns. (Mack Walker. Pages 145-146.Op. Cit.)
104. Hood, Christopher and Jackson, Michael. Two Administrative Philosophies: From the 
Leading Edge and the Lumber R oom . Page 180-181. In: Hood, Christopher and Jackson, 
Michael, Administrative Argument. Hants, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Co.,1991.
105. For example, under German Cameralism, rather than intervening directly 
to eliminate tensions between central and local policies and practices, the 
central state left most of the institutions, traditions, and essence of German 
Hometowns relatively intact and allowed them to function as they always had. 
(Walker. Pages 147-150. Op. Cit.)
106. For example, in the case of German Cameralism, although in theory, it 
was logical to attempt to regulate the various aspects of the economy and of 
business in the German Hometowns in order to maintain harmony between the 
various activities of the Hometowns as well as between the Hometowns and State 
law and principles, in practice, this implied an endless compilation of 
economic and professional classifications, a patchwork of laws and 
regulations, and an unrealistic amounts of endless monitoring and policing by 
state officials. In practice then, the aspirations and the regulatory 
framework of German Cameralism were untenable. (Walker. Page 151. Op. Cit.)
107. Hood, C. and Jackson, M. Page 182. Op. Cit.
108. Moynihan, Daniel. Pages 168-171 especially. Op. Cit.
109. Bardach. Pages 19-20, Op. Cit.
110. Sam Sieber. Pages 21-23. Op Cit.
Table 3.1; Radical, Reformist and Conformist Aspects of the SHD/PCD Agenda
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Radical (Anti status quo) 
Elements of SHD/PCD
Reformist (Moderate) 
Elements of SHD/PCD
Conformist (neo-Liberal) 
Elements of SHD/PCD
Global Level Reforms:
•Make DC's ODA contributions 
mandatory
•Create an Ec. Security 
Council with permanent votes 
for LDCs
•Compensate LDCs for 
damages caused by DCs' 
migration and trade 
restrictions t pay LDCs to 
fight global human security 
threats
•Penalize Oligarchic behaviour 
by TNCs '■
•Create int'l institutions 
that prioritize credit & ease 
interest rates for poorest 
LDCs
•Forgive/Reschedule LDC 
debt
Global Level Reforms :
•Strengthened role for 
UN as Dev. Umbrella. 
•Global SHD/PCD 
Compact signed by all 
Form Global Safety Nets 
for LDCs 
•Focus ODA on SHD/PCD 
•A 20/20 Compact for 
all
•Diversify exports to 
avoid dependence on 
global price 
fluctuations 
•Increase manufactured 
component of exports to 
increase value added 
•Encourage regional 
economic groups
Global Level Reforms :
•All countries, includ. 
LDCs must adopt policies 
that attract considerable 
DPI. (e.g. Free- 
floating exchange 
rates, DFI incentives)
•All countries, includ. 
LDCs must foster 'dynamic 
competitiveness' and 
liberalized trade by 
ending export subsidies, 
tariffs & NTBs includ. 
quotas Sc obstructive 
health & safety 
regulations.
National Level Reforms :
•Call for demilitarization. 
•Access to assets (including 
credit, land & a once-and-for 
all redistribution of assets) 
•Fiscal polices to benefit the 
poorest.
•Halt capital flight.
•Enhance grassroots democracy 
Sc participation 
•Empower the poor 
•Organize & foster alliances 
within civil society & with 
the poor which countervails 
the power of govt & employers
National Level Reforms ;
•Safety Nets for poorest 
•Increase Human priority 
expenditures in basic 
health Sc education 
•Increase employment- 
intensive production 
•Invest in infrastruc­
ture; as well as R&D 
•Skills training for all 
•Free & fair elections;
Accountable govt 
•Rule of law;law enforce 
ment;equality of oppor­
tunity; freedom of expre­
ssion; human security
National Level Reforms :
•Sound macroeconomic 
policies (e.g, avoid 
deficits, price controls; 
raise interest rates) 
•Privatize public corps to 
boost efficient produc­
tion Sc service delivery 
•Increase competition & 
profit incentives for 
private enterprises 
•Simplify & reduce taxes 
•Eliminate excessive 
regulation & corruption 
•Reduce state's role in 
economic planning 
•Promote 'Good Governance'
Organizational-Proi ect 
Level Reforms :
•Changes in existing power 
relations & institutional 
reforms are needed on top of 
foreign aid or org. reforms 
•Replace high project load by 
effective policy advocacy 
•Build genuine North-South 
partnerships with southern 
counterparts & beneficiaries 
•Foster ownership & 
participation among field- 
level development agency 
staff Sc beneficiaries by 
reversing top-down 
organizational structures & 
introducing effective forms 
of downward accountability 
•Replace foreign-imposed blue 
prints with indigenous 
knowledge & flexible learning
Organizational-Proiect 
Level Reforms;
•Increase ODA 
disbursements & 
foreign aid projects 
targeting the poor 
•Focus foreign aid on 
the SHD/PCD agenda 
•Relieve short-term 
suffering with more 
emergency relief 
•Improve aid coordina- 
nation Sc forge new 
coop. agreements with 
WB, GEF, F AO, UNEP, 
UNHCR, etc.
•Improve development 
agencies' research, 
policy analysis & 
substantive capacity 
•Work multi-sectorally 
•introducing effective 
accountability_______
Organizational-Proi ect 
Level Reforms ;
•Shift from 'entitlement' 
based to 'incentive' &
'performance' based orgs. 
•Cut staff Sc administrati­
ve costs in Dev. Agencies 
•Allow independent audits 
by int'l accounting firms 
•Introduce personal 
liability & penalize 
infraction of financial 
or other rules.
•More efficient Exe. Board 
•Introduce a Corporate 
Plan, success indicators. 
Sc an evaluation 
methodologies to measure 
impact.
Source ; UNDP, Human Development Reports, 1990-1997.
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Chapter 4: The Pearl to Rise and Shine Again?
A Glance at Uganda's 
Human Development Prospects
Rebuilding Uganda involves remaking all aspects of Ugandan society 
from the physical infrastructure to the soul and the spirit of the 
nation. It will require strong and substantial political will to 
overcome significant resistance generated by the wide scope of the 
reform measures. These reforms will remain artificial forms 
superimposed from the top unless genuine attempts are made to 
decentralize power to the grassroots through popular participation. 
External and internal resources must be mobilized and managed 
efficiently and effectively to create widely and equitably 
distributed economic and spiritual prosperity. When human values 
are enhanced and all forms of dehumanization curbed, the pearl of 
Africa will be seen to rise and shine again.
Mahmood Mamdani ^
I. The Tarnished Pearl; Uganda, Land of Promise, Land of Despair
Thanks largely to the discipline and commitment to stability and 
institutional reform by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) , for over a decade
now, Uganda has been considered one of the countries most likely to
progress in Africa. Yet, despite the new development opportunities
unleashed by the NRM's numerous political and economic reforms, today 
Uganda is still an extremely impoverished country whose future Human
Development remains uncertain. In this Chapter, I provide a very general
overview of the new development opportunities which have opened up for 
Ugandans since the arrival of the NRM government in 1986 until 1996, while 
at the same time exploring some of the broader contextual and institutional
constraints which persist in the state and market sectors as well as in
Uganda's civil society and system of international development cooperation.
The purpose of this exercise is twofold. On the one hand, I am 
interested in developing an idea of the kind of environment in which 
international development agencies like UNDP and AA have had to operate in 
and in seeing whether Uganda has an environment conducive to SHD/PCD by 
exploring how Uganda ares with respect to the key aspects of 'Sound 
governance'  ^which agencies like UNDP believe to be an important component 
as well as a precondition for SHD/PCD. On the other hand, I am also
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interested in determining whether the types of contraints which are 
currently undermining Uganda's SHD/PCD are a product of the unequal and 
dualistic forms which development has taken in Uganda (that is, the types 
of constraints highlighted by advocates of the Democratic Development [DD]
school of thought: e.g., lack of access to wealth, productive assets, or
political power by the majority of poor Ugandans; and the persistence of 
clientelistic relations) or, whether Uganda's development setbacks are 
attributed mainly to the conflictuel and opportunistic nature of 
development actors (i.e., the chief concerns of the advocates of the New
Institutional Economics [NIE] : high transaction costs and distrust in existing
institutional arrangements resulting from predatory behaviour by government 
officials and the tendency of community beneficiaries to exploit one 
another and to use foreign aid as a means of personal gain.)
A) The Colonial Legacy and Post-Independence Debacle
When the young Winston Churchill first visited the Kingdom of Uganda 
in 1907, he described it as "one beautiful garden from end to end" and 
marvelled at the industriousness, sophisticated organizations, elegance of 
manners, and peacefulness of its people. It was these attributes, combined 
with British innovation which convinced Churchill that Uganda would always 
be "the Pearl of Africa": "Nowhere else in Africa.... unless some grievous
error or neglect should intervene will (development) results be more 
brilliant, more substantial or more rapidly realized", he asserted.  ^
Lamentably, Uganda's development during the 20th Century did not unfold as 
expected. True, the British did build railways, imported advanced western 
knowledge, and introduced modern systems of public administration as well 
as a network of missionary-run schools and hospitals. However, at the 
time of Independence in 1962, Uganda also inherited a colonial economy 
dominated by expatriate monopolies and Asian entrepreneurs; an education 
system which had neglected the higher education of Africans; a public
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service which was efficient and shared a strong civil service ethic but 
whose upper echelons were predominantly made up of expatriate managers who 
were paid, trained, regulated by, and accountable to an external power; 
and, a Baganda elite (the dominant tribe in the South) which had signed a 
pact with the British Empire which recognized, and indeed extended, the 
hierarchical position of the Baganda but which did so at the expense of 
rival tribal groups, especially in the non-kingdom areas, and ceded 
hegemonic ruling power to the British. *
With so many conflicting interests left unresolved, it was not 
surprising that Uganda's Independence was followed by a prolonged period of 
civil war (especially between southern economic administrative power and 
northern political and military control) and the gradual impoverishment of 
the majority of Ugandans. First, came the government of Milton Obote 
which, once it had broken its pact with the Baganda Kingdom, used the 
military to abrogate the 1962 Independence Constitution and to monopolize
political power. As part of an effort to move to the Left, Obote 
nationalized a large number of firms and assumed control of much of the 
import and export business in Uganda. When Obote was overthrown by his 
army commander, Idi Amin, in 1971, the centralization of state power was 
accelerated and disregard for the rule of law and human rights worsened. 
Amin expelled Asian entrepreneurs and confiscated houses, shops, warehouses 
and factories in order to distribute these to supporters of his regime.
By the 1970s, Uganda was on a downward spiral of rapid economic decline and 
political chaos. State predation and shortages had become chronic, the 
parallel black market (Wigendo) was almost the only functioning sector of
the economy, and Ugandans lived in constant terror as military and local 
officials looted rural areas and abused their authority without impunity. ®
Amin was eventually overthrown in 1979 by the Tanzanian army and 
exiled Ugandans. But despite some attempts at democratization between
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1979-81, Amin's rule was followed by no less than five successive 
dictatorships: the regimes of Yasufu Lule, Godfrey Binaisa, Muwanga, Obote 
II and the Okellos). By the mid 1980s, Uganda's infrastructure was 
virtually in ruins as a result of continued civil strife; public services 
had collapsed due to deteriorating equipment, erratic supplies and the 
exodus of Ugandan professionals; the country's economy was in dire straits 
due to the collapse of the state's tax and marketing revenues after state 
parastatals, marketing boards and cooperatives ceased to function and 
factories closed down crime and extortion were widespread as the 
government lost control of security forces and the army and donors had 
practically withdrawn from the country. It was these circumstances, 
coupled with Obote's contentious win in the 1980 Elections that prompted 
Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) to take to the jungle to
wage a guerrilla war. After considerable suffering (especially in the 
infamous Luwero Triangle) , Museveni's guerrillas were finally triumphant in
1986 when his National Resistance Movement (NRM) assumed power. ® It is
estimated that 1 million people may have lost their lives in the interim.®
B) Uganda's Human Development Prospects Today
From the moment it took power in 1986, the NRM promised Ugandans that 
the bloodshed and suffering caused by previous regimes would never be 
repeated again. In accordance with its pledge, the NRM government embarked 
on a national reconciliation and reconstruction campaign and enshrined its 
pledges in a 10-Point Programme, a development strategy based on 10 goals:
i) to establish popular democracy; ii) to restore security; iii) to 
consolidate national unity; iv) to defend national independence; v) to 
build a national economy; vi) to restore and rehabilitate social services; 
vii) to eliminate corruption and misuse of power; viii) to resettle 
displaced peoples; ix) to foster regional cooperation and respect for human
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rights; and, x) to build a mixed economy which is self-sustaining, yet 
integrated into the global economy. Clearly, many of these priorities 
overlap with core SHD/PCD goals such as 'Sound governance' through 
observance of the rule of law, democratic processes and popular 
participation (NRM Programme; Pages 7-9); guaranteeing the poor access to 
basic social services and empowering them to take charge of their own 
destinies (NRM Programme: Page 25); moving beyond Capitalist-Socialist 
dichotomies by promoting a mixed, diversified, self-sustaining, yet 
globally-integrated economy; (NRM Programme: Pages 19, 35); and enhancing 
cooperation among neighbours while at the same time speaking out against 
dictatorship or human rights violations. (NRM Programme: Page 33). 10
In order to realize the Human Development goals set out in its 10-Point
Programme, the NRM government has introduced an ambitious and often radical
reform agenda spanning the political, military, and economic spheres as 
well as Ugandan civil society at large. Its chief aim has been to revive 
the full spectrum of Ugandan institutions in order to create an enabling 
environment for the country's long-term Sustainable Human Development. In many
respects, the NRM's development efforts have been a major success. Between 
1987-1994, the Ugandan economy grew at an average rate of 5% and even 
reached 10% in 1995 government spending increased nearly five-fold in 
real terms between 1987-1993 and foreign flows of both private and 
official transfers increased from 2.2% of GDP in 1985/86 to as much as 13% 
by 1993-94. “ As the crowning touch, Yoweri Museveni's had his mandate 
renewed by an overwhelming majority of the Ugandan people who re-elected 
him with 74% of the vote during the 1996 Presidential Elections .
On a more sombre note though, with a per capita income of only US$
220 in 1994, Uganda's real GDP was still well below the level enjoyed by 
Ugandans 25 years ago and the country still ranked among the poorest in the 
world. Moreover, according to some estimates, as many as 61% of Ugandans
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are still defined as poor and despite the fact that many Ugandans have 
some minimal access to land, few live beyond basic subsistence levels, 
Aggravating things even further, despite the fact that levels of inequality 
in Uganda have never been as extreme as those of neighbouring Kenya, the 
country's latest Gini coefficients reveal a widening urban-rural gap and 
growing regional inequalities between the poorer North and the better-off 
southern and central regions. Added to the picture is the reality
that, the NRM's total budget expenditure has remained extremely low at only 
about US $40 per head (and only US$ 2 per capita for health and education 
combined). Consequently Uganda's social indicators remain very dismal:
In health, while Ugandans' life expectancy used to compare favourably to 
that of other sub-Saharan countries, at only 43 years of age, today 
Ugandans have one of the shortest life expectancies in the world °^, child 
mortality remains extremely high at 203 per 1000 births due to malnutrition 
and preventable infectious diseases and, according to World Health 
Organization estimates, the number of HIV-infected people in Uganda could 
increase to more than 1.9 million by 1998, thereby further increasing the 
high number of needy widows and orphans in the country. In the area of 
education, literacy remains extremely low at 54% (much lower among women 
and in rural areas) 43% of Ugandans in the bottom quartile have no 
education at all, as many as 70% of pupils dropped out by Primary 7 in 1986 
compared to 10% in 1975, and the quality of education remains poor due to 
dilapidated school facilities, the rising proportion of untrained teachers 
and the scarcity of instructional materials. (Table 4.1 accompanying
this Chapter provides regional and longitudinal data on changing social 
indicators for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania).
The continued human deprivation of Ugandans is reflected in the 
country's disappointing and deteriorating ranking in UNDP's 1997HDR, where
Uganda placed 159th out of 175 countries in the HDI. Lastly, but 
definitely not least, the Ugandan government has become increasingly
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dependent on foreign aid. In fact, as a share of GDP, Uganda's gross aid 
flows have risen from 2.7% in 1986/87 up to 13.4 % in 1993/94 and by the 
mid 1990s, foreign aid covered more than 80% of all the public investment 
in Uganda. Although foreign aid has been critical in maintaining the 
country's infrastructure and in keeping Uganda's social capital base from 
sliding back too far, because grants account for less than half the total 
aid, the increased borrowing has exacerbated Uganda's external debt which, 
in 1994, reached US$ 3.2 billion--i.e.,80% of Uganda's GDP in 1993/94.
Although statistics do not capture the ingenuity and adaptability of 
Ugandans and, as such, do not provide a full picture of Ugandans' well­
being, it is safe to say that Uganda today is as much a land of promise as 
it is a land of despair. The sections which follow provide a more in-depth 
analysis of the institutional opportunities and constraints facing Uganda 
and of the ways in which the policies of the NRM government have affected 
the country's SHD/PCD prospects over the last ten years.
II. Institutional Opportunities and Constraints Affecting Uganda'
SHD/PCD Prospects
A) Institutional Opportunities and Constraints in the State Sector
Upon its coming to power in 1986, one of the first actions initiated 
by the NRM was a process of national reconciliation. Among other things, 
this process included the demobilization and domestication of the Ugandan 
army, including the offer of amnesty to the country's armed opposition 
groups and the absorption of elements from defeated armies into the NRA.
As part of its early pacification efforts, the NRM government took measures 
to domesticate the army by subjecting it to a Code o f Conduct and publicly
disciplining abuses by soldiers, by assigning the army developmental tasks 
such as repairing roads and planting maize, giving the army special 
representation (along with interest groups such as women, workers, and the 
disabled) in the National Resistance Council (NRC) , the interim parliament, and by
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demobilizing two-thirds of Uganda's 100,000 soldiers. “ Although 
insurgency activities have been re-ignited in Northern Uganda and surges of 
violence still occur in the East ” , by and large, the NRM's reconciliation 
efforts did reduce the full-scale civil war and anarchy of the 1980s.
In the political realm, the NRM's reconciliation efforts have 
involved the establishment of a broad-based system of 'movement politics' 
in which rival political parties, ethnic groups, and representatives for 
the army, women, workers and disabled persons, were all incorporated and 
offered Cabinet positions in the interim NRM government. The re­
establishment of law and order and the stamping out of pervasive crime and 
corruption was another a political priority for the NRM. The NRM partly 
achieved this by formalizing the justice functions of locally-elected 
Resistance Councils (RCs or LCs now) originally established by the NRM to ensure
law and order in rural communities during the civil war and partly by 
introducing a Leadership Code and establishing the Ojfice o f  the Inspector General o f
Government (IGG) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) to investigate charges of
corruption and embezzlement both within and outside of government.
Another important step in restoring faith in the honesty and competence of 
the Ugandan government has been the overhaul of the Ugandan civil service, 
including the elimination of 42,000 'ghost workers' whose names were on the 
government payroll but whose salary was pocketed by fellow civil servants. 
Through the NRM's Ctvil Service Reform Programme (CSRP) , Uganda's bloated civil
service comprising 38 Ministries and 320,000 staff members has been reduced 
to 21 Ministries and 145,000 employees.
In addition to the reinstatement of law and order, social and 
political freedoms have been expanded as well. As a result, in Uganda 
today, there is religious tolerance, most of Uganda's traditional Kingdoms 
have been reinstated, several human rights organizations and NGOs operate
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in the country in a fairly autonomous fashion, and several daily newspapers 
compete with one another. Perhaps even more importantly, under the NRM
Uganda also started on a gradual path towards democratization which began 
with the setting up of elected local RCs in 1987, and was followed by 
elections to Parliament in 1989, the 1994 Constituent Assembly Elections 
aimed at forming a legitimate Constituent Assembly to approve Uganda's 
new Constitution, and culminated in Presidential and Parliamentary 
Elections in 1996. President Museveni's electoral victory in 1996 was the 
first secured by universal and direct suffrage since 1962.
The last significant institutional reforms introduced by the NRM in 
the last 10 years has been the initiation of a decentralization process as 
a means of giving more direct power to the people and ensuring a more 
equitable distribution of resources between and within districts, as well 
as a means of improving public sector performance, transparency and 
accountability. In spite of Uganda's decision to remain a unitary state 
as opposed to a federal system, the decentralization process has involved a 
substantial delegation of power and resources to sub-national centres. In 
accordance with the decentralization legislation, much of the budgetary 
allocations and service delivery functions of the line ministries have been 
transferred to the Districts, along with responsibilities for development 
planning, local policing, prisons and justice, administrative matters and 
revenue collection in their respective local areas.
The above institutional reforms have reduced the tribal conflict, 
violence and predatory rule which plagued Uganda during the 1970s and 
1980s. By restoring the rule of law, efficiency, tolerance and democratic 
accountability of the Ugandan state, the NRM has clearly enhanced Uganda's 
SHD/PCD prospects. This does not mean, however, that Uganda is no longer 
plagued by regional conflict, clientelistic tendencies, and continued 
inefficiency and rent-seeking behaviour within public institutions.
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Persistent Civil War and Regional Conflict
To this day, one of the most destructive impediments to human 
security in Uganda is the country's protracted civil war in the North, new 
violence in the West (Kasese), and continued regional conflict with Sudan 
and the Congo (formerly Zaire), It is partly true that being surrounded by 
dangerous neighbours has left the Museveni government with little choice 
but to engage them. Still, there is no denying that the persistent 
aggression has undermined Uganda's long-term SHD/PCD prospects. First of 
all, as shown in Table 4.2, at 27%, the Ugandan government's security 
expenditures in the 1994/95 Recurrent Budget were twice the proportion of 
money being spent by the government in health and education jointly.
The second detrimental effect of the continuation of civil war has been 
mounting regional inequalities as well as the growing impoverishment and 
marginalization of the North which has been excluded from the economic 
recovery as a result of inadequate infrastructure and limited access to 
markets in Kampala and the central region. Appleton and MacKinnon estimate 
that as much as 3 9% of the rural population in the North fall under the 
lowest expenditure quartile, compared to only 17% in the central region.
Limited Democracy and Freedom
Uganda's Constituent and Presidential Elections were clearly a 
watershed for Ugandan democracy. Nevertheless, it would be a delusion to 
assume that the country has become a perfectly free and democratic society 
as a result of these two events. The truth is that democracy in Uganda is 
still precarious and incomplete. To begin with, some Ugandans worry that
the Constituent Assembly's decision to limit Ugandans' freedom of 
association and to prohibit the creation of coherent political party 
platforms (mostly out of fear that multi-party politics can lead to a 
resurgence of tribal and ethnic conflict) may be restricting the expansion
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of political pluralism and open political debate among Ugandans. This 
situation is particularly worrying given that, since the Constituent 
Assembly Elections in 1994, the NRM began transforming itself into a 
professional political organization akin to a political party while at the 
same time closing the door to organized political opposition. Another way 
in which the NRM regime has escaped direct political competition has been 
by restoring Uganda's traditional kingdoms but reducing their role to 
predominantly a cultural and ceremonial one by prohibiting the kings from 
sitting in Parliament or participating in partisan politics even though 
other interest groups in Uganda, including the army, unions, youth, women 
and even the disabled, have guaranteed representation in Parliament.
This is not to say, of course, that the existing political system in 
Uganda does not allow some degree of dissent to operate through Parliament 
or local RCs. Nevertheless, since political parties are banned, Uganda's 
traditional Kings can not become involved in politics, and there no second 
legislative chamber such as a Senate or House of Lords to veto government 
policy, the Museveni's government faces no organized competition. Having 
said this though, it is important to realize that, despite its political 
shortcomings, the Museveni government has come a long way from the 
patrimonialism and authoritarian style of "personal rule" which 
predominated in unintegrated African societies during the post-colonial 
era; that very few African countries have moved towards multiparty 
elections and that in a regional context Uganda is among those African 
countries which have made the most significant strides towards partial 
political liberalization; and that, even in Western societies, democracy is 
a fragile plant whose sometimes ambiguous rules, boundaries and 
accountabilities can break down, whose elected politicians are also subject 
to party-related corruption, and whose elites need to constantly exercise 
personal restraint over their own power for the system to work.
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Clientelistic and Parochial RCfLC Rule
Another serious constraint in Uganda's existing system of governance 
lies in the sometimes parochial rule of local Resistance Councils (RC/LCs) 
which were delegated new powers by the central government via the 
decentralization process. There are essentially three issues at stake 
here. The first concern is that, with the exception of RC/LC Councils at 
the very lowest village level (RC/LC I) where some 100-200 persons vote, 
the selection of RC/LCs used to place through indirect voting. The 
pyramidal and indirect form of elections used to select most RC/LCs means 
that the democratic legitimacy of the system becomes diluted precisely at 
the higher levels where long-term planning and public budgetary 
expenditures take place. A second deficiency in the election of RC/LCs is 
that, even at the village level, elections are by queuing as opposed to 
secret ballot, making it very difficult for locals not to support locally 
powerful elites such as influential landlords, tribal leaders, and in the 
case of women, whoever their husbands support. Moreover, as James
Katarobo discovered during his study of the Constituent Assembly Elections 
in 1994, in Uganda it is still not uncommon for candidates to resort to 
intimidation and violence to secure votes, for electoral officials biased 
in favour of a certain candidate to manipulate electoral procedures or to 
disenfranchise illiterate or disabled voters, and for candidates to offer 
gifts of money and scarce commodities as a means of buying votes.
According to Katarobo, even when the voting process is secret, because of 
the persistence of patron-client relationships, tribalism, fear of 
witchcraft and sorcery, and lack of popular knowledge or access to 
information about electoral processes, poor Ugandans feel obligated to 
reciprocate for the payment of gifts given to them by candidates by 
delivering their vote to those who paid them. When you add to this the 
prohibition of political party platforms, what you end up with in Ugandan 
is a particularly localized, individualized, and patronizing form of
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politics. The third caveat of RC/LC rule is that, because President 
Museveni personally appoints a District Administrator (A Resident District 
Commissioner under the 1995 Constitution) to watch over every District and 
ensure that RC/LCs remain loyal to the government, RC/LCs often reinforce 
the established order rather than challenge inequity or unjust traditions.
Limited Expertise and Continued Rent-Seeking Behaviour in the Public Service
The effectiveness of both local and central government in Uganda has 
also been undermined by the paucity of public resources and the consequent 
lack of technical expertise and runaway corruption in the public service.
Despite the retrenchment of ghost employees and modest wage increases 
for civil servants, at the time of my visit in 1995, Uganda's national 
civil service was still grappling with problems such as fierce inter- 
ministerial competition and dependence on donor funds, unacceptably low 
wages, lack of appropriate office equipment or of access to transport, 
insufficient specialized staff to engage in policy formulation and 
planning, inadequate statistical and technical information, confused and 
overlapping institutional responsibilities, and unnecessary routines and 
procedures which kept the ministries' few highly-trained civil servants 
performing tedious administrative duties. At the District level, the
lack of public resources and the government's recent retrenchment has 
resulted in the Ugandan civil service having to spread itself out very 
thinly in the Ugandan countryside and Ugandans having to pay user fees 
(either legally or illegally) for services or having to forego services 
altogether. According to the draft Poverty Action Plan , due to their lack of
transport and the reality that their inadequate remuneration forces them to 
spend much of their time on non government related activities. District 
government staff rarely go to the field. With respect to RC/LCs, their
effectiveness has tended to be undermined by their inexperience in
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Strategic planning and management the erratic and badly advertised 
nature of RC/LC meetings the dismal and geographically varying revenues 
which RC/LCs collect from local taxation and poor coordination between 
public servants and RC/LCs as well as between the five overlapping levels 
of local government and the tens of thousands of RC/LC Committee members 
who are increasingly expected to be politicians, administrators and 
magistrates all in one, but receive no transport, training or allowances.
However, the factor which has most seriously undermined the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of the Ugandan state is the persistence of 
rent-seeking behaviour, despite the NRM's anti-corruption efforts. During 
my first field visit alone, newspapers reported that the NRM Secretariat 
could not vouch for the 221 million excess Ugandan shillings it had paid to 
District Administrations in the year ending on June 1991; that a 1 billion 
Ugandan shillings pension fraud scheme involving thousands of fictitious 
files had been unearthed in the Ministry of Education and Sport; that 
senior Uganda Commercial Bank officials were suspected of taking portions of
loans given to prominent Ugandan businessmen and politicians and, that 
a sporadic spot check on government vehicles had exposed a racket of false 
"garage bills." At the District level, corruption is equally common,
with medical provisions destined for government health clinics appearing 
for sale in local markets and RC/LCs members looking the other way.
As is evident from the above discussion, the lack of consolidation of 
Uganda's new democracy and the persistence of clientelistic and unequal 
relations resulting from poverty and historically inappropriate social and 
political structures--all key concerns of the DD school of thought-- 
continue being an impediment to 'Sound governance' in Uganda. Yet, as 
noted by NIE advocates, constraints associated with rent-seeking behaviour 
and limited technical expertise in Uganda's civil service also potentially 
undermine the creation of a political environment conducive to SHD/PCD.
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S) Institutional Opportunities and Constraints in the Market Sector
When the NRM first seized power, its economic policies were heavily 
influenced by Dependency and Marxist thought. As such, the Museveni 
government was vehemently opposed to the stabilization and structural 
adjustment programmes often advocated by foreign donors. By May 1987, 
nevertheless, the NRM succumbed to foreign pressure and adopted the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP, 1987-1993) proposed by the IMF and the World
Bank. Under the ERP, the NRM government freed the Ugandan exchange rate, 
allowed the Ugandan Shilling to devalue and legalized foreign exchange 
bureaux (FOREX Bureaux) in order to stimulate domestic output and thus 
improve the competitiveness of its exports and its balance of trade. The 
NRM also introduced a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) aimed at controlling
spiralling inflation through monetary contraction, restoring positive real 
interest rates and imposing stricter budgetary discipline. Once 
inflation was brought under 10%, a Revenue Authority was created, foreign
contributions towards the ERP grew, the deficit was brought under control, 
and, by 1995, the Ugandan economy was growing at unprecedented rates.
The NRM's new-found faith in liberalization did not stop at monetary 
policy. Many of the protectionist economic structures which had led to 
predatory behaviour and high transaction costs were gradually dismantled, 
including the monopolies once guaranteed to the Coffee, Lint and Produce 
Marketing Boards, which were replaced by numerous private firms offering 
market prices for farmers' produce. By the mid 1990s, the government 
had reduced its tariffs, import duties and quantitative restrictions and 
managed to rationalize the tariff structure down to the 10-30% range.
In  the banking sector, the rapidly growing but badly managed Uganda
Commercial Bank (UCB) retrenched half of its staff, closed down some 30 UCB
branches which were not economically viable and turned 55 into mobile
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vehicles, and imposed stricter commercial lending criteria, including 
limits on the amount of money lent to one borrower or to Bank insiders. In 
addition, some 2,500 Asian enterprises expropriated under the Amin regime 
were returned to their original owners and 1,700 owners have had their 
claims met by the NRM government. However, the climax to the 
liberalization process in Uganda probably came when, after enormous 
pressure from the World Bank and considerable debate within the Ugandan 
government, the NRM agreed to the Parastatal Enterprise and Divestiture (PEDR) Statute
which paved the way for the eventual divestiture of 43 public enterprises 
and the liquidation of 17 parastatals by 1993/94. Finally, by the mid 
1990s, the NRM had also launched a Rehabilitation and Development Plan (1993-1996)
to accelerate the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Uganda's long 
neglected infrastructure, including roads, telecommunications,and energy.®®
The above economic reforms have clearly stimulated the Ugandan 
economy. Reduced inflation, improved infrastructure, and the greater 
availability of imported inputs have no doubt helped to jump-start Uganda's 
industrial and manufacturing recovery, while banking sector reforms have 
increased the availability of credit to the private sector, and, according 
to World bank estimates, reduced state subsidies, tax exemptions and 
preferred access guarantees, may be saving Ugandans as much as US$ 180 
million a year--about three times the government's contribution to the 
development budget. In their totality, these reforms have increased
investors' trust in the Ugandan economy and helped to create an environment 
much more conducive to growth, something which UNDP's own HDRs cite as 
being an important prerequisite for long-term Sustainable Human Development.
But even in the market sphere, Uganda's future growth and long-term SHD/PCD 
potential is threatened by remaining economic institutional constraints.
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A  Weak Capitalist Class and Disorganized and Disadvantaged Working Class
Despite the proliferation of entrepreneurial activity as a means of 
survival during the 1970s and 1980s, Uganda's indigenous capitalist classes 
remain small, have little capital, rely on primitive technology and skills, 
and are predominantly concentrated in the central regions of the country.
In addition, because much of Uganda's entrepreneurial class emerged from 
the black market, its members still retain the informal, political, 
village, and tribal links and obligations through which it originally 
accumulated its wealth. Thus, while the entrepreneurial spirit is alive 
and well in Uganda, its chief characteristics are a far cry from the 
independent, rational and profit maximizing business class depicted in neo­
classical Economics. Instead, many Ugandan business elites still depend on 
state-derived contacts and rents. Due to poor infrastructure, unreliable 
supplies and lack of major markets in rural areas, they are reluctant to 
venture beyond the Kampala-Jinja-Entebbe triangle. And although some 
Ugandan elites have more resources than others, because of their fear of 
fraud, many prefer to avoid large transactions or dealings with persons 
with whom they do not have village, tribal or family links.
Due to the above-mentioned constraints, the private sector in Uganda 
has traditionally been fragmented and ineffective at influencing the 
government's economic policy dialogue. Thanks largely to their improved 
policy research capacity (attained largely with the support of foreign 
funds), their own personal contacts in the upper echelons of government, 
and the new receptivity of President Museveni towards business interests, 
large Ugandan business associations are beginning to directly lobby the 
Ugandan President and key PEC and NRC members on economic issues.
However, small business groups representing the informal sector and 
national union bodies like the National Organization o f Trade Unions (NOTU) , a
federation representing 15 trade unions with a combined membership of
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80,000, has failed to gain the ear of the NRM while the Uganda Public Employees 
Union (UPEC) was virtually obliterated in the privatization process. “
Persistent Protectionism, Erratic Supplies and Rent-Seeking Behaviour
Another very obstructive impediment to the development of Ugandan 
markets is the continuation of protectionist practices. According to a 
study conducted on behalf of the Danish Development Agency (DANIDA) in Uganda,
despite the above-mentioned reforms, protection continues to be high in 
Uganda, averaging 93% in relation to competition from outside the region 
and 64% within the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) area. Even though recent
reforms have ameliorated the situation somewhat (e.g., by eliminating 
export taxes and dismantling many former marketing boards), the tax regime 
in Uganda continues to be excessive and regressive. Fuel taxes, for 
example, are extremely high and corporate taxes of 50% seriously undermine 
small Ugandan firms, while foreign firms and NGOs continue receiving import 
and other exemptions not available to local ones. Persistent 
protectionism has had various negative effects on the Ugandan market 
economy. The first undesirable effect of protectionist schemes is that 
they impose an anti-export bias in the economy Taxes on simple capital
assets and inputs (e.g., bicycles, sewing machines, hoes, seeds, etc.) also 
make it increasingly difficult for the very poor to gain access to even 
simple capital assets, while the exemption of capital imports by foreign 
firms and donors can, in some cases, act as a disincentive to local 
manufacturers of the same inputs. A final detrimental side-effect of 
protectionism in Uganda is that it instigates illegal smuggling and the 
continuation of the black market economy by Ugandan producers and traders 
hoping to bypass the high transaction costs created by heavy-handed 
regulation and predatory behaviour. The persistence of these various 
forms of illegal activity and predation translated into a very uneven
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distribution of public resources. As E.A. Brett points out, "while 
predation secures resources for a small minority, it denies the state the 
income required to provide essential services for the many" . Predation 
also has the effect of criminalizing business since it impedes small 
businesses obeying the law from operating profitably. When you add to the 
problem of protectionism, the high cost of raw materials, irregular 
electrical supply and restrictions to sell through wholesale channels, 
Ugandan manufacturers' chances for open competition seem even slimmer.
Unclear Rules o f the Game and Uneven Law Enforcement
An added obstacle hindering the expansion of Uganda's economy is the 
absence of clear laws and consistent law enforcement, both of which have 
heightened transaction costs and the risks of investment. One major 
source of the problem has to do with the insecurity of land titles in 
Uganda. At present, the Ugandan Constitution recognizes at least four 
land tenure systems: Customary Ownership, Mailo (a form of landlord-tenant 
relationship in which tenants enjoy special protection and many de facto
freehold rights and have), Leasehold (the leasing of public land) and 
Freehold. Unfortunately, lack of clarification about how the various
land ownership systems will actually work together means that land security 
in Uganda remains uncertain. It is still unknown, for instance, what will 
be a peasant's protection as a tenant on public land, whether Mailo 
tenants' traditional tenurial rights are sufficiently and legally secure, 
or whether the 'rights of squatters' supersede those of legal Mailo owners, 
and if not, what kind of compensation must be paid to Mailo owners. In 
addition, under some of the above tenure systems, the ownership rights of 
women and particularly those of widows and orphans, are especially 
insecure. This is a deterrent to rural investment by poor rural women who 
still have no choice but to farm on their husbands' land, have little 
control over the income generated by the land they work and, upon the death
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of their husbands, must allow male relatives to decide the fate of family's 
land without their consent. Uganda's land tenure laws have still to be 
translated into enforceable rules and Ugandans informed of their rights.
A second source of uncertainty in the Ugandan market is lack of trust 
in contractual agreements, the laws governing market transactions, or in 
the enforcement of such laws. Examples of breaches of contract and 
violations of financial and market laws abound in Uganda. These may include 
cases in which private companies misrepresent their achievements; firms 
which, in collusion with government officials, overcharge or send false 
bills for work never done; private companies which utilize government 
equipment without paying for its use; or, firms being awarded lucrative 
contracts when other firms offered lower bids in the tendering process.
Donor-Led and Exclusive Policy-Making Processes
One of the dominant features of policy-making in Uganda is that high- 
level economic decisions are dominated by President Museveni and his select 
cadre of advisers. Not only are strategic executive bodies such as The
National Resistance Council (NRC), the Cabinet, The Presidential Economic Council (PEC),
and the National Executive Committee (NEC), all presided over by the President.
But, because of inadequate resources or technical expertise, the 
contribution of the sector ministries to the policy formulation process in 
Uganda remains negligible and uncoordinated. Furthermore, the youth of the 
private sector, the weakness of the union movement (including the disarray 
of the public service union since its retrenchment), the prohibition of 
opposition parties, and the lack of clear mechanisms for the operation of 
lobby groups, all make organized policy influencing difficult.
Consequently, the policy advocacy which does occur is usually by 
individuals with family links or personal access to top decision-makers.
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Another feature of economic decision-making in Uganda is the enormous 
clout which foreign interests and donor pressures have in the process.
Given its lack of national technical and planning capacity, its desperate 
need of foreign exchange, the NRM government has often had no choice but to 
cave into the political and economic conditionality of the donor community. 
The weight of donor pressures upon the shoulders of the NRM first came to 
light when Museveni reluctantly endorsed the ERP and SAP, but was equally 
evident in the adoption of economic policies such as deregulation, civil 
service reform, and privatization, all of which were donor-instigated. 
Official donors have also proven very adept at placing policy advisers and 
upgrading strategic thinking and planning units within key financial and 
economic planning ministries in establishing donor-funded research 
groups and think tanks such as the Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) , the
Export Policy Analysis and Development Unit (EPADU) and t.h.& Agricultural Secretariat, and in
directly lobbying the Ugandan government (e.g., the World Bank's successful 
lobbying for the creation of Priority Programme Areas (PPAs) in Uganda's
recurrent budget and indirectly influencing economic policy through 
publications and country economic studies promoted at major conferences.’®
Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the 
Treasury in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning concedes that 
economic policy in Uganda has been strongly influenced by donor 
conditionality but, at the same time notes that, the Ugandan government has 
implemented economic reforms at its own pace and, in cases such as the 
introduction of FOREX Bureaux and the acceleration of the decentralization 
programme, has even taken the initiative. ” This does not mean, of 
course, that donor-led and elite-inspired economic policies have been 
necessarily bad for Uganda's economy. After all, as shown above, the NRM's 
liberalization and deregulation policies have increased growth and foreign 
investment in Uganda. However, the pressure of major donors to focus on 
physical rehabilitation and economic reforms may be partly responsible for
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the NRM's delay in drafting national poverty-eradication plans and 
strategies. This is not to say that infrastructural reconstruction and 
economic reform do not contribute to poverty reduction--obviously they do. 
Still, aside from the general commitments of its 10-Point Programme, the NRM
government has been slow in drafting a comprehensive poverty reduction 
strategy or setting specific poverty reduction targets. In fact, the 
government's 1993 Rehabilitation and Development Plan (RDP) in 1993 does not
explicitly list 'poverty reduction' as a key criteria for development 
projects and the World Bank-supported Programme for the Alleviation o f Poverty Social
Costs o f Adjustment (PAPSCA) was only a temporary and minor contribution.
Donors' overpowering influence over Ugandan economic policy may also 
have undermined Ugandans' internalization of the policy debate on poverty. 
In fact, Ugandan officials have invariably complained about their lack of 
ownership over their government's policy-eradication efforts which many 
feel are controlled by the World Bank, the IMF and a small cadre of Ugandan 
government officials who serve as the Bank's interlocutors. Such was the 
case, for instance, in the drafting of Growing out of Poverty (1993) , the 
main profile on poverty produced jointly by the World Bank and the 
Government of Uganda in the mid 1990s. With the exception of a small 
cluster of Economists from the MFEP who enjoy a special relationship with 
the World Bank, few government officials from the line ministries or the 
social sectors participated actively in the report's production and the 
policy debates which emerged in the process remained inaccessible and 
remote from the concerns of most poor Ugandans. In 1997, with the release 
of an equity and socially-conscious Draft Poverty Action Plan it was hoped
that the spotlight would finally be placed on the issue of poverty 
reduction. The challenges involved in doing so for both the Ugandan 
government and for donors like UNDP and AA who are interested in pursuing a 
SHD/PCD agenda is the primary focus of my own work and of Chapters to come.
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In sum, while liberalization policies have increased market-based 
activity and the chances for more open competition in Uganda, the 
persistence of unclear rules of the game and poor law enforcement, 
protectionism and state-derived rents continue to produce high transaction 
costs, to limit efficiency and to act as disincentives to market entry and 
investment in Uganda--all concerns of the NIE. At the same time though, as 
highlighted by DD advocates, many of Uganda's economic bottlenecks lie in 
the persistence of clientelistic power relations and the inequitable manner 
in which Uganda's wealth is distributed, the lack of access to technical 
expertise, services or capital inputs in remote rural areas, and the 
limited access to power or organizational and lobbying capacity, especially 
among small businesses and truly poor and disempowered Ugandans.
C) Institutional Opportunities and Constraints in Civil Society and 
Uganda's System of International Development Cooperation.
Within civil society, Uganda has made significant progress in 
fostering an open and diverse community in which human rights are respected 
and both donor and grassroots development initiatives encouraged. To begin 
with, Uganda is presently party to most international human rights 
instruments and maintains an open policy of reception to human rights 
groups. And, in the 1995 Constitution, the Ugandan government 
introduced several legal advances in the area of human rights, including 
the permanent establishment of a Uganda Human Rights Commission which
investigates emerging human rights complaints. Moreover, as noted 
earlier in this Chapter, the NRM has from the outset made a conscious 
effort not to discriminate any of Uganda's numerous ethnic groups and has 
incorporated members from former political parties into the NRM government.
Also to be commended are the NRM's genuine efforts to enhance the 
public representation of special interest groups such as women, youth and 
the disabled, all of whom have guaranteed representation in Parliament and 
are accorded special attention in the 1995 Constitution. Likewise, the
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NRM has allowed the proliferation of various competing newspapers, the 
airwaves were open to private entrepreneurs in 1994, both business 
associations and unions are permitted to operate, all religious groups are 
tolerated. Finally, since 1986, Uganda has witnessed the mushrooming of 
1,500 foreign and indigenous NGOs (about 300 of them are believed to be 
international) which, despite compulsory registration for the larger NGOs, 
operate in a fairly laissez-faire manner and, in their aggregate, have annual
expenditures of around US$ 125 million--an amount equal to the World Bank's 
30% contribution towards the Rehabilitation and Development Plan in 1992/93.
Nevertheless, as in other sectors, Ugandan civil society still has 
far to go before becoming the tolerant, well-informed and proactive civil 
society crucial for the fulfilment of SHD/PCD ideals of 'Sound governance'.
Occasional Intolerance Towards Alternative Views in Civil Society
One of the most preoccupying aspects of the NRM regime in Uganda is 
the political intimidation sometimes experienced by activists, journalists, 
and politically-oriented NGOs. In the labour sector, although unions are 
legal, the use of police to break strikes and the arrest of union leaders 
has taken place in public sector industries like the former Uganda Transport
Bus Company [UTC] and Uganda R a i l w a y s At least 20 journalists have been
harassed or taken to court on sedition charges or for breaching 
'professional decorum' after having published stories which offended 
President Museveni. And, politicized and confrontational Ugandan NGOs such 
as the Ugandan Human Rights Activists (UHRA) , the National Organization o f  Educators and
Election Monitors (NOCEM) , the Ugandan Law Society (ULS) , the Centre for Constitutional
Governance (CCG) , and the Foundation for African Development (FAD) have had their
meetings disrupted by state officials. ®® As a case in point, Lance Seera- 
Muwanga, Executive Director of UHRA was allegedly detained without trial in
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Muwanga, Executive Director of UHRA was allegedly detained without trial in 
1987 for giving an interview critical of the NRM regime and the Ugandan
Federation o f Women Lawyers (FIDA) has avoided politically-sensitive issues like
the detainment of women in military barracks to avoid government criticism.
Hence, although tolerance and respect for the rule of law has 
improved substantially in Uganda over the last 10 years and some of the 
above allegations remain unsubstantiated while others may well be 
propaganda, as Susan Dicklich points out, the NRM has not always been as 
tolerant as it could be of civil society groups who challenge the status 
quo and do not function in an apolitical and non-confrontational manner.
An Impoverished, Traditional and Marginalized Rural Majority
The other serious obstacle standing in the way of a well-informed and 
politically active civil society in Uganda is the impoverished and 
marginalized estate of the majority of Ugandans, especially in rural areas. 
As already mentioned above, by some estimates, as many as two-thirds of 
Ugandans are classified as poor and most lack access to even basic social 
services and information. In the view of some analysts, the de facto 
privatization of social services in Uganda is undesirable on several 
grounds. First of all, the whole depends on the goodwill of foreign 
donors. Secondly, the system heightens poverty and reinforces existing 
inequalities by making poor Ugandans pay for mediocre public services with 
out-of-pocket payments. And, thirdly, the system hides the reality that 
the social services available in both the public and private sector rely on 
the staff, equipment and distribution channels of the state.
Having a population as impoverished, unhealthy and illiterate as 
Uganda's has calamitous consequences for building a dynamic civil society: 
Illiterate persons with no access to newspapers or incapable of reading one
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can not inform themselves about current affairs or their legal rights and 
are unlikely to take an active role in political processes which they do 
not fully understand and can only be explained to them by their patrons. 
Persons who are unwell, have no means of transport, no assets to invest, or 
who must carry out numerous economic activities (including predatory ones) 
at once simply to survive are unlikely to have the free time to attend 
local meetings or to join local community associations. Similarly, Ugandan 
villagers governed by tribal loyalties and traditional beliefs (e.g., the 
belief that women should not own land) and who have limited access to 
information, modern scientific knowledge or training are unlikely to 
challenge social norms or manage multisectoral SHD/PCD efforts.
A Fragmented, Duplicative and Unaccountable Donor Community
One last factor to be taken into consideration is the nature of 
Uganda's international development cooperation system. Claims that it is 
donors who have sustained basic social services and spearheaded grassroots 
development initiatives in Uganda are irrefutable. On the other hand, it is 
equally true that the traits which the donor community has assumed in 
Uganda over the years may also be counterproductive to achieving long-term 
Sustainable Human Development and a self-reliant Ugandan civil society.
There are a number of explanations for this. The first is that the 
international development community in Uganda has dominated development 
processes in the country and, in the process, has tended to reinforce the 
lack of national ownership and the unequal relationship between donors and 
recipients in the country. Even more ominous though, "donors' support of 
some areas of government but not others" has created "problems of 
comparability between civil servants receiving supplementation and others 
who did not" and "may have postponed the necessary restructuring of 
ministries and reduction in over-staffing". Another detrimental
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characteristic of donor assistance in Uganda is that the donor community is 
itself uncoordinated and highly atomized. As such, development approaches 
vary tremendously from donor to donor, both in terms of ideology and 
methodology. The lack of coordination means that donors often duplicate 
each others' work and concentrate most of their activities in the central 
zone surrounding Kampala and in the health and education sectors and in the 
process neglect the needs of Ugandans who do fall under such parameters.
In the case of international NGOs, a different phenomenon has 
occurred and that is the tendency for such NGOs to bypass the Ugandan 
government altogether. Part of the problem is rooted in the inability of 
the underfunded NGO Registration Board to effectively coordinate NGO
activities with the government's development efforts so as to avoid 
duplication. The other side of the coin though is that NGOs rarely feel 
accountable to Ugandan government authorities who they view as too 
demoralized or corrupt to be trusted with development funds.
Unfortunately, by neglecting the Ugandan government, NGOs end up operating 
in policy vacuum which hinders the sustainability of their efforts.
In short, despite the NRM's tolerance towards opponents and NGOs, 
major contextual and institutional contraints still stand in the way of a 
fully open Ugandan civil society. As DD thinkers would emphasize, many of 
the remaining obstacles are attributable to the inequitable distribution of 
resources, and the growing impoverishment and political marginalization of 
most poor Ugandans. Yet, as noted by NIE thinkers, some constraints are 
due to technical deficiencies and self-interested behaviour in Ugandan 
civil society and in the system of international cooperation.
Ill. The Theoretical and Implementation Implications of Persisting
Institutional Constraints for Uganda's Future Human Development
From the above discussion we can draw out a number of important 
empirical and theoretical lessons about the potential of SHD/PCD in Uganda.
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First, the NRM government has proven to be earnestly committed to a 
process of national reconciliation, rehabilitation and institutional 
reform. Early on, it itself to a 10-Point Programme comprised of development
goals similar to SHD/PCD ideals. A few years into its rule, the NRM also 
introduced of far-reaching political and economic institutional reforms to 
restore Ugandans' trust in the state, the competitiveness of the economy, 
and the diversity of Ugandan civil society. These reforms have 
undoubtedly improved Ugandans' Human Development prospects.
On the other hand, without detracting from Museveni's achievements, 
the discussion in this Chapter shows that serious constraints are still 
standing in the way of Uganda's Human Development. (Refer to Table 4.3 for a
summary of persisting constraints in Uganda). These mostly institutional 
constraints are prevalent in the state and market sectors as well as within 
Ugandan civil society and, until they are resolved, the "Pearl" is unlikely 
to rise again. Hence, despite the impressive strides made by the NRM 
regime, the Ugandan state is still not subject to organized competition 
from opposition parties, the Ugandan civil service remains underfunded, 
demoralized, uncoordinated and corrupt, and Ugandan policy debates and 
decision-making mechanisms are still dominated by foreign interests and a 
small elite of government officials and hence, remain inaccessible to the 
majority of poor and unorganized Ugandans. Economically, despite the NRM's 
physical rehabilitation and economic liberalization efforts, persistent 
protectionism, state-derived rents and tribal/village links, lack of access 
to markets, inputs or services in rural areas, and both unclear rules and 
poor rule enforcement continue to undermine competitive economic 
activities. And, in civil society, the reluctance of NGOs to become 
politically involved, clientelistic power relations, lack of information, 
illiteracy, and poverty in the Ugandan countryside, have all made it 
difficult for poor Ugandans to organize or to express voice.
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Theoretically speaking, the evidence presented above confirms that 
wider institutional constraints continue to hinder the realization of 
SHD/PCD approaches in Uganda and suggests that such institutional 
constraints are as much related to problems of undemocratic governance and 
unequal access to wealth and productive assets--the key concerns of DD 
thinkers--as they are rooted in unclear rules of the game, high transaction 
costs resulting from persistent regulation and rent-seeking behaviour and 
poor coordination within the international development cooperation system 
and lack of technical knowledge, organizational capacities or free time 
within poor beneficiary communities--all preoccupations of NIE advocates.
As for why these constraints have persisted despite the reform 
efforts of the NRM government, the response seems to be threefold. The 
first reason is that reform processes are by nature both difficult and 
gradual, especially when one is dealing with constraints which have been 
deeply-embedded in Ugandan society over decades of conflict and bad rule. 
The second reason is that Ugandan development policy has been greatly 
dictated by foreign donors and a small elite of government officials who 
have often sought to protect their own power base (e.g., donors 
prioritizing direct foreign investment or Ugandan government officials 
delaying the privatization of state enterprises from which they derive 
benefits) rather than addressing the Human Development needs of poor
Ugandans. The third reason though is that the 'Sound governance' agenda 
which constitutes part of SHD/PCD approaches is itself flawed, and hence, 
difficult, for any government to realize. Although the problematic nature 
of the 'Sound governance' agenda is too complex to address in depth, it is 
important to point out that there is no agreement on what 'Sound 
governance' means nor on operational benchmarks with which to measure its 
progress. Moreover, the 'Sound governance'/democratization discourse 
has become one of the magic trio of "development panaceas" (along with 
'the market' and 'civil society') which is commonly used in vague.
173
simplistic, and biased ways. In this respect ,it could be argued that, 
like the SHD/PCD paradigm, the 'Sound governance' agenda is itself a Baroque
Science in as far as it has become an ambiguous "public-policy wish list"
which tries to be all things to all persons yet the links and the 
prioritization of its various parts are not fully understood, and the 
agenda's components are themselves sometimes at odds with one another 
(e.g., democratizing government is among the goals/ends of the 'Sound 
governance' agenda but doing so through external pressure runs counter to 
the 'Sound governance' agenda's commitment to self-determination and 
participatory processes/means). Finally, some have criticized the 'Sound 
governance' agenda on the grounds that it has been dictated by Western 
countries who do not adhere to its ideals but use the agenda for "regime 
maintenance" and to secure their power base rather than to challenge 
unequal and undemocratic relations at the global and national level.
The above caveats aside, it is still important to ascertain how far 
Uganda has advanced in the realization of the ideal type 'Sound governance'
principles put forth in the SHD/PCD agenda. The evidence above shows that 
although the NRM government has not fared badly in this respect, it still 
has far to go in creating a system of governance which is responsive to the 
human needs of the majority of poor Ugandans. The chapters which follow 
given an account of how two different international development 
organizations (UNDP and AA) attempt to implement SHD/PCD approaches in 
Uganda in the context of the above institutional constraints and their own 
contestable assumptions and organizational interests and limitations.
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Table 3 : Life
live
Expectancy at 
births)
Birth (in years) and Infant Mortality Rates (per 1000
KENYA TANZANIA UGANDA
Life
Expectancy
(Yrs)
Infant
Mortality
Rate
Life
Expectancy
(Yrs)
Infant
Mortality
Rate
Life
Expectancy
(Yrs)
Infant
Mortality
Rate
1970 50.0 102.0 45.1 132.0 49.8 108.0
1971 50.5 100.0 45.6 131.0 50.2 106.6
1972 51.0 90.0 46.0 130.0 50.7 104.4
1973 51.5 96.0 46.1 129.0 50.3 106.6
1974 52.0 92.0 46.3 127.0 49.9 111.1
1975 52.5 90.0 46.4 126.0 49.5 113.3
1976 5.30 80.0 46.5 125.0 49.1 115.5
1977 53.5 06.4 46.6 123 .8 48.7 115.5
1978 53.9 84.8 46.8 122.7 40.6 115.5
1979 54 .4 84.1 47.0 122.2 40.5 115.5
1900 54.9 03.2 47.2 121.5 48.4 115.5
1981 55.4 81.6 47.4 120.6 48.4 115.5
1902 55.9 80.0 47.5 119.2 48.3 115.5
1983 56 .4 78.4 47.7 118 .4 40.3 115.5
1904 56.9 76.0 47.0 117.6 40.3 115.5
1905 57.4 75.1 48.0 116.9 48.3 115.4
1906 57.9 74.0 48.2 116 .1 48.2 115.4
1907 58.6 71.9 48.3 115.3 48.2 115.4
1908 58.7 70.3 48.1 115.3 47.8 115.9
1909 58.9 60.0 47.0 115.3 ^ 47.3 116.4
1990 58.8 67.2 47.5 115.3 46.9 117.0
1991 58.9 65.4 47.7 110.5 46.9 116.7
1992 50.8 63.1 49.4 93.7 45.8 122.5
1993 58.0 61.0 50.9 04.3 45.6 ^ 121.1
1994 58.8 60.7. 52.2 82.1 45.D 120.3
1995* 59.1 - 52.4 - 43.1 N.A
*Provisional estimates
Source : World Bank: World Development Report, various issues. The World Bank,
Washington DiC.
UNDP: 1993: Human Development Report.
Source: Fred Opio. "The Dynamics of Poverty in Uganda: The Soci^
6-7, 1995. Kampala, Uganda.
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Table 3.3: Functional classification of Government Recurrent Expenditure
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95
Administration and social 80.3% 47.1% 66.7% 82.7% 83.2%
General public service 2/ 16.8% 22.6% 22.5% 41.2% 39.9%
Security 3/ 37.5% 13.3% 23.8% 22.9% 26.9%
Education 4/ 17.5% 4.1% 14.1% 12.0% 10.8%
Health 5/ 5.6% 1.4% 5.1% 4.8% 4.2%
Other social services 6/ 3.0% 5.7% 1.2% 1.8% 1.4%
Economic Functions 
of which:
8.6% 18.1% 6.4% 6.0% 4.8%
Rural areas 7/ 3.4% 2.3% 2.5% 1.8% 1.8%
Others 8/ 5.2% 15.8% 3.9% 4.2% 3.0%
Unallocated items 0.6% 6.9% 5.5% 0.0% 0.4%
Interest payments (Net) 10.5% 27.9% • 21.5% 11.3% 11.6%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
1/ For 1988/89-1991/92, based on cash releases and includes expenditure on 
Statutory expenditure and for 1992/93-1993/94 based on cheques printed.
2/ Comprises President's Office, State House, V/President, P/Minister, Public Service,
Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and Economic Planning, Judiciary, N/Assembly 
Audit, Local Government, Public Service Commission, Law Reform Commission, Decentralised Services 
3/ Comprises Defence, Internal Affairs, Police, Prisons.
4/ Comprises Education, Makerere, and Uganda Management Institute, Teaching Service Commission,
5/ Health ministry, Mulago hospital.
6/ Information and Broadcasting, Labour, Women in Development, Karamoja Development Agency 
Mass Mobilisation, and Inspectorate of Government.
7/ Agriculture, Connmerce, Trade and Industry, National Agricultural Res. Organisation 
8/ Comprises Lands, Works Transport and Communications, Tourism, and Energy.
Source: Background to the Budget, 1995-1996.
Ministry of Finance and Econcxnic Planning. Government of Uganda. 
Kampala, Uganda, 1995.
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Têüsle 4.3: Major Contextual and Institutional Constraints
Impeding Uganda's Human Development
Institutional
Sector
Persisting Contextual and 
Institutional Constraints in Uganda
Within the 
State
• Persistent Civil War & Intra-Regional Conflict
• Limited Democracy 6 Freedom
• Clientelistic & Parochial RC/LC Rule
• Limited Government Resources, Expert Knowledge or Skills
• Continued Rent-Seeking & Corruption
Within the 
Market
• Donor-Led and Exclusive Policy-Making
• A Small Capitalist Class with Strong Black Market as well 
as Tribal/Village Links
• A Disorganized & Marginalized Working Class
• Persistent Protectionism & Rent-Seeking Behaviour
• Lack of Access to Markets, Inputs, Services in Remote 
Rural areas
• Unclear Rules of the Game & Uneven Law Enforcement
Within 
Civil 
Society 
& the Donor 
Community
• No Guarantee of Tolerance Towards Politicized and 
Confrontational Oppostion within Civil Society
• Fragmented, Duplicative & Unaccountable Donor Community
• Impoverished, Traditional & Marginalized Rural Majority
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Chapter 5 :
The Rude Awakening:
UNDP's Implementation of Sustainable Human 
Development in Uganda and Beyond
If we are not serious [about participation and empowerment], 
let us stop using these words. If we are serious, let us 
recognize that we are talking about radical change.... There 
has been time enough to change policies, to adjust programmes, 
to re-design projects, to invent and implement procedures. 
Something much deeper is needed....The challenge is personal, 
professional and institutional.
Robert Chambers ^
I. Introduction; UNDP's Implementation of SHD/PCD Approaches in Uganda 
and Beyond--The Baroque Science and River PolIutinQ Phenomena Revisited
By the early 1990s, UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD approaches were 
widely acclaimed in the international community and beginning to gain 
momentum far beyond UNDP's HDRO. By the time James Gustave Speth had 
become Administrator in 1993, UNDP had made a conscious decision to make 
the SHD/PCD paradigm the agencies chief mandate and raison d ’etre and set in
motion a series of policy, organizational and programme reforms to equip 
itself to realize its new-found mission. The purpose of this Chapter is to 
test the validity of both the Baroque Science and River Pollution Phenomena
presented in the first chapter of the thesis by exploring whether the 
conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm described in Chapter 3 have 
indeed hindered UNDP's operationalization implementation of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm and determining whether the core transformative goals of the 
SHD/PCD agenda have been displaced in the process and, if so, determining 
why and how this has occurred.
This chapter tries to answer these questions by exploring how UNDP 
has changed as a result of its adoption of SHD/PCD approaches and what 
factors motivated UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches; how exactly UNDP 
has gone about interpreting, operationalizing and implementing SHD/PCD 
approaches both in headquarters (HQ) and in the field in Uganda; what kinds 
of constraints and disruptions UNDP has met in the process; and what
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development impact the agency's SHD/PCD efforts have had thus far, both 
globally and at the field level in Uganda. The chapter analyzes the full 
transition of SHD/PCD from paradigm to practice by tracing the various 
steps involved in the process. As such, the chapter is organized around 
UNDP's adoption and promotion of SHD/PCD at the conceptual, policy, 
programme/project levels and each section analyses UNDP's impact on the 
five core SHD/PCD components and guidelines outlined in Chapter 1. Hence, 
while the first section on UNDP's conceptual interpretation of SHD/PCD 
analyses UNDP's achievements in producing multi-sectoral, holistic and 
integrated development; the policy section explores UNDP's donor 
coordination efforts and its advocacy impact on 'Sound governance' issues; 
and the last section the programme/project level looks at UNDP's progress 
in enhancing North-South partnerships and national ownership, fostering 
beneficiary participation and empowerment, and improving equity and the 
public service needs, capabilities and self-reliance of the poorest. With 
respect to time-lines, the Chapter focusses on the implementation of UNDP's 
Fifth Programming Cycle (1992-1996) which is the first to contain strong SHD/PCD
components. On top of this, the Chapter places special attention on what 
was happening in 1995, the year in which I visited UNDP headquarters (HQ) 
in New York and the UNDP-Uganda Country Programme (CP) and in which UNDP's 
promotion of SHD/PCD was at its peak as the agency UNDP prepared itself to 
influence the 1995 World Summit for Social Development (WSSD).
II. UNDP Before and After the Adoption of SHD/PCD in Uganda and Beyond
Obviously, UNDP's transition towards SHD/PCD approaches, both in HQ 
and in the field in Uganda has been gradual and ongoing. As such, there is 
no clear date on which one can pin UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD. However, as 
UNDP's first programming cycle designed with SHD/PCD goals in mind, the 
Fifth Programming Cycle is a useful watermark for comparing the way UNDP 
operated before and after the adoption of SHD/PCD in Uganda and beyond.
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A) UNDP Before and After the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches
Although the United Nations became involved in technical assistance 
work immediately after WWII, UNDP did not come into being until 1966 when 
it was given a mandate to "facilitate overall planning and needed 
coordination of the several types of technical cooperation programmes 
carried on" and to allocate its resources in an equitable and universal 
manner world-wide.  ^ For most of the 1960s and much of the early 1970s, 
UNDP's development work consisted mostly of financing traditional forms of 
technical assistance--i.e., foreign expertise, fellowships and imported 
equipment. Agricultural development (e.g., locust control, rice growing, 
livestock production, digging water wells, etc.), natural resources (e.g., 
hydrology projects, mineral exploration, etc.), infrastructure (e.g., 
navigation administration, civil aviation and telecommunications training, 
etc.), industry (e.g., coal mining, iron production, etc.) and development 
planning (e.g., regional and sectoral planning, statistical training) were 
all among the UNDP's favoured areas of support during this period. By 
1975, however, after undertaking a major examination of the impact of its 
technical assistance efforts, UNDP decided to add "new dimensions" to its 
work, including building up the productivity, managerial, technical and 
research capacities of recipient governments and promoting greater self- 
reliance among developing countries. These new dimensions represented an 
early attempt to move beyond blueprint project packages, dependence on 
outside experts and technology and the excessive preoccupation with inputs 
by focussing more on results, building indigenous capacities, introducing 
more flexible policies and forms of technical cooperation, increasing local 
purchases of equipment, and encouraging LDC governments and institutions to 
assume greater responsibility for the execution of UNDP-financed projects.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, UNDP had become known as a leader 
of technical cooperation at the country level as well as an effective
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problem-solving agency with strong field offices and solid relationships 
with LDC governments. Around that time though, the steady proliferation of 
UN system funding agencies began to undermine UNDP's coordinating role as 
well as threatening its funding base. It was in the context of this newly 
competitive environment that UNDP decided to seek new forms of financing by 
establishing special trusts, entering into a wide range of cost-sharing 
arrangements with recipient governments and third parties, providing 
management support services to other development agencies, and becoming 
directly involved in operational implementation. By the early 1980s, UNDP 
was administering ten separate trust funds with expenditures of over US$50 
million a year and the number of organizations acting as executors of UNDP- 
supported projects had grown from the original six to 29, including UNDP's 
own Office For Project Execution, established in 1973. By this time UNDP 
was also overseeing other UN funds in the field (chiefly, the UN Population
Fund, the World Food Programme, and the Voluntary Fund for Women) , leading
roundtable consultations on international cooperation with fellow donors, 
assuming the chairmanship of several international steering committees and 
supporting a wide range of research initiatives and world conferences. ^
By 1990, UNDP worked in 152 countries, had a network of 112 field 
offices, had 6,140 projects under execution, and contracted out 21, 944 
consultants (about half were international and half national) and close to 
6, 888 staff members (most of them nationals and in the field). By its 
4th Programming Cycle (1987-1991) UNDP had achieved expenditures of US$ 3.7 
billion, compared to only US$ 2.6 billion during its Third Programming 
Cycle (1982-1986). The largest amount of UNDP funds in 1990 were going 
towards general development issues (approximately 22% of programme 
expenditures), with agriculture and fishing (20%), industry (12%), natural 
resources (11%) and transport and communications (8%) also constituting 
important sectors, but with health (4%), human settlements (4%) education 
(3.8%) lagging considerably behind. ■*
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On the basis of the above narrative, it is evident that, although 
almost from its inception, UNDP worked in a multi-sectoral fashion and made 
a conscious effort to expand its network of field offices, to build strong 
links with recipient governments, and to expand its funding base as well as 
its range of services and sectors of work, by the dawning of the Fifth 
Programming Cycle (1992-1996), UNDP was also facing serious challenges.
For one, UNDP's expansion into numerous new areas of work meant that the 
agency was more than ever suffering from a lack of focus or a unique niche 
for itself, the need to develop substantive expertise as well as research 
or policy analysis capacities of its own. Moreover, by becoming involved 
in so many development activities over the last three decades and by 
deciding to expand its own implementation and management services in 
response to financial difficulties and increased competition from fellow UN 
agencies, UNDP had never been able to realize its longer-term goals of 
fostering national ownership and greater self-reliance in the South or of 
playing the coordination and coherence role which it had been initially 
mandated to play within the UN system.
It is also important to remember that the end of the Cold War in the 
late 1980s made the position of international development agencies like 
UNDP even more precarious since, in the post Cold War era, neither the 
Western or Eastern bloc needed to continue outdoing one another in order to 
capture the loyalties of the Third World through generous development aid 
programmes which were by then thought to have only limited development 
impact. This shift in the winds proved to be an especially difficult blow 
for UNDP which had prospered in the 1960s and 1970s precisely by building 
close links with southern governments but which consisted mostly of 
generalists managers and hence lacked its own niche, in-house substantive 
or policy-influencing expertise, especially in the field or strong links 
with actors other than recipient and donor governments. In fact, a study 
of UNDP's effectiveness commissioned by the governments of Denmark, India,
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Sweden and the UK, criticizes UNDP precisely for having played too much of 
a 'mailbox function' or 'processing function' for other agencies for far 
too long during its earlier years ® and a private consultancy firm told 
UNDP as early as 1991 that if it wanted to survive the challenges of the 
post Cold War era, it had no choice but to become a thought-leader, assume 
greater global leadership, reduce its cumbersome procedures and numerous 
projects, and carve out a niche for itself in the UN and the aid regime at 
large. ’’ It is in this difficult context in which UNDP decided to adopt 
SHD/PCD approaches as the cornerstone of its development mandate by the 
early 1990s and to eventually place SHD/PCD guidelines at the centre of the 
agency's Fifth Programming Cycle.
In the eyes of Mr. Speth and other senior UNDP managers, SHD/PCD 
answered their prayers by providing UNDP with unprecedented public profile 
as an intellectual leader and counterweight to the World Bank's neo-Liberal 
agenda, a newly focussed mandate, and a unique niche to help it compete for 
diminishing funds with the specialized agencies of the UN system which 
already had their own sectoral focus and were beginning to work in new 
cross-sectoral areas to capture a bigger portion of the international 
development cooperation pie. The prevalence of organizational interests in 
the motives behind UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD is evident in UNDP documents 
and speeches. Indeed, in his opening statements to the UNDP Executive 
Board in 1996, Mr. Speth reminded his constituents that it was precisely in 
response to declining core resources ® that UNDP was trying to transform 
itself into 'the recognized leader and powerful champion of SHD/PCD'.® The 
explicit link between UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches and the 
agency's pursuit of its own organizational interests emerged as a dominant 
theme during my interviews as well. According to Ms. Saraswathi Menon, at 
the time a policy analyst in UNDP's HDRO, while claiming that UNDP had 
adopted SHD/PCD in order to resolve its financial crisis was going too far, 
UNDP had undeniably continued supporting the promotion of SHD/PCD
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approaches because the approach appealed to potential donors. The 
finding that UNDP adopted the SHD/PCD paradigm largely as a means of 
fulfilling its organizational interests, does not, however, mean that UNDP 
was never committed to implementing SHD/PCD approaches. Quite the 
contrary, during the Fifth Cycle, UNDP introduced many conceptual, policy, 
organization and programme reforms to help it move in this direction.
For example, at the conceptual level, UNDP proclaimed its commitment 
to SHD/PCD as early as 1993 when it declared that the agency's two-fold 
mission was: First, "to assist countries in their endeavour to achieve
Sustainable Human Development" ; and. Second: "to support the United Nations in
the endeavour to achieve world peace, human security and development." 
UNDP's conceptual commitment to SHD/PCD was unequivocally reiterated in 
UNDP's 1996 Mission Statement (reproduced in Table 5.1 ) which affirms that 
UNDP's mission is to help countries achieve Sustainable Human Development by
assisting them in the design and implementation of development programmes 
based on what UNDP has labelled the four E's: The Eradication of Poverty,
Employment Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods, Empowerment of Women, and 
Environmental Protection and Regeneration, with first priority going 
towards Poverty Eradication. The adoption of a SHD/PCD mandate and the 
pursuit of the four E's were intended to give UNDP a new sense of direction 
as well as an integrated framework on which to focus its development work. 
Finally, at its 1994 global UNDP meeting in Rye, New York, senior staff 
agreed on seven prerequisites to operationalize SHD/PCD for UNDP.
At the level of policy, UNDP's Fifth Programming Cycle differed from 
former ones in that it involved UNDP much more proactively in what the 
agency now calls Upstream work--i.e., in policy analysis and in assuming an
intellectual leadership role in current development debates and 
institutional reforms. At the global level, examples of such efforts 
include UNDP's attempts to influence the outcomes of the 1995 WSSD through
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the policy proposals put forward in its 1994 HDR “ as well as the UNDP
Administrator's policy contribution to key international documents such as 
Agenda for Development. At the national level, UNDP has encouraged
recipient governments to draft national Human Development and poverty
eradication plans and national HDRs. In terms of donor and aid 
coordination, at the behest of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros 
Ghali, UNDP Administrator Speth has tried to play a greater policy and aid 
coordination role within the UN at large. And at the national level, the 
Fifth Cycle has led to the establishment of a network of high-profile UN 
Resident Coordinators (who are usually but not always UNDP's Resident
Representative--RR) equipped to oversee and ease collaboration between all 
UN activities in the field; the introduction of a mechanism for joint UN- 
government development planning in the form of the Country Strategy Note (CSN) ;
and a shift towards greater harmonization of country programme presentation 
and budgetary procedures through the Joint Consultative Group on Policy ( JCGP) which
includes UN agencies such as UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, IFAD, WFP UNHCR. Each 
of these initiatives were intended to improve UN-wide coordination both 
globally and in the field and to reassert UNDP's coordination functions 
within the UN at both levels.
The 1990s brought numerous changes into UNDP at the programme level 
as well. First of all, in terms of programme expenditures, although 
sectoral allocations did not change dramatically from the Fourth to the 
Fifth Programme cycles, the available evidence shows that UNDP did somewhat 
reduce the proportion of its funds going towards its traditional sectors of 
agriculture, fishing, and industry and started investing more money (though 
not much more) in general development (i.e., development planning, policy 
work, cross-cutting themes, etc.) and in social development areas like 
health, education and settlements. On top of this, a review of 79 UNDP 
CPs covering both the Fourth and Fifth cycles revealed a definite shift in
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emphasis towards poverty and Human Development concerns. According to the
study, not only are the programmes executed under UNDP's Fifth Cycle more 
multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional in approach but 76% of the Fifth cycle 
programmes sampled addressed poverty alleviation as a theme, compared with 
only 34% of the programmes for the same countries in the Fourth cycle.
Other recent programme innovations at UNDP include the establishment 
of nine Centres of Experimentation (Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Egypt, 
Mali, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam and Zimbabwe) which have been encouraged 
to innovate and to form a network of 'change agents' within UNDP the 
launch of newly flexible and collaborative initiatives with grassroots 
organizations, including the Partners in Development Programme (PDP) , the Local
Initiative for Urban Environment (LIFE) and th e  Africa 2000 N etw ork--aX I of them aimed
at building bridges between LDC governments, UNDP, NGOs and Community-Based 
Organizations (CBOs) the introduction of more effective methods of 
measuring development impact in the form of the Programme Impact Performance
Assessment--PI PA; the replacement of UNDP's entitlement-based system of
resource allocation with the Target for Resource Assignment (TRAC) which disburses
funds to country programmes on a much more competitive basis depending on 
each CP's SHD/PCD performance; and an increase in the proportion of UNDP 
funds channelled to Least Developed Countries (LLDCS) during the Fifth 
Cycle: Between 1977-81, 64% of the country-level Indicative Planning 
Figures (IPF) went to LLDCs with GNP/pc below US$ 500, yet by 1982-1986, 
this had risen to 79% and, by 1995, 87% of UNDP core resources went to 
LLDCs with annual pc GNP of US $750 or less. During the Fifth Cycle UNDP 
also shifted towards a much more holistic and integrated Programmatic approach
to development planning. Thanks to its adoption of a Programmatic approach
during the Fifth Cycle, UNDP has also been able to reduce the total number 
of UNDP-supported projects by half (from 6,888 in 1990 down to 3,811 
projects by 1995) while keeping total project budgets constant.
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Finally, in an effort to decentralize authority from UNDP HQ to the 
field and to build greater capacity and ownership in recipient countries, 
UNDP used the Fifth Cycle to promote National Execution (NEX) as the preferred
implementation modality for UNDP-Supported programmes. " By 1993, the 
share of nationally-executed projects at UNDP had jumped to 75%, the use of 
national experts had more than doubled and personnel costs declined since 
the personnel costs of NEX projects were lower than they had been for 
agency-executed projects which had become dependent on costly international 
consultants yet were the norm in previous UNDP cycles. And, in order to 
facilitate National Execution, during the Fifth cycle UNDP also delegated
authority downward to country offices for procurement of project budgets of 
up to US $100,000. As part of its effort to delegate more power from HQ 
to the field, at the 1994 Rye Conference for senior UNDP managers, UNDP HQ 
made a genuine effort to incorporate RRs into the agency's brainstorming 
process about UNDP's future. Nevertheless, there is no denying--even 
within HQ--that, despite the above decentralization efforts, relations 
between UNDP HQ and field offices remain very top-down. In the case of the 
Rye Conference, for example, UNDP HQ had already decided to make SHD/PCD 
the cornerstone of its mandate before inviting RRs to discuss the agency's 
future and it was clearly New York HQ which defined the parameters of the 
discussions which took place at Rye. During my interview with Ms. Sharon 
Capeling Alajika, Chief of OESP, conceded that, the impetus for 
implementing SHD/PCD had emanated predominantly from UNDP HQ and that 
motivating RRs to carry out SHD/PCD at the field level was proving 
extremely difficult since some RRs viewed New York HQ as a distant paper 
maze imposing utopian ideas--such as SHD/PCD--upon the field.
(Table 5.2 shows UNDP's increased emphasis on poverty alleviation and 
on use of national human resources during its Fifth cycle.)
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In the realm of management, in 1993, UNDP created an in house 
Transition Team which designed a 7 Point Programme of Change at UNDP which
included translating global goals into operational activities, 
strengthening partnerships, promoting Resident Coordinators, Human Resource 
Management, restructuring HQ, and decentralizing and streamlining.
During the Fifth Cycle UNDP also created an Office o f  Evaluation and Strategic Planning
(OESP) which has provided UNDP with its first Corporate Plan and a 
Strategic Planning Framework aimed at introducing UNDP to 'results-oriented 
management' by identifying specific success indicators based on the SHD/PCD 
framework. UNDP has tried to enhance its organizational effectiveness 
by strengthening linkages between the various UNDP Departments spearheading 
SHD/PCD within UNDP HQ as well. However, during my interviews with UNDP 
officials at New York HQ, a number of officials conceded that mechanisms of 
collaboration between the HDRO and UNDP's operational departments were 
still few that there were still tensions between the thinkers and doers 
within the agency that staff in UNDP's regional bureaux often felt 
isolated and that they had few chances for cross-regional learning that 
coordination between UNDP departments occurred mainly between senior-level 
officials but rarely at lower levels and, that turf battles between the 
current Directors of the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) and the Office of
Development Studies (CDS) had resulted in the severance of ties between these
two offices even though both were intended to work hand in hand in the 
promotion of SHD/PCD at UNDP HQ. ”
Also in the area of management, UNDP has adopted a series of measures 
to become a more accountable and leaner organization. This has involved 
introducing staff performance systems based on more transparent and 
objective criteria, enhancing the career development opportunities of 
national professional staff, and pledging considerably more resources 
towards staff training. In terms of financial accountability, UNDP has
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introduced independent audits for its CPs and procedures for personal 
liability for financial loss to UNDP. Finally, in 1996 Speth announced 
that, from 1992-1997, UNDP will have reduced its administrative budget in 
real terms by 12%, have cut its regular staff at New York HQ by 31% and its 
total regular staff by 13%. (See Table 5.3 for an Organizational Chart 
of UNDP as the agency was in 1994, mid way through the Fifth Cycle).
B) The UNDP-Uganda Country Programme Before and After the Adoption of
SHD/PCD Approaches
Before the Fifth Programming Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda CP worked very 
much in the way in which UNDP operated elsewhere from the 1960s-1980s.
This involved mostly accounting to and receiving policy directives, 
guidelines, evaluation missions from New York HQ; providing technical 
assistance--usually in the form of fellowships, foreign experts, or 
equipment; and sustaining a considerable but mostly administrative and 
generalist cadre of national field staff to oversee between 40-60 projects 
(less than today due to the difficulties of working in warn-torn Uganda), 
most of them aimed at supporting the recipient government, implemented by 
fellow UN agencies, and concentrated in technical and scientific fields 
like agriculture and fishing, natural industry infrastructure and 
communications, and development administration. The amount of resources 
managed by the UNDP-Uganda CP grew steadily from US$ 10 million during the 
First Programming Cycle (1972-1976) up to US$ 50 million by the Fourth 
Programming Cycle (1988-1991) and eventually reached US$ 77 million during 
the Fifth Programming Cycle (1992-1996) . Follow-up work on conferences, 
chairmanships of committees, and participation in special working groups 
and roundtables continued to take place, but it was the management of the 
project portfolio (i.e., fulfilling the reporting demands of New York HQ, 
ensuring that consultants' contracts were signed on time or that 
tripartite evaluations were carried out for each project) which absorbed 
most of UNDP's national budget and the CP project officer's time, both in 
Uganda and elsewhere. Before the 5th Programming Cycle, on the basis of
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both its own strengths and the Ugandan government's Rehabilitation and Development
Plan (1987-1991) , the UNDP-Uganda CP concentrated on the rehabilitation of
Uganda's infrastructure and in strengthening the planning capacity of 
government institutions. Both goals emphasized high-tech solutions and 
central government ministries based in Kampala. During the 4th Programming 
Cycle, for example, the UNDP-Uganda CP had two major goals: Agriculture and 
Integrated Rural Development (which absorbed over 60% of the US$ 63 million 
spent during the cycle and consisted mostly of highly technological and 
government-centred projects like support to a Migratory Pest Unit in the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the rehabilitation of the National Parks and Game 
Reserve Department, the establishment of an agro-meteorological services 
and climatological data in the Department of Meteorology) and the 
Enhancement of Planning, Financial and Human Capacities (which absorbed the 
remainder to the budget and consisted mostly of capital-intensive sectoral 
projects in the areas of communications, infrastructure, and industry, but 
also included a handful of projects in support of public administration in 
the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, the Uganda Commercial 
Bank and the Uganda Development Bank). In essence, the Fourth Cycle UNDP- 
Uganda CP did not have Human Development or poverty reduction as an
overriding goal, it did not have any projects in the area of 'Sound 
governance', it had only four projects in the social sector (none in 
HIV/AIDS), and only two projects whose major goals included building the 
capacities of NGOs and community groups. Moreover, by UNDP's own 
admission, many of the 43 individual projects executed as part of its 
Fourth Cycle CP in Uganda were overly dispersed, lacked common goals or 
linkages, did not have counterpart inputs from government, and therefore, 
had limited long-term sustainability.
As in the rest of UNDP though, by the mid 1990s, the UNDP-Uganda CP 
started making a decisive shift towards SHD/PCD approaches.
199
To start, in its Fifth Programming Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda CP 
explicitly defines its goals as developing Uganda's human resources and 
enhancing national self-sufficiency as well as the Ugandan government's 
capacities in Human Development issues and social and economic policy
analysis. Accordingly, the UNDP-Uganda Office proposed that its Fifth 
Programming Cycle concentrate in four areas with strong parallels to the 
above-mentioned four Es: Policy and Management Capacity, Poverty
Alleviation and Rural Development, HIV/AIDS and Environment and Natural 
Resources, and that at least 60% of the Fifth Cycle's resources be invested 
in the first two. Although the shift in resources allocation from the 
Fourth to the Fifth cycles are not dramatic, the UNDP-Uganda CP for the 
Fifth Programming Cycle does represent an attempt to gradually place more 
emphasis on Human Development at the Upstream level by enhancing national 
capacities in the realm of policy and 'Sound governance' and at the 
Downstream level, by focussing much more on poverty alleviation and social
sectors. The latter was achieved by introducing more projects with a 
strong poverty focus, and especially projects aimed at strengthening the 
capacity of NGOs and CBOs at the community level. The shift, of course, 
coincided not only with UNDP's desire to pay more attention to Human
Development issues but with the Ugandan government's desire to focus more on
poverty eradication, as described in Chapter 4. Unluckily, because of 
dwindling core resources at UNDP, the resources of the UNDP-Uganda's CP 
were unexpectedly cut by 30% half through the 5th Programming Cycle. In 
the process, the UNDP-Uganda CP not only saw its budget diminish from US$
77 million down to US$ 57 million, but the area of Poverty Alleviation was 
hit the hardest. Instead of the projected US$ 27 million once intended for 
poverty alleviation and rural development projects, UNDP allocated only US$ 
16 million. *° In short, despite its initial efforts to prioritize poverty 
alleviation--i.e., what UNDP considered the most important of the four E's- 
-financial troubles caused UNDP to considerably lessen its emphasis on
200
poverty alleviation. In fact, the Mid Term Review of XJNDP-Uganda's 1992- 
1996 CP itself concludes that UNDP's development efforts had been spread 
too thinly among too many projects and that the CP would continue to lack 
focus or SHD/PCD impact unless it refocussed on poverty reduction and 
equitable development. (Table 5.4 shows how the resources of the UNDP- 
Uganda CP were declining by 1992 and how poverty alleviation never became 
the salient component of the UNDP-Uganda CP during the Fifth Cycle).
At the policy level, during the Fifth Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda Office 
has tried to further the SHD/PCD agenda in two ways. The first has been by 
supporting a series of Upstream-lev^el interventions aimed at promoting
'Sound governance' and wider political institutional reforms, including 
UNDP support to Uganda's civil service reform, electoral processes, and 
decentralization. The second way in which the UNDP-Uganda Office has 
tried to influence SHD/PCD policies has been by convening Uganda's first 
National Workshop on Human Development i.n January 1994. This workshop was
instrumental in bringing together Ugandan government officials, donors, 
NGOs, and Ugandan academics to debate and analyze the Uganda's Human
Development conditions and challenges. At the workshop, UNDP and the Ugandan
government also discussed ways of accelerating the promotion and 
implementation of SHD/PCD in Uganda through the creation of a National Task 
Force and SHD/PCD Technical Teams within the MFEP which would help the 
government design a Human Development Profile, and eventually, a SHD/PCD 
Strategy and Action Plan which would: i) specify priority SHD/PCD sectors 
and targets (e.g., poverty reduction, basic education, health and nutrition 
for all, etc.), ii) needed areas of national capacity building for the 
implementation of policies conducive to SHD/PCD (e.g., undertake 
independent research on methods to promote SHD/PCD in Uganda, develop 
guidelines to mainstream SHD/PCD at the policy and programme levels, set up 
a core team to develop a SHD/PCD strategy within government, set up a
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permanent data base and monitoring system on SHD/PCD, train district and 
local leaders on SHD/PCD etc.) and iii) a framework for dialogue between 
the government and donors to provide financial support for Human 
Development (e.g., promote SHD/PCD as the champion concept to lead the 
dialogue between donors and the Ugandan government, reform aid coordination 
mechanisms in Uganda, assign the office of the UN Resident Coordinator to 
lead the dialogue, integrate the programmes and budgets of donor agencies, 
etc.) At the time of my visit, UNDP-Uganda had designed a 1995 Plan
for the Operationalization of SHD/PCD to follow up on these proposals.
By late 1994, the promotion of SHD/PCD in Uganda had began to gain 
momentum at the organizational level as well. With the arrival of Dr. 
Babatunde Thomas as UNDP-Uganda's new RR, the UNDP-Uganda CP was given much 
needed intellectual gravitas, while the assignment of Dr. Joseph Opio 
Odongo as the UNDP-Uganda Office's first Human Development Advisor prompted 
an internal review of how SHD/PCD was being integrated into the Office's 
work. As the UNDP-Uganda Office's new RR, Dr. Thomas proceeded to 
stimulate the cross-fertilization of ideas as well as a more integrated, 
multi-sectoral, flexible, team learning approach to development. He did so 
largely by encouraging informal luncheon debates about SHD/PCD issues and 
bringing in outside analysts (such as myself) to talk during those 
occasions but also by establishing a series of multi-sectoral and multi- 
departmental office working groups such as the Strategic Planning, Policy and Resident
Coordination i/wz/- -SPPRC, the Programme Development and Resource Mobilization t/n/r- -PDRM,
and the Quality Management Group) , and re-organizing the UNDP-Uganda Office's
previously individual and sectorally-based project officers into two major 
clusters: Development Management and Governance Issues (Cluster I) and Human Survival
and Environmental Management (Cluster II). Under Dr. Thomas' stewardship,
the UNDP-Uganda Office began assuming a more proactive coordination role as 
well. This was achieved through Dr. Thomas' appointment as Resident
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Coordinator for the UN in Uganda, as well as through monthly meetings of 
the heads of the UN in Uganda chaired by UNDP and UNDP's leadership role in 
the Country Strategy Note (CSN) process--an attempt to plan development
objectives jointly between the government and all UN agencies in Uganda. 
However, despite UNDP's increased involvement in multi-sectoral projects 
and policy-level work, the UNDP-Uganda Office continued to be composed of a 
much larger cadre of administrative and support staff (41 UNDP staff in 
1994) than of technical or policy professionals (in 1994 the UNDP-Uganda 
Office had professional staff, of which only two--the SHD advisor and the 
Chief Economist were specialists) overseeing the Office 85 projects under 
implementation. Added to these numbers, of course, should be the numerous 
Chief Technical Advisors and fellow consultants hired under each of these 
projects and their own secretarial and office staff. (The Organizational 
Chart of the UNDP-Uganda Office in Table 5.5 attests to the large numbers 
generalists and of support staff absorbed by UNDP's still dispersed CP).
Finally, at the programme level, by the Fifth Programming Cycle, the 
UNDP-Uganda Country Office was making an effort to move from a project- 
based approach to development based on the individual formulation and 
implementation, and evaluation of numerous projects in various sectors 
towards a Programmatic approach in which development issues are closely inter­
linked, treated in a multi-sectoral fashion, and placed under the umbrella 
of wider coherent programmes. During the Fifth Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda CP 
also made important strides in building greater ownership of programmes 
among recipient governments by moving towards the National Execution (NEX) of
UNDP-Uganda supported projects and setting up a NEX Unit within the Ugandan 
government. Another programmatic change put into place during the Fifth 
cycle was the Target for Resource Assignment (TRAC), a much more decentralized and
flexible performance-based system of resource allocation. TRAC freed the 
UNDP-Uganda Office from the micro management of budgets by New York HQs by
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delegating authority to the UNDP-Uganda CP when it came to the procurement 
of project budgets up to US$100,000. However, whereas most staff in the 
UNDP-Uganda Office welcomed HQ's decentralization efforts, many feared that 
system like TRAC tied the UNDP-Uganda CP's funding too closely to SHD/PCD 
priorities set in New York. In addition, none of the staff I spoke to 
viewed their rapport with UNDP HQ as reciprocal or maintained regular 
channels of communication with HQ departments (e.g.,the HDRO, ODS, OESP 
etc.) other than their supervisors in the Regional Bureau for Africa.
Although it is difficult to attribute development achievements solely 
to UNDP's support, especially when donors like the World Bank and the IMF 
have been much more influential in Uganda, in the Mid-Term Review of the 
its Fifth Cycle Programme, the UNDP-Uganda Office claims that its 
achievements in Uganda include; improved revenue collection, inflation and 
debt management, the rationalization and modernization of the Ugandan civil 
service in the area of Economic Policy and Management Capacity-Building; 
improved rural infrastructure, strengthened Agricultural Planning and 
Statistics Departments, and improved accessibility to credit for small 
scale enterprises in the area of Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development; 
support to the development of a National Environmental Action Plan and the 
Environment Management Authority in the Area of Environment and Natural 
Resources; and support to the Uganda AIDS Commission and indigenous NGOs 
like the Aids Support Organization (TASO) and a role in the formulation of 
a national HIV/AIDS strategy and operational plan as well as in 80 small 
income-generating projects in the area of HIV/AIDS and Human Survival.
In sum, during the Fifth Programming Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda Office 
made a conscious effort to place SHD/PCD and poverty alleviation at the 
centre of its CP; to accelerate the promotion of the SHD/PCD agenda by 
launching a national workshop and putting forth capacity-building proposals 
to mainstream Human Development at the policy level; became involved in a
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series Upstream-’Love.l. interventions aimed at promoting 'Sound governance' 
and wider institutional reforms; it enhanced the role of NGOs and 
grassroots CBOs in its Downstream interventions; and introduced important
organizational and programme-related changes aimed at increasing the 
intellectual and coordination capacity of UNDP in Uganda, making the 
operation of the UNDP-Uganda Office more flexible, multi-sectoral, and 
enhancing the role of the Ugandan government, NGOs and grassroots 
communities in the implementation of UNDP-supported projects. These 
advances notwithstanding, change at UNDP has been slow and the agency has 
faced serious obstacles in its efforts to operationalize and implement 
SHD/PCD in Uganda and beyond. The sections which follow outline the 
setbacks suffered by UNDP at the conceptual, policy and programme levels.
Ill. UNDP's Conceptual Interpretation and Imposition of the SHD/PCD 
Paradigm in Uganda and Beyond
A) Obstacles Related to SHD/PCD's Conceptual Complexity
The first major finding to emerge from research was that just like 
the various international development experts and officials I had 
interviewed in London, New York, and Washington (Refer back to Chapter 3), 
development actors in Uganda had tremendous difficulties grasping the 
meaning, novelty or usefulness of the SHD/PCD paradigm and had dramatically 
different definitions and ways of operationalizing SHD/PCD approaches.
Within the Ugandan government, my interviews with officials showed 
that most of them appreciated that SHD/PCD approaches were about poverty 
eradication and improving peoples' well-being and felt that such goals were 
complementary to those of the Museveni government, often citing the NRM's 
10-Point Programme or the proceedings of The Challenge o f  Growth and Poverty Reduction in
Uganda Conference held in Kampala in November 1995 as evidence of shared UNDP-
government Human Development and poverty-eradication goals. However, my
interviews also revealed that, aside from those small pockets of government
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directly receiving funding from UNDP (i.e., mainly the National Execution Unit
[NEX] , the A id Coordination Department within the MFEP and parts of the
Decentralization Secretariat) , few officials in the Ugandan government could speak
at length about the meaning of SHD/PCD and key officials such as Ms. Mary 
Muduuli, Commissioner for Economic Planning in the MFEP, admitted to never 
having read the SHD/PCD literature and not knowing how SHD/PCD ideas added 
to ongoing development debates in Uganda, while others noted that they did 
not understand how SHD/PCD was different from existing social development 
terminology, indicators or efforts or equated SHD/PCD with foreign grants 
for improved national or local government planning capacities. **
Within the donor community in Uganda, several respondents remarked 
that SHD/PCD approaches were simply the latest 'jargon' developed by UNDP 
to resolve its own organizational problems and that, instead of 
transmitting novel thinking, UNDP was mostly articulating the existing 
consensus and advocating development practices already underway in other 
donor agencies. When it came to discussing the novelty of the SHD/PCD 
approach then, many UNDP-Uganda staff themselves seemed to think that 
SHD/PCD approaches were radically different from what UNDP had been doing 
all along. As one of the middle-level managers in the UNDP-Uganda Office 
retorted: "SHD/PCD is a gimmick. What is new about telling us to focus on 
women, the environment and the poor? UNDP should have been doing this all 
along." In addition, respondents noted that SHD/PCD was not
necessarily the preferred concept/term in the donor community in Uganda 
donor agencies used their own development definitions and terminology 
and that SHD/PCD was too vague and abstract to guide the development 
interventions of donors in a constructive and concrete way.
Moreover, although most UNDP personnel in Uganda understood that 
SHD/PCD approaches were generally about 'improving peoples' living 
standards' and 'putting people at the centre of development', it was they
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who expressed the most confusion about the meaning of SHD/PCD approaches 
and apprehension about the relevance or usefulness of SHD/PCD ideas to 
their work. With respect to the meaning of SHD/PCD, many of the UNDP-Uganda 
CP staff I spoke to remarked that, because SHD/PCD approaches were 
extremely vague, broad and abstract, it was difficult for them to 
understand what SHD/PCD entailed. In the view of a senior manager in the 
UNDP-Uganda Office, "the SHD/PCD approach is so broad and nebulous that "it 
seems to have no limits.... anything one wants falls within SHD/PCD and can 
be justified under it"...."What falls outside of it?", he asked. My 
conversations with professional staff in the UNDP-Uganda Office also 
revealed that many of them had never internalized the concept of SHD/PCD 
and did not feel comfortable having a conceptual discussion about it. In 
fact, during our interview, UNDP-Uganda's RR, Dr. Babatunde Thomas, 
conceded that his staff were confused about the meaning of SHD/PCD, that 
they had not internalized the concept, and that they had little ownership 
of it since they felt that it mostly emanated from UNDP HQ in New York,
Finally, during my field work, I learned that UNDP-Uganda staff were 
finding it extremely difficult to close the gap between SHD/PCD theory and 
practice and held serious reservations about the operationalizability and 
practicality of SHD/PCD approaches despite the pressures from the 
Administrator's Office in New York to 'sell' SHD/PCD in the field. As one 
UNDP-Uganda senior advisor, pointed out, UNDP would first have to itself be 
clear about what SHD/PCD was about before it could make it clear to 
politicians and planners while another explained that, because SHD/PCD 
is "only a set of principles, it is hard to quantify or to operationalize 
into concrete guidelines" . A UNDP Programme Officer summarized the 
difficult predicament of the UNDP-Uganda Office by noting that, while 
everyone knew that SHD/PCD was supposed to lead to poverty eradication, no 
one knew how to operationalize SHD/PCD so that it had a clear focus yet at 
the same time constituted an integrated development strategy. In fact.
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an internal analysis of the UNDP-Uganda CP through the SHD/PCD lens 
confirmed that UNDP-Uganda staff had trouble determining what constituted 
Upstream and Downstream SHD/PCD interventions or how to go about making UNDP-
supported programmes pro-Human Development and pro-poor.
As shown above, many of the difficulties encountered by UNDP-Uganda 
staff in interpreting and operationalizing SHD/PCD in a clear yet 
integrated fashion are undoubtedly rooted in the sheer abstractness, 
complexity, and unfinished nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm. Yet, as the 
following sections will show, much of the problem is attributable to UNDP's 
own dispersed operationalization of the SHD/PCD paradigm into what often 
seem like an endless array of entry points, emphases, and agendas.
B) Obstacles Related to UNDP's Interpretation, Imposition and
Manipulation of SHD/PCD Approaches
i) The Dispersed and Fragmented Interpretation o f SHDIPCD Approaches Within the UNDP
The difficulties which staff in the UNDP-Uganda Office have had 
grasping, disaggregating, and effectively operationalizing SHD/PCD 
approaches have coincided with a very dispersed and fragmented 
interpretation and operationalization of SHD/PCD approaches within UNDP. 
Within UNDP at large, for instance, in addition to a new two-fold mission 
and '4 substantive SHD/PCD priorities (i.e., the 4 Es already mentioned), 
the agency's internal documents also point to '5 Capacities and Strengths 
of UNDP', a '7 Point Programme of Change at UNDP', '7 Prerequisites for the 
Operationalization of SHD/PCD', and propose a '10 Point Agenda for a New 
Approach to Development Cooperation' as well as '10 Patterns of 
Intervention' in which UNDP should specialize in order to realize its 
SHD/PCD goals. Judging from the wide range of entry points, emphases 
and agendas on offer above, it would seem that UNDP's interpretation and 
operationalization of SHD/PCD has become very dispersed and sectorally- 
fragmented (especially in the case of the 4 Es) and currently constitutes
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far too many separate components to comprise a focussed and integrated 
SHD/PCD strategy. Indeed, the assessment report produced by the Centre for
Development Research on UNDP's effectiveness comes to a similar conclusion and
urges UNDP to immediately focus its SHD/PCD strategy by concentrating on 
only two multi-sectoral and cross-cutting areas: i) helping to build 
capacity in effective management of public resources for SHD/PCD and; ii) 
creating an enabling environment for people's participation and choice.
Within the UNDP-Uganda Office, the difficulties of giving focus to 
UNDP's wide menu of SHD/PCD entry points, emphases, and agendas has 
resulted in individual staff members assigning SHD/PCD approaches their own 
meaning and focus. Hence, while the Programme Officer in charge of UNDP- 
Uganda's governance portfolio defines SHD/PCD mainly as 'Sound governance' 
and sees policy-level interventions as the preferred venue for implementing 
SHD/PCD, the Office' Resident Economist primarily views SHD/PCD as an 
economic planning tool which can be used to make adjustments in economic 
programmes, and the Volunteer Coordinator feels that SHD/PCD interventions 
should be predominantly community-based and implemented at the household 
level. Naturally, these divergent definitions and interpretations of 
SHD/PCD are not mutually exclusive. However, the wide gulf in 
interpretations and perspectives does make it more difficult for the UNDP 
in Uganda to develop an integrated SHD/PCD strategy and present a clear yet 
unified SHD/PCD vision to the Ugandan government, donors or beneficiaries. 
Under ideal circumstances, of course, it would be possible to formulate 
such a strategy, even when the ideas at stake are complex and the agency's 
interpretation of those ideas rather messy. Unfortunately, in the case of 
UNDP, the appropriate circumstances do not exist. As the following 
sections show, the problem lies with UNDP's own treatment of SHD/PCD as 
well as with the limited analytical skills and experience of UNDP staff in 
dealing with multi-sectoral and integrated development issues.
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ii) UNDP’s Top-Down Interpretation and Imposition o f SHDIPCD Approaches
Another factor which has significantly undermined the promotion of 
SHD/PCD within UNDP has to do with the impositioned and top-down manner in 
which UNDP introduced SHD/PCD ideas into the organization. A 1994 external 
evaluation commissioned on UNDP's effectiveness confirms that a serious gap 
always existed between the way UNDP HQ in New York and UNDP country offices 
viewed SHD/PCD ideas. According to the assessment, whereas UNDP HQ 
generally favours "increasingly comprehensive" and "complex definitions" of 
poverty and SHD/PCD, UNDP Country Offices yearned for "simplicity" and 
clear guidelines for operationalization." In a confidential internal 
memo, a senior UNDP staffer intricately involved in the operationalization 
of SHD/PCD within UNDO candidly admits that UNDP HQ had made the mistake of 
carrying out SHD/PCD in very "a top-down way" and "as though it had been 
created on a different planet and now needed to be operationalized on 
earth", when, in fact, the SHD/PCD concept should have been treated more as 
"a distillation of successful operational experiences on the ground." The 
same memo goes on to openly recognize that UNDP's imposition of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm was aggravated even further by UNDP HQ's attempts to continually 
"sell" SHD/PCD in a manner that "rubbed a lot of people the wrong way." “
Apprehensions about UNDP HQ's imposition of SHD/PCD ideas upon the 
field became evident during my interviews with staff from the UNDP-Uganda 
CP, where several senior managers admitted feeling "pressed against the 
wall" by the Administrator's Office and the Bureau for Policy and Programme 
Support (BPPS) to adopt SHD/PCD ideas even though field staff themselves 
had not yet internalized the SHD/PCD paradigm. As one senior UNDP-Uganda 
manager explained, "BPPS does not say you have to do x, or y but, they do 
say UNDP is about x and y and since incentives go towards BPPS-supported 
ideas, other interests in the field tend to get excluded." The 
restricting effect of New York HQ's definition of the parameters within 
which the UNDP-Uganda CP can operate was identified as a problem by various
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UNDP-Uganda Programme Officers, several of whom complained that they felt 
little ownership of SHD/PCD ideas and that the top-down manner in which 
policy directives were still decided at UNDP made it difficult for them to 
challenge New York HQ's tendency to send abstract SHD/PCD guidelines 
bearing little relevance to Uganda's development reality.
In retrospect, the overly dispersed, fragmented and top-down manner 
in which SHD/PCD was interpreted and operationalized within UNDP was 
perhaps predictable given that UNDP's transition into a multi-sectoral, 
decentralized and more analytical development agency is still far from 
complete. The fact is that despite recent efforts to decentralize some of 
its funds through the introduction of the TRAC funding system and NEX, UNDP 
still has very hierarchical decision-making structures in the sense that 
all of the agency's funds are disbursed from HQs, all staff positions are 
decided in HQs and all of the agency's key policy-making (e.g., BPPS) and 
strategic management (e.g., OESP) units and guidelines are based in New 
York HQ. Moreover, despite UNDP's recent efforts in the 1990s to
develop more of a substantive and policy analysis capacity, the available 
evidence shows that the majority of UNDP staff still lack the experience or 
substantive analytical capacity needed to deal with complex and holistic 
development issues which transcend traditional sectoral boundaries. Recent 
studies show that UNDP staff still tend to divide along sectoral or 
regional lines and that, even within UNDP HQ's main policy arm, the BPPS, 
UNDP lacks substantive personnel in key multi-sectoral SHD/PCD areas such 
as poverty eradication and gender equity. Furthermore, this is unlikely to 
change soon since there are few funds for UNDP to expand its expertise in 
these areas. In essence, UNDP's own organizational composition seems to 
be at odds with the analytical capacity and the bottom-up and multi­
sectoral organizational structures needed to effectively operationalize 
SHD/PCD approaches into integrated strategies and to pursue core SHD/PCD 
goals such as holistic thinking and multi-sectoral development.
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Hi) UNDP*s Toning Down o f SHDIPCD’s Potentially Transformative and Controversial Components
Another factor which may have undermined the operationalization of 
SHD/PCD ideas within UNDP has to do with the agency's own decision to shift 
its position on the more audacious and potentially controversial components 
of the SHD/PCD paradigm in the face of adversity. The first shift came 
when, in order to appease the concerns of Republican former UNDP 
Administrator, Mr. William Draper II that many of the ideas in the HDRs 
were too reminiscent of "Old Labour and Fabian Party ideas" the Team of 
Experts in the HDRO agreed to incorporate more things into the HDRs about 
the virtues of free markets. According to Prof. Streeten, while the HDRO's 
Team of Experts agreed that people-friendly markets played an important 
role in development, more doubtful market policy proposals such as the 
private supply of education and health services, the supposed benefits of 
cost-recovery and saying that the state was over-extended in LDCs, were 
incorporated into the HDRs largely to please Mr. Draper. The 
concessions made by the HDRO may have aggravated the conceptual confusion 
and ideological ambiguity already surrounding UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD.
The above incident was the first of a series of compromises which 
UNDP would find itself making in the face of resistance to the more 
transformational and anti-status quo proposals contained in the SHD/PCD 
agenda. The other instance occurred when UNDP first tried to introduce a 
Political Freedom Index (PFI) in 1991. Although the PFI was from the start
regarded as ill-conceived much of the outcry over the index in the 
international community was undeniably political and largely provoked by 
G-77 countries (and especially in preponderant southern nation-states such 
as China, Algeria, India, and Pakistan) who saw the PFI as a potential 
threat to their governments' tight reins on national power and resented 
outside influences in internal human rights and governance issues.
Shaken by the debate which ensued, UNDP responded by refraining from
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publishing PFI figures for all countries in its 1992 HDR and from
mentioning the PFI in the future. In the process, UNDP learned an 
important lesson about the costs of challenging traditional yet powerful 
southern nation-states still influential within the UN system and as well 
as in UNDP's Executive Board.
By way of synthesis, the evidence above would seem to show that the 
UNDP staff in Uganda have had serious difficulties grasping the meaning of 
SHD/PCD approaches and operationalizing such ideas in a focused yet 
integrated manner. These finding seem to confirm the Baroque Science
Phenomenon presented earlier in a number of ways. First of all, we can see
from the evidence that, as was the case with Baroque Sciences, while lofty 
ideas such as SHD/PCD seem appealing and convincing in the abstract, their 
sheer vagueness, abstractness and incomplete nature make their translation 
into practice extremely difficult. Secondly, as in the Baroque Sciences 
which assumed that the various parts of the whole somehow fit together 
harmoniously, in the case of the SHD/PCD paradigm, while in theory it is 
assumed that the various components of SHD/PCD have an inherent order to 
them, in actuality, it is extremely difficult for practitioners to 
translate the paradigm into practice without knowing the exact nature of 
the links and effects between SHD/PCD's various components, which entry 
points should be given priority, or in what sector or level one should 
intervene first. In the case of the UNDP-Uganda Office, for example, 
practitioners not only complained that they had not had time to fully 
internalize SHD/PCD ideas but also that they did not understand which of 
the various components should be given priority, at what level one should 
apply the ideas first, or how SHD/PCD ideas could be given focus while at 
the same time remaining a an integrated and cohesive whole. The grievances 
of the UNDP staff in Uganda also bring to mind Bardach who cautioned that a 
policy or programme based on an overly complex theoretical framework was 
bound to run into difficulties in the implementation process.
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At the same time though, the evidence above reveals that not all of 
the difficulties UNDP has encountered in its promotion of SHD/PCD ideas are 
attributable to conceptual deficiencies. Instead, the analysis shows that 
UNDP's own actions and traits have also complicated its operationalization 
of SHD/PCD approaches. Here I am referring to UNDP's overly dispersed 
SHD/PCD entry points, priorities and emphases, its top-down imposition of 
SHD/PCD ideas and the agency's lack of personnel with substantive 
experience in multi-sectoral and integrated development, all of which have 
made it harder for staff to understand what SHD/PCD ideas are about, to 
feel enough ownership of SHD/PCD ideas to give their own angle and focus, 
or to mould the ideas into concrete yet multi-sectoral and integrated 
development strategies. Added to the above should be UNDP's own shifting 
position on SHD/PCD and its decisions to abandon some of the more 
transformative components of the SHD/PCD agenda in the face of resistance 
from traditional stakeholders within UNDP and the wider donor community.
Consistent with the River Pollution Phenomenon, UNDP's decision to
downplay both the PFI and the anti-establishment components of the SHD/PCD 
agenda undoubtedly led to a partial displacement of core SHD/PCD goals such 
as the promotion of 'Sound governance' and challenging existing power 
relations and the neo-Liberal hegemony. The concessions made by UNDP in 
this case are also interesting in that they reveal how, within UNDP, 
conceptual judgement calls depend heavily on the agency's growing need to 
maintain its development niche and to attend to its own organizational 
interests by listening to the grievances of powerful stakeholders --in this 
case, both traditional staff within UNDP and preponderant nation-states 
with the power to create noise in the international community and UNDP's 
Executive Board. Of course, having organizational interests is not in and 
of itself a bad thing. The problem is that, in this case, there is a 
tension between UNDP's pursuit of the more radical, albeit controversial, 
goals of the SHD/PCD agenda and of its own organizational interests.
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Finally, the above analysis also confirms that agencies like UNDP may 
be sustaining a series of contestable assumptions which have no foundation 
in reality. In essence, by romanticizing the SHD/PCD paradigm and its 
operationalization UNDP seems to be failing to recognize that: an inter­
governmental development agency dependent on the approval of traditional 
nation-states may lack the political autonomy needed to challenge hegemonic 
ideas and the balance of power in the existing system of international 
cooperation; that an agency still spread too thinly in too many sectors, 
staffed mostly by generalists, and operated in a top-down manner may lack 
the capability to create multi-sectoral and integrated development 
strategies at the field level; and, that a system of international 
development cooperation where actors protect their own interests may not be 
conducive to development approaches which require close collaboration.
Thus, as in Baroque Sciences, there would once again seem to be a gap 
between UNDP's SHD/PCD aspirations, its own organizational interests and 
capacities, and the severity of the constraints present in the 
international system of international development cooperation.
IV. UNDP's Effectiveness in Implementing SHD/PCD in Uganda and Beyond
A) UNDP's Implementation of SHD/PCD at the Policy Level
At the level of policy, UNDP's has tried to pursue the SHD/PCD agenda
mostly in two ways: i) attempting to assume a greater leadership role in
coordinating development policy and aid within the UN system at the behest 
of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali; and ii) launching both a 
global and national dialogues on 'Sound governance' and poverty reduction.
i) UNDP's Efforts to Coordinate Donors and Foreign A id Within the UN
at Large and Within Uganda
At the level of UN HQ, UNDP Administrator Speth has concentrated much 
of his policy coordination efforts in acting as a de facto Resident Coordinator
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for the UN's development activities in New York as well as on being a 
spokesperson for an expanded role for the UN in the realm of development. 
Unfortunately for UNDP though, there is considerable evidence suggesting 
that Mr. Speth's increased involvement in coordinating and leading the UN's 
development policies and efforts at the global level has antagonized the 
World Bank as well as the UN's specialized agencies. The resulting 
friction was evident in the negativity of several of the UN and World Bank
officials I spoke to in New York and Washington.
In the case of the UN's specialized agencies, I learned that such
agencies were much more interested in guarding their organizational
autonomy and strengthening their respective sectoral niches within the
existing system of international development cooperation than they were in
promoting an integrated development approach such as SHD/PCD or in being
coordinated by UNDP. To paraphrase the words of a senior UNICEF Expert:
UN agencies like UNICEF will not let themselves be coordinated 
by UNDP. ...or in perestroika fashion. Donors want the UN to 
work together but each agency to keep its identity.
However, equal scepticism was expressed at the World Bank where some
officials felt that UNDP's limited resources, analytical capacity, and
clout threw UNDP's coordination ambitions into doubt :
The reason that more global resources are put into the World 
Bank than into the UN system is not only that the Bank is 
seen as having more high calibre staff than the UN, but also that 
powerful donors know that they have more clout within the Bank 
since power is distributed according to donation size.
Others at the Bank also remarked that the Bank did not welcome UNDP's 
or the UN's policy coordination efforts in the North if such efforts were 
to result in attempts to place the Bretton Woods institutions under the UN 
umbrella and to make them accountable to the General Assembly and ECOSOC.^
It appeared that resistance to UNDP's policy coordination efforts in 
the field were as ardent as those faced by UNDP in New York and Washington.
216
First, when asked about UNDP's policy coordination leadership in the 
Ugandan context, most donors I interviewed remarked that it was other 
international development agencies which were playing the most proactive 
role in terms of policy, programme and donor coordination. For example,
Mr. Patrick Fine, Head of USAID's Development Office in Uganda, noted that 
it was the World Bank which led Monthly Donor Coordination Meetings in 
Kampala, USAID which was in charge of the Private Sector Donor Sub-Group, 
and UNICEF and USAID which chaired the Social Sector Donor Sub-Group.
When probed as to why UNDP was not playing a more significant role in 
policy or donor coordination in Uganda, Mr. Iradj Alikhani, Chief Economist 
for the World Bank in Uganda, asserted that "it was one thing to be a 
leader and another to claim that one wants to be a leader." "Where is 
UNDP's thinking and technical capacity?, "Where are the results that an 
agency must show to take leadership?", he asked. "Human Development 
Reports formulated in New York do not establish UNDP's expertise at the 
country level," he warned. ” Other donors and Uganda-based development 
advisors concurred that the UNDP-Uganda Office had foregone its window of 
opportunity in the area of policy and donor coordination due not only to 
its restricted funds and substantive technical capacity, but also due to 
the poor leadership of its previous RR, Mr. Tedla Teshome, and UNDP's 
bureaucratic nature and inability to shake off perceptions that its staff 
were ineffective political appointees.
Fellow donors within the UN family were even less gracious when asked 
about UNDP's coordination effectiveness. For instance. Dr. Francois Farah, 
Director of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) in Uganda, remarked that while 
he agreed in principle that UNDP should coordinate UN agency policies and 
activities given its seniority in the UN system , he at the same time felt 
that UNDP lacked the clout or maturity to do so. Underlying Dr. Farah's 
responses was undeniably an added concern that UNDP's increased 
coordination efforts might put a damper on other UN agencies' ambitions for
217
greater organizational autonomy: "UNFPA does not want to be put under the
aegis of UNDP although we are part of the same family. Coordination is all 
right but it works only when one recognizes each agency's identity", he 
declared. Fears over UNDP's possible encroachment upon the separate
mandates of other specialized UN agencies were reiterated by staff in the 
World Food Programme (WFP) in Uganda who conceded that there existed a 
"passive resistance" between UNDP and UN agencies such as WFP which were 
fighting to become more autonomous and self-sufficient. ®°
Although effective donor and aid coordination (or lack thereof) is 
something which is difficult to observe, especially during a short period, 
during my field research in Uganda I was able to collect documentation and 
to witness instances which corroborate the coordination problems described 
above. For instance, while the available documentation shows that the UNDP- 
Uganda CP has made a useful contribution to aid coordination through its 
National Technical Cooperation Assessment (NATCAP) mechanism which is aimed at
enabling recipient governments to define their technical cooperation 
priorities and promoting systematic programming and coordination of 
technical cooperation. Unfortunately though, because of budgetary 
constraints, the second phase of NATCAP which was expected to produce a 
Technical Cooperation Programme to help identify technical cooperation 
resources from all sources, was stalled at the time I visited Uganda in 
1995. Similarly, because, in 1995, the MFEP was not holding the aid 
coordination meetings which it was meant to, UNDP was still unable to play 
the "big coordination role of linking government with other donors and 
agencies" at such meetings. Instead, UNDP's own internal documents reveal 
that the main policy and donor coordination meetings which had been taking 
place in Uganda during the Fifth cycle were the Paris Consultative Group 
Meetings organized by the World Bank in collaboration with Ugandan 
government, monthly donor meetings chaired by the World Bank, and a series 
of sectoral meetings led by the donors cited above. The only meetings
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being led by UNDP in 1995 then, were monthly meetings of heads of the UN 
who, as part of the UN family, have little choice but to accept UNDP's 
coordination. However, even within the UN system, there is written 
evidence suggesting that UNDP's coordination ambitions have not been 
welcomed by specialized UN agencies struggling to retain their distinctive 
character, focus, fundraising, governance structures and their own 
accountability on country programme and policy matters. " Hence, apart 
from being named leader of the newly constituted but much reduced United
Nations Development Group (after much negotiation it was decided that the group
would only be comprised of UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF and would exclude the WFP 
and the World Bank's IFAD), UNDP has had to settle for leading one of the 
small sub-groups of the various inter-agency task forces led by different 
UN agencies, and has reduced the scope of its coordination efforts to 
improving field-level programme collaboration (e.g., by promoting the 
Country Strategy Note and the Resident Coordinator System) and harmonizing operational
and procedural systems between UN agencies And, even these modest
coordination goals have progressed slowly as UN agencies have resisted 
UNDP's efforts to harmonize programme and administrative procedures.
On the basis of the evidence provided above, it would seem that UNDP- 
Uganda's own organizational limitations (i.e., its restricted global power 
vis-a-vis the World Bank and limited funds, analytical capacity or 
trajectory of policy influence), coupled with the sectoral protectionism of 
other donors have undermined UNDP's hopes of playing a greater leadership 
role in coordinating development efforts in the UN system at large as well 
as in Uganda. Of course, the conflictuel and territorial nature of donor 
behaviour, or what UNDP-Uganda's SHD/PCD Advisor calls the "balkanization" 
of Uganda's system of international development cooperation" ®®, is not 
exclusive to UNDP but rather a prevalent feature of Ugandan development 
cooperation which, as noted in Chapter 4, has been reinforced by the 
Ugandan government's own poor coordination of donors and the tendency of
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Ugandan ministries to take advantage of donors' sectoralism and 
territoriality to protect their own funding. The result has been a 
system of development cooperation in which each donor operates in their own 
sphere and ministerial zone and in which territoriality and turf-battles 
occupy time and energy which could have been spent on poverty-eradication.
Judging from the discussion above, it would also seem that UNDP's 
donor and aid coordination ambitions, both in New York and in the field in 
Uganda, have been undermined by UNDP's inability to appreciate the gap 
between its coordination aspirations and the reality of the situation in 
the international development cooperation community or within its own 
agency. In particular, UNDP seems to have made two contestable 
assumptions: one, that the agency had the appropriate organizational 
structures to play a greater policy and aid coordination role, in the 
process ignoring its own lack of funds, substantive technical capacity, or 
trajectory as a shaper of policy; and, two, that the existing system of 
international development cooperation is harmonious and driven by a common 
desire for cross-agency and cross-sectoral collaboration, thereby failing 
to recognize the prevalence of sectoralism, territoriality, and fiefdom- 
creation within the international donor community. In the case of UNDP, 
the tensions already present within the donor community may have been 
further aggravated by the financial corruption of the Ugandan civil service 
and the balkanized nature of the aid system in Uganda as well as by UNDP's 
own insistence on using SHD/PCD as a means of increasing its profile in the 
system of development cooperation even it this meant alienating fellow UN 
agencies by reducing their share of UNDP-supported consultancies and 
contracts through the introduction national execution modalities. **
These findings have direct implications for my analysis of the 
implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in as far as they show that, as stated 
in the River Pollution Phenomenon, organizational interests (and 
specifically the need to pursue a higher public profile through a greater
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leadership role in policy and aid coordination), coupled with inappropriate 
organizational structures within UNDP and the lack of an enabling 
environment within the donor community in Uganda, have caused UNDP to 
gradually scale down some of its more ambitious coordination aspirations. 
The above evidence is equally instructive in that it confirms that, as 
stated in the Baroque Science Phenomenon, the contestable assumptions held by
UNDP can end up resulting in a serious gap between UNDP's SHD/PCD 
aspirations and what is doable in the existing development context.
ii) UNDP’s Efforts to Foster a Policy Dialogue on ’Sound Governance’ and Poverty Reduction
The other important way in which UNDP has been trying to exert policy 
influence has been by promoting a policy dialogue on 'Sound governance' and 
poverty reduction, both at the global and national levels. As already 
mentioned, at the global level, UNDP' has concentrated its policy efforts 
on using the policy proposals contained in its 1994 HDR to influence the
outcomes of the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen. At the national level, 
the policy efforts of the UNDP-Uganda Office have focused mainly on 
supporting U p s t r e a m programmes conducive to wider governance and
institutional reform in civil service and electoral reform, the 
decentralization process, and in trying to convince the Ugandan government 
to formulate and implement its own National Human Development S t c a t e g y .
However, as the following sections show, UNDP has encountered serious 
difficulties enhancing its policy work, at the conceptual as well as at the 
global and national levels.
Conceptually speaking, UNDP's main obstacle to effectively promoting 
a 'Sound governance' debate lies with the sheer vagueness of the concept of 
'Sound governance' and the lack of controversy surrounding its varying 
definitions. The conceptual weaknesses of the whole 'Sound governance'
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debate has already been discussed in Chapter 4 and does not need to be 
addressed here. What is useful to emphasize at this point though is that, 
like the wider 'Sound governance' debate, UNDP itself has never quite moved 
beyond a very general definition of 'Sound governance' (as stated in 
Chapter 1, endnote #57). The lack of concreteness of UNDP's treatment of 
'Sound governance' is evident in the vagueness and idealism of many of the 
policy statements found in UNDP documents. Hence, while statements such 
as: "leadership should be transformational", "government will be expected
to facilitate rather than interfere", "the state must be called upon to 
manage less but to manage better and differently", or, "which approach to 
adopt towards civil service reform should be gauged on the extent to which, 
in the circumstances prevailing at the time, it (a particular approach) is 
deemed better able than alternatives to produce desirable outcomes" are 
commendable in principle, they are of little use to the practitioner since 
they do not specify what aspects of the 'Sound governance' agenda UNDP 
prioritizes or how the tensions which sometimes occur between the different 
components of the agenda will be resolved (e.g., greater democratization 
vs. greater self-determination), or what kinds of benchmarks the agency 
plans to use to assess 'Sound governance' progress. As the sections which 
follow will show, the vagueness of UNDP's approach to 'Sound governance', 
once coupled with factors such as political resistance and organizational 
interests and limitations has had adverse effects on UNDP's promotion of 
the 'Sound governance' agenda, both globally and in Uganda.
At the global level, both the moderate (e.g., increased ODA funding, 
a 20120 Compact, etc.) and more audacious policy proposals (e.g., a
reinvigorated framework for global governance based on the establishment of 
an Economic Security Council, a World Central Bank and a Global Human Security Compact)
put forward by UNDP at the WSSD were intended to give UNDP a catalytic role 
in global governance debates as well as to challenge the status quo by 
advocating a more equitable, democratic, and caring system of international
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cooperation. This, at least, was the intention before UNDP's pro-active 
approach to 'Sound governance' was unexpectedly put to an end by those 
international actors that rejected UNDP's policy activism. My interviews 
in New York indicate that both UN officials and large, influential, albeit 
traditional UN member-states LDCs such as India, China, and Nigeria 
feared that UNDP's proactive promotion of the 'Sound Governance' agenda 
threatened their own power bases.
Among traditional nation-states the main concern was that through its 
promotion of 'Sound governance' ideals such as demilitarization, 
democratization, respect of human rights and the investment of the peace 
dividend on social investments for the poor, UNDP was not only challenging 
the power (and sometimes authoritarian preferences) of still influential 
LDC governments but, in the process, was also undermining the sacredness of 
the principle of self-determination in the world regime and the South's 
efforts to vehemently protect its diminishing global power base and 
national sovereignty in the face of declining aid entitlements and 
escalating northern conditionality.
However, in addition to political pressures exerted by influential 
LDCs fearing global and national power loss, UNDP's global advocacy efforts 
at the WSSD were frustrated by the territoriality and protection of 
organizational interests within the UN system itself. In fact, not long 
after traditional nation-states started protesting that UNDP had 
overstepped its mandate by promoting global policy proposals at the WSSD 
which their governments had not officially endorsed the UN 
Secretariat's Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development 
(DPCSD) itself began accusing UNDP's HDRO of pre-empting the results of the 
Social Summit as well as of overstepping its mandate and encroaching upon 
the responsibilities of the DPCSD. According to UN insiders, the rivalry 
which ensued between the DPCSD and UNDP's HDRO culminated in a turf battle
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which ended only once UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali ruled that 
it was the DPCSD which had been formally given the mandate to organize 
global summits, and that the HDRO, therefore, should step back. ”
The first negative consequence of the above events was that, by 
December 1994, the UN General Assembly had decided to formally distance 
itself from the SHD/PCD policy proposals in UNDP's HDRs. It did so by 
officially stating that UNDP's HDRs were to be regarded as 'reports to UNDP
rather than Reports o f UNDP' and reiterating that all policies governing
operational activities for development would continue to be set by UN 
member-states . Lamentably, as pointed out by a senior official within 
the HDRO, UNDP's official distancing from the HDRO undermined the Office's 
policy impact on core SHD/PCD goals such as 'Sound Governance' by sending 
mixed signals of support to SHD/PCD promoters and change agents within UNDP 
as well as by appearing lukewarm and inconsistent on its support of SHD/PCD 
to the international community at large. The second adverse effect of 
the 'rap on the knuckles' received by UNDP was the subsequent distancing of 
nation-states themselves from the SHD/PCD proposals put forward by UNDP at 
the WSSD. As another senior advisor within UNDP explained, and as is 
evident in the Declaration of the WSSD, governments were partly reluctant 
to adopt SHD/PCD proposals initially put forward in UNDP's 1994 HDR or to 
use the term 'SHD' in the text of the Summit's Declaration since such ideas 
and terminology were deemed to be too closely associated with UNDP and 
governments preferred to promote their own proposals and terminology. ** 
Finally, even within UNDP, internal memos reveal that, after seeing how its 
efforts to promote global 'Sound governance' were met by resistance from 
nation-states and fellow UN agencies, UNDP began warning its own staff to 
avoid offending the G-77 which saw SHD/PCD as 'bristling with 
conditionality' or regional entities like the Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) which feared that SHD/PCD's focus on governance
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ignored harder areas of aid. Instead, UNDP suggests, staff should adopt a 
more "low key" approach to SHD/PCD, restrict itself to supporting ongoing 
national endeavours and policy proposals already "blessed by inter­
governmental consensus in the General Assembly" and generally pursue 
SHD/PCD goals like 'Sound governance' and poverty eradication in an 
apolitical fashion. Indeed, in a presentation to parliamentarians in the 
British House of Commons in 1996, UNDP Administrator Speth, suggested that 
there was a difference between 'Governance' and 'Politics', and noted that 
UNDP should be careful not to intervene in the latter. He did not, 
however, say how UNDP would distinguish the thin line separating the two.®®
At the national level, as already mentioned, the UNDP-Uganda Office 
has followed a two-track approach to the promotion of 'Sound governance' 
and poverty eradication in Uganda.
The first track has entailed supporting a series of Upstream programme
interventions aimed at wider governance and political institutional 
reforms, including assisting the Ugandan government's civil service reform, 
as well as electoral processes and decentralization. As part of its 
support to the Constituent Assembly elections in 1994, for instance, UNDP 
facilitated civic education and the coordination of international observers 
and local monitoring groups--both crucial contributions given the lack of 
information accessible to Ugandan peasants about democratic processes, as 
problem highlighted in Chapter 4. In the case of civil service reform,
UNDP claims that its technical assistance contributed to the creation of a 
rationalized Ugandan civil service with an improved remuneration package 
for employees retained in the service. ®® In the case of
decentralization, UNDP's consultants have provided an in-depth analysis of 
how core planning concepts could be applied to a Strategic Decentralization 
Planning Framework and produced a proposal for UNDP's support in the 
formulation of a prototype Integrated District Plan and a training
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programme for decentralized planning. Through these policy-related
programmes, the UNDP-Uganda Office has shown that it wants to begin 
contributing to wider governance and institutional reform processes.
The main barrier faced by the UNDP in Uganda in its promotion of the 
'Sound governance' agenda and wider institutional change is that, the UNDP- 
Uganda's potential in this area has never been fully realized. The first 
reason for this is that the UNDP-Uganda CP for the Fifth Programming Cycle 
does not include 'Sound governance' as one of its main components and, as 
such, the CP has only 3 projects (out of 85) which address 'Sound 
governance' issues at the Upstream l & v e l . Even more problematic, at US$ 2.7
million (out of a total Fifth Cycle budget of US $ 54 million), the amount 
of resources allocated to these programmes from 1992-1996 amounted to only 
a few hundred thousand dollars a year--much too little to have significant 
policy impact. (See Table 5.5). Given the limited amount of resources UNDP 
was making available for projects with a wider institutional and 'Sound 
governance' component it should not be surprising that several of the 
actors I spoke to in Uganda noted that it was donors such as the World Bank 
which had substantial resources, in-house policy analysis and research 
capacity which influenced Ugandan governance and poverty debates.
These claims were confirmed during my research in Uganda, where I was 
able to directly observe that it was the World Bank's publication: Uganda:
The Challenge o f  Growth and Poverty Reduction (Op. Cit) which was recommended to me as
mandatory reading by respondents and that it was the numerous studies 
presented at the World Bank's seminar on poverty reduction, held jointly 
with the Ugandan government in November 1995 which was preoccupying the 
minds of policy makers and development experts during my two visits to 
Uganda in 1995. That same year, the only publication the UNDP-Uganda 
Office had released was a Development Cooperation Report for Uganda during 1993-1994
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which contained mostly descriptive statistical data and showed little 
evidence of substantive policy leadership. Finally, during my research, I 
also learned that the one area in which donors could show that they had 
influenced Ugandan government policy: i.e., in the establishment of five 
Priority Programme Areas (PPAs)--health, primary education, agricultural
research, rural feeder roads and water supply--which would be protected 
from funding cuts in the Ugandan budget, were predominantly the result of 
the World Bank's policy advocacy efforts.
The second track used by the UNDP-Uganda Office to influence Ugandan 
policy was to try to convince the Ugandan government to give priority to 
poverty reduction and Human Development issues by formulating a National
Human Development Strategy for Uganda. In this area, it is worth noting 
that, through its organization of a National Human Development Workshop in 1994
and recommendations for possible activities to follow-up on the Workshop, 
the UNDP-Uganda Office did make a genuine attempt to put poverty reduction 
and SHD/PCD policies on the table in Uganda. UNDP's main mistake though, 
seems to have been its tendency to propose its own concrete and easily 
visible technical outputs--e.g., creating a special SHD Unit and SHD data 
base within the MFEP or formulating a special SHD Strategy--rather than 
working within the framework existing national development and poverty 
reduction initiatives. As an illustration of this tendency, MFEP officials 
told of how the UNDP-Uganda Office had recently drafted a new poverty 
reduction project without involving key ministry officials. The resulting 
document, they complained, had to be re-drafted by the MFEP since its 
proposition to establish a new Poverty Reduction and Human Development Data 
Base within the MFEP went against the Ministry's desire to build up its 
existing capacity on poverty analysis rather than creating a separate 
academic unit within the Ministry. In the view of Ms. Mary Muduuli, the
Ministry's Commissioner for Economic Planning, the above incident showed
227
how "UNDP still has a tendency to send ready-made documents to the Ugandan 
government simply because HQ told them to spend the money". At the time 
of last visit to Uganda, the UNDP-Uganda Office and the MFEP were still 
discussing a draft Preparatory Assistance on Poverty Reduction which they 
hoped would become the foundation for a larger programme.
The other major setback encountered by UNDP in its efforts to promote 
SHD/PCD policies and to strengthen the poverty analysis capacity of the 
Ugandan government is that the Ugandan civil service has itself been 
weakened by the constant brain drain, rent-seeking behaviour and inadequate 
coordination or policy leadership resulting from the shortage of public 
funds for office equipment or to pay expert personnel. The UNDP-Uganda 
Office has made an earnest attempt to remedy this situation by investing 
close to US$ 6.4 million from the Fifth Programming Cycle on projects aimed 
at strengthening the policy and economic analysis capacity of the Ugandan 
government. (Refer to Table 5.5). Such projects have undoubted helped to 
consolidate the analysis, planning, budgeting and statistical collection 
skills of senior government managers in key ministries such as MFEP. 
However, according to UNDP's own Mid Term Review of the Fifth Programming 
Cycle UNDP-Uganda CP, because the Ugandan government often does not provide 
counterpart government personnel to work alongside UNDP project advisors, 
UNDP advisors often end up assuming the policy analysis or management 
responsibilities of government officials. Instead of transferring skills, 
notes the review, many of UNDP's capacity-building efforts end up fostering 
a "dependency syndrome." As noted by Ms. Muduuli, UNDP's capacity 
building efforts were also unsustainable over the longer-term since the 
Ugandan government could not match UNDP's top-up salaries or maintain UNDP- 
provided lap-top computers, vehicles, and secretaries once such projects 
came to an end. Hence, although UNDP's efforts to build policy analysis
and management capacity is not unique to UNDP and is partly a product of 
pressures from Ugandan officials for a greater share of aid funds there
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seems to be evidence that such projects lack sustainability and may 
aggravate dependence rather than foster self-reliance.
From the above, we can deduce that UNDP HQ's initially ambitious 
efforts to prompt change within the existing system of international 
development cooperation and to promote core SHD/PCD goals like 'Sound 
governance' were aborted by resistance from still influential southern 
nation-states protecting their foreign aid entitlements and power base at 
home as well as from fellow UN agencies set on protecting their own turf in 
the existing system of international development cooperation. In turn, 
UNDP's overriding concern with elevating its global profile while at the 
same time protecting its own organizational interests by retaining the 
support of both northern and southern governments in its Executive Board, 
eventually resulted in the agency taking much of the bite out of its 
initially radical global advocacy agenda, consistent with the River Pollution
Phenomenon. These findings not only confirm that an inter-governmental
organization as dependent as UNDP is on placating powerful nation-states is 
unlikely to be in a position to challenge the status quo but also that, far 
from being harmonious or collaborative, international organizations are 
prone towards territoriality and to protecting their own niche and 
organizational interests in the existing system of international 
development cooperation. At the country level, the impact of UNDP's policy 
influencing and capacity building efforts in Uganda have been mainly 
thwarted by UNDP-Uganda's own organizational deficiencies, including the 
limited amount of resources it invests in Upstream and policy-related 
interventions, its lack of policy research or credibility as a substantive 
policy shaper, and its penchant for pursuing its own organizational 
interests by doing what is easiest (e.g., pushing its own agenda) and most 
likely to preserve its niche in technical cooperation services or to be 
rewarded by UNDP HQ (e.g., by suggesting the creation of a separate data 
base which requires the use of UNDP advisors and is easily identifiable as
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a UNDP output.) Finally, as stated in the Baroque Science Phenomenon, the
evidence above shows that UNDP's policy advocacy aspirations have been at 
odds with the reality in Uganda and the international community at large.
C) UNDP's Implementation of SHD/PCD at the Programme/Project and 
Grassroots Level in Uganda
The last aspect of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts which I explore are UNDP- 
Uganda's programmes with a strong SHD/PCD component at the grassroots level 
as it is these initiatives which directly touch the lives of poor Ugandans.
i) Overall Constraints Encountered in the UNDP-Uganda Country Programme
The first obstacle standing in the way of UNDP's effective 
implementation of holistic and integrated SHD/PCD programmes in Uganda has 
been the persistence of a multiplicity of 85, largely sectoral and 
ministry-linked UNDP projects in the UNDP-Uganda CP. In addition, data 
from UNDP's Report on Development Cooperation in Uganda in 1993-1994 shovis that, even
by late 1995, the bulk of UNDP-supported technical cooperation projects in 
Uganda concentrated in traditional sectors such as agriculture, industrial 
and mineral exploitation, infrastructure and conventional forms of 
technical cooperation such as assistance to customs and aviation 
regulations or transport policy. The exception to the rule are those funds 
which were beginning to go towards HIV/AIDS projects (about US$ 2.8 million 
between 1992-1996), on projects with a strong poverty focus, especially at 
the grassroots levels (US$ 3.5 million), and projects related to wider 
governance issues and institutional reforms (i.e., the US$ 2.7 million 
spent on civil service reform, electoral processes and decentralization). 
However, a close look at the numbers in Table 5.6 shows that, the bulk of 
the US$ 54 million budget for the 1992-1996 UNDP-Uganda CP was still being 
channelled towards the traditional UNDP sectors such as agriculture, 
industry, infrestructure/communications and economic management.
230
Nevertheless, despite its difficulties in breaking old patterns of 
working mostly with central government ministries and providing technical 
assistance in the traditional sectors of agriculture, industry and 
infrastructure, as mentioned above, the UNDP-Uganda CP has undertaken a 
series of organizational and programme-level reforms in order to better 
equip itself to implement integrated and empowering SHD/PCD initiatives. 
These efforts, unfortunately, have not been without their problems.
In the case of UNDP-Uganda's adoption of a Programmatic approach, even
though, by the time of my visit, the technical staff in the Office were 
already organized into two clusters which transcended traditional divisions 
of labour along sectoral lines, many of the programme officers I spoke to 
noted that, due to lack of experience, guidance, or time their attempts to 
work in a multi-sectoral fashion and to draft holistic and integrated 
programmes had not worked out. Instead, noted one respondent, UNDP-Uganda 
staff had simply ended up treating existing sectoral projects like 
programmes but been unable to properly link up these various projects or to 
integrate Upstream interventions with Downstream and community-based work.
From the data available in Table 5.6, it is obvious that far from moving 
towards a Programmatic approach, in 1995, the UNDP-Uganda CP was still spread
out too thinly by implementing over 85 separate sectoral projects. The 
Mid-Term Review of the UNDP-Uganda's Fifth Cycle further confirms that, 
with the exception of the HIVIAIDS Prevention and Poverty Reduction Programme which
does indeed effectively integrate policy and community-level interventions, 
"UNDP's new Programmatic approach was not successfully applied in Uganda" and
that the novelty and complexity of the Programmatic approach, coupled with its
lack of synchronization with the Ugandan government or other donors 
resulted in each of these actors formulating their own programmes.
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With respect to National Execution (NEX) several senior managers in the
UNDP-Uganda Office remarked that, although NEX had initially been intended 
to implement development cooperation projects for the whole Ugandan 
government and on behalf of all donors, including NGOs and CBOs, in 
actuality, NEX had been reduced to a specific unit within the MFEP and was 
only being used for UNDP-supported projects executed by the Ugandan 
government. Hence, according to UNDP's own Mid-Term Review of the UNDP-
Uganda CP, NEX was still far from being considered a shared national 
mechanism since both donors and government ministries had opted to retain 
their own multiple donor-ministry implementation modalities. Similarly,
many of the development actors I spoke to seemed to regard NEX as "an extra 
layer of bureaucracy" and as a 'UNDP Unit' artificially sustained by UNDP- 
supported salaries, vehicles, computers and telephones. As one top- 
level UNDP manager commented, given NEX's financial dependence on UNDP, the 
government's lack of ownership of NEX, and UNDP distrust of the Ugandan 
government's ability to manage NEX, it was perhaps predictable that the 
UNDP-Uganda Office would end up leading NEX and formulating new initiatives 
such as the HFVIAids Prevention Programme and Poverty Reduction Project which MFEP
officials had rejected precisely because they had not been sufficiently 
involved. In both cases, UNDP failed to cede project formulation
responsibilities to government. In retrospect, it would seem that, by 
creating NEX without first ensuring that other donors, government 
ministries and NGOs would use the NEX mechanism, UNDP may have aggravated 
duplication in Uganda's system of development cooperation and failed to 
introduced a form of national execution owned by the Ugandan government or 
accessible to civil society partners and Ugandan communities, as initially 
intended. At the same time though, not all of the blame can be assigned to 
UNDP. Given the prevalence of fiefdom creation and rent-seeking behaviour 
and the lack of skilled Ugandan personnel in the Ugandan civil service,
UNDP had actually few choices but to do as it did.
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ii) Constraints in the Implementation o f Selected UNDP Field Programmes/Projects
On top of the general programme setbacks described above, my research 
involved a more in-depth analysis of three UNDP-supported programmes under 
execution at the grassroots level : The Africa 2000 Network; the Micro Projects
Programme to Combat Aids (MPP) ; and the Community Management Programme (CMP).
The projects have been selected because they are part of UNDP's recent 
efforts to move beyond supporting sector-specific projects implemented 
mostly by central government ministries. Moreover, each of the programmes 
supports core SHD/PCD goals such as working through non-governmental 
organizations and community groups at the grassroots level, reaching the 
poorest in rural areas, and using participatory capacity-building 
approaches to empower Ugandan communities be more self-reliant..
In the case of Africa 2000 Network, the chief development objective
of the programme is to combat environmental degradation and to promote 
ecologically sustainable development by seeking the support and mobilizing 
NGOs and community groups. The Network's main outputs include giving 
Ugandan farmers needed inputs (e.g., zero grazing cattle, chickens, animal 
feed, fertilizer, water pumps, spades and hoes, etc.) and offering on-the 
spot training session on environmentally sound and mostly indigenous 
technologies to improve farm productivity (e.g. teaching techniques like 
grazing, mulching, grafting, building trenches to avoid soil erosion, 
building latrines, using fuel efficient stoves, etc.). In addition, the 
Network has been quite effective at public education, forging links between 
Ugandan farmers through exchange visits, the dissemination of information 
about environmentally sound and indigenous farming practices through 
theatre, radio and a community-oriented newsletter called UGANDA 
ENVIRONEWS, and incorporating Ugandan NGOs (e.g.. Environmental Alert, 
CARD, JESE) as trainers and project implementors. During our visits with
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beneficiaries in Fort Portal and Iganga, we observed that the Network's 
model farmers had indeed constructed compost pits to supply manure for 
their gardens, built ditches to avoid soil erosion, and were cutting grass 
for mulching and planting trees for firewood and fruit. The Africa 2000
Network is part of an international UNDP programme established in 10-12
African countries in 1989. In Uganda, the Network is directly executed by 
a National Coordinator who is directly hired and supervised by UNDP. The 
National Coordinator is assisted by regional coordinators based in the 
field who in turn hire both international and national NGOs/CBOs to 
implement the Network's various projects. Since its inception in 1990, the 
Network has invested over US$ 2 million and created 31 small projects in 
Central Uganda, each with budgets ranging from US$ 15-20,000 and composed 
of various beneficiary groups of 30-50 farmers. Finally but most 
importantly, during our field visits, some farmers informed us that their 
farm incomes and crop yields had improved thanks to the programme.
In the Micro Projects Programme to Combat A ids , (MPP), the chief premise is
that, in addition to providing curative care (e.g., medical attention, 
counselling and drugs), development agencies should enhance the well-being 
and self-sufficiency of Ugandan communities afflicted by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. In Uganda, MPP has tried to achieved this by encouraging Ugandan 
communities afflicted by HIV/AIDS to form groups and giving such groups 
seed capital as well training in basic savings and book-keeping techniques 
in order to enable them to launch their own income-generating activities 
(IGAs). The group's profits are then either re-invested in the group 
(usually in the form of technical training--e.g., sewing skills) or used to 
help widows or pay school fees for orphans whose parents have died of 
HIV/AIDS. MPP is directly implemented by the NEX Unit in the MFEP which 
overseas the work of MPP's national coordinator in Kampala and appoints the 
programme's regional coordinators in the field. Since 1992, MPP has 
supported a total of 116 micro projects from 20 districts. Approximately
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95% of the US$ 700,000 earmarked for the MPP pilot programme has already 
been disbursed. The income generated from the community-based IGAs created 
with MPP's assistance have provided school fees for 3,500 orphans and 
helped over 500 families to increase their own incomes rather than having 
to rely on the charity of family or the church. In addition to 
supplementing communities' incomes, MPP has strengthened an array of both 
international (e.g.. World Vision, SALEM) and local NGOs (e.g., Uganda 
Women's Concern) now serving as umbrella organizations and providing 
training and lending implementational support to MPP.
Lastly, in the Community Management Programme (CMP), both communities
and local politicians are equipped with poverty analysis, development 
planning and evaluation skills which are supposed to enable beneficiaries 
to formulate their own community development project proposals. In CMP, 
consultants and staff play the role of catalysts and mobilizers rather than 
that of omniscient development experts. The Programme is supported by UNDP 
but directly implemented by the United Nations Commission on Human 
Settlements (HABITAT). CMP is run by a Canadian Chief Technical Advisor 
(CTA) who answers both to UNDP and HABITAT. He in turn has a government 
counterpart in the Ministry of Gender and Community Development. As in the 
Africa 2000 Network and MPP, CMP's CTA and national coordinator are assisted
by a team of regional coordinator, the main difference being that, in the 
case of CMP, all government counterparts are government employees on 
secondment to CMP. By the time of my visit in 1995, the project had 
shifted its focus from 'community development' towards 'community 
management and empowerment' and was being increasingly geared towards 
fostering community self-reliance. The programme's most outstanding 
results include several mobilization workshops on communications and data 
collection and analysis skills as well as a series of training sessions 
involving central government representatives, district officials, project 
staff and community beneficiaries. The latter trainings have concentrated
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on consolidating skills in gender awareness, improved agricultural systems, 
community participation needs, writing effective project proposals, 
designing baseline surveys and evaluation techniques. According to CMP 
reports, by July 1995, over 14 community projects had been submitted to the 
Programme, including 10 proposals for the construction of community 
facilities and 4 in income-generating activities. CMP's most unique 
feature is probably its conscious involvement of government officials from 
all levels (e.g., from Kampala Ministries, District Offices and local 
Resistance Councils--RC/LCs) both as project managers and beneficiaries. 
This aspect of CMP's design largely explains the support it has received 
from government officials who have praised CMP for working alongside 
government and facilitating the decentralization process by strengthening 
local planning capacities rather than duplicating government services.
(The enclosed MAP shows the physical location of the three above programmes 
and Table 5.7 summarizes their objectives and achievements.)
The constraints faced by UNDP in the above three programmes range 
from broader institutional to inter-organizational, intra-organizational, 
and community level constraints. I focus on those constraints with 
greatest implications for UNDP's implementation of SHD/PCD in Uganda.
a) Broader Institutional Constraints:
Because the broader constraints obstructing the implementation of 
SHD/PCD approaches in rural Uganda were described in detail in Chapter 4, 
here I only discuss those most commonly found in UNDP-supported projects.
Lack of Access to Productive Assets and Markets
One of the most common institutional obstacles cited by project 
beneficiaries and staff as a hindrance to the success of UNDP-supported
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development efforts was poor access to roads, markets, supply parts, or 
repair services in remote rural areas. Respondents also complained of 
insufficient seed capital, land or income to hire labour or to invest in 
productive investments as serious impediments. In MPP, for example, Ms. 
Betty Ddungo, MPP's National Coordinator, herself concludes that many MPP 
projects have failed precisely because the grants given out by UNDP to 
community groups were much too small to start viable projects which would 
produce sufficient profits to be shared among all group members. These 
findings coincide with the independent evaluation of the programme carried 
out by R.M. Nyonyitono et al concludes that the community groups funded 
through MPP have at best made small profits and that only a few (2 out of 
17 micro projects visited by the study) made enough profit to set up HIV/ 
AIDS education funds. The internal hand-over report by E.A. Birungi, MPP 
Regional Coordinator in Mbale confirms that, out of the 800 orphans which 
were expected to benefit from the 23 MPP projects in Mbale, only 200 did so 
since many projects never took off or had insufficient returns.
Limited Access to Government Assistance For Community Development
A parallel problem was that, despite the decentralization process, the 
availability of government funds for community-level development was 
especially inaccessible to the poorest Ugandans. As beneficiaries from CMP 
explained, in their community, Entandikwa government loans intended for poor
persons who were not otherwise eligible for bank credit often went to 
persons who had capital or land to invest in, who could pay the 12% 
interest rate, and who were politically connected. In fact, during our 
visits to the Africa 2000 Network, the RC/LC V member responsible for Entandikwa
in Kabarole District himself admitted that Entandikwa credit normally went
to those with close ties to local government officials.
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The above confirms the findings in Chapter 4 that the poor's lack of 
access to resources is a major impediment to SHD/PCD in Uganda.
Furthermore, according to UNDP's own analyses (see endnote 118), because of 
the small size of the loans given out by UNDP, programmes like MPP and the 
Africa 2000 Network were having only limited impact in this respect.
b) Inter-Organizational Constraints:
Weak UNDP-Government Consultation and Communication
One of the dominant features of the UNDP-supported programmes I 
studied in the Ugandan countryside was poor collaboration between UNDP and 
government actors, both before and during project implementation. This has 
diminished UNDP's chances of incorporating SHD/PCD goals into local 
development strategies or of fostering genuine North-South partnerships.
The fragile state of UNDP-government relations was evident in the 
work of the Africa 2000 Network and MPP in Fort Portal as well as in MPP's work
in Mbale District. Mr. James Mkata, the Assistant Chief Administrative 
Officer for Kabarole District pointed out that, although UNDP should be 
consulting with his office on a regular basis, UNDP had arrived in the 
region with pre-conceived project ideas and that he had barely seen UNDP 
project coordinators after their initial arrival. Mr. Mkata further
complained that, with the exception of a letter which arrived from UNDP a 
few days before our meeting, his office had not been consulted about UNDP's 
recent decision to merge the coordination of MPP an d the Africa 2000 Network in
Fort Portal. During a subsequent conversation, Ms. Mary Jo Kakinda, 
National Coordinator for the Africa 2000 Network confirmed that neither local
government officials or the Fort Portal District Committee for MPP had
been involved in decisions about changes to MPP's management structure in
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Fort Portal. In response to the government charge that UNDP did not work 
closely enough with Kabarole District officials, Ms. Kakinda, pointed out 
that, when District officials were given reports by UNDP, they did not read 
them since what truly mattered to them was the direct benefits they could 
accrue from collaboration with UNDP. Also in Fort Portal, the District 
Agricultural Officer for Kabarole District told us that he worried about 
the duplicative effects of inadequate UNDP-government collaboration and of 
donors like UNDP giving farmers advice that contradicted that of the 
government's. Finally, in Mbale District, the Deputy Resident District
Commissioner noted that UNDP's tendency to visit District officials only 
after the agency was established in the area and needed their official
approval contrasted considerably with the approach of donors like ODA/DfID 
and CARE who had invited District officials to advise on potential District 
projects prior to settling in Mbale. The lack of communication between
UNDP and District officials was confirmed by UNDP's reluctance towards my 
visiting government officials during my research as well as by these 
officials' lack of knowledge about what UNDP was doing in their Districts.
Limited Government Interest in UNDP-Supported Projects
According to my findings, the lack of Ugandan government involvement 
in the early planning or later implementation of UNDP-supported projects in 
their areas cannot be entirely blamed on UNDP. Undeniably, a major part of 
the problem in many of the projects studies is the inefficiency of the 
Ugandan government itself as well as the reluctance of government 
officials to contribute to donor-supported development efforts unless they 
were directly compensated for doing so. Hence in Mbale and Tororo, I 
learned that local government officials who had originally been active 
members of MPP's District Selection Committee were inactive by the time of our
visit due to the lack of sufficient incentives available from MPP. This 
situation, said the Assistant Chief Administrative Officer for the
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member of MPP's District Selection Committee, would not improve until MPP 
improved its sitting allowances for District Selection Committee members. When
these comments were relayed to MPP's National Coordinator, she remarked 
that MPP already paid District Selection Committee members a transport allowance of
20,000 shillings per meeting as an incentive to attend.
Admittedly, in some of the UNDP-supported projects we visited, the 
Uganda government was considerably more active. In CMP in Mubende, for 
instance, both the District's Chief Administrative Officer and the RC/LC V 
Chairman told us that, in addition to giving government officials useful 
training. District officials were active in monitoring CMP projects, and 
that CMP staff themselves contributed to the District's through their 
participation in the formulation of Mubende's first District Development Plan.
Still, even in Mubende, the willingness of local government officials to 
invest time and energy in donor-led development efforts has not come free. 
The truth is that the local government's collaboration in CMP is attributed 
largely to the fact that a number of key CMP staff, including the District 
Coordinator and Community Development Assistants for CMP in Mubende, are 
government personnel who have been seconded to CMP. For such officials, 
working with CMP implies attractive project "incentives" and, in the case 
of the District Project Coordinator, the right to a secretary, a driver and 
a vehicle--all benefits which are a rarity in government circles and 
virtually unseen in rural areas. In addition, CMP's Project Coordinating Team
(composed of the District Project Coordinator, the Chief Administrative 
Officer, and heads of other relevant departments in the District 
Administration) are paid a sitting allowance for CMP meetings attended. 
Besides reinforcing dependence on foreign funds, CMP's proximity to 
government has the drawback of having work with Ugandan civil servants who 
see themselves as bureaucrats rather than enablers of communities; of 
endless logistical glitches (e.g., lack of vehicles for community
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mobilizers); and of stifling bureaucracy (e.g., salary delays for staff, 
low morale among national professional staff who, despite project top-ups, 
resent being paid less than international administrative staff).
Here, my intention is not to chastise the use of financial incentives to 
motivate Ugandan government officials, but simply to show that, because of 
the dearth of public resources, in Ugandan civil servants have become 
dependent on extracting benefits from donors and that this undermines these 
projects' goals of self-sufficiency and sustainability. UNDP's main error 
in these projects then was not that it gave financial incentives but that 
it failed to openly acknowledge the problem and to take measures to counter 
its adverse effects in the initial programme formulation phase by 
considering alternatives that generate money from sources other than donors 
(e.g., getting project beneficiaries to pay government officials a small 
fee for needed services in the project; getting government officials to 
create governmental IGAs and to reinvest part of the profits into salaries 
and the rest into the project's sustainability, etc.), while at the same 
time treating the problem at the wider institutional and policy levels.
Government Pressures in Beneficiary Selection
As hinted above, sometimes projects can suffer more as a result of 
Ugandan government involvement than they do from its absence. In Mbale 
District, for instance, an elected RC/LC official who was also a member of 
MPP's District Selection Committee told us that even though both the RC/LC I and
RC/LC V Chairpersons approved all MPP project proposals and confirmed their 
viability as well as the legitimacy of the groups applying, project 
proposals were known to be signed by RCs/LCs or local government officials 
in exchange for bribes. Furthermore, remarked the respondent, it would not 
be uncommon for a lower level RC/LC I Chair giving an honest assessment of 
a project proposal to be overridden by a higher-level RC/LC Chairperson.
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c) Intra-Organizational and Project-Level Constraints:
Inability to Reach the Poorest
One of the biggest shortcomings of UNDP-supported programmes at the 
intra-organizational and project level was their inability to reach the 
poorest. In the case of CMP in Mubende, the Programme's Regional 
Coordinator for Mubende conceded that the non-educated were not selected 
for CMP trainings and that only the educated had participated in CMP's 
Baseline Survey as they were in a better position to read and respond to 
the survey questions posed. In Africa 2000 Network in Fort Portal, one
of the most active model farmers we visited was a well-educated nurse who 
happened to be one of the founding members of Joint Efforts to Save the Environment
(JESE), the Network's implementing NGO in the area, as well as the aunt of 
JESE's Coordinator for Fort Portal. Another favoured beneficiary was not 
only a fairly large farmer with over 10 acres of land, but also the RC V 
member for Kabarole District. In Iganga, the Community Association for Rural
Development (CARD) , the local community-based organization acting both as
implementor and beneficiary of the Network's projects in that District, 
admitted to channelling most of the project's benefits directly to CARD'S 
Management Executive. The valuable water pump supplied to the group by the 
Network was set up in the Project Coordinator's farm and, of the first six 
cows given to the group, one went to the Project Coordinator, one to the 
Project Vice-Chair, one to the Treasurer, one to the Assistant General 
Secretary, and one to a family where the father was one of CARD'S founders, 
thereby leaving only one cow for a farmer not on CARD'S Executive.
These findings have very negative implications for UNDP's realization of 
core SHD/PCD goals like greater equity and accessible social services for 
the poorest since they suggest that, by channelling project benefits to 
community members who have privileged access to resources, power
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information, and UNDP project managers, UNDP's interventions may be 
reinforcing rather than reducing existing inequalities in rural Uganda.
Opportunism by Intermediary NGOs Serving Poor Rural Communities
Another trend which may be aggravating inequalities in the Ugandan 
countryside is the growing expansionism and financial donor dependence of 
UNDP's intermediary NGOs. For example, in a few years, the Joint Effort to Save
the Environment (JESE), the local NGO contracted out by the Africa 2000 Network to
oversee projects in Fort Portal had grown from a small cadre of volunteers 
to an NGO with full-time staff and fairly high operating costs. According 
to the figures in JESE's April 1, 1994 Project Document, out of JESE's 24 
million Shilling budget for 1994, only 3 million shillings (12%) actually 
went to farmers in the form of credit--the same sum farmers contributed to 
the project in the first place, while 2.5 million shillings were being 
spent on exchange visits, 5 million shillings (or 2 0%) on transport, 4.5 
million shillings (or 19%) on administrative and contingency costs, and 6 
million shillings (or 25%) on meeting the costs of extension and training 
services, including staff salaries, allowances and staff training and 
development. Admittedly, some of JESE's organizational expenditures, 
notably those related to the NGO's training and extension services as well 
as to exchange visits, do constitute benefits for farmers as well. Even so, 
the budget figures show that the trend at JESE is clearly towards 
escalating administrative and logistical costs. Interestingly, a
similar trend can be found in the Africa 2000 N etw ork's international programme
which allocates only US$ 8 million (31%) out of its US$ 26 million budget 
towards financial and material support for community-based activities, with 
the rest going towards technical assistance to intermediary NGOs and 
research institutes (US$ 8 million--or 31%), communications and networking 
by project coordinators and implementing NGOs (US$ 4 million--or 15%) and 
programme support costs and administration (US $6 million--or 23%).
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In the Uganda Women^s Concern Ministry, this initially very modest
indigenous NGO created by locals in Mbale in 1991 was given a grant of 2.6 
million shillings by MPP to establish a pig breeding centre which started 
with 6 pigs and eventually grew to provide 18 families with pigs and to 
generate enough profits to help care for 40 families and 240 orphans. 
However, by the time of our visit, this NGO had already moved from its once 
modest office space in a simple 1-room structure (which now lay idle in the 
background) to a newly-constructed and fairly modern 10-room complex of 
which we were proudly given a tour. Today, the Uganda Women*s Concern Ministry
is comprised of numerous departments and monthly salaries alone cost over 4 
million shillings. The rapidity with which it has expanded is surprising. 
Moreover, the NGO's Coordinator who happens to be the wife of an MPP 
District Selection Committee member, was submitting an even more ambitious 
98 million shilling expansion proposal to UNDP.
Distant, Paternalistic and Unaccountable Management Methods
Another obstacle in UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD in the Ugandan 
countryside has been the use of top-down, technocratic and paternalistic 
management approaches by some UNDP project coordinators. For example, in 
Mbale and Tororo, we were told by several project beneficiaries that they 
had not seen MPP's Regional Coordinator in the last 6-8 months even though, 
according to the National Coordinator, he had been submitting detailed 
reports of his field visits to project beneficiaries in the area. Near the 
end of our visit to MPP projects in Mbale and Tororo we also learned that 
there were certain projects in the District, namely mainly those up Mount 
Elgon on the border with Kenya, which, due to their remoteness, no MPP 
Coordinator had ever wanted to visit. When I asked how such projects were 
monitored, I was told by MPP's National Coordinator that they had recently 
sent the young secretary from the MPP Mbale Office to meet with project 
beneficiaries since she was herself "from up there on the hills."
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Even within CMP in Mubende which utilizes local government staff and 
residents as community mobilizers, beneficiaries complained that UNDP and 
HABITAT imposed unrealistic rules requiring community groups to formulate 
and evaluate their own project proposals. As one mobilizer in the S.S. 
Secondary School Group explained: "It is difficult for peasants to write
proposals which are very complicated since most of them are illiterate.
Yet, CMP staff are adamant that project proposals be written." During my 
research, I discovered that project beneficiaries generally coped by 
'shirking' their project formulation responsibilities and paying community 
mobilizers to write project proposals on their behalf. An added problem was 
that because CMP community mobilizers, though locals, were identified and 
assessed by CMP rather than selected by communities, they were not 
accountable to or bound to incorporate the needs of beneficiaries in the 
projects they formulated. Beneficiaries from the S.S. Light Secondary 
School Construction Project also complained that, by the time CMP projects 
reached their communities, the projects' objectives and parameters had been 
pre-defined by external development experts and were difficult to alter 
even if they did not coincide with local community aspirations and hence 
were not conducive to self-reliant development in the long-run. As an 
example of the strait-jacket such projects put communities in, group 
members recalled how, after considerable collective discussion, they had 
decided that what they most wanted UNDP's/HABITAT's assistance for was the 
creation of revolving savings funds which would eventually generate 
personal loans for group members. However, because CMP staff had 
unilaterally decided that they would not provide loans or grants, the group 
had decided that they had little choice but to settle for the only other 
development priority they could agree on: the construction of a school.
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Lack of Feasibility Studies, Monitoring or Impact Evaluation
The absence of pre-feasibility studies or impact assessments is 
another major drawback of the UNDP-supported project we visited and one 
which has renders learning processes in such projects very difficult.
As a case in point, in the Bananyole Youth Group for Carpentry and 
Joinery, a Tororo group supported by MPP, the lack of a proper feasibility 
study resulted in some very unsound investment advice being given to the 
group. In this instance, while most group's members were young farmers who 
had originally applied for funding to start an agricultural maize and soya
growing project, without having carried out a feasibility study, the MPP
Regional Coordinator at the time told the group that it was preferable for 
them not to become involved in an agricultural activity since this would 
make them dependent on the weather. On the basis of this advice, the group 
settled for a carpentry project instead, only to realize much later that, 
poor access to roads, unpredictable electricity, and the limited market 
potential of their small village meant that carpentry was not a profitable 
or sustainable business venture there. At the time of our visit, this
group was requesting additional funds from MPP in order to move their
business to a larger town with better facilities During our research we 
also discovered that UNDP-supported projects which gave the impression of 
being successful on the surface were difficult to assess properly due to 
inadequate ongoing project monitoring. For example, of all the model 
farmers we visited in the Africa 2000 Network, only one farmer from Iganga was
able to show records comparing his overall farm income and crop yields both 
before and after UNDP's assistance. In this case, the farmer could prove 
that his farm's net profit had increased from 245,130 Shillings in 1991 up 
to 771,390 Shillings in 1993, the period during which he received 
assistance from the Africa 2000 Network via CARD. However, all other farmers
visited in the Network, lacked 'before' and 'after' records of their farm's
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performance and when asked for their r records, claimed that they had 
recently lost them. The Network's national Coordination, Ms. Kakinda 
conceded during our interview that the programme's data on increased farm 
income or productivity was incomplete since beneficiaries were not keeping 
records and since occasional visits by the national and regional 
coordinator did not allow enough time to gage groups' progress.
A related problem was the absence of comprehensive impact 
evaluations. Although all three UNDP-supported programmes studied had 
produced evaluation reports, an analysis of the data in these reports 
reveals that the projects have tended to focus on the measurement of 
quantitative outputs (e.g., number of community groups given grants, number 
of training sessions carried out, etc.) instead of producing evidence of 
long-term development impact on beneficiaries' living standards either in 
terms of increased income, productivity, trade, or employment. Nor, for 
that matter, had indicators or a methodology been developed to ascertain 
whether these interventions had achieved core SHD/PCD goals like reaching 
the poorest, reducing inequities, or fostering greater empowerment and 
self-reliance. In CMP, for instance, during my interview with Mr. Joshua 
Ogwang , National Programme Coordinator for CMP, conceded that, although in 
places such as Mubende, District officials were very active in CMP, the 
programme did not yet have conclusive indicators showing that CMP trainings 
had influenced government policy or development plans. In its 1995 Mid-
Term Review of the Fifth Cycle UNDP-Uganda CP, evaluators concede that the 
absence of appropriate impact assessment is a major problem in the UNDP- 
Uganda CP and that the CP never identified success indicators with which to 
measure its progress.
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d) Community and Beneficiary-Level Constraints:
Limited Community-Level Know-how
In many of the projects we visited, serious implementation setbacks 
occurred due to a dearth of know-how within the beneficiary communities. 
Unfortunately, these bottlenecks were rarely detected in time. In the 
Omukise Yetolere Grinding Mill Group supported by MPP in Tororo, for 
instance, because no one in the community knew how to install the grinding 
mill given to the group by MPP, a small fortune had to be spent bringing in 
a technician from Kampala, and, even then, the grinding mill broke down 
after its installation since group members had not been aware that they 
could not utilize the mill until its newly-built cement foundation had 
dried. When I visited, the grinding mill was still out of operation.
Preference for Quick Profit Rather than Training and Participation
During our research we also found that beneficiary groups were often 
much more interested in receiving financial grants, loans or inputs which 
could be directly used to generate profit than they were in receiving 
training which would build up their long-term capabilities. Hence, in the 
Unity Group Women's Association in Tororo town, a group supported by MPP, 
we discovered that group members were demanding that the money given by MPP 
to the project's intermediary NGO, SALEM Brotherhood, to train group 
members in tailoring skills be instead given directly to the group so that 
they could buy textiles and profit from selling clothes in the interim 
rather than having to wait to improve their tailoring skills before 
expanding the group's income. During our research, we even learned of
instances in which groups' desire to earn cash in the short-term led them 
to deceive UNDP staff. In the case of the Nabweya Women's Group supported 
by MPP in Mbale, for example, group members had claimed that they already
248
possessed tailoring skills in order to receive sewing machines from MPP. 
Upon the arrival of the sewing machines though, it became clear that group 
members did not know how to sew and that the group had planned to rent out 
the sewing machines for profit. And, in the S.S. Light Secondary
School Construction Project supported by CMP in Mubende, we learned that 
this project too had began to suffer as a result of shirking and low 
participation after CMP rejected group members' request for individual 
credit and savings opportunities and told them to settle for a collective 
school construction project with no concrete individual financial gains.
Reluctance to Work Collectively Due to Unaccountability and Corruption
Another obstacle which we found in UNDP-supported projects was that 
internal tensions or distrust within beneficiary communities often meant 
that people did not want to or could not work collectively. This problem 
was pervasive in all three of the UNDP-supported field programmes we 
visited. Sometimes, tensions or distrust within communities would result in 
the exclusion of some members in project activities. In the Africa 2000
Network, for instance, distrust was the cause of low participation in the
Burhara Group where men had discouraged their wives from planting trees due 
to their fears that tree planting might bring land ownership rights to the 
women. But, most commonly, the tensions and mistrust resulting from the
beneficiary community's social heterogeneity and internal inequalities 
manifested themselves in the form of unaccountable, autocratic or, corrupt 
leadership by group leaders known to be taking advantage of group members. 
As the Chief Administrative Officer for NGO and Women's affairs in Kabarole 
District noted, better-off women or established organizations in Kabarole 
were known to have formed groups in an impromptu manner for the purpose of 
capturing outside aid funds. This, he remarked, had made many community 
members reluctant to join groups even though this was a prerequisite to 
receiving assistance from donors such as UNDP. And indeed, in Mubende,
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I discovered that the Kisakyamaria Women's Group for Mushroom Growing which 
was receiving management and report writing skills training from CMP was in 
fact led by a well-connected US-educated College Professor from the Mubende 
National Teacher's College who was the neighbour of the local CMP 
Mobilization Officer. During my visit, I learned that this group leader 
had deceivingly told her poorer and less educated group members that a 
grant she had been given by British Volunteer Services Overseas (VSO) was 
in fact a personal loan from herself to the group and that, as such, the 
group would have to pay her back for it. However, by far the worse 
violations of trust were encountered between group leaders and community 
members were in MPP which was the UNDP programme most directly involved in 
giving out grants to community groups. In MPP we came across half a dozen 
situations such as the one at the Malaba Women's Quarrying Group in Tororo 
where we discovered that the group's Chairwoman had unilaterally spent as 
much as 600,000 shillings of the 2 million shillings given to the group by 
MPP in order to pay for personal physical therapy in Kampala. Because this 
group's Chairwoman was the only person in the group who spoke English, was 
educated and kept the group's financial records, she was able to hide her 
expenditures from group members until MPP's National Coordinator asked to 
see their bank book. The lack of accountability by group leaders in MPP
probably has a lot to do with the fact that the ultimate beneficiaries of 
these group initiatives (i.e., orphans and widows of HIV/AIDS victims) are 
not the same persons implementing the projects or receiving UNDP grants.
Lack of Self-Reliance and Community Dependence on Outside Assistance
The final, but perhaps most detrimental shortcoming which I observed 
in UNDP-supported programmes was a tendency by community beneficiaries to 
become overly dependent on UNDP funding, often refusing to carry out 
beneficial group activities without a financial reward from UNDP for doing 
so. For example, after the Chiraro Group in Kabarole insisted on
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receiving additional training from the Africa 2000 Network to improve the
quality of their farming techniques, group members refused to donate even a 
small sum of money to defray some of the public transport costs involved in 
travelling to Kampala to obtain the training. In their defence, group 
members claimed that their farm incomes were far too small for them to 
generate the 30,000 shillings (about US$ 30.00) for transport requested of 
the group by the Network. Ironically though, when the Network's National 
Coordinator asked group members whether they ever travelled to Kampala to 
visit family and friends, most responded that they did so but that in those 
instances they did so for their own purposes. To this, the National 
Coordinator retorted that if group members could afford to travel to 
Kampala for personal reasons, she did not see why they could not afford to 
travel for training and farm visits. This exchange is illustrative of 
the severity of beneficiary dependence on foreign funding in Uganda and 
raises questions about the self-reliance and long-term sustainability of 
donor-supported projects after agencies like UNDP withdraw from the area.
The above discussion of UNDP's efforts to implement SHD/PCD at the 
programme and project/grassroots level in Uganda has several implications 
for my analysis of the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches in LDCs.
First of all, at the general programme level, the tendency of the UNDP- 
Uganda CP to continue implementing over 85 small projects in traditional 
sectors like agriculture and industry and its difficulties applying the 
Programmatic approach confirm that when one is dealing with a vague and complex
development paradigm such as SHD/PCD in which concrete entry points, 
priorities or connections between components are not easily apparent, the 
operationalization of such ideas becomes extremely difficult. At the same 
time though, we can see that because UNDP has retained its strategy- 
building functions, policy units, and hence its intellectual capacity, in 
New York HQ to this day, the agency is lacking field staff with the 
analytical, integrated planning and consensus-building skills required to
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carry out integrated development approaches which foster national ownership 
and capacity. These findings seem to confirm that UNDP is wrong to assume 
that a top-down, generalist, and financially-strapped organization such as 
itself has the organizational structures needed to carry out holistic and 
bottom-up SHD/PCD initiatives. Secondly, the above findings shows that 
although effective development at the grassroots level requires flexibility 
and genuine community participation--as stated by DD thinkers, NIE thinkers 
are also correct in point out that community participation and indigenous 
knowledge should not be seen as a panacea since, to be truly effective, 
participatory development projects also require at least technical 
expertise, close supervision and some form of managerial regulation by 
specialized development experts. Thirdly, the evidence in this chapter 
shows that, far from being harmonious or naturally collaborative, the 
existing system of international development cooperation in Uganda is 
characterized by territorialism and a system of foreign aid in which donors 
and sectoral government ministries have their own vested interests and 
created their own fiefdoms. What we end up with is a cadre of UNDP-Uganda 
staff who have become accustomed to meeting the quantitative, time- 
restricted, and top-down demands of UNDP HQ and to getting around the 
territoriality of the donors community and the rent-seeking behaviour of 
government officials, by focusing on quick and visual results and 
proceeding on their own, often at the expense of core SHD/PCD goals like 
enhanced donor collaboration. North-South partnership and national 
ownership, and greater self-reliance.
At the project and grassroots level, although the UNDP-Uganda CP has 
obviously made a genuine effort to widen the scope of its networks by 
working more directly with civil society actors and supporting grassroots 
initiatives, the evidence in this chapter suggests that such efforts have 
fallen short of reaching the poorest Ugandans, generating broad-based 
participation, empowering and fostering greater self-reliance among
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beneficiaries, or creating conditions for long-term sustainability. 
Admittedly, many of the obstacles which the UNDP-Uganda CP has faced at the 
project/grassroots level have been beyond limited scope of intervention 
(e.g., broader institutional and community-level constraints). Still, many 
others have clearly been a product of UNDP's pursuit of its organizational 
interests--and specifically its tendency to do things in an expedient and 
top-down fashion, at the expense of SHD/PCD's goals of participatory, 
empowering and self-reliant development. UNDP's idealism and preoccupation 
with being seen as the champion of SHD/PCD caused it to overlook the 
severity of the constraints facing it and to sustain contestable 
assumptions such as the supposition that beneficiaries are naturally 
altruistic and equipped with abundant indigenous skills, free time and 
inputs to carry out complex and time-consuming SHD/PCD initiatives.
V. Conclusion; The Baroque Science and RiverPollutine Phenomena Confirmed
By way of conclusion, it is undeniable that UNDP has made impressive 
strides in putting the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice at the conceptual, 
policy, and programme/project levels both in Uganda and beyond. As the 
above evidence shows, UNDP has been particularly effective at redefining 
its mission on the basis of the achievement of SHD/PCD, at raising the 
profile of Human Development concerns in international reports and
conferences, and at diversifying into new areas such as wider institutional 
and governance issues as well as into grassroots projects which actively 
involve NGOs and beneficiary communities in efforts to implement SHD/PCD at 
the grassroots level. At the same time though, it is equally clear from the 
evidence presented in this chapter that UNDP has encountered serious 
setbacks in its efforts to implement SHD/PCD both globally and in Uganda.
First of all, we have seen that the sheer abstractness, complexity, 
and incompleteness of the SHD/PCD paradigm created serious interpretation
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and operationalization difficulties for donors, government officials and 
for the professionals in the UNDP-Uganda Office. As in the Baroque Science
Phenomenon, UNDP staff in Uganda found themselves unable to grapple with a
paradigm whose meaning was much too vague, whose components' linkages were 
not fully understood and whose priority entry points were difficult to 
identify. Moreover, as in Baroque Sciences, UNDP's idealism, coupled with 
its determination to elevate its profile by becoming known as the chief 
promoter of SHD/PCD, seem to have impeded UNDP from detecting (or at least 
addressing) the internal tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm (e.g., 
the tension between the strong conditionality inherent in donors' promotion 
of SHD/PCD and their promotion of SHD/PCD goals like fostering greater 
self-reliance in LDCs; the trade offs between expecting development 
agencies to implement programmes which integrate fast-paced policy 
3id.-voca.CY--Upstream work with slow-paced grassroots-level participation--
Downstream work; the tension between expecting project coordinators to
foster flexible, participatory and beneficiary-driven initiatives while at 
the same time providing detailed feasibility analyses and monitoring which 
requires a very managerial approach to project implementation) or 
recognizing the gap present between SHD/PCD ideals and the severity of 
constraints in its own agency, the existing system of international 
cooperation, and within developing societies. UNDP's inability to 
appreciate the gap between ideals and its reality explains why it continued 
sustaining a series of over-ambitious assumptions about the ability of 
inter-governmental agencies to lead a major paradigmatic shift and 
challenge existing power relations; about the ability of the international 
community to work in a harmonious fashion; about the ability of an 
organization as top-down, bureaucratic and sectoral as UNDP to work in a 
bottom-up, integrated, analytical and flexible manner; and about the 
altruism and omniscience of poor beneficiary communities.
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Judging from the evidence in this chapter, it would seem that 
SHD/PCD's conceptual vagueness and abstractness, the unknown links or 
prioritization of SHD/PCD various components, the internal tensions and 
trade offs between various SHD/PCD components, and the gap between SHD/PCD 
ideals and existent constraints were felt most at the field level in Uganda 
and among UNDP-Uganda Office professionals as it is they who were left with 
the burden of putting SHD/PCD ideas into practice in the context of extreme 
poverty, social inequality and political and institutional weaknesses.
On top of SHD/PCD's conceptual deficiencies though, this chapter 
shows that UNDP's own actions--namely the agency's overly dispersed 
interpretation of SHD/PCD approaches, its top-down imposition of SHD/PCD 
ideas and its own shifting ideological position on SHD/PCD--which have 
added to the confusion surrounding the implementation of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm. These latter actions by UNDP were partly the result of its 
inexperience in dealing with a development paradigm as ambitious and 
complex as SHD/PCD. However, they are also, to a great extent, the product 
of UNDP's tendency to place its own organizational interests ahead of core 
SHD/PCD goals when the two are at odds with one another. In the case of 
UNDP, we have seen that its organizational interests can take various 
forms, including giving into political resistance from its most powerful 
stakeholders (e.g., by abandoning the more audacious components of its 
global 'Sound Governance' agenda once it came under attack by traditional 
UN member nation-states and fellow UN agencies or CMP's tendency to 
incorporate government officials in its projects' implementation but to 
disregard the concerns of community beneficiaries); trying to extend its 
own development mandate (e.g., by insisting that UNDP lead the UN's global 
development efforts even though fellow UN agencies saw this as a threat to 
their growing autonomy or the tendency of intermediary NGOs working with 
MPP and the Africa 2000 Network to expand their own operations); concentrating
on what is easiest and most feasible (e.g., bypassing inefficient
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government offices in the MFEP in Kampala rather than ensuring their 
ownership or CMP's tendency to pre-define project parameters and to refuse 
to give out cash loans rather than engaging community beneficiaries in a 
participatory process); or simplifying the complexity of development 
processes and failing to acknowledge the gap present between UNDP's SHD/PCD 
ideas and the severity of the constraints the agency faces (e.g., by 
failing to recognize the conceptual deficiencies of SHD/PCD, the limited 
autonomy and organizational capacity of UNDP, the territoriality in the 
system of international development cooperation, or how limited beneficiary 
knowledge and altruism undermines the effectiveness of IGAs).
The first two forms of organizational interests mentioned above 
(i.e., giving in to powerful stakeholders and trying to extend the agency's 
development mandate) seemed strongest at the policy and global level, 
probably because it is at this level that the highest decisions about 
development mandates and policies are made. It is at this level, 
therefore, that UNDP is under the greatest pressure from UN member nation­
states not to adopt overly radical policies and from the HQs of fellow UN 
agencies not to expand its global development efforts at the expense of 
those agencies. The last two forms of organizational interests (i.e., doing 
what is easiest and a tendency to simplify the complexities of development 
processes) seemed to manifest themselves most strongly at the programme and 
national level where, as it is to be expected, the obstacles to putting 
SHD/PCD approaches into practice in poor societies with weak institutional 
frameworks, limited financial and human resources, and weak governance 
trajectories are felt most directly. Either way, and as stated in the River
Pollution Phenomenon, the unfortunate result, has been a gradual displacement of
core SHD/PCD goals such as pursuing an audacious 'Sound governance' agenda, 
introducing more democratic and equitable structures as well as greater 
collaboration in the existing system of international development 
cooperation, moving towards more flexible, integrated and analytical, and
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learning-based development interventions, building genuine North-South 
partnership and national ownership, and fostering greater equity, 
participation, empowerment and long-term self-reliance in LDCs.
Despite the above findings though, it is important to realize that 
the empirical test to which I am putting UNDP in this Chapter is an 
extremely exacting one. This is not only because, almost by definition, 
there is always a gap between an agency's aspirations and the reality, but 
also because UNDP has perhaps set unrealistic goals for itself which no 
other international development agency, or any other institution for that 
matter, has ever been able to realize. In similar vein, the analysis in 
this chapter should not be taken to mean that everything UNDP does is 
guided by organizational interests or that such interests always with core 
SHD/PCD goals. For instance, during my research I did find a few instances 
in which UNDP followed alternative pathways and behaved in ways which ran 
counter to the logic of the River Pollution Phenomenon (e.g., UNDP-Uganda ' s
decision to work via unknown NGOs and to give credit to CBOs in programmes 
such as MPP was a risky move which went against the agency's tendency to 
work unilaterally and to 'do what is easiest'). I also encountered 
instances in which UNDP's pursuit of its own organizational interests 
(e.g., trying to elevate its global profile by putting forth a set of very 
audacious policy proposals at the 1995 Social Summit) coincided with and
indeed helped promote core SHD/PCD goals (such as promoting the 'Sound 
governance' agenda). On top of that, organizational interests are rarely 
homogeneous and agencies like UNDP can be simultaneously under pressure to 
pursue different stakeholder agendas (e.g., northern donors' desire to push 
'Sound governance' ideals and recipient governments' pressure to give LDC 
governments aid entitlements free of conditionalities). Under such 
circumstances, it is often those stakeholders who are the most influential 
or exert the greatest pressure (e.g., the G-77 countries) who win out. 
Furthermore, not all of the setbacks encountered in UNDP-supported SHD/PCD
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initiatives can be blamed on UNDP's behaviour. After all, as this chapter 
has shown, the rent-seeking behaviour of Ugandan officials themselves must 
assume much of the blame for the limited impact of many of UNDP's SHD/PCD 
efforts at the programme and project/grassroots levels in Uganda. Lastly, 
the River Pollution Phenomenon, should not be taken to mean that all the
constraints impinging upon UNDP's SHD/PCD agenda are of an organizational 
nature. Instead, this thesis recognizes that a series of broader 
contextual and institutional factors (e.g., Uganda's tribal values and 
inequitable social structures, its undeveloped and overly centralized 
markets, and its cash-strapped, inefficient and rent-seeking civil service, 
etc.) have also obstructed the implementation of SHD/PCD in Uganda. What 
this chapter does usefully show, however, is that UNDP's organizational 
interests--and specifically UNDP's inescapable need for self-perpetuation-- 
are important underlying causes as it is they which have caused UNDP to 
sustain a series of contestable assumptions which have impeded the agency 
from recognizing the gap between its SHD/PCD aspirations and the reality of 
the organizational, institutional and societal constraints which it faces. 
Another distinction which is helpful here is that, while the four forms of 
organizational interests described above are especially useful in 
explaining why it has taken UNDP so long to design SHD/PCD policies and 
programmes as well as why UNDP has constantly found itself displacing the 
more ambitious SHD/PCD components of its programmes, it is the existence of 
wider institutional constraints both globally and in Uganda which largely 
explain why it is so difficult to put SHD/PCD initiatives into practice 
once designed and why their impact has been less than hoped.
Theoretically speaking, this chapter's analysis of UNDP's 
implementation of SHD/PCD coincides with the claims of the International 
Development Cooperation literature (notably, Tendler, Smillie, Rondinelli, 
Riddell and Robinson) that international development agencies have 
difficulties challenging the status quo, influencing policies or fostering
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flexible, participatory, empowering or self-sufficient development and 
confirms the warnings of Clay and Schaffer as well as those of 
Implementation Process thinkers like Bardach and Sieber that implementation 
processes are inherently complex and political, that organizational self- 
interest usually leads to some goal displacement in the process, and that 
there is always a gap between ideals and practice no matter how good the 
ideas involved. Perhaps more importantly though, the chapter makes two 
theoretical contributions to the existing literature.
The first theoretical contribution lies in showing that rent-seeking 
behaviour (e.g., the search for personal benefits, free-riding, and limited 
participation by government, intermediary and community beneficiaries) and 
limited knowledge (e.g., lack of information and scientific knowledge by 
beneficiaries, and weak project feasibility, integrated planning and impact 
assessment skills by project advisors) as well the inequitable distribution 
of socio-economic resources and political power (e.g., beneficiaries' lack 
of access to sufficient land, inputs, markets, or government assistance) 
and the undemocratic nature of project management (e.g., project managers 
imposing project priorities or procedures on beneficiaries) can be 
impediments in the implementation of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts. In other 
words, the chapter shows that both the concerns of the NIE and DD schools 
of thought have an empirical basis in UNDP's experience in Uganda. A 
closer analysis of the three UNDP-supported programmes studied also shows 
that problems of rent-seeking were most severe in MPP where UNDP was 
working through government officials and giving out cash loans to 
beneficiaries yet had only distant supervision from a regional project 
coordinator who occasionally visited the region from Kampala. In projects 
where UNDP did not need to work with government (e.g., the Africa 2000 Network)
or where no cash loans were given out (e.g., CMP), beneficiary and 
government opportunism were kept in check. The second but perhaps more 
important theoretical contribution of the chapter lies in showing how the
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conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm manifest themselves in the 
field level and how they complicate the operationalization efforts of those 
UNDP-Uganda staff who have been assigned the task of putting SHD/PCD ideas 
into practice in Uganda. By revealing the gap between UNDP's SHD/PCD 
aspirations and the severity of the conceptual, organizational and broader 
institutional constraints the agency faces in its efforts to put SHD/PCD 
approaches into question, the chapter also manages to challenge the SHD/PCD 
Literature and the inability of those associated with it to question the 
implementability of SHD/PCD approaches in least developed countries.
Finally, it is important to realize that, because of the difficulties 
of getting to know an agency as image-conscious as UNDP from outside, the 
evidence provided in this chapter is not complete. On top of that, 
because much of the information used in the chapter is based on interviews, 
much of the material presented is based on actors' own perceptions rather 
than on statistically representative facts. All the same, I would argue 
that the combination of testimonies, directly-observed behaviour, 
quantitative data, and assessment reports analyzed in this chapter 
constitute one of the most comprehensive portraits of the inner workings of 
UNDP ever put together and that the chapter's exploration of the views and 
perceptions of the key actors involved in the implementation of SHD/PCD 
ideas are essential to understanding why the SHD/PCD paradigm has been so 
difficult to operationalize both in Uganda and beyond.
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WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED 
...to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth o f the human person,
in the equal rights o f men and women and o f  nations large and small,
. . . to  promote social progress and better standards o f  life in larger freedom,
and for these ends 
... to employ international machinery for the promotion 
of the economic and social advancement o f  all peoples, 
have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims ....
From the Preamble to  the Charter o f th e  U nhed N ations
UNDP is p a r t  o f  t h e  U n ited  N atio n s a n d  u p h o ld s  t h e  v is io n  o f  t h e  U n ited  N a tio n s  C h a rte r . It is 
c o m m itte d  to  t h e  p rincip le  t h a t  d e v e lo p m e n t is in se p a ra b le  f ro m  t h e  q u e s t  f o r  p e a c e  a n d  h u m a n  s e c u r i ty  
a n d  t h a t  t h e  U n ited  N a tio n s  m u s t  b e  a  s tro n g  fo rc e  f o r  d e v e lo p m e n t  a s  w ell a s  p e a c e .
U N D P 's m iss io n  is to  help  c o u n tr ie s  in th e ir  e f fo r t s  t o  a c h ie v e  s u s ta in a b le  h u m a n  d e v e lo p m e n t by  
a s s is t in g  th e m  t o  build th e ir  c a p a c ity  to  d e s ig n  a n d  c a r ry  o u t  d e v e lo p m e n t  p ro g ra m m e s  in p o v e r ty  
e ra d ic a tio n , e m p lo y m e n t c re a tio n  an d  su s ta in a b le  liv e lih o o d s , t h e  e m p o w e rm e n t  o f  w o m e n  a n d  t h e  
p ro te c tio n  a n d  re g e n e ra tio n  o f  t h e  e n v iro n m e n t, g iv ing  f i r s t  p rio rity  t o  p o v e r ty  e ra d ic a tio n .
UNDP a ls o  a c t s  t o  h e lp  th e  U nited  N a tio n s  fam ily  t o  b e c o m e  a  u n if ie d  a n d  p o w e rfu l f o rc e  fo r  
s u s ta in a b le  h u m a n  d e v e lo p m e n t an d  w o rk s  to  s t r e n g th e n  in te rn a t io n a l  c o o p e ra t io n  fo r  s u s ta in a b le  h u m a n  
d e v e lo p m e n t.
UNDP, a t  th e  r e q u e s t  of g o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  in s u p p o r t  o f  i t s  a r e a s  o f  f o c u s ,  a s s i s t s  in b u ild ing  
c a p a c ity  fo r  g o o d  g o v e rn a n c e , popu lar p a rtic ip a tio n , p r iv a te  a n d  p u b lic  s e c t o r  d e v e lo p m e n t  a n d  g ro w th  w ith  
e q u ity , s tr e s s in g  th a t  n a tio n a l p lan s a n d  p rio rities c o n s t i tu te  t h e  o n iy  v ia b le  f ra m e  o f  r e fe re n c e  fo r  t h e  
n a tio n a l p ro g ram m in g  of o p e ra tio n a l ac tiv itie s  fo r  d e v e lo p m e n t  w ith in  t h e  U n ited  N a tio n s  s y s te m .
UNDP re s id e n t  re p re s e n ta tiv e s  norm ally  s e rv e  a s  r e s id e n t  c o o r d in a to r s  o f t h e  o p e ra tio n a l a c t iv i t ie s  
o f  th e  U nited  N a tio n s  s y s te m , su p p o rtin g  a t t h e  r e q u e s t  o f  g o v e r n m e n ts  t h e  c o o rd in a tio n  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t 
a n d  h u m a n ita r ia n  a s s is ta n c e .  R e sid en t c o o rd in a to rs  a ls o  h e lp  t o  o r c h e s t r a te  t h e  full in te lle c tu a l a n d  
te c h n ic a l  r e s o u rc e s  o f t h e  U nited  N atio n s s y s te m  in s u p p o r t  o f n a t io n a l  d e v e lo p m e n t .
UNDP s tr iv e s  to  b e  an  e ffe c tiv e  d e v e lo p m e n t p a r tn e r  fo r  t h e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  relief a g e n c ie s ,  w o rk in g  
t o  s u s ta in  live lih o o d s w h ile  th e y  se e k  t o  s u s ta in  lives. It a c t s  t o  h e lp  c o u n t r ie s  t o  p re p a re  fo r , av o id  a n d  
m a n a g e  co m p lex  e m e rg e n c ie s  an d  d isa s te rs .
UNDP d ra w s  on  e x p e r tise  fro m  a ro u n d  th e  w o r ld , in c lu d in g  f ro m  d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s .  U n ited  
N a tio n s  sp e c ia liz e d  a g e n c ie s , civil so c ie ty  o rg a n iz a tio n s  a n d  r e s e a rc h  in s t i tu te s .
UNDP s u p p o r ts  S o u th -S o u th  co o p e ra tio n  by a c tiv e ly  p ro m o tin g  t h e  e x c h a n g e  of e x p e r ie n c e  a m o n g  
d ev e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s .
UNDP s u p p o r t s ,  w ith in  its  a re a s  of fo c u s , t e c h n o lo g y  t r a n s f e r ,  a d a p ta t io n ,  a n d  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  m o s t  
e f fe c tiv e  te c h n o lo g y .
e n s u re  a  p re o ic ia o ie  n o w  o t  r e s o u rc e s  to  s u p p o r t  its  p ro g ra m m e s . It p ro v id e s  g ra n t fu n d s  th ro u g h  
b a s e d  o n  u n iv e rsa li ty  t h a t  s tro n g ly  fa v o u r  lo w -in co m e  c o u n tr ie s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  t h e  lea s t d e v e lo p e d .
U NDP is  politically  n e u tra l  a n d  its c o o p e ra tio n  is im p artia l. It s e e k s  t o  c o n d u c t its  w o rk  in a  m a n n e r  
t r a n s p a r e n t  a n d  a c c o u n ta b le  t o  all i ts  s ta k e h o ld e rs .
U NDP is c o m m itte d  t o  a  p ro c e s s  o f c o n tin u in g  s e lf - e v a lu a t io n  a n d  refoVm. It a im s t o  Im p ro v e  h s  
o w n  e f f ic ie n c y  a n d  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  a n d  to  a s s is t  t h e  U n ite d  N a tio n s  s y s t e m  in b e co m in g  a  s t ro n g e r  fo rc e  fo r  
t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  p e o p le  a n d  c o u n tr ie s  of t h e  w o rld .
U N D P will c o n t in u e  t o  s u p p o r t  an  in te rn a tio n a l d e v e lo p m e n t  c o o p e r a t io n  f ra m e w o rk  t h a t  r e s p o n d s  
t o  c h a n g in g  g lo b a l, re g io n a l a n d  n a tio n a l c ir c u m s ta n c e s .
Source: UNDP/ "UNDP in 1996: Progress in Change". New York/ New York/ USA/ October 1996.
U N D P re c e iv e s  v o lu n ta ry  c o n tr ib u tio n s  f ro m  n e a r ly  e v e ry  c o u n try  in t h e  w orld . UNDP s e e k s  t o  
j d t b l f l f h h  crite ria  
o
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Table 5.2:
Progress Achieved in UNDP as Whole During the Fifth Programming Cycle (1992-1996)
Table 1: Percentage of Country Programmes with Emphasis on Poverty Alleviation, by Region, Fourth 
and Fifth Cycle
Total Number of CPs % with Emphasis on 
P.A. 4th Cycle
% with Emphasis on 
P.A.5th Cycle
Africa 25 32% 80%
Asia 19 16% 79%
Latin America 21 62% 85%
Arab Region 10 10% 50%
Europe 4 50% 50%
Total 79 34% 76%
Source: Godfrey et al. Building the Capacity to Prevent Poverty: UNDP as
Facilitator. Consultancy Report Commissioned by UNDP. Page 96. New York, New York, 
USA. 1995.
GROWTH OF NATIONAL EXECUTION
As sliaiv of total value of appm ivls (fPF+C/S)
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Source: UNDP, N a t i o n a l  Execution: Promise and Challenges. Pages 14 and 25, respectively. 
OESP, UNDP HQ. New York, New York, USA 1995.
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Table 5.4: Trends in the UNDP-Uganda CP During the 
5‘h Programming Cycle (1992-1996)
ACTUAL IFF EXPENDITURE 1987-1993 273
(1993 ESTIMATED)
Non-IPF and Cost-sharing expenditure resources have generally 
been on a downward trend since peaking in 1989 (CP3). However,
since the beginnings of the current cvcle, these resources have 
averaged US$9.2m p.a.
A C TU A l IPF EXPENDITURE BT PROCRAUUE
POVERTY BOONJHOT. Afl3S
p r o g r a m m e
S31992 ^ 1 9 9 3
ENV.
NATIONAL E X E C U T IO N  A S A P E R C E N T A G E  O F  IPF 
,1993-ESTTMATE. l'W4-PROJECTIONi.
^  40
Source: Government of Uganda 
and UNDP-Uganda. Joint Issues 
Paper for the Mid-Term Review 
o f the fourth CP. Page 6. 
Kampala, Uganda. June 1994.
Actual IPF expenditures by programme with the bulk of US$15.5m
were reserved for AIDS Prevention allocated largely in 1993 and 
early 1994
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Table 5.5: Organizational Chart of the UNDP-Uganda Office in Kampala.
1 Shared Secretary 
with Resident Econ.
SHD/PCD Advisor
A d m i n /Finance Office
Support Staff: Information 
Office Supplies, Reception 
Chauffeurs, etc.
1.Shared Secretary with 
SHD/PCD Advisor
Resident Economist
1 Personal Secretary
Deputy Resident Representative
Head, Programme 
Resource 
Management Unit
Oversees:
1 Prog. Assist.
1 Fellowships Assist. 
1 Office of Project 
Services (OPS) 
Asssist.
UNDP Resident Representative and Resident 
Coordinator for the UN System
1 Personal Secretary
3 Prog Officers 
3 Secretaries
Assistant Resident 
Representative and 
Head of Cluster 1: 
Development Management 
and Governance
Oversees:
Assistant Resident 
Representative and 
Head, Cluster II:
Human Survival and 
Environmental Management
3 Prog. Officers 
2 Prog. Coordinators 
5 UNDP Office Secretaries
Oversees:
NB: In early 1994, the UNDP-Uganda Office had 19 professional staff and 41 support staff.
Added to this are the various consultants (Chief Technical Advisors) and their staff 
hired to oversee UNDP's 80 plus programmes/projects.
Sources: UNDP-Uganda. Country Programme Responsibilities. Internal Document from the
UNDP-Uganda Office. 1995. Kampala, Uganda.
UNDP and Government of Uganda. Joint Issues Paper for the Mid-Term Review of the 
Fourth Country Programme. ANNEX II and III. June 1994. Kampala, Uganda.
POV = Strong Poverty Focus 
ECM= Economic Management projects 
80= Sound Governance Projects 
AIDS= HIV/AIDS Projects
Table 5.6;
PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF 
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992 
AS OF October 31 1995
Country : UGA UGANDA Paye 1 
Version 5.1
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PROJECT NUMBER and 
SNORT TITLE
BUDGET 
BEFORE 1992
BUDGET
1992
BUDGET
1993
iUOGET
1994
BUDGET
1995
BUDGET
1996
TOTAL
1992-1994
BUDGET 
AFTER 1994
GRAND
TOTAL
U6A/81/006/U/01/I3 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING 1,993,292 0 16,304 0 0 0 16,304 0 2.009,596
V6A/B4/006/T/OI/99 
MEDICAL SCHOOL, TCDC 404,471 154,909 160,856 54,142 D 0 369,907 0 , 776,578'
UGA/B4/018/$/0l/J7 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 371,227 -75 0 0 0 0 -75 0 371,152
UGA/I4/02S/U/01/12 
DAIRY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT 4,066,555 770,894 32,748 0 0 0 803,642 0 4,870,197
UGA/85/001/P/01/40 
EXTERNAL DEBT CONTROL AND REG. 189,048 24,228 0 0 0 ' 0 24,228 0 213,274
V6A/85/000/P/01/12 
TSETSE .CONTROL 434,257 ■1,284 -400 0 0 0 -1,484 0 432,573
U6A/Bi/0Dl/0/0l/l2 
VETERINARV TRAINING 1,502,338 23,668 658 -150 D 0 24,174 0 1,526,514
UGA/84/005/P/Ol/56
LOM COST ROUSING, NAHUN0N6O P O V 1,405,432 128,547 55,957 10,173 0 0 194,677 0 1,800,109
UGA/86/006/L/0I/II POV 
SPMP LUNERO 2,867,062 -750 0 0 D D -750 0 2,866,312
U6A/B6/009/M/01/J1 , , y 
PLSP fryrvnimi 377,595 53,275 1,375 0 0 0 54,450 0 432,245
U6A/86/010/U/01/J2 
WILDLIFE AND PARKS 2,256,164 702,437 91,830 -2,220 1,140 0 793,207 0 3,049,371
UGA/84/012/N/01/12 
FORESTRY TRAINING 1,486,938 96,351 3,375 0 0 0 99,724 0 1,584,664
NB: The ledger excludes the dozen international and regional projects supported by UNDP, 
mcludiingClAP màihQ Africa 2000 Network.
PROGHMME AND PAOJCCr NANAGENENf SYSTEM 
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PROJECT NUMBER inO 
SNORT TITLE
BUDGET 
BEFORE 1992
BUDGET
1992
BUDGET
1993
BUDGET
1994
BUDGET
1995
BUDGET
1990
TOTAL
1992-1996
BUDGET 
AFTER 1996
GRAND
TOTAL
UGA/IOjOlS/U/Ol/ll 
FEEDER ROADS
VSA/86/D15/T/0I/37 
AGRICULTURAL TOOLS, SOROTI
VGA/86/DU/G/D1/49 
TOURISM DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
U6A/I7/002/S/01/S1 
PSP f n ÿ u m m t
UGA/07/003/S/01/12 
HORTICULTURE INDUSTRY
U6A/B7/004/L/01/S2 
UNV ASSISTANCE
U6A/07/006/R/OI/12 
PLANT PROTECTION
UGA/B7/007/0/01/12 
FISHERIES STATISTICS
UGA/i7/008/X/01/42
ECOM PLANNING AND AID COORDINA ECM
WGA/07/009/N/01/40 
EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
ÜGA/07/014/l/Dl/IJ 
BEND iattt
UGA/87/D15/N/01/3I 
NAIERERE PLANNING OFFICE
3,185,071
217,458
619.157
328,998
2.524,591
258,375
843,108
1,484,696
3,932,971
604,368
351,155
323,173
743,118
295,726
15,367
2,502
896,679
148,856
419,138
-20,103
498,361
106,330
99,997
34,036
131.496 53,341
121,974 634,223 459,137
30.784 47,828 111,656
437,682 20,557 3,000
206,155 145,891 41,900
24,934 -26
40,000
22,562
262,004 102,721
-35.130 270
168,097 67,647 ' 329,658
927,955
1,491,060
15,367
192,770
1,357,918
542,802
444,046
19,897
520,923
471,055
65,137
599,438
4,113,026
1,708,518
634.524
521,768
3,882,509
801,177
1,287,154
1,504,593
4,453,894
1,075.423
416,292
922,611
Country : UGA UGANDA
PNDGRAMNE AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT STSTEM 
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF 
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLT COMPLETED lEFORE 1992 
AS OF Octobir 31 1995
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PROJECT NUMBER and 
SHORT TITLE
UGA/87/020/L/01/99 
CONSULTANCY SERVICES
U6A/fl7/fl?a/l/01/99 
HASULITA TRAINING CENTRE
U6A/87/02S/0/01/01 
SURVEYING AND MAPPING
UGA/87/028/H/01/15 
CIVIL AVIATION III
UGA/87/029/N/01/01
UGANDA COMMERCIAL BANK ECM
UGA/87/030/N/01/11 
HOTEL TRAINING
UGA/87/031/J/01/16 
METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES
UGA/88/002/P/01/12 
AGRICULTURAL CENSUS
U6A/B8/004/0/01/31 
UMBRELLA PROJECT FOR NIO
UGA/8B/005/6/01/99 
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
U6A/89/001/I/01/01 
MINERAL INVESTMENT
UGA/89/002/R/01/0I 
POPULATION CENSUS
BUDGET 
BEFORE 1992
BUDGET
1992
BUDGET
1993
BUDGET
1994
BUDGET
1995
BUDGET
1996
TOTAL
1992-1996
BUDGET 
AFTER 1996
GRAND
TOTAL
455,346 165.537 230,170 7,167
5,335 96,665
1.600,443 210.582 151,443 28,564 10,166
213,496
101,968
1,153
1,778,204 360,283 99,228
1,452,244 232,233 -18,492
846,381 399,120 476,147 26,270 37,516
2,769,287 888,161 359,165 45,165
525,637 274,900 186,471
568,056
•867 72,267
78,186 698,018 600,305 672,691 261,780
889,755 -28,319 169,031 105,885
402,874
102,000
400,755
1,153
459,516
213,741
939,053
1,292,491
532,771
568,056
2,232,794
246,597
858,220
102,000
2,001,198
214,649
2,237,720
1,665,985
1,785,434
4,061,778
1,058,408
670,024
2,310,980
1,136,352
PROGRAMME AND PROJECT HAHACEHENT SYSTEM 
LEDGER Of PROJECTS FOR IPF 
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED KFORE 1992 
AS OF October Jl 1995
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PROJECT NUMBER and 
SHORT TITLE
BUDGET 
BEFORE 1992
BUDGET
1992
BUDGET
199J
BUDGET
1994
BUDGET
1995
BUDGET
1996
TOTAL
1992-1996
BUDGET 
AFTER 1996
GRAND
TOTAL
UCA/89/003/H/01/12 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING
UGA/89/004/G/01/12 
AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION
UGA/89/0II/R/01/42 
ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY
UGA/89/012/J/01/11 
LIPN KARANOJA
POV
POV
UGA/B9/014/H/01/56
SNELÎER STRATEGY GROSS
CS
NET
UGA/90/001/6/01/31 
MANAGEMENT TRAINING
UGA/90/002/J/01/37 
BUREAU or STANDARDS
UGA/90/010/J/01/3I
CENSUS BUSINESS ESTABLISNENTS
UCA/90/012/X/01/37 
INDICATIVE INDUSIRIAL PLAN
UGA/90/OU;G/01/99 
INVESTMENT PROMOTION SEMINAR
U6A/90/016/H/01/J7 
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
ECM
268,267 21.778
430.715
382.621
0
382.621
-842
89.738
89.739
38 2.411
■697 3.781 0 24.862
-842
169.415 23.067
486.900 46.901 93.903 32 66.748
23,067
0 207,584
2,420
195,561
92,158
285,300
■193,141 -193.142
0 25,000 407.551 305,000 739,962
506,214 323,580 112,641 109,475 87.298
516.078 298.254 -41.123
16,164 245.076 557.804 97,337 4.239
117,841 1,212 36.165
222.690 89.828 45,103 79
632,994
257,131
904,456
37.377
135.010
293.129
429.873
192.482
694.484
474,779
285.300 0^ifé0t\or5
189.479
740,000
1.139.208
773.209
920,620
155.218
357,700
Country : UGA UGANDA
PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF 
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992 
AS OF Octobar 31 1995
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PAOnCT NUMBER and 
SHORT TITLE
BUDGET 
BEFORE 1992
BUDGET
1992
BUDGET
1993
BUDGET
1994
BUDGET
1995
BUDGET
1996
TOTAL
1992-1996
BUDGET 
AFTER 1996
GRAND
TOTAL
UGA/9D/0I7/K/0I/37 
SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES 134.4IB 144,147 331,250 124,881 21,382 0 621,660 0 756.078
UGA/90/01B/G/0I/42 
TRANSPORT POLICY AND PLANNING 354.068 668,168 280,001 177,597 4,200 0 1,129,966 < • 1,484,034
U6A/90/0I9/G/0I/62 
PROMOTION OF EXTERNAL TRADE 104,938 337,563 70,088 185,309 157,000 0 749,960 0 854,898
UGA/90/020/J/OI/01 
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION 94 208,505 311,576 336,327 319,560 ? 7,840 1,183,808 » 0 1.183.902
UGA/90/02I/L/0I/15 
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY 653.701 1,242,898 697,753 346,839 183,651 0 2,471,141 0 3,124,842
U6A/90/022/0/01/99 ECM 
ASSISTANCE TO DEPT. ECONOMICS GROSS
CS
17,040
0
412.619
0
1,028,759
0
508,105
526,136
336,342
185,804
309,413
129,000
2,595,238
840,940
0
0
2,612.278 
840.9400th#f Jioinoi'5
NET 17,040 412,619 1,028,759 -18,031 150,538 180,413 1,754,298 0 1.771,338
UGA/91/00I/F/01/42 
SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT MISSIONS 159,066 37,179 0 0 33,755 0 70,934 0 230,000
UCA/9I/003/R/OI/99
AIDS CONTROL PROGRAMME A1L75> 173,800 190,212 79,631 89,535 101,465 S%000 544,843 0 718,643
UGA/9I/004/E/OI/42
ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM b ^ J V l 0 522,777 186.786 0 0 0 709,563 0 709,563
UGA/91/DD5/J/01/99
AIDS MICRO PROJECTS AIDS 9,442 237,720 333,063 526,436 120,051 0 1.217,270
%
0 1.226,712
UCA/9I/0I0/D/0I/49 
TOURISM MASTER PLAN 0 454.196 262,090 7,100 0 0 723,386 0 723,386
PROCMIWC AND PROJECT MNACENENl W H E N  
lEDCER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF 
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PROJECT NUMBER end 
SNORT TITLE
BUDGET 
BEFORE 1992
BUDGET
1992
BUDGET
1993
BUDGET
1994
BUDGET
1995
BUDGET
1994
TOTAL
1992-1996
BUDGET 
AFTER 1996
GRAND
TOTAL
UGA/91/0I1/I/0I/99 
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM GROSS
CS
NET
ÜCA/92/001/F/01/42
LON COST NATER PILOT PROJECT GROSS
CS
NET
ÜCA/92/002/E/01/01 
GEOTHERMAL EXPLORATION
UGA/92/003/E/01/99 
NILDLIFE CLUBS OF UGANDA
UGA/92/0D4/F/01/11 
NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND POV
UGA/92/006/0/01/99
KAIERWE DRAINAGE (ùi*<mu4tlyiuSéJ) P O V
UGA/92/007/E/01/99 
SUPPORT TO MIN. OF NATER
UGA/92/009/J/01/99 
VETERANS ASSOCIATION
UGA/92/0I0/D/01/12 
COMMUNITY DAIRY PRODUCTION POV
UGA/92/0II/C/DI/99
KARANOJA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT pQV
21B.575
0
21,271
47.314
0
26,733
316,255
0
334,093
65,000
181,061
85,000
1,049,984
150,000
218,575 316,255
199,679
0
269,093
316,609
16,650
96,061
246,226
25,864
899,984
832.514
112.514
199,679
249,876
84,969
265,871
304,853
53,000
242,685
391,831
299,959
-35,945
101,345
.308,731
224,357
68.500
156,207
38,296
65,071
220,362
6,000
54,065
83,200
6.000
10,000
439,676
4.648
188,386
720,000
219,931
261.650
705,116
535,210
111.500
865.501 
434,775 
253,457
1,049,984
150,000
899,984
832.514
112.514
720,000
219,931
261,650
705,116
535,210
111.500
865.501 
434,775 
253,457
PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
LEDGER or PROJECTS FOR IPF 
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992 
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PROJECT NUMBER and 
SHORT TITLE
BUDGET 
BEFORE 1992
BUDGET
1992
BUDGET
1993
BUDGET
1994
BUDGET
1995
BUDGET
1996
TOTAL
1992-1996
BUDGET 
AFTER 1996
GRAND
TOTAL
UGA/93/001/D/01/42 
ECONOMIC PLANNING ECM
UGA/93/003/E/01/99 
COMM. PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISES
UGA/93/006/C/01/12 
COAST FEVER VACCINE
UGA/93/008/B/01/99 _
AIDS CONTROL PROGRAMME A l L J d
UGA/93/0I0/E/01/99 
ASSISTANCE TO PRISON SERVICES
«A/93/014/R/01/99 S G
ELECTORAL PROCESS IN UGANDA GROSS
CS
NET
UGA/93/020/C/01/99
REHABILITATION OF HEALTH UNITS PQV
UGA/93/031/C/01/11 
ENPLOYHEAT ADVISORY MISSION
UGA/93/039/D/01/99
FOOD CROP POST HARVEST SYSTEMS
UGA/93/046/F/01/99 
CONSULTANCY SERVICES II
UGA/94/003/C/01/99 ^ 0
ASSISTANCE 10 DECENTRALIZATION
505,050 491.090 562,108 0 1,558,328
31,865 544,772 339.990 916,627
171,852 3,159 24,989 200,000
0 29,159 545,941 137.700 712,800
104,200 172,800 45,000 342,000
537,886
332,904
2,066,397
2,219,549
567,079
0
3,171,362
2.552,451
204,982 153,152 567,079
8,063 204,567
0 135,883 103,404
618,909
0 212,630
239,287
0 152,878 412,899 216,823 782,600
0 257,337 358,440 372,817 908,594
254,612 206,500 461,112
1,558,328
916,627
200,000
712,800
342.000
3,171,362
2,552,453 okintr Aonof^
618,909
212,630
239,287
782,600
988.594
461.112
Country : UGA UGANDA
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PROJECT NUMBER end 
SHORT TITLE
BUDGET BUDGET BUDGET BUDGET BUDGET BUDGET TOTAL BUDGET GRAND
BEFORE 1992 1992 1993 1994 1995 1994 1992*1994 AFTER 1996 TOTAL
U6A/94/004/A/0I/99 
NiTCAP PHASE II
UGA/94/007/C/01/99 
CRIME PREVENTION
ECM
UGA/95/081/C/01/99 
MITIGATION OF AIDS IMPACT
U6A/95/002/A/01/99 
PRIVATE SECTOR
UGA/95/003/A/01/99 
ELECTORAL PROCESS
SG
UGA/9S/009/A/01/99
IMPACT STUDIES OF MIV/AIDS AIDS
573 49,427
73,748
50,000
73,748
0 4,030,801 4,107,848 10,138,449
0 371,250 385.250 754,500
0 421,600 41,300 482,900
289,000 0 289,000
0 50,000
0 73.748
0 10,138,449
0 756,500
0 682,900
0 289,000
Country : VGA UGANDA
PAOCRAiNIE AND PAOJCCr NANAGCMEWT STSTEM 
lEDCEA OF fAOJECTS FOA IPF 
EXCIUOING FAOJECTS FINANCIAllY COMPIETEO lEFOAE 1992 
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IUOGET 
lEFOAE 1992
IUOGET
1992
IUOGET
1993
IUOGET
1994
IUOGET
1995
IUOGET
1996
TOTAL
1992-1996
IUOGET 
AFTCA 1996
GRAND
TOTAL
COUNTRY TOTAL 
Approvod Projictt: 
Cost Sharing:
Not Total
47.664.157 14,304,755 12,319,403 9,831,195 13,279,946 0,599,401 58.335,480
0 89,739 528,465 2,897,335 296,668 129,000 3,941,207
47.664.157 14,215,016 11,790,938 6,934,560 12,913,278 1,470,481 54,394,273
0 105,999,637
0 3,941,207
0 102,058,430

MAP of UNDP Projects Visited:
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Source: Child Health and Development Centre/ 
UNICEF. Uganda
AFRICA 2000 Network Projects in Kabarole and Iganga
COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME (CMP) Projects visited in MUbende
MICRO PROJECTS PROGRAMME TO COMBAT AIDS (MPP) Projects visited 
in Mbale and Tororo

Table 5.7: Highlights of Selected UNDP-Supported Field Programmes Studied 285
Programme Title: Africa 2000 Network (INT/89/G22/A/56/31)
Project Traits Development Objectives Highlight of Achievements
Implementor/s :
UNDP's Office of 
Project Services 
(OPS)
Executors:
Various NGOs & 
Community Based 
Organizations
Duration:
5 Years; Starting 
in 1989 but in 
1990 in Uganda
Total Budget:
US$ 5.7 million
Main Funders :
Canada, France, 
Denmark, Norway
6 Japan
Ugandan Budget:
Approx. US$ 2 
million since 
1991
Geographic Scope;
Africa; Arab 
States
Scope in Uganda:
31 small projects 
in central Uganda 
each with budgets 
ranging from US$ 
15,000-40,000 and 
each composed of 
many beneficiary 
groups with 30-50 
members receiving 
small individual 
loans and support.
Sector:
Environment & 
Agriculture;
Public Education
Chief Development Objective:
Combat environmental degra­
dation & promote 
ecologically sustainable 
development by seeking the 
support & mobilizing NGOs 
and community groups
Specific Objectives:
Training:
1. On the spot training on 
organic and largely 
indigenous farming 
techniques (e.g.. Grafting, 
mulching and making compost 
pits, building trenches to 
avoid erosion, building 
animal bins)) and hygienic 
home practices (e.g., 
building latrines, using 
fuel efficient stoves)
Public Education:
2. Disseminating information 
about new farming 
innovations and success 
stories through radio, 
theatre & a monthly magazine 
(UGANDA ENVIRONEWS) and 
Exchange visits to farmers 
from other regions or 
countries.
Inputs :
3. Furbish farmers with 
needed inputs: e.g.. Water 
pumps, Zero-gr- ing cattle, 
chickens, rab. . s , feed, 
drugs, spades, hoes, boots, 
etc.
Typical Projects:
Tree Planting 
Cattle Raising 
Poultry Keeping 
Passion Fruit Growing 
Bee Keeping 
Fish farming
Major Achievements:
• Has taught a couple of 
thousand Ugandan farmers 
how to utilize 
environmentally-sound & 
largely indigenous 
farming techniques.
During our visits to 
project beneficiaries in 
Fort Portal and Iganga, 
we observed that the 
Network's model farmers 
have indeed constructed 
compost pits, built 
ditches to avoid soil 
erosion, and were cutting 
grass for mulching and 
planting trees for 
firewood and fruit. In 
addition, most farms we 
visited had either built 
chicken coups, rabbit 
sheds or were practicing 
zero grazing with at 
least one cow.
• Has helped forge 
links between Uganda 
farmers from different 
regions via exchange 
visits, theatre, radio 
and a community-oriented 
newsletter called UGANDA 
ENVIRONEWS
• Has helped finance and 
strengthen Ugandan NGOs' 
(e.g.. Environmental 
Alert, CARD, JESE,
DENIVA, among others) 
experience in project 
implementation.
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Programme Title: Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids UGA/91/005/01/99
Project Traits Major Project Objectives Highlight of Achievements
Implementor/s :
UNDP
Execution Agency:
Ugandan Gov't. 
via NEX
Duration:
1992-1995
Total Budget:
A larger, US$ 10 
million "HIV/AIDS 
Prevention and 
Poverty Reduction 
Programme was 
drafted by the 
UNDP-Uganda 
Office in 1995
Ugandan Budget:
US$ 700,000 for 
the pilot visited
Scope in Uganda:
116 Micro-Projects 
giving micro 
credit to 
community- 
based groups & 
indirectly 
benefiting indivi­
dual orphans, 
widows 6 the 
elderly in 20 
districts in 
mainly central 
Uganda
Sector;
Health
Micro-Finance
Chief Development Objective:
Provide quick and flexible 
assistance to needy families 
and survivals of HIV/AIDS 
victims by supporting NGO 
and community-based 
activities attempting to 
lessen the adverse socio­
economic consequences of the 
pandemic in Uganda.
Specific Objectives:
Community-Based Income 
Generating Activities:
1. Establish a mechanism 
capable of effectively 
channelling and monitoring 
technical and micro capital 
assistance to community- 
based actions initiated to 
generate income in areas 
seriously impacted by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic
Help AIDS Orphans; Widows :
2. To distribute money made 
from community groups' 
income-generating activities 
to care for the families of 
the victims or survivors of 
HIV/AIDS, with a special 
emphasis on orphans, widows 
and the elderly
Strengthen NGOs & CEOs:
3. To strengthen the 
capacity of NGOs and 
Community-Based Organi­
zations to address the 
socio-economic repercussions 
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic & 
to support innovative 
initiatives by such 
organizations.
Typical Projects:
Grants to start small 
businesses;
Training & Input Costs 
Direct Grêuits for Social 
Services (e.g.. School fees 
Renovation of Community- 
Based Infrastructure (e.g., 
Clinics, Daycare)
Major Achievements:
• MPP has helped
to increase the incomes 
of 500 families who have 
started-up small busine­
sses in various sectors 
by giving them seed 
capital and teaching them 
the technical, book­
keeping, and group 
management skills which 
they need to launch their 
own community-based 
income-generating 
activities (IGAs).
• The Project has re- 
channelled profits from 
income-generating 
activities into social 
services and direct 
assistance to poor 
families with a large 
number of HIV/AIDS widows 
& orphans within them. 
Paying school fees for 
3,500 orphans is an 
example of MPP's 
contribution in this area
• By working on the 
premise that, in addition 
to providing curative 
care (e.g., medical 
attention, counselling 
and drugs), it is crucial 
to enhcuice the self- 
sufficiency of those 
afflicted by HIV/AIDS, 
the project has helped to 
change views so that 
those afflicted by the 
epidemic are seen as 
contributors to the 
community rather than 
merely as victims in need 
of charity by family & 
the church.
• MPP has strengthened 
an array of international 
(e.g.. World Vision, 
SALEM) and local NGOs 
(e.g., Uganda Women's 
Concern) now serving as 
umbrella organizations 
providing training and 
implementing MPP 
initiatives.
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Programme Title: Community Management Programme (CMP) DN/91/UGA/D09
Project Traits Major Project Objectives Highlight of Achievements
Implementing
Agency:
Government of 
Uganda via the 
Dept. of 
Community 
Development, Min. 
of Community & 
Gender 
Development
Administering 
Agency:
UNDP
Execution Agency:
HABITAT
Funders of the 
Wider Programme:
UNDP, HABITAT, 
DANIDA, Regional 
Funds, Selected 
Embassies & Reci­
pient Gov'ts.
Geographic Scope :
Uganda, Bolivia, 
Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Ghana,
Sri Lanka, Zambia
Scope in Uganda:
Two projects each 
in Kampala, Mpigi 
& Mubende District
Duration in 
Uganda;
1992-1998
Ugandan Budget:
US$ 2.6 million
Sector:
Training;
Institutional
Strengthening;
Community-based
development
Chief Development Objective:
Improve the living & working 
conditions of the poor by 
empowering local communities 
& strengthening the capacity 
of local governments to 
plan, implement and maintain 
human settlement improve­
ments 6 development.
Specific Objectives:
Development Training:
1. Train govt, officials, 
their staff & community 
leaders in the mgt. of 
operational strategies aimed 
at creating integrated 
enabling strategies as well 
as on gender, youth, 
environment &. poverty- 
eradication issues
Support Community Efforts:
2. Provide direct assistance 
to poor local community 
groups trying to improve 
services & facilities
Institutional Strengthening:
3. Strengthen relevant local 
institutions & organizations 
involved in decentralized 
service provision & 
community management.
Typical Projects:
Building or rehabilitating 
local infrastructure (e.g., 
Schools, bridges and roads, 
draining ditches, neigbour- 
hood sewer/waste systems)
Community awareness 
programmes (e.g., gender, 
youth environment, violence)
Production of basic 
commercial goods (e.g., 
bricks, building materials)
High-level policy and 
planning seminars for govt, 
officials 6 community 
leaders
Major Achievements:
• By July 1995, over 
14 community proposals 
had been submitted to 
CMP, including 10 for 
the cons- truction of 
community facilities & 4 
in income-generating 
activities
• By mid 1995, several 
mobilization workshops on 
communications skills, 
data collection and 
analysis had taken place, 
as well as a series of 
training workshops on 
consolidating skills in 
gender awareness, 
improved agricultural 
systems, community 
participation needs, 
writing effective project 
proposals, designing 
baseline surveys and 
evaluation techniques.
The latter involved 
central govt & district 
officials, project staff 
and community 
beneficiaries.
• CMP has promoted a 
dvlp. approach which 
fully integrates govt, 
officials into CMP 
trainings & as project 
implementors & in which 
poor communities are 
encouraged to work 
alongside govt. to 
facilitate 
decentralization & 
strengthen local planning 
capacities rather than 
the two duplicating each 
others' work
• By shifting its focus 
& methodology from
'community dvlp' towards 
'community mgt. & empo­
werment' , & getting local 
communities to draft 
their own project 
proposals while project 
staff act mainly as 
catalysts, CMP is hoping 
Ugandans begin to think 
more in terms of self- 
reliance rather than in 
terms of foreign 
dependence.______________
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Chapter 6: Deja Vu?
Action Aid's Implementation of Sustainable Human Development
in Uganda and Beyond.
We have here almost a literal case of "trickle down" development:
Of the sums contributed in the UK, only a very tiny proportion
of the money (perhaps as little as 5-10 per cent) actually
trickles down as money....available for actual community-based 
development. Staff salaries supposedly represent services delivered 
to the community, but their provision and allocation has been 
determined by OUR (emphasis in original) priorities and 
institutional legacy. The community's demand or need for these 
services has been justified by our planning procedures, but never 
been quantified. Value for money, the efficacy of this approach to 
development against the alternatives has never been demonstrated.
Keith Rennie ^
I. Introduction; Birds of a Feather? UNDP's and Action Aid's SHD/PCD 
Efforts Compared
As noted in Chapter 2, one of the recurring themes in the 
International Development Cooperation, and especially in the NGO 
literature, is the assumption that international development NGOs are much 
more effective than multilateral (or bilateral) development agencies at 
carrying out participatory and pro-poor development. The logic behind 
this argument is that, because of their smaller size, lower wages, 
directly operational approach, relative political autonomy from 
governments, greater involvement with grassroots community groups, and 
their value-oriented commitment to the eradication of poverty and 
injustice, NGOs are in an ideal position to implement SHD/PCD approaches. ^
In the case of AA and UNDP, the differences in working styles and 
organizational structures are considerable. Although data on the average 
costs per staff in the two agencies are considered highly confidential, and 
therefore, are difficult to gain access to, the statistics available do 
show that, with a budget of approximately US$ 57 million in 1994-95, total 
staff of about 3500 and 20 Country Programmes (CPs), AA is considerably 
smaller and less dispersed than UNDP which, in 1995 had a budget of US$ 1.7 
billion, staff of 6,000 and 132 Country Offices. (Refer to data provided in
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Chapter 1). Another important difference is that while the UNDP-Uganda CP 
consists of over 85 technical cooperation projects implemented mostly from 
Kampala and through either Ugandan government officials (usually but not 
exclusively via NEX), other UN agencies, especially-hired consultants, or 
NGOs and CBOs, the majority of AA-Uganda's resources are concentrated in 
five Development Areas (DAs) in the Ugandan countryside where a large cadre 
of AA staff--DA managers. Area Managers, Field Development Workers (FDWs), 
drivers, etc.--live in the DA and directly oversee project implementation. 
Because UNDP and AA have divergent working styles and organizational 
structures, a comparison of the two agencies' development efforts is a good 
way of testing whether the above assumptions are correct and of exploring 
how two very different international development agencies put SHD/PCD into 
practice and the kinds of obstacles they face along the way.
Specifically, in this chapter I am interested in exploring four key 
issues related to both the Baroque Science and River Pollution Phenomena presented
earlier. Firstly, I am interested in exploring whether an NGO like AA 
whose work has been supposedly guided by pro-poor, pro-equity and pro­
participation values almost identical to those of the SHD/PCD approach is 
in a better position to internalize the SHD/PCD paradigm and to effectively 
fill the gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice. Secondly, I am 
interested in knowing exploring whether, because of its greater autonomy 
from governments, AA is in a better position (i.e., less susceptible to 
political resistance from UN member nation-states or to the turf battles 
between the specialized agencies of the UN system) than UNDP to pursue the 
more audacious and transformative goals of the SHD/PCD agenda. Thirdly, I 
am interested in knowing whether AA's directly operational and more hands- 
on approach to development is more likely to generate better results when 
it comes to the promotion of SHD/PCD, especially at the project and 
grassroots level. And lastly, I am interested in testing whether an NGO 
like AA which is smaller and supposedly considerably less hierarchical and
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top-down than UNDP is organizationally better equipped to implement SHD/PCD 
approaches, both globally and in Uganda.
This chapter addresses the question identified above by tracing the 
evolution of AA's approach to development during the 1990's and taking a 
close look at how AA was going about interpreting, promoting and 
implementing SHD/PCD approaches during 1995--the year of my field research 
as well as the year in which AA introduced some of its most fundamental 
reforms in order to transform itself into an agency geared towards the 
realization of SHD/PCD. The Chapter explores AA's progress in realizing 
SHD/PCD globally as well as within Uganda and assesses what the NGO has 
done at the conceptual, policy and programme/project levels. Core SHD/PCD 
goals like the realization of flexible and integrated development 
approaches are mainly explored in the Chapter's earlier conceptual 
discussion while goals such as the promotion of 'Sound governance' and 
improved coordination are addressed in the section on policy-level 
interventions, and core SHD/PCD goals like reaching the poorest, achieving 
greater equity, and fostering participation and empowerment as well as 
self-reliant and sustainable development are mostly addressed in the final 
section on AA's implementation of SHD/PCD approaches at the 
programme/project and grassroots level.
II. Action Aid Before and After the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches
A) Action Aid's Mandate and Modus Operandi
AA is a registered UK charity and is constituted as a company, 
limited by guarantee. It is governed by a Board of Trustees which is 
responsible for setting and monitoring the strategic direction of the NGO 
and for establishing policy. The Trustees are also directors for the 
purposes of company law. The Board of Trustees meets quarterly and
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delegates the day to day operation of the agency to an Executive Board, led 
by a Chief Executive and comprised of full time senior management. An 
Executive Committee of the Board, an Audit Committee and a Remuneration 
Committee meet regularly to make recommendations to the Board of Trustees 
and the Chief Executive and other principal officers. AA's Board of 
Trustees, the Chief Executive and its Division Directors are based in UK HQ 
in London; some fundraising and public education staff are also stationed 
in different regions of the UK; the NGO's Country Directors are based in 
the capitals of the 20 developing countries in which AA operates and are 
themselves supported by smaller rural offices in the various Development 
Areas (DAs) in which AA is active in their countries ; and, since 1996,
AA's Regional Directors for Africa and Asia have been based in Zimbabwe and 
India, respectively, while the Latin American region is directed by Ayuda 
Accion in Spain). Finally, there are a number of European partner 
organizations which bear the name 'Action Aid' (including. Action Aid- 
Ireland, Aide et Action in France, Ayuda en Accion in Spain and Azione 
Aiuto in Italy), or a foreign language equivalent, which also raise funds 
through child sponsorship but are independent registered charities.
AA's principal objective is to work with the poorest and the most 
disadvantaged people in the world to address the root causes of poverty and 
improve the quality of their lives. AA seeks to achieve its principal 
objective in three main ways: by implementing long-term development
programmes and working directly with poor communities in 20 developing 
countries in three continents by providing emergency assistance in times of 
disaster and crisis ; and by influencing how others contribute to the 
process of poverty eradication through UK-based fundraising, public 
education and policy influencing. In 1997, 66% of AA's income was derived 
from child sponsorship, 13% from official income, and the remainder from 
fundraising, European partners or other donations. ^
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B) Action Aid Before the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches
When AA was first created in 1972, its philanthropist creator, Cecil 
Jackson-Cole, was looking for ways to 'do good' by helping children around 
the world. It was with these goals in mind that AA came into being. 
According to most accounts, AA was built around the notion that Britons 
could help individual children in the Third World by sponsoring them from 
the UK. During the early years, AA had only four programmes (India, Kenya, 
Burundi and The Gambia) but these grew steadily during the 1980s and 1990s. 
AA began its work in Uganda in 1981. According to current accounts, in the 
early years, the system of "adoption by post" created by AA was not only 
very paternalistic and colonial in nature (e.g., providing British school 
uniforms or lunches for individual school children), but the focus on 
individual sponsorship meant that, even within one family, some children 
received AA support while others were excluded. *
By 1986, however, with the arrival of a more development-oriented CEO 
and the desire of AA staff to be more like its respected sister development 
organization, OXFAM, AA began making a gradual transition from 
paternalistic charity towards a bona fide development agency. The first and
most fundamental change in this direction was the creation of Development 
Areas (DAs) with their respective development strategies. Hence, although 
AA continued its child sponsorship system, instead of the benefits going to 
individual children, by the mid 1980s, AA was funding the development of 
the whole community in which sponsored children lived. The second change 
was to make AA's development interventions more sustainable by replacing 
short-term programmes with much longer-term Country Strategies (i.e., a 
minimum of 10 years) One persistent trait of AA's work during these
years was that the NGO spent between 75-80% of its funds on field-based 
development work in its overseas DAs. ®
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These two above-mentioned changes were the first among many which 
would help AA become a development agency espousing core SHD/PCD goals such 
as long-term and sustainable community development. These changes 
notwithstanding though, until the early 1990s, AA remained a centralized 
agency whose country programmes were often directed by "expatriates" and 
whose country offices and family of partner agencies were treated, and 
indeed, behaved as "dependencies" of AA HQ. The centralized nature of 
decision-making within the agency was evident in the fact that, despite 90% 
of AA's staff being based in the field, the agency's Board of Trustees only 
included northeners; AA's development policies and strategies were led by 
a strong International Division in London HQ; that regional desks were all 
based in London and were composed of country desks which played an active 
supervisory role in the monitoring and assessment of AA's Country 
Programmes in the field, and that the Finance and Administration, Human 
Resources, Support, Communications and Fundraising Divisions were also each 
based in London and kept a tight grip on operational procedures as well as 
budgetary guidelines and deadlines. Just like UNDP, AA's internal reports 
reveal that the size and the overhead expenditures of its HQ had been 
growing steadily and that the trend contradicted the NGO's corporate 
commitment to cost-effectiveness and to spending most of the agency's 
sponsorship money in the South. ’
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the work of the AA-Uganda 
(AAU) Office followed very much the pattern described above. Until the mid 
1990s, AAU's Directors were British expatriates, most operational 
procedures and budgetary parameters were set in London HQ and the AAU 
accountant was as a rule an expatriate as well. In addition, while the 36- 
person AAU Office in Kampala took the leadership in liaising with London 
HQs and in passing down most strategic management decisions, AAU's 
development interventions were clearly concentrated in the Ugandan 
countryside, and especially in the areas surrounding Kampala.
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Although AA has from the outset been officially registered with the 
Ugandan government (its registration certificate is renewed every three 
years), sent annual progress reports to government, and been a member of 
Uganda's NGO Consultative Committee, the NGO's work concentrated in rural
Development Area (DAs), where it was normally independent of government or 
fellow NGOs. In each of its three initial DAs (Mityana, Buwekula, and 
Kamuli) AAU operated large sectorally-based programmes on its own.
In the case of the Buwekula DA (ABP) , for example, by late 1994, AAU
had a budget of £402,000, over 50 vehicles and a staff of as many as 67 
persons (including a Programme Coordinator, a Financial/Accounting unit, an 
Administration/ Logistics unit, and a series of Sectoral Supervisors, each 
with their respective teams of FDWs). ® This large team of sectorally- 
oriented ABP staff worked in a hands-on fashion and directly delivered 
services and made decisions for project beneficiaries in the areas of 
infrastructure, water and sanitation, health, education, agriculture, women 
and development and small business promotion rather than playing a 
facilitation role in the community. ® In an effort to move beyond direct 
rural service delivery, by 1994 the AAU created a Programme Development
Department (PDD) which was given a mandate to begin supporting Ugandan NGOs
such as Vision Terudo (a local NGO in Kumi District) and Ugandans AIDS Support
Organization (TASO) in a more systematic fashion, as well as to become more
involved in research initiatives such as the Mubende Integrated Teacher Education
Programme (MITEP) and Farmer Participatory Research (FPR) initiative, carried out
with assistance from the London-based National Research Institute (NRI) and 
starting to design possible advocacy initiatives. Even by late 1995 
though, AAU's PDD Unit had only seven staff (compared to the 202 staff 
members in the AAU Office in 1995) and a modest budget of £239,000 
(compared to AAU's total annual budget of £3,210,000 in 1994-95.)
Moreover, as AA own documents recognize, because local institutions were
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often weak and AA had traditionally been an operational agency, the NGO had 
often been unable to build effective partnerships with local actors.
By late 1994 and early 1995, however, AA's transition towards SHD/PCD 
ideals was accelerated as AA introduced a series of additional changes in 
order to equip itself to carry out SHD/PCD approaches.
As in UNDP, AA's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches was largely motivated 
by its own organizational need to elevate its profile and secure a niche 
within an increasingly competitive and demanding development environment. 
The global competition and pressure to 'innovate' facing AA by the early 
1990s was evidence during my interviews with senior AA staff in HQ and the 
field as well as in internal reports such as that produced by AA's 
Regionalization Working Group which notes that, in a discouraging environment of
donor fatigue, increased competition between agencies, greater donor 
control of NGO activities and demands for more accountability and evidence 
of development impact on the poor, NGOs like AA have no choice but to 
achieve greater impact by targeting AA activities more effectively on the 
poor while at the same time scaling up and expanding into new areas of 
work, including advocacy and emergency work. Moreover, as was the case 
at UNDP, the impetus for change within AA came predominantly from HQ and 
personally from Mr. Martin Griffiths, AA's Director from 1991-1994, who 
assumed the role of 'change agent' within the NGO in a similar manner that 
Speth had within UNDP. As in UNDP then, AA's country staff and especially 
lower-level field-based staff were not significantly involved in the 
changes taking place at AA by the mid 1990s. However, one aspect of
AA's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches which differs from UNDP's experience is 
that, in the case of AA, the Board of Trustees never pressed for the 
adoption of SHD/PCD. Quite to the contrary, AA's cautious Board of 
Trustees were from the start much too concerned with maintaining financial 
accountability to encourage participatory development efforts which
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might prove difficult to measure or policy advocacy efforts which would 
be too political to justify to traditional sponsors. In the case of AA, 
furthermore, while some field managers feared that rapid changes would 
create too much uncertainty in their Country Programmes the adoption
of SHD/PCD ideas nevertheless supported by some AA middle-level managers 
and professional cadre, both in London and in the field, who felt that AA
had to make the changes to remain innovative and to be finally seen as a
progressive and bona fide development NGO.
Even if the changes which took place at AA by the mid 1990s were
motivated by organizational interests though, there is no denying that the
NGO introduced significant innovations to help it move closer towards 
SHD/PCD approaches. Such innovations took place at the conceptual, policy, 
organizational and programme levels and encompassed AA HQ as well as AAU.
C) Action Aid After the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches
At the conceptual level, AA completed its transition from relief 
agency to a SHD/PCD agency by formally stating in its 1994 statement of 
purpose. Giving People Choices, that the agency was committed to recognizing
beneficiary communities' own development specificities and needs; to 
collaborating with other development actors and strengthening local 
institutions; to building the capabilities and encouraging the 
participation of the poor; to being accountable and transparent; and to 
adopting a flexible learning-process to development work ^^ --all core 
components of the SHD/PCD paradigm as defined in this thesis. AA's 
commitment to the notion of Human Development has since been reiterated in
its 1995-1996 Annual Report which is appropriately entitled: The Human Face o f
Development explicitly states that AA has come a long way from the
traditional "charity view" of development which the agency initially held
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and its current belief that development is about "enabling people to 
influence the environment in which they live." “ (Refer to Table 6.1 for 
a copy of AA's latest Vision and Mission statement).
As part of its efforts to equip itself into an NGO capable of 
carrying out SHD/PCD approaches, by the mid 1990s, AA underwent a major 
organizational restructuring aimed at containing the growing hierarchy and 
bureaucratization of the agency at large and the excessive concentration of 
decision-making powers in London HQ. AA's restructuring has, on the one 
hand, entailed ensuring that a greater proportion of AA staff in country 
offices are nationals and, on the other hand, launching a major 
regionalization/decentralization process aimed at delegating a great 
proportion of the NGO's decision-making, planning and operational 
management responsibilities from the centre to the periphery and creating 
regional offices based in the South so as to encourage greater local 
ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness. The restructuring 
process has also involved a reorganization and reduction of staff in London 
HQ, including the replacement of HQ' International Division (once divided 
into regional departments and individual country desks) with a much better- 
integrated Programme Development Division (PDD) now guided by common 
strategic goals and comprised of both thematic departments, (i.e., an 
Emergency Unit, an Impact Assessment and Programme Learning Department, a 
Resource Centre, an International Advocacy Department, and an International 
Education Unit) and regional coordination departments (e.g.. West and 
South Africa, East and Horn of Africa) composed of fewer staff and now 
mostly playing an advisory role rather than directly running individual 
country programmes. (Refer to Table 6.2 for a copy of AA's newly 
decentralized organizational structure by 1996/97).
At the programme level, since the mid 1990s AA has made a conscious 
effort to increase the capacity-building, participatory, and self-learning
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components of its overseas programmes by introducing Participatory Rural Appraisal
(PRA) techniques which allow AA managers to learn about beneficiary 
communities' development aspirations directly from them. The NGO has 
also been working to strengthen its capacity to measure process-based 
impacts like participation and empowerment by creating community-based 
monitoring and evaluation methods. It is to this latter end that, since 
1996, AA has been working with the British Overseas Development 
Administration (now the Department for International Development) on the 
formulation of Sustainable, Measurable, Achievable Replicable and Time Bound (SMART) forms
of development assessment and a Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation Systems
(CBMS) designed in partnership with beneficiary communities. The final 
but perhaps the most noticeable change at AA since 1995 is the NGO's 
attempt to move beyond community work--or what AA calls 'DA-level work', by 
strengthening its research, analytical and policy influencing role both 
internationally and at the country level. It is with this goal in mind 
that, by the mid 1990s, AA HQ announced that it would launch global 
advocacy initiatives in seven focus areas (education, HIV/AIDS, natural 
resources, financing the poor, conflict, urban development and development 
cooperation) and that it would seek to influence the outcomes of the UN
Social Summit in Copenhagen by supporting UNDP's 20120 Compact, giving exposure
to adult literacy and children's education at the upcoming World Conference on
Education for A ll in the year 2000, and exploring advocacy options to influence
UN humanitarian approaches in the Great Lakes region of Africa. In the 
meantime, AA-UK has been trying to kick-start a number of smaller policy- 
related initiatives, including the creation of a Collaborative Leadership and Action
Group on Advocacy (CLAG) which draws 'next generation leaders' into current
advocacy debates, preparing a Field Book for staff engaged in advocacy, and 
organizing staff training workshops on policy influencing. Another 
important component of AA's efforts to extend its influence beyond field-
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level interventions has been to intensify the NGO's role within inter­
agency collaborative efforts such as the annual Reality o f  A id Report produced
jointly by AA, Eurostep (an umbrella of 22 European NGOs) and The 
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), as well as AA's links 
with the Corporate sector and the World Bank. Finally, by the end of 1997, 
AA's Board of Trustees had also approved an agency-wide Advocacy Strategy 
to mainstream advocacy throughout the NGO.
At the country level in Uganda, by the mid 1990s, the AAU Country 
Programme was also undergoing major changes in an effort to move towards 
more integrated and empowering forms of community development. These 
changes included the dramatic reduction in the size of AAU's personnel as a 
whole (from 202 staff in late 1994 down to 151 in 1995 (the year I visited) 
and eventually down to 126 by the end of 1996 °^) . Although AAU's programme 
methodologies vary somewhat from DA to DA, by 1995, evaluations of large 
AAU DAs by consultants such as John de Coninck started to show that these 
DA'S staff-dependent sectoral approach were causing a series of 
implementational difficulties, including unnecessary duplication and 
rivalries between sectors, beneficiary burn out from too many meetings by 
each sector, and the hiring of an excessive number of over-specialized 
staff who were making most programme decisions and implementing most 
activities on their own. It is with these concerns in mind that, by 1995, 
the AAU CP started moving away from large, top-down, sectorally-based, 
technocratic and administrâtion-heavy DAs and to create much smaller and 
more integrated DAs composed of small but tightly-knit teams of FDWs 
capable of working in a multi-sectoral fashion and of functioning as 
development catalysts rather micro-managers of community development 
initiatives. In the Buwekula Programme, for instance, the 67-person cadre of
sectoral experts and administrators were reduced to 41 staff members in 
early 1995. Among the most innovative changes introduced by the AAU 
Programme to make its transition towards more empowering development
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interventions was the creation of Parish Development Committees (PDCs) made up of
beneficiaries and local community leaders themselves. Since 1995, the 
chief aim of AAU's DAs has been to train PDCs and those structures which 
complement them (e.g., community facilitators, wider development fora, 
etc.) to identify their development needs and formulate, implement and 
assess their own development initiatives.
Moreover, the AAU CP has not restricted its reforms to the DA-level. 
Parallel to the above-mentioned changes, since 1995, AAU has worked hard to 
expand its work outside of DA-level work. It has done do by escalating its 
political networking and broader institutional-capacity-building role in 
Uganda at large. For instance, in addition to its ongoing support to TASO 
and Vision Terudo and its research involvement with MITEP and NRI, AAU has
become increasingly involved in strengthening Ugandan CBOs through its 
Strategies for Action initiative which helps Ugandan communities respond to the
HIV/AIDS pandemic and a series of Micro Projects which led management 
support and develop the resource mobilization skills of umbrella Peoples' 
Organizations and small business and credit and savings schemes started by 
small groups of women, poor farmers and disabled persons. This latter 
effort is AAU's first direct venture into income-generation, business and 
urban community projects. Lastly but definitely not least, by the mid 
1990s the AAU CP began to considerably enhance the research, lobbying and 
fundraising capacities of its Programme Development Department (PDD) whose 
expenditures in 1996 were triple what they had been a year earlier. In 
short, in addition to its five core DAs, AAU is also involved in various 
institutional capacity building, research, and policy influencing efforts.
Judging from the above achievements, it is fair to say that, like 
UNDP, AA has made tremendous strides in trying to reform itself into an 
agency better able to influence wider development policies and to carry out 
flexible, targeted, integrated, and self-reliant community development
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initiatives--all core components of the SHD/PCD agenda. As was the case in 
UNDP though, AA has faced obstacles putting SHD/PCD into practice at the 
conceptual, policy and programme/project levels both in Uganda and beyond.
Ill. Action Aid's Conceptual Interpretation of the SHD/PCD Paradigm
As we saw in the previous chapter, UNDP made an already difficult 
situation worse by proclaiming that the SHD/PCD paradigm was the answer to 
all development woes. AA, on the other hand, has avoided most of UNDP's 
conceptual pitfalls by never proclaiming SHD/PCD to be a novel development 
paradigm or the answer to the NGO's prayers nor imposing set definitions or 
entry points for SHD/PCD upon field offices and other development actors. 
Actually, AA has not been too preoccupied with conceptual issues at all. 
Instead, the NGO has preferred to use SHD/PCD ideas as a general source of 
inspiration and a new way of communicating the idea that development is 
about 'more than economics'.
However, by the time of my field research in 1995, this situation was 
beginning to change somewhat due to three factors: Firstly, AA's decision
to begin involving poor communities in development planning meant that the 
NGO could no longer shy away from inducting both field staff and programme 
beneficiaries into the more abstract dimensions of the SHD/PCD paradigm by 
introducing them to concepts such as 'capability-building',
'participation', 'empowerment', and 'long-term sustainability'. Secondly, 
AA's growing interest in working in a multi-sectoral and integrated fashion 
meant that the conceptual merits and downfalls of different development 
approaches now also had to be addressed and understood by AA staff and 
beneficiaries. And, lastly, AA's mounting interest in becoming more 
actively involved in research, policy analysis, and advocacy work beyond 
the DA-level meant that AA staff would need to learn to 'abstract' from 
their practical field experiences. It is these three changes which by the
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mid 1990s were forcing AA to address conceptual issues and to rise to the 
challenge of anchoring its work in both development theory and practice.
A) Action Aid's Conceptual Treatment of the SHD/PCD Paradigm
Like UNDP, AA started moving towards the adoption of SHD/PCD 
approaches during the mid 1990s. The first signs of the shift were evident 
in Martin Griffith's Moving Forward in the Nineties. Although in this document,
Griffiths, AA's Director from 1991-1992, reiterated that working at the 
grassroots level and with poor communities in specific DAs would continue 
to be AA's comparative advantage, he also began placing unprecedented 
attention on the importance of AA becoming much more "international" and 
"influential" in its work. This, noted Griffiths, would require AA 
becoming a "channel of both ideas and resources", of becoming involved in 
"influencing the policies and practices of others" and in being 
"collaborative" rather than "competitive" by strengthening existing 
institutions and networks rather than working alone and working on each of 
these principles both globally and nationally. Two years later. Giving
People Choices, AA's key guiding document for the 1990s, went a step further
and fully embraced the five core principles of SHD/PCD: i.e., pursuing 
holistic and flexible development approaches; influencing policy in support 
of the 'Sound governance' agenda; reinvigorated North-South partnerships 
and enhanced development collaboration; increased beneficiary participation 
and empowerment; and enhanced equity by providing services and building the 
capabilities of the poorest. Both reports are significant in that they 
represent a gradual departure from AA's main focus on children's poverty, 
community-level interventions and operational rural development programmes 
and a shift towards more sustainable and high impact interventions by 
doing more global and policy-related work, working in a more participatory 
and empowering fashion, and operating within the context of existing local 
and global institutions and networks rather than building new ones.
303
As noted above though, where AA's conceptual approach to the SHD/PCD 
paradigm does diverge from UNDP's is in that AA has never attempted to 
formulate a specific definition of SHD/PCD or to establish the diverse 
array of SHD/PCD guidelines, entry points, focus points, etc. which UNDP 
did. Instead, AA staff have used the notion of SHD/PCD as a point of 
departure for thinking and talking about development in a broader fashion 
but have never felt compelled to either define SHD/PCD, to prove that 
SHD/PCD is novel, or to show how exactly the NGO applies SHD/PCD ideas to 
their work. In essence, the priority at AA has been on what is directly 
relevant to the field and easily translated into practical action. In 
fact, during our interviews, even more intellectual staff such as Robert 
Dodd, Head of AA HQ's former Policy and Research Division, noted that, at 
AA, they preferred to use the simpler term "community development" 
while Mr. Hugh Goyder, Head of the Evaluation and Impact Assessment 
Department at AA HQ, noted, while UNDP had painstakingly defined and 
inculcated the SHD/PCD paradigm among its staff, AA had never pursued the 
meaning of SHD/PCD concept as consistently or holistically as UNDP since 
staff in the agency were unclear about what the SHD/PCD agenda involved.
These admissions are instructive for they show that, in contrast to 
UNDP, AA has chosen to deal with the abstractness and complexity of the 
SHD/PCD agenda and its lack of agency-wide consensus regarding SHD/PCD's 
meaning or desirability by not placing too much emphasis on the concept or 
over-selling it to either fellow development actors or field staff. This 
largely explains why, in Uganda itself, even though programme reforms 
represent a shift towards a SHD/PCD approach, AA staff were not conscious 
of the emergence of SHD/PCD nor did they feel particularly pressured to 
'define' or 'sell' the SHD/PCD paradigm to other development actors as had 
been the case at UNDP. ” When probed about the conceptual influences in 
their development work, AA staff pointed to the practical experiences of 
respected development agencies (e.g., OXFAM, UNICEF) or to the development
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writings of Robert Chambers (part of AA's Board of Trustees) or fellow 
practitioners on operationalizable ideas like PRA as major influences.
In sum, rather than making an issue of the SHD/PCD paradigm, whether 
consciously or not, AA has preferred to detract attention from the concept 
itself and to focus on practical issues and to speak of field-level 
community development instead. The advantage of the above stance has been 
that AA has managed to keep to a minimum the confusion of its staff, the 
resentment of fellow development actors, and the political resistance from 
powerful stakeholders. The down side is that AA has ignored the gap 
between SHD/PCD theory and practice this has itself created a series of 
complications which have undermined AA's transformation into an NGO whose 
development work is informed by both theory and practice. These problems 
are outlined below as well as developed later in the Chapter.
B) Action Aid's Difficulties Operationalizing SHD/PCD and Filling the 
Gap Between Theory and Practice
The main disadvantage of AA's inattention to conceptual matters and 
definitions has been that it has led the NGO to introduce a series of 
organizational and programme reforms without first developing a shared or 
well-rounded conceptual vision of where the agency is going in the long- 
run. This, along with AA's top-down imposition of SHD/PCD-related reforms, 
had detrimental effects for the NGO's implementation of SHD/PCD approaches.
i) A A ’s Dijfkidties in Abstracting’ From Field Experience and in Capturing 
the Conceptual Complexities o f  Development Processes
The first problem traceable to AA's absence of a shared conceptual 
framework and the NGO's neglect of conceptual matters is AA's inability to 
'abstract' from its practical field work in its DAs, and hence, to engage 
in higher-level policy-analysis and influencing work. In fact, as noted by 
one of the senior managers in UK HQ, because AA staff have traditionally 
focussed on service-delivery and poverty alleviation work at the community
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and micro level, most have little or no experience thinking in terms of 
broader development issues or policies. "This is what AA staff have become 
good at, what they have been recruited and trained for, what clients expect 
and what AA is inclined to do as most agencies prefer to do what they are 
good at", remarked the respondent. This predisposition, was evident in
the fact that AA Director of Policy Advocacy was changed four times between 
1995-1997, that even by 1997 AA HQ still did not have an approved Advocacy 
Strategy in place, and by my own field observations that the AAU Office was 
having considerable trouble linking its policy advocacy work to its DA- 
level interventions--both difficulties are discussed further in the 
following section on AA's promotion of SHD/PCD at the policy level.
A similar problem related to both AA's neglect of conceptual matters 
as well as to SHD/PCD's own theoretical complexity is one which started 
becoming evident in mid 1995 when AA's managers decided that it was time to 
involve DA-level staff and project beneficiaries directly in development 
planning, implementation and evaluation processes and in the process 
discovered that neither AA field staff or beneficiaries fully comprehended 
the meaning of more abstract Human Development principles or the inter­
linkages between the various components of integrated development and 
SHD/PCD ideas. These conceptual ambiguities have only recently been 
recognized by internal agency documents such as AA's Africa Region Strategy for
1996 which openly recognizes that "a detailed understanding of the dynamics
of poverty is still relatively superficial" within AA (as well as Africa 
and the foreign aid sector as a whole) and that AA still lacks clarity in 
determining whom its programmes should be directed at, how exactly it can 
attack the root causes of poverty, or how it should go about targeting 
policy-level inputs. In its internal assessments, the AAU CP has itself
expressed concern over its lack of the professional and analytical skills 
needed to abstract policy lessons from its field experiences or to reflect 
on the conceptual complexities of integrated and holistic development.
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ii) A A ’s Perpetual State o f Flux and Trial and Error
Another adverse effect of AA's lack of a shared conceptual framework 
is that, as a result, the NGO has found itself in a perpetual state of flux 
and of trial and error as it tries to find its way. During my research, I 
found several examples of this. During the time that I followed events at 
AA (1995-1997), the NGO's International Division was restructured no less 
than three times. Moreover, not only did most of the AA staff members I 
spoke in London HQ change positions at least once during my research 
period, but most of my key informants (M. Griffiths, N. Twose, S. Johnson, 
R. Dodd, R. Thamotheram, H. Goyder) left AA during that time. In similar 
vein, even by 1997 when I had stopped consistently following events at AA, 
the change process in the NGO was still not complete and AA was still 
debating its Corporate Strategy and a possible agency-wide Advocacy 
Strategy. In AA-Uganda, there were similar signs of frustration with the 
constant and what sometimes seemed like direction-less changes within AA. 
For instance, an internal Communications Exercise carried out in the 
Buwekula DA revealed that staff morale and productivity were seriously
suffering as a result of staff members' feelings of powerlessness over 
strategic programme changes at AAU. A later interview with Mr. Nigel 
Twose, Head of AA HQ's International Division, confirmed that much of the 
flux and trial and error at AA could have been reduced had AA HQ not 
introduced major organizational reforms before the NGO had defined a 
conceptual vision of where it was going.
in) Internal Tensions Within AA
AA's lack of a coherent conceptual framework has also meant that the 
agency has been unable to rally its troops behind one shared cause or 
vision. Consequently, within AA one finds considerable internal discord 
with respect to what the NGO is about or where should be heading. In fact.
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one respondent familiar with the upper echelons of AA describes the NGO as 
an agency "riddled with internal tensions" whose effectiveness has been 
seriously undermined by growing disagreement between the NGO's conservative 
forces (i.e., AA's cautious Board of Trustees preoccupied chiefly with 
financial accountability and the field's compliance to UK Charity Law and 
traditional child sponsors which according to market research are driven 
primarily by charitable motives); its progressive elements (i.e., AA's 
development-oriented Director and technical staff set on professionalizing 
the agency and moving it closer towards SHD/PCD approaches); and an 
increasingly autonomous cadre of regional and country directors whose 
positions vary from country to country.
My research also revealed that a gulf existed at AA between the 
development perspectives of policy and technical development specialists 
and AA staff who had more administrative functions and dealt with financial 
or child sponsorship matters. The rift between the two camps was best 
articulated by Ms. Marion Jackson, Head of Marketing at AA HQ, who 
explained that while the policy and development specialists in the 'seventh 
floor' (i.e., formerly the International Division and currently the 
Programme Development Department) spent most of their time thinking about 
conceptual issues, achieving greater policy impact, and moving the agency 
closer towards SHD/PCD principles, staff in AA's administrative, financial, 
communications and sponsorship departments are far less inclined towards 
theorizing, took much more consideration of practical constraints, and 
hence, much more likely to support a traditional service-delivery approach 
to development. As for country-level managers, noted Ms. Jackson, they 
mostly favour doing 'more of the same' (i.e., continuing the current child 
sponsorship mechanism and traditional service-delivery in DAs) since they 
know that is what has won the approval of sponsors in the past since they, 
above all, value 'security' and 'growing income which they can spend as 
they like. To field managers, remarked Ms. Jackson, political advocacy
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campaigns or national fundraising schemes which entail becoming involved in 
sensitive political issues and taking financial risks are not desirable 
since these put their own jobs in jeopardy.
The internal rifts described above are illuminating not only because 
they illustrate that, far from being harmonious or naturally inclined 
towards consensus-building, NGOs like AA are themselves riddled with 
internal tensions and ideologically divided over the desirability or 
feasibility of core SHD/PCD principles. Ultimately, warned Ms. Jackson,
AA can not continue simultaneous promoting traditional service delivery 
work in DAs and pursuing SHD/PCD goals like more advocacy work: "something 
has to give", she remarked. As the following section shows, this is indeed 
what happened in the case of AA's promotion of SHD/PCD at the policy level.
iv) The Top-Down Nature o f AA *s Adoption o f SHDIPCD
Finally, as was the case in UNDP, one of the main caveats in AA's 
adoption of SHD/PCD approaches was the top-down manner in which SHD/PCD- 
related reforms were introduced within the agency and the harmful effects 
which this has had on HQ-AAU relations and the ownership of SHD/PCD-related 
ideas in the field. In the case of AA's promotion of SHD/PCD goals such 
as greater policy advocacy, for instance, my interviews revealed that 
several AA staff in Uganda felt that advocacy work had been imposed almost 
unilaterally upon them by AA HQ in London without sufficiently taking into 
consideration that most AAU staff were teachers, nurses or field-oriented 
people, and in some cases even former exiles, who could not afford to 
antagonize the government the way UK expatriates could. Even when 
discussing AA's regionalization/decentralization process, AA respondents 
pointed out that much of the brain-storming for the process had taken place 
within AA HQ or among high-level Country Directors but had excluded lower- 
level and field-based staff in Ugandan DAs who, as a consequence, had
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little ownership of the process and feared that the regionalization/ 
decentralization process might be utilized to cut existing African 
programmes in order to allocate funds to start up new AA programmes in 
other countries. The above discussion clearly illustrates that, as in 
UNDP, reforms linked to SHD/PCD ideas are perceived to have emanated 
largely from AA HQs and, as such, not only suffer from a lack of local 
ownership but may even have exacerbated tensions between HQ and the AAU.
In summary, it would seem that in deciding not to dwell on complex 
conceptual definitions or to explicitly state its ideological position on 
SHD/PCD, AA has managed to bypass much of the confusion, resistance and 
grief suffered by UNDP. What has began to become apparent from the 
discussion above though is that, when it comes to putting SHD/PCD 
approaches into practice, AA's inattention to conceptual matters was not 
able to save the NGO from facing many operationalization problems. In the 
case of AA these problems are linked to the lack of theory which can inform 
practice and include complications like difficulties linking practical 
field experience to wider policy lessons and theoretical poverty debates; 
insufficient conceptual guidance or analytical skills among staff and 
beneficiaries to understand development processes well enough to be able to 
design, implement and assess integrated and process-based development 
initiatives; and lack of internal consensus or field-level ownership of 
what the NGO represents and where it is heading. The adverse effects of 
these problems is something which I return to in my later my analysis of 
AA's implementation of SHD/PCD at the policy and programme/project levels.
IV. Action Aid's Effectiveness Implementing SHD/PCD in Uganda and Beyond
A) Action Aid's Efforts to Promote SHD/PCD at the Policy Level
Like UNDP, AA has made conscious effort to position itself as an 
effective policy advocate capable of coordinating and influencing wider 
development debates and policies at the global and national level.
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i) Policy Influencing and Coordination Efforts by Action Aid Headquarters
Some of AA's difficulties in the area of policy advocacy and 
coordination are no doubt attributable to AA's smaller size and lack of 
access to a global policy forum such as the UN. Nevertheless, a large 
part of AA's difficulties in advocacy are traceable to the NGOs' own 
inexperience in policy influencing and lack of personnel with specialized 
advocacy and lobbying experience. For example, according to AA's own 
internal assessments, for a long time the agency had difficulties 
distinguishing between policy research and analysis, programme promotion 
and actual lobbying. I myself saw evidence of this during my research 
when I observed that even up to mid 1995, AA was committing the mistake of 
equating the replication of successful AA programmes such as Regenerated
Freireian Literacy Through Empowering and Community Techniques (REFLECT) with policy
advocacy and spending much of its time promoting programmes such as REFLECT 
instead of influencing broader institutional arrangements and policies,
During my research of AA I was also able to directly observe that as 
late as mid 1995 AA HQ still lacked an established advocacy/lobbying 
department or an agency-wide Advocacy Strategy. In fact, the available 
evidence confirms that it took AA as many as 8 years and four restructuring 
attempts to create an effective policy advocacy department and to 
mainstream advocacy into the agency. AA HQ's various attempts to build an 
advocacy unit include the creation of a "Public Policy Unit"--1989-92 (the 
Unit was staffed by one person and seen as a peripheral 'think tank' which 
commissioned studies and ensured AA attended high profile global 
Conferences); the Policy and Research of "issues" approach inspired by 
Moving Forward in the N ineties-199 2 -1 9 9 A (the approach assumed that AA could have
policy influence through direct service delivery and tried to integrate 
policy concerns with programming in the field. The approach led to new
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research on issues like environment, education and children both in AA HQ 
and in the DAs but little specialist lobbying of decision-makers was done); 
the joint External Affairs and Policy Research approach--1994-1995 (under 
this model the Policy and Research Unit continued doing research on issues 
while and External Affairs Department lobbied MPs and other UK audiences. 
Unfortunately the approach focussed on UK audiences rather than on 
international advocacy and no overall advocacy policy was ever put 
forward); and more recently--1996-1997, an attempt has been made to 
identify seven priority issues for advocacy (i.e., education, HIV/AIDS, 
natural resources, financing the poor, conflict, urban development, and 
development cooperation) and to formulate an agency-wide and integrated 
Advocacy Strategy through a process of intra-agency consultation--i.e., the 
so-called Collaborative Leadership and Advocacy Group (CLAG) process.
AA's inexperience and slowness in kick-starting its policy work in AA 
HQs, of course, largely explains why, by the end of 1997, the NGO still had 
not been able to narrow down its 7 overly dispersed and unwieldy advocacy 
themes into much more focussed and therefore workable advocacy themes.
Nor was AA's top management expected to officially agree on an agency-wide 
Advocacy Strategy for AA or to select specific policy areas or targets 
around which AA could begin to design advocacy initiatives until 1998.
Given AA's tendency to launch its advocacy work "from scratch" many times 
over, its lack of an agency-wide advocacy strategy and its limited number 
of international advocacy efforts by late 1997, it should not be surprising 
that the NGO's own internal analyses have concluded the AA's attempts to 
develop an agency-wide Advocacy Strategy and to influence policy at the 
global level have not been particularly effective.
A second problem resulting from AA's inexperience in wider policy 
work had been the NGOs' difficulties forging strong collaborative links 
with fellow development NGOs carrying out global policy advocacy. The best
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example of this is found in the disappointing results of AA's involvement 
in the Reality o f A id network, an effort by two NGO networks (Eurostep and
ICVA) to influence international development policies through the 
publication of a shadow OECD/DA report on foreign aid. From the mid 1990s 
AA invested a considerable amount of money and energy in the Reality o f  A id
Project by assuming the role of lead agency and both hiring and paying the
wage of a project coordinator for the project. According to a recent 
evaluation of the policy impact of the Reality of Aid project, however, 
although the Reality o f  A id network has managed to produce useful annual report
on foreign aid from the perspective of NGOs, the network has proven unable 
to produce a global advocacy strategy and therefore to influence global aid 
policy. Perhaps more worryingly though, although AA had been chosen to 
be the lead agency in the Reality of Aid project in the mid 1990s, by the 
end of 1997, network members were requesting that AA's role as lead agency 
in the project be terminated given the NGO's domineering tendencies and 
competitive rather than collaborative behaviour,
However, not all of AA's difficulties in the area of policy 
influencing work are rooted in inexperience or technical limitations. 
Actually, my research reveals that the setbacks experienced by AA in the 
area of global policy advocacy are also closely linked to internal 
organizational constraints and political pressures within the NGO itself.
The most obvious organizational constraint undermining AA's global 
advocacy efforts is the reality that the initiative to do advocacy and 
lobbying work at AA clearly emanated from London HQ and, as such, enjoys 
little support or legitimacy at the country level. During my research, I 
found that the top-down nature in which advocacy work was introduced into 
AA was not only evident in the fact that, until the mid 1990s, all of AA's
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policy, research and advocacy staff were based in London and that it was 
not until 1995 that policy and advocacy professionals were put in place in 
AA-Uganda but also in the fact that, it was not until after my research and 
the creation of CLAG in 1997 that AA actually involved its southern staff 
in discussions about advocacy issues. The imposed nature and lack of 
staff ownership of advocacy work in the field was also a view which 
dominated many of my interviews with AA staff in Uganda and has even 
been explicitly recognized in internal (albeit confidential) AA documents 
which concede that because policy, research and advocacy work were seen as 
"London-based" and as "separate from Country Programme priorities", these 
never had much legitimacy or following within AA's Country Programmes.
Finally, during my research, I also discovered that AA's lacklustre 
record in the area of global policy advocacy was also attributable to the 
reluctance of AA's own Board of Trustees to involve AA in policy 
influencing work or in challenging the status quo. According respondents 
familiar with the upper echelons of AA, the root of the problem laid with 
the political conservativeness (i.e.,Tory) disposition of AA's Board of 
Trustees who saw advocacy work as much too 'political' and potentially 
alienating to AA's traditional child sponsors. My own research into the 
matter confirms that, with the exception of Prof. Robert Chambers at the 
University of Sussex and the Labourite Lord Dubbs, AA's Board of Trustees 
in the mid 1990s was predominantly made up of Conservative captains of 
industry and included familiar UK Tory names such as John Stanley (a 
Thatcherite Tory who managed the Falklands War for Prime Minister Thatcher) 
and Sir Christopher Chataway, a former athlete and well-known personality 
in British Tory Circles. Moreover, during my interview with Mr. Rodney 
Buse, Chairman of AA's Board of Trustees, he agreed that AA's child 
sponsors were predominantly Conservative, middle-aged, and an upper-middle 
class constituency who did not relate to AA's more transformational goals. 
For this reason, he explained, AA preferred to use a more 'neutral'
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language and to emphasize the importance of having compassion for the poor 
rather than talking about the need for more radical institutional 
transformation. It is this fear of becoming involved in 'political' 
issues which, by the mid 1990s, partly prompted AA's Board of Trustees to 
limit the amount of money the agency would be allowed to spend on advocacy 
and policy influencing work by introducing a rule which stipulated that no 
more than 5% of AA's resources could be spent on such work. According 
to respondents, it was the Board of Trustees' unrealistic ceiling on agency 
expenditures on policy issues which has forced AA HQ to keep its advocacy 
unit to a minimum of 3-4 persons and which forced AA to let go a number of 
its policy and public education staff at AA HQ in 1994--an incident which 
caused resignations among several AA staff members who felt that although 
service-delivery was a valuable part of AA's work, alone, it was not 
sufficient to challenge wider institutional and governance arrangements.
Although it is impossible for an outside researcher to capture the 
full range of an agency's advocacy work during a short period of time, 
judging from the available evidence, it would seem that, despite genuine 
efforts to increase its global advocacy efforts, the combination of 
technical limitations (i.e., inexperience, lack of the appropriate skills) 
coupled with inappropriate organizational structures (i.e., the imposition 
of advocacy work in a top-down fashion) and political resistance from 
traditional yet powerful stakeholders (i.e.. Trustees' reluctance to enter 
into 'political' advocacy work) seem to have undermined AA's initial hopes 
of influencing global institutions and wider development debates.
As for AA's policy impact in Uganda itself, although the NGO had 
committed itself to becoming actively involved in advocacy work as early as 
1992, because of the trial and error and various false starts described 
above, AAU's Programme Development Department (PDD) and advocacy functions were
still in the early stages at the time of my visit in 1995 and were not to 
take off until 1997. However, it is useful to discuss some of the early
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obstacles which the AAU Office was beginning to face in its efforts to 
become more involved in influencing wider policy and governance issues in 
Uganda. The first obstacle observed was the preference of the AAU CP to 
concentrate its development interventions in geographically limited DAs in 
rural areas. There is no denying, of course, that it is in the Ugandan 
countryside where poverty is most severe and where development assistance 
is needed most. At the same time though, AAU's rural and grassroots-focus 
has prevented the NGO from building the high profile and political access 
it would need both in Kampala and within the upper echelons of government 
in order to significantly influence Ugandan policy and institutional 
reforms. Another caveat of AAU's DA-focus is that it restricts the NGO's 
impact to a few thousand selected beneficiaries in rural areas. Moreover, 
with time, staff become so consumed with solving operational problems in 
their micro areas that they are unable to thin in holistic terms or to 
reflect about the root causes of poverty or wider institutional solutions.
During my field research, AAU's lack of profile among decision-makers 
and the international development community became evident during 
interviews with diverse development actors in Kampala. During such 
interviews government officials themselves asked me what AAU was about and 
what it was currently doing; respondents from bilateral agencies such as 
USAID noted that although though AAU was known to be effective in 
implementing education programmes on the ground, it was the World Bank 
which set the pace of education policy in Uganda; and respondents from 
fellow NGOs like OXFAM noted that although OXFAM and AA had shared values, 
the two NGOs did not collaborate much when it came to influencing wider 
policy issues in Uganda since AA was mainly involved in 'hands-on' 
operational activities in the field,
The above problems turned out to be of considerable concern to AA-UK 
staff such as Nigel Twose who himself remarked that convincing AA staff in
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the CPs to work beyond the local level or in a sectoral fashion by becoming 
more involved in broader policy issues or in learning from other CPs was 
proving to be a major struggle at AA and undermining cross-country and 
cross-sectoral learning within the NGO. In Uganda itself, a senior 
manager in AAU's PDD in Kampala alluded to the same difficulties during our 
interview and remarked that, because the vast majority of AAU staff still 
worked in the field and were mainly concerned with meeting time-lines and 
targets set in the DAs which were still the 'bread and butter' of AAU's 
work, most AAU staff had little time to think about, let alone try to 
influence broader national and international policy issues. The same 
respondent further confirmed that, although AAU was at the time trying to 
forge links with the World Bank and UNICEF as well as to carry out joint 
research initiatives with OXFAM, AAU had generally become accustomed to 
doing things on its own in the Ugandan countryside and was still somewhat 
wary of competition from fellow NGOs. The limited time, money and 
skilled personnel available to the AAU to do advocacy work is confirmed by 
the available statistics, including the fact that out of the 3 9 AAU staff 
members based in Kampala in early 1995, only 3-4 persons had a mandate to 
do policy-influencing work and that AAU as whole spent as much as 78% of 
its budget in 1995 on DA-related activities. (See Table 6.3). Moreover, 
out of the modest amount of money which AAU spent on non-DA activities, it 
is estimated that AAU only spends about £35,000 per year on direct advocacy 
work in Uganda. Finally, some AA staff also noted that, despite the 
pressures from AA HQ for the NGO to become more involved in policy advocacy 
in the South, the difficulty of raising delicate political issues in a 
country where memories of violence were still vivid, where staff from 
international NGOs like AA are sometimes themselves former political exiles 
who have understandably preferred to stay out of politics, and where 
international NGOs like AA are seen as foreign entities lacking a 
legitimate Ugandan constituency or voice, also explain why the AAU Office 
has not taken a more activist approach to policy influence in Uganda.
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Admittedly, problems such as limited time, experience, and resources, 
are inherent in any attempt to change the orientation of an agency that 
operates at many levels and in many contexts. Nevertheless, the slow and 
top-down manner in which AA's overall advocacy strategy was launched go a 
long way to explaining why the transition proved to be a particularly 
painful one at AA and why, at the time of my visit in 1995, AAU had few 
concrete policy results to speak of other than the recent formulation of a 
draft working paper justifying the expansion of its advocacy work.
Still, it is worth noting, nonetheless, that on a subsequent visit to AA HQ 
in London, Ms. Sara Mangali, head of AAU's FDD, reported that, during 
1996, 10 staff positions had been established within the FDD in AAU; links 
had been fostered with the District governments of Mityana and Mubende 
through a research initiative on Non-Formal Education (NFE); new research 
had been started in areas such economic growth and the nature of the 
relationship between HIV/AIDS and conflict in Northern Uganda; and that new 
Non-DA Micro-Frojects had been designed to help women and the blind.
B) Action Aid's Implementation of SHD/PCD Approaches at the Programme/
Project and Grassroots Level in the Buwekula Development Area
The last aspect of AA's work which I analyze in this chapter are 
AA's SHD/FCD efforts at the programme and project levels in Uganda as a 
whole as well as in selected DAs. Because SHD/FCD aspires to bring about 
flexible and bottom-up development initiatives which aim to improve equity 
and to assist the poorest of the poor, to foster greater donor 
collaboration, genuine North-South partnerships as well as greater 
participation and a sense of ownership and self-reliance among aid 
recipients, the sections which follow explore whether AAU's organizational 
structures actually embody these features and to what extent these SHD/FCD 
goals have been furthered through AAU's field-level programmes/projects.
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i) Action Aid-Uganda’s Country Programme as A Whole
During my study of AA's CP in Uganda, it became evident that AA had 
many positive attributes, including a strong rural presence and direct 
involvement with poor rural communities (this is evident in MAP 1 appended 
to this chapter which shows AAU's various DAs at the time of my visit in 
1995); strict enforcement of rigorous accountability and transparency 
measures and a cadre of committed and disciplined staff which received 
ongoing training as well as benefits such as transport to and from work, 
a daily free lunch and ample opportunities for exchange visits.
Respondents also identified AAU's dedication to building schools, training 
teachers, passing on new skills to communities, and trying to work in more 
participatory ways among the contributions the NGO had made in Uganda. 
However, these achievements notwithstanding, my research revealed that the 
AAU CP was facing many of the same difficulties as UNDP in its attempt to 
mainstream SHD/PCD into its development programmes in Uganda.
North-South Tensions and Lack of Ownership Resulting from the Hierarchical 
and Top-Down Management Style of Action Aid HQ and the Action Aid-Uganda CP
One major factor afflicting AA's effectiveness in Uganda is the 
hierarchical nature of the organization's own structures and the top-down 
manner in which staff perceive that the NGO has carried out its agenda for 
change. Evidence of such perceptions has already been given above. What 
is important to add at this point is some of the supplementary evidence 
which corroborates these perceptions at the programme level. On the issue 
of northern domination, a glance at the organizational chart for AA HQ in 
Table 6.2 confirms that, despite AA's regionalization/decentralization 
efforts, the NGO's main international programming unit--i.e., the Programme 
Development Department, has retained its main office in London, while 
functions such as Financial Management, Marketing, Sponsorship, and Human 
Resource Management are all still run from London, and AA's Director, 
General and Board of Trustees all remain London-based and dominated. With
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respect to hierarchy within AA-Uganda, an organizational chart of the AAU 
Office in Kampala in Table 6.4 clearly shows that the NGO is organized in a 
vertical fashion and that most responsibility is vested directly in the AAU 
Country Director. Another sign of the centralized manner in which planning 
and programming decisions are made in the AAU CP is evident in the 
similarity between AAU's various DAs. If DA-level and programme-related 
decisions were truly made by field staff and beneficiary communities in a 
decentralized manner, it would be very unlikely to find--as I did during my 
AAU field research, all but one of AAU's rural DAs introducing identical 
methodological changes such as the promotion of AA HQ's star education 
programme, REFLECT and the use of Parish Development Committees (PDCs)
--the negative effects of which are analyzed later. AAU's tendency to 
impose 'blueprints' was explained by a former AAU manager as follows:
Action Aid must spend the money and get things done. As a 
result, programmes end up being dictated rather than 
giving people choices.
The above quotation shows that, like UNDP, smaller NGOs like AA are 
equally pressed by HQ and organizational imperatives to 'do what is 
easiest' : i.e., arriving in communities with pre-determined ideas,
'spending the money' rapidly, and producing concrete outputs on time.
Top-Heavy Management Structures and Limited Community-Level Investment
Another problematic feature of the AA-Uganda programme lies with its 
top-heavy management structures and high administrative and logistical 
cost. Of course, some perspective is in order here. For instance, 
compared to the UNDP-Uganda Office in Kampala (Refer back to Chapter 5), 
the staff of the AAU Office in Kampala (as shown in Table 6.4) is obviously 
much smaller than UNDP's and AAU overall has a much smaller proportion of 
its staff concentrated in Kampala than UNDP as well as a much ratio of 
administrative/logistical: professional/technical staff in its Kampala
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Office than UNDP does. Moreover, while only a small proportion of UNDP- 
Uganda's 85-plus projects are grassroots development initiatives, the bulk 
of AAU's CP (i.e., over 78% of the AAU CP budget in 1995 according to Table 
6.3) goes directly towards development initiatives in AAU's five rural DAs. 
In short, there is no denying that AAU is overall smaller, less 
administration-heavy and less centralized in Kampala than UNDP.
At the same time though, even after major staff cutbacks in 1995, at 
the time of my visit, the AAU Office in Kampala had a staff of as many as 
3 9 persons (this was later to increase with the expansion of the PDD) even 
though most of the NGO's development activities were based in the 
countryside. (See Table 6.4). Furthermore, despite AAU's efforts to cut its 
personnel costs in Kampala, to trim the size of its older DAs and to design 
much smaller and flatter DAs, during my field visits I observed that, even 
after staff cut-backs in its older DAs, AAU's organizational structure 
remained very administration-heavy. For example, in DAs such as the one in 
Buwekula, out of a remaining staff of 40 in 1995 (down from 67 at the end 
of 1994), only 15 Field Development Workers (FDWs) and 2 Area Managers 
spent most of their time working directly with beneficiary communities in 
the countryside, while the remainder of the DA's staff remained in Mubende 
town performing a series of management, administrative, logistical support 
and regulation functions, (e.g., reporting to Kampala, processing child 
sponsorship letters, filling in inventory on stationary and other 
materials, keeping track of motorcycle mileage, making out receipts for 
project-related purchases, etc.) (Refer to Table 6.6 for details).
I also found documents showing that the proportion of the AAU CP 
expenditures going towards the maintenance of the NGO's own operations 
(i.e., staff salaries, rent, vehicle maintenance, office services, etc.) is 
substantially larger than the proportion of money channelled directly into 
investments in beneficiary communities themselves. In fact, according to
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an internal but confidential calculation carried out by AAU's Financial 
Unit, as little as £11 out of every £180 pledged by an individual AA 
sponsor annually--i.e., as little as 3.5% of a sponsor's donation--is 
money directly available to the beneficiary community 78
Limited Collaboration with Other Development Agencies or Government
A related shortcoming of AAU's DA-focus and directly operational 
approach is the seclusion which results from doing things on its own and 
being the sole provider of all a community's development needs. This is 
one respect in which AA's style of grassroots work in Uganda differs 
dramatically from that of UNDP which was much more apt to use other UN 
agencies, the Ugandan government or intermediary NGOs and CBOs as 
implementors of its field projects. Luckily, by the time of my field 
visit, the AAU CP had begun supporting indigenous Ugandan NGOs such as TASO 
and VISION TERUDO and was experimenting with implementing development 
projects on behalf of other donors--the Kamuli DA which AAU implemented on
behalf of the World Bank-funded PAPSCA initiative is an example of this. 
Nevertheless, AAU's seclusion, especially in its DAs, is something which 
became quite evident to me after being based in the Buwekula DA for six
weeks and having virtually no interaction with non-AA staff and finding out 
that Buwekula's DA Coordinator and UNDP/CMP's Chief Technical Advisor did
not know each other (until my introduction) even though both agencies had 
been operating in the same areas around Mubende for years. A similar 
experience was recounted by Hugh Goyder, Head of AA-UK's Monitoring and 
Evaluation Department, who himself remarked that, whenever he visited the 
AAU CP, he rarely met anyone but AAU staff. AAU's tendency to 'go it 
alone' (especially in rural DAs) and its reluctance to co-implement 
projects with other development agencies or the Ugandan government have not 
escaped the attention of other development actors, some of whom attributed 
AAU's seclusion to the NGO's strongly-held belief that its own methods of
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doing things are superior and more easily put into practice when they do 
need to be debated with outsiders as well as to the NGO's persistent 
distrust of the Ugandan government and, hence, its preference to bypass or 
duplicate government structures rather than dealing with the challenge of 
working with them. Of course, as it will be shown later, AA's distrust
of the Ugandan government, has often been justified. This, however, does 
not change the fact that AAU's reluctance to work through existing 
governmental institutions or to link up its beneficiaries with other 
development actors and potential funders has undermined its policy 
influence in top-level decision-making circles and reduced its potential 
learning from other development organizations. The decision also means 
that, once AAU leaves the vicinity, its beneficiaries may well be left in 
limbo. I return to this issue in my analysis of the Buwekula DA.
A Tendency to Attend to Organizational Interests By Doing What is Easiest
Finally, during my assessment of the AAU CP I discovered a number of 
ways in which AAU chose to 'do what is easiest' and most feasible in order 
to keep the money moving and to meet targets and deadlines set in AA HQ and 
the expectations of influential stakeholders such as the NGO's Board of 
Trustees. The most obvious example which I found of this tendency was 
AAU's choice of DAs. As explained by a respondent familiar with the early 
establishment of AAU CP, rather than targeting in those remote Ugandan 
regions which were the neediest (e.g., in the North), AAU's first two DAs 
(Mityana and Buwekula), were in great part chosen because of their 
proximity to Kampala, and hence, their convenience. In the case of the
Buwekula DA, this logic has meant that the two sub-Counties chosen by AAU
(i.e., Kasambya and Kitenga) were not the poorest within Mubende District 
either but were chosen, instead, because their shorter distance from 
Mubende town made work there easier. These are not in and of themselves 
bad decisions since extreme poverty exists both in Mityana and Buwekula.
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Moreover, given the danger and difficulty of working in remote areas in 
Uganda during the 1980s, this decision may have been logical. And, lastly, 
it is important to remember that when trying to attribute agency decisions 
to certain motives, one can never do so with certainty. Nonetheless, 
various other examples of AAU taking the easier path are discussed below 
and, in their collective, these decisions do show that NGOs are not 
necessarily more likely than other types of international development 
agencies to work with the poorest or in the most remote and neediest areas.
In summary, it would seem that, as a whole, the AAU CP has made 
significant progress in strengthening its advocacy and policy influencing 
capacity, its support of indigenous Ugandan NGOs and CBOs, and in trying to
run a much leaner and less centralized agency as well as more participatory 
and bottom-up development programmes--all core components of the SHD/PCD 
approach. Moreover, despite the organizational limitations outlined above, 
AAU is still much less Kampala-based or administration-heavy than UNDP and 
generally spends a greater proportion of its budget, time and energy 
working directly with rural communities who remain the poorest section of 
Ugandan society. On top of this, AAU's preference for working on its own 
and in a 'hands on manner' does have its advantages in that it saves the 
NGO from spending valuable time and resources on turf-battles with fellow 
donors; it enables it closely to monitor field activities and to enforce 
work and financial accountability procedures; and ensures that agency staff 
spend time in the community rather than in Kampala, thereby reducing the 
scope for staff and beneficiary shirking, free-loading and corruption and 
keeping opportunistic outsiders such as rent-seeking politicians, at bay.
These benefits notwithstanding though, the bulk of the evidence 
provided above shows that AAU has encountered many of the same problems as 
UNDP in its efforts to put SHD/PCD approaches into practice in Uganda.
These include difficulties influencing wider Ugandan policy or governance
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issues through proactive advocacy work; persistent North-South tensions and 
an inability to foster a sense of national ownership over SHD/PCD 
approaches or those reforms accompanying its adoption; a tendency to 'go it 
alone' rather than collaborating closely with fellow development actors or 
the Ugandan government (a problem more pronounced within AAU and within 
UNDP-Uganda); and a tendency to protect organizational interests (e.g., by 
'pushing pre-set development agendas', 'doing what is easiest' and being 
careful not to 'offend powerful stakeholders') even when such 
organizational interests undermine core SHD/PCD goals like fostering 
genuine partnership, participation, and self-reliance.
ii) Action Aid-Uganda’s Implementation o f SHDIPCD in the Buwekula DA
To observe the constraints faced by AAU at the grassroots level, I 
carried out an in-depth analysis of its Buwekula (ABP) DA in Mubende
District. ABP was chosen as a case study not only because it was one of 
AAU's older DAs but also because its multi-sectoral development approach 
and recent shift towards an integrated methodology and both self-reliant 
and participatory development is commensurate with the principles of 
SHD/PCD. In addition, ABP was deemed easier to study than the Mityana DA
which was already phasing out at the time of my arrival as well as a more 
typical AAU DA than the Kamuli which AAU was implementing on behalf of the
World Bank as a unique experiment. The remaining DAs in Bundibugyo and 
Apach were discarded since the former focussed exclusively on women and 
literacy and the latter was not fully operational at the time of my visit.
The Buwekula Programme began in 1989. Its main development objective
was to assist socially and economically disadvantaged communities to take 
responsibility of their own development needs and to gain access to 
development opportunities and sustainable improvements in their living
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conditions. In the case of ABP, this is achieved through four inter­
linked interventions: i) empowering communities and building their
capacities to develop, plan, implement and assess their own development 
initiatives; ii) providing support in basic health, education, water and 
sanitation and agricultural extension services; iii) building and 
rehabilitating community infrastructure such as roads, clinics, schools and 
water tanks; and iv) helping communities to improve their economic base and 
entrepreneurial skills and potential through business training and credit 
and savings schemes. By the time of my visit in 1995, ABP cited among its 
achievements the training of over 300 PDC members in development planning, 
project formulation and the formulation of evaluation indicators; the 
construction of over 200 classrooms, training to over 140 teachers, and the 
establishment of over 70 literacy centres with 4,000 persons taught in the 
area of education; the immunization of 2, 918 children in 1994 alone, 320 
health courses, and the training of over 200 Community Health Workers and 
105 Traditional Birth Attendants in the area of health; the construction of 
over 50 water sources and the rehabilitation of over 500 Km of feeder roads 
and 92 bridges, thereby making 42 villages accessible in the area of 
infrastructure; the initiation of 69 tree nurseries between 1989-1994 and 
the training of 800 farmers on environmentally-sound farming practices by 
1993 (30% had adopted some of these practices) in agriculture; and the 
identification of 80 groups for potential credit and savings schemes and 
financial management training to 35 of these groups in the area of business 
promotion. (The development objectives of ABP are summarized in Table 6.5. 
and the 22 project sites I visited in the DA with the help of my Research 
Assistant, Mr. Edward Ssekayombya, are illustrated in MAP II.)
The sections which follow analyzes to what extent ABP has achieved 
its programme objectives and explores some of the obstacles which the 
programme has encountered at the broader institutional, inter- 
organizational, intra-organizational and community levels.
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a) Broader Institutional Constraints
Lack of Access to Local Supplies, Markets or Services
As was the case at UNDP, AAU's effectiveness in carrying out SHD/PCD 
approaches in the Ugandan countryside have also been set back by a series 
of broader institutional constraints. Lack of access to regular 
transport, markets or local inputs and services were frequently cited as 
major obstacles to development by both ABP staff and beneficiaries. Having 
lived in Mubende District for almost two months, I directly observed how, 
inadequate roads (especially during the rainy season) made access to remote 
communities virtually impossible; how the lack of major local markets meant 
that young boys from rural areas cycled a full day in order to be able to 
transport 4 bunches of Matoke (the green bananas which constitute Ugandans'
main staple) to the central market in Mubende town; and how a lack of 
rural store outlets or repair services meant that spare parts or supplies 
took months to arrive from Kampala. These economic institutional 
constraints impaired ABP's operations in a number of ways: The erratic
supply of electricity meant that ABP's 15-plus lap-top computers had to be 
individually operated on expensive batteries; the paucity of local repair 
services meant that ABP's photocopiers were usually out of order; and the 
absence of efficient local banking services or spare parts meant that ABP 
staff spent much of their time travelling to Kampala to repair vehicles, 
procure spare parts, or perform simple financial transactions. These 
activities absorbed tremendous time and energy and elevated the costs of 
every day transactions for the ABP project and the Buwekula community.
Limited Access to Productive Assets and Local Government Support
ABP beneficiaries also remarked that their communities' and personal 
development were hindered by lack of access to productive assets. Many
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respondents also specifically complained that they lacked government 
assistance in this area and invariably suffered at the hands of ineffective 
and corrupt government officials and local leaders who furthered their 
personal, family and tribal interests, at the expense of the wider 
community. In fact, according to a study carried out by the government of 
Mubende District, the area's planned development activities were often 
hampered by the local government's own incompetence and malfeasance, 
including problems of embezzlement due to poor financial accountability, 
weak political leadership, and low morale resulting from poor internal 
communication, confusion over the role of RC/LCs and government 
departments, weak planning and tax collection capacity, inappropriately 
trained manpower, and excessive bureaucracy and delays in pay. **
None of these grievances are surprising and most of the broader 
institutional constraints mentioned above have been already identified in 
previous chapters. What is different, however, is that AAU dealt with many 
of these wider institutional constraints by running its own, virtually 
autonomous development operations and thus bypassing existing Ugandan 
institutions. In the case of ABP, this has involved maintaining its own 
fleet of vehicles and accompanying mechanics; building up its own extensive 
system of office computers, printers and photocopiers; supplying its own 
staff clothing, lunch and security services; and generally running a self- 
contained operation with its own strict rules and procedures. On the 
positive side, this directly operational approach has led to a tightly-run 
ship with little room for laxity by staff or fraud by outsiders. On the 
down side, as shown above, the approach has restricted collaboration with 
others and left little time or money to challenge wider policies or 
institutional constraints. On top of this, the available evidence shows 
that ABP's directly operational and self-sufficient approach to DA-work has 
implied large numbers of office-based staff in Mubende town (As shown in 
Table 6.6, even after staff cutbacks, only ABP 17 staff members--15 FDWs
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and 2 Area Managers--spent most of their time in the countryside while the 
remaining 34 regular ABP staff and 7 informal workers oversaw logistics in 
ABP's Mubende Office.) and extremely high administrative/logistical costs. 
(As Table 6.7 shows, over 86% of ABP's costs in 1995 went towards the DA's 
administrative/logistical maintenance.)
b) Inter-Organizational Constraints
Considering what has already been said about AAU's tendency to 'go it 
alone' and directly to control operational activities in its rural DAs, it 
should not be too surprising that the Buwekula Programme has not faced as
many inter-organizational complications as UNDP. Although this may well 
change as ABP begins to forge more links with non Action Aiders, at the 
time of my visit, the main source of ABP's inter-organizational problems 
seemed to be its isolation from fellow development actors, government 
officials and Mubende town itself.
Limited Interaction Between ABP Beneficiaries and Non Action Aiders
Although AAU had already committed itself to increasing its 
interaction with different development actors both within and beyond its 
DAs, during my visit to ABP, not only did I not encounter any other 
development agencies implementing development activities in the Kasambya or 
Kitenga Sub-Counties in which the Buwekula Programme o p e r a t e d , but, as noted
above, ABP staff seemed unaware of neighbouring development programmes 
taking place in Mubende District. Furthermore, when I asked ABP 
beneficiaries what other agencies or actors contributed to their 
development, most pointed out that, aside from sporadic support from their 
RC/LCs, they were not in regular contact with other Ugandan or 
international development actors. Of course, it is true that the number 
of agencies present in Buwekula have been few. It is also quite plausible
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that respondents may have under-reported their collaboration with non- 
Action Aiders in fear that doing otherwise might cause them to lose the 
support they were receiving from AAU. If this is the case, this finding is 
itself important for it confirms that encouraging beneficiaries to 
establish contact with other development or community actors is not an 
objective which has been given major priority at ABP.
Weak Links or Collaboration Between ABP and Local Government
ABP's relations with local government and encouragement of 
beneficiaries to increasingly engage their government was equally weak. 
During my first interview with Mr. Isaac Mudoi, Chief Administrative 
Officer for Mubende District, he remarked that AAU had never been very 
transparent or forthcoming about what it was doing in its two DAs in 
Mubende District (i.e., Mityana and Buwekula) . He further noted that, in
response to AAU's tendency to over-concentrate its development efforts in 
specific DAs, his government had intentionally pulled back from those DAs 
in which AAU was involved. Although the decision to pull back its 
public services may seem logical from the perspective of a government with 
limited resources, the effects of this decision were to leave AAU playing a 
"gap filling" role for government in DAs such as ABP, while at the same 
time isolating ABP beneficiaries in Kitenga and Kasambya and thus putting 
them in even greater risk of being left in limbo upon ABP's departure.
When I spoke to Mr. Mudoi during a follow-up visit, he remarked that, 
AAU's relations with his government were improving and that, for the first 
time, a government official had sat in on AAU meetings; that AAU was itself 
beginning to attend District government meetings; and that ABP's 
Coordinator (along with staff from UNDP-HABITAT and other donors) had 
participated in the formulation of Mubende's first District Plan under 
decentralization. However, Mr. Mudoi still worried that, because AAU had
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created a privileged minority in its DAs and began to consult government 
and grassroots communities only near the end of its involvement in 
Mubende, once AAU actually phased out of Mubende District, a large gap 
would be left both in terms of personnel and capacity. Dr. Emmanuel 
Mawajje, RC/LC V Chairman for Mubende District, also praised AAU for making 
a greater effort to collaborate with local government after a tensions had 
erupted between the two due to the government's initial hopes that AAU's 
assets would be considered District property. However, like Mr. Mudoi, he 
remarked that, had ABP worked in a collaborative manner from the outset, 
its long-term development impact in Mubende could have been much greater.**
To be fair, since the creation of Parish Development Committees (PDCs) in
late 1995, ABP had been creating closer links with lower level RC/LC 
members, some of whom were themselves PDC members and whom I found present 
in special PDC and community planning sessions. Nevertheless, if the above 
testimonies are any indication, it would seem that, despite some 
improvements, AAU's relations with government remain lukewarm. As already 
noted, this is largely attributable to AAU's continued distrust of 
government--a feeling which has been no doubt propelled by the 
ineffectiveness and corruption often associated with the Ugandan government 
as well as by AAU's own awareness of the great gulf which exists between 
its own well-equipped programmes and the government's meagre resources.
The continuing distrust between ABP and Ugandan government largely explains 
why, to this day, ABP does not plan jointly or co-implement programmes 
with government *°, let alone open up its accounts or disburse funds 
through government. AAU's preference for keeping at 'arms-length' from 
government is most evident in ABP's determination to create a parallel PDC 
structure of its own which duplicates many local government development 
functions rather than working through the existing RC/LC structure, even 
though, as one AAU manager pointed out, ABP never carried out a 
comprehensive study which showed that the RC/LC structure would not be
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effective nor was there ever a consensus among ABP beneficiaries that PDCs 
were preferable to the existing RC/LC structure. Instead, conceded the 
manager, the notion of forming PDCs was pre-conceived by AAU staff before 
the idea was debated with communities and was largely motivated by AAU's 
desire for a standardized system which was easily managed throughout AA.
Tensions Between ABP and Mubende Townspeople
By talking to residents in Mubende town and thus transcending what 
Robert Chambers calls 'project bias', I discovered that ABP's relations 
with Mubende's townspeople were even weaker than those with government. 
Conversations with residents from Mubende town (e.g., a local business­
women, a local Reverend, a local School Master, etc.) revealed not only 
that many town residents still did not know what exactly AAU did, but that 
many felt wrongfully excluded as a result of AAU's unilateral decision that 
Mubende town would not comprise part of the Buwekula DA even though ABP's
Office would be in the town and, in the view of the town's residents, ABP's 
rural beneficiaries were not necessarily poorer than Mubende's townspeople, 
many of whom had legitimate development needs of their own.
c) Intra-Organizational and Project-Level Constraints
Reinforced Inequities and Inability to Reach the Poorest
As was the case in UNDP, AAU has faced many implementational setbacks 
at the intra-organizational and project level. Chief among these has been
ABP' inability to universalize services and to, therefore, end up 
reinforcing geographic and wealth inequalities within the Buwekula DA. The
first way in this has been done is through the unequal treatment of 
residents in Mubende town and the countryside--a decision which, as we saw 
above, has caused resentment and alienation among Mubende townspeople.
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A second factor which may have reinforced social and geographic 
inequalities is AAU's decision to concentrate ABP's assistance on only one 
of five Counties in Mubende District (i.e., Buwekula County), to work only 
in two of Buwekula's 6 sub-Counties (i.e., Kitenga and Kasambya sub- 
Count ies) as ABP's selected areas of work even though both of the selected 
sub-Counties are known to be far less poor than sub-Counties such as 
Butoloogo and Kiyuni which are far more remote from Mubende town and the 
Kampala-Mubende-Fort Portal road. By choosing to work only in rural areas, 
and even then, in only two out of six sub-counties in Buwekula, ABP may 
well have caused greater disharmony within Mubende District and resentment 
by those who were excluded. On this point, it is important to note that 
although, according to AAU documents, Mubende District's Administrator 
approved ABP's choice of sub-Counties as pointed out by Mr. Mudoi in 
the Mubende District Office, it had been the hope of his government that 
AAU would spread out beyond Kitenga and Kasambya rather than aggravating 
inequalities by creating an enclave of privilege within the chosen sub- 
Counties. It is also worth noting that, since 1996, AAU has succeeded
in being more inclusive of surrounding communities by selecting smaller 
districts and building DAs (e.g., such as the Apach DA) which rely less on
AAU staff activities and more on those of the existing community.
Lastly, but very importantly, my field work revealed that the various 
community groups formed by or supported by ABP in the Buwekula DA, including
PDCs, have themselves failed to incorporate the 'poorest of the poor'. This 
inadequacy is largely explained by the fact that most groups (e.g., Health 
Committees, Parent-Teacher Associations [PTAs] or School Management 
Committees) address issues or involve training activities which require 
high levels of literacy, organizational capacity, access to information, 
transport and spare free time--all rare qualities among the poorest in
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rural Uganda. The other reason though, has to do with ABP's own 
organizational interests and its concern with, above all, meeting time­
lines and quantitative targets imposed by managers in Kampala and 
stakeholders in AA-London. It is these organizational imperatives which 
explain, for instance, why ABP's agricultural programme which was intended 
to give extension services and technical assistance to individual 
cultivators and pastoralists through farm special visits (i.e., what ABP 
calls a concentrated "batch" methodology) focused on farmers with access to 
productive assets (e.g., access to sufficiently fertile land and to some 
farm labour and implements) and who therefore have enough room to 
manoeuvre and to assume the economic risks needed to generate assured 
results. It is for the above reasons that many of the beneficiaries in
ABP's various groups are either educated professionals (e.g., teachers, 
public servants), strategically situated persons with clout or a leadership 
role in the community (e.g., RC/LC Chairmen, church leaders), or persons 
with sufficient capital and assets (e.g., local businessmen, better-off 
farmers) to take full advantage of ABP's targeted activities such as its 
agricultural extension programme and ABP's recently established Savings and 
Credit Groups. It is for these reasons that ABP's groups draw on the same 
small pool of volunteers for activities--a problem reflected in the 
considerable amount of cross-membership which exists between groups.
To be fair, even the poorest and most marginalized members of the 
Buwekula DA have benefited at least indirectly from ABP's contributions to
universal social service delivery (e.g., ABP's support to immunization for 
all children and mothers in Buwekula) and the improvement of indivisible 
public infrastructure (e.g., ABP's assistance in the area of road 
improvement, the construction of schools, health clinics and water valley 
tanks). All the same, it is accurate to point out that, the much more 
select nature of ABP's targeted technical assistance and training 
activities have excluded the poorest of the poor in the Buwekula DA,
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including those economically dispossessed, socially marginalized, the old 
and disabled, recent migrants and outsiders. The inequitable nature of 
ABP's groups and targeted beneficiaries first became apparent during my 
field visits when I noticed that most of the group members we were meeting 
with were well-educated, spoke English well and played overlapping 
leadership roles in the community. These impressions were later confirmed 
during discussions with selected Poverty Focus Groups (i.e., community 
members identified as being amongst the 'poorest of the poor' during wealth 
rankings and PRA exercises conducted by ABP and community members 
themselves). During these Poverty Focus Group discussions, respondents 
told us that, as marginal members of the community, they were not an 
integral part of the various community groups formed or supported by ABP in 
Kitenga and Kasambya; that they were generally excluded from ABP's training 
sessions and concentrated (batch) farmer assistance programme; and they in 
fact rarely felt comfortable showing themselves at public meetings, 
approaching ABP staff, let alone voicing their grievances to local 
politicians, since, in their words, they were much "too embarrassed to 
bother such busy people with their concerns".
With respect to ABP's agricultural programme, an internal survey 
carried out by ABP staff in 1993 confirms that, although ABP's concentrated 
farmer methodology had always maintained that its target group were farmers 
cultivating less than 3 acres, in actuality, only 60% of those reached by 
the survey fell under that category. The survey also showed that a very 
low proportion of female-headed households (less than 5%) were contacted 
intensively through ABP even though female-headed households comprised over 
18% of DA households and were among the poorest farmers in the DA.
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Hierarchical Decision-Making Within ABP and Limited Community Participation
Another area in which ABP's grassroots development efforts have 
fallen short of SHD/PCD aspirations is in fostering genuine participation 
among staff and beneficiaries. Contrary to AAU's intentions of delegating 
development planning, implementation, and evaluation responsibilities to 
programme beneficiaries and regardless of whether one defines participation 
in a maximalist or minimalist fashion, at the time of my visit in 1995, it 
was predominantly AAU and ABP managers who were calling the shots.
There are many areas in which I found evidence of this trend. The 
first and most obvious was the manner in which AAU's management dealt with 
ABP' methodological shift in early 1995. My field visits to over 20 ABP 
project sites revealed that none of the respondents we spoke had been 
consulted about the need or desirability of the transition until after the 
decision was made by AAU and ABP managers; none had been involved in 
determining ABP's new development objectives or the types of organizational 
structures or training which would be required for the new methodology; and 
none were consulted about the timing or pace of the transition. Hence, 
while ABP's management undoubtedly made important strides by informing 
programme beneficiaries that major changes would be forthcoming at ABP and 
while many beneficiaries noted that they supported ABP's shift towards a 
more integrated and participatory approach to development, there is no 
mistaking that the impetus for the decisions made during the transition 
emanated entirely from AAU rather than from programme beneficiaries. This 
finding was later substantiated by an ABP staff member who acknowledged 
that ABP managers had decided what forms ABP's methodological changes would 
occur and which group activities would be terminated before informing the 
beneficiary community about their decisions via RC/LC meetings and 
household visits.
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One of the worse effects of the limited involvement of ABP 
beneficiaries in the methodological changes which took place at ABP became 
obvious in the process of my field work when I discovered that many 
beneficiaries were extremely confused about the logic or nature of ABP's 
methodological shift and felt little ownership over the process. These 
problems were later confirmed by ABP's own internal evaluation of the 
process. The other negative consequence of ABP's limited consideration
of beneficiaries' views before it carried out its methodological changes was
that, several of the beneficiaries we spoke to were upset over the abrupt 
manner in which former sectoral activities had been terminated by ABP. 
Agriculturalists in particular were concerned that the sudden termination 
of intensive household visits and of the technical advice they used to 
receive from ABP would hurt their farm productivity. And, community groups 
such as ABP's Traditional Birth Attendants expressed distress at the manner 
in which their training had been cut short even though many of them were 
still unable to put their skills into practice since they had only received 
two out of the three required training sessions and were still waiting to 
receive the medical kits they had been promised. In addition, some
community groups pointed out that, if ABP now expected them to voice their 
concerns or put forward their development proposals to the newly-created 
PDCs or to local government, instead of simply terminating groups' 
activities, ABP should have considered how it could train them in project 
identification and design, as well as in fundraising and lobbying.
Finally, my field research also revealed that ABP staff had 
themselves felt that their concerns had not been sufficiently taken into 
account during ABP's methodological transition which resulted in an 
unexpected number of staff cut-backs, especially at the lower-levels.
From the perspective of several ABP staff members in Mubende, once the 
methodological changes at ABP got under way, senior-level AAU managers from 
Kampala and London were able to "hijack the agenda" and to utilize the
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opportunity to dramatically cutback ABP's personnel which AA's top brass in 
Kampala and London feared was become too large and expensive to be 
justified to AA stakeholders. By the time of my visit in mid 1995,
unexpected staff cutbacks and the precarious job situation at ABP was 
causing tremendous distress among ABP field staff and affecting both staff 
morale and productivity as many of the ABP's more qualified personnel were 
leaving the programme in search of secure employment elsewhere.
The above examples of poor consultation and the limited participation 
of both programme staff and beneficiaries coincide with John de Coninck's 
own findings that the planning culture at AAU is top-down, overly 
centralized, and bureaucratic in nature.
When probed as to why, despite attempts to the contrary, AAU managers 
continued monopolizing the decision-making process at ABP, much of the 
evidence points the finger at organizational interests and the pressure to 
keep to budgetary deadlines and planning guidelines set by AA managers in 
Kampala and the UK. Actually, it is precisely organizational imperatives 
which obstructed the first planning cycle of ABP's newly-created PDCs in 
December 1995 when, due to strict planning and budgetary deadlines 
emanating from AA-UK, ABP forced all PDCs to submit their project proposals 
before they were complete. The consequence was that ABP staff and PDC 
members had to gloss over complex poverty analysis and integrated planning 
issues and rush what would normally have been a gradual learning and 
consensus-building process. This, according to an internal AA memo, meant 
that "the participatory planning process at AAU was to a large extent 
derailed by AA's own planning and budgeting system", and that, far from 
identifying their own priorities, objectives and indicators, the planning 
process at ABP was largely dictated by AA. This, adds the memo, has forced 
beneficiary communities to resort to designing familiar projects (i.e., 
predominantly infrastructural projects like building schools) rather than
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carefully analyzing the community's wider development needs and coming up 
with a broader range of solutions different from those identified by 
'agency-led' planning processes in previous years. The rushing also meant 
that communities acquired little ownership or understanding of the planning 
process they had just undergone and, as a result, found themselves having 
to 'revisit' basic development concepts and objectives after their PDC 
projects had already been designed and approved by ABP.
Limited Staff Skills and the Difficulty of 'Breaking Old Habits'
Another finding to emerge from my study of ABP was that PDC members 
were not only having difficulties analyzing complex poverty issues or 
planning, implementing and evaluating integrated development efforts, as 
stipulated by the SHD/PCD approach.
Instead, we found that, because under ABP's new integration 
methodology, staff members' Terms of Reference were much broader than they 
had been under the sectoral methodology, ABP staff were finding that they 
lacked the experience as well as the integrated planning, time-management, 
priority-setting and mobilization skills needed to carry out development 
initiatives in a holistic and participatory fashion rather than simply 
'doing things' for beneficiaries as had previously been the case. The 
troubles faced by ABP in making the transition towards the new integrated 
methodology came through during our interviews as several FDWs commented 
that, whereas under the sectoral methodology, they had known exactly what 
to do since they simply monitored specific sectoral activities using 
quantitative indicators, under the integrated methodology, they explained, 
they were uncertain about how to do everything in the Parish at once and to 
break away from former sectoral biases; to develop qualitative impact 
indicators; and to accustom beneficiaries used to close supervision and 
periodic home visits to no longer expect AA to provide all the answers.
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In essence, and as several ABP managers themselves pointed out, 
because integrated poverty analysis and planning can be a very complex area 
of work and because ABP staff are mainly school teachers and nurses with 
little previous experience in policy analysis or integrated development 
planning, budgeting, or evaluation, it was proving very difficult to bring 
the notion of integrated development down to the project or community level 
and for staff to develop the skills required to carry it out, especially 
with such limited training and in such a short period of time.
My own analysis of the situation confirmed the frustrations expressed 
by ABP staff that the training they had thus far received to adapt to the 
new integrated methodology was inadequate both in length of time and 
content. For example, the 65-page training manual designed by ABP to 
facilitate staff members' transition into the new integrated methodology is 
mostly organized by sectoral areas and covers as many as 25 sub-headings, 
each containing only a few paragraphs on very specific yet basic sectoral 
information (e.g., basic principles of animal husbandry, what is 
immunization? skin diseases, ear and eye infections, registration of 
illiterates, how sponsorship works, what makes a good and bad photograph, 
what is a business, simple record keeping, etc.). The only section in the 
manual which offers any information conducive to integrated planning and 
management is the Monitoring and Evaluation section which is only two pages 
long and again fails to go beyond basic principles (e.g., under the sub­
heading on planning the manual asserts that "planning is very important and 
good planning determines a good monitoring system")
On a more promising note, during my field research, I was able to 
attend or to learn about AAU training sessions for its staff in the areas 
of "training of trainers", "PRA skills", and "community-based monitoring 
and evaluation systems". These training sessions did cover areas related 
to integrated development planning as well as a considerably stronger
340
skills-building component than ABP's previously mentioned training manual. 
Nevertheless, as the sessions' trainers have themselves have pointed out in 
their evaluation of the training sessions, because the training has 
generally been quite short (3-5 days on average), they have had to be given 
to large numbers of AAU staff from different locations at once, because the 
training has come so late in the projects' history, and because the levels 
of understanding on basic aspects of planning and monitoring and evaluation 
issues, need considerable development among most AAU staff, they have not 
been as effective as initially hoped.
On the basis of the concerns expressed above, it would seem that, 
ABP's newly integrated methodology expects staff to simultaneously perform 
multiple roles requiring entirely different skills. For example, under 
ABP's new integrated methodology, FDWs are expected to perform top-down, 
tedious and regulatory activities such as child registration, letter and 
photo collections in order to meet AA-UK's accountability requirements to 
sponsors while at the same time engaging in equally time-consuming but 
bottom-up and participatory planning processes with beneficiary 
communities. The two types of activities are not only geared towards 
opposed goals (i.e., regulation vs. self-determination) but also require 
diametrically opposite skills and behaviours (i.e., top-down behaviour vs. 
participatory behaviour). Together, the above difficulties reveal that, 
whereas ABP's transition towards an integrated methodology was quite 
possibly a needed change, it was perhaps unrealistic to expect sectoral 
experts used to directing others and performing managerial tasks to be 
attuned to the development priorities or indigenous knowledge of poor 
beneficiaries who have themselves become accustomed to being told what to 
and who are getting mixed signals about how far AAU is willing to go in 
sharing its authority and regulatory control with poor communities.
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Limited Monitoring and Evaluation or Evidence of Long-Term Development Impact
Aside from assessing ABP's impact on process-based indicators such as 
participation and local ownership, it is important to determine the longer- 
term social and economic impact of the Buwekula Programme. This can be done
in a number of ways. One of these is to measure the effects which AAU's 
presence in the Buwekula DA has had on social indicators such as life
expectancy, literacy, school enrolment, etc. Unfortunately, according to 
the major independent assessment done of the Buwekula DA, "process and long­
term impact indicators (at ABP) are insufficient to gauge the long-term 
impact of the Programme" and in the rare instances where data is available, 
ABP's impact on social indicators has turned out to be negligible.
ABP's lack of evidence of long-term social impact is partly due to the 
major policy changes which have occurred in the lifetime of the Buwekula
Programme, but as noted in de Coninck's assessment of ABP, it is also the
consequence of AAU not having consistently gathered the type of data which 
would have been needed to show clear impact on wider social indicators.
For example, after a thorough analysis of the documentation available 
in the Buwekula Programme, I discovered that although ABP did carry out a
comprehensive Baseline Survey just before ABP's initiation in 1989, no 
comparable follow-up survey was carried out in the DA. Instead, what ABP 
had on file were detailed monthly reports containing quantitative 
indicators on specific project outputs in each parish (e.g.. According to 
ABP's March 1995 Monthly Report, that month in Kasambya Parish, sponsorship 
photo updates were done in primary schools, each village elected 3 
representatives to their PDC, and 4 iron sheets were delivered to the 
Bulonzi Adult Literacy Centre) or extensive statistics on personnel and 
operational support issues (e.g., days of sick leave taken by ABP staff, 
meals served, monthly cost of ABP's medical scheme for staff that month.
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etc.) aimed mostly at fulfilling AA-Kampala and AA-UK accountability 
demands I was in addition shown rough notes from wealth ranking
exercises conducted in some DAs as well as some occasional staff write ups 
on existing socio-economic data in the DA and more aggregated, yet still 
mostly quantitative statistics in AAU's annual reports (e.g., Out of 500 
PDC members targeted for training, 300 attended regularly, out of 65 new 
classrooms planned, 30 were roofed, two health units began operations, 
etc.--these are the types of data which are summarized in Table 6.5.)
In the final analysis though, none of the secondary summary statistics or 
output and parish-specific data of the type described above were sufficient 
to assess changes in Buwekula's social indicators before and after ABP.
Another perhaps more concrete, way of assessing the socio-economic 
impact of the ABP Programme is to look for signs of improvements in income 
through improved trade, business or agricultural activity or the generation 
of new employment or skills resulting from AAU's interventions in Buwekula.
With respect to income-generation, because with the exception of the 
creation of Credit and Savings Groups rather late in the Buwekula programme,
ABP's activities have concentrated on social service provision and 
infrastructure, the programme's effect in this sphere has been 
insignificant and, at the time of my visit, was being hampered by ABP's 
reluctance to give beneficiaries access to either credit or start-up 
capital. In agriculture, while some of the concentration farmers
visited did claim to have increased their farm yields and incomes by 
applying some of the farming skills imparted upon them by ABP, none of the 
respondents we spoke to could offer specifics on the improvements they had 
experienced. Furthermore, ABP's own agricultural adoption survey shows
that the attendance at ABP farm training sessions had been quite low 
(though better for residentially-based courses) and that the external 
education trips provided through ABP's agricultural programme had been far
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too few for farmers to truly internalize new technicjues. And, to top it 
all off, the same survey shows that while some of ABP's concentration 
farmers had adopted innovative agricultural practices such as mulching, 
pest control and soil conservation, the rates of adoption were very low 
and, in actuality, many of the practices adopted had been acquired from 
sources other than AAU. To this day, the impact of ABP's agricultural
programme remains inconclusive due to a lack of data since, as noted above, 
the DA'S comprehensive 1989 Baseline Survey was never followed-up with a 
survey of equal scale); since, as we discovered during our field visits, 
beneficiary farmers do not necessarily assign monetary values or discuss 
family income with outsiders; and since the headway ABP was beginning to 
make with its concentrated farmer batch methodology (e.g., recruiting 
innovative farmers to act as 'motivators' and accustoming farmers to accept 
technical advice and to attempt new farming techniques) were lost in the 
process of ABP's transition towards a new integrated methodology in 1995.
By the time of my arrival in Buwekula, ABP no longer had the specialized 
staff, transport or time to follow-up on what farmers were doing. Finally, 
with respect to new income generated through increased trade, according to 
one of ABP's managers, after conducting an informal survey which proved 
that trade levels had indeed increased in the area, the results showed that 
the increases in trade in Buwekula were not attributable to ABP's presence 
but rather to the construction of the main Kampala-Mubende-Fort Portal road 
which had allowed easier transport of foodstuffs to other cities.
As for new skills and employment-generation, while the presence of 
the ABP Office in Mubende town may have created some new demand and 
employment in the town through AA staff members' consumption, this is 
unlikely to have generated significant employment given ABP's self- 
sufficient nature, the fact that higher-paid staff were usually brought 
from Kampala and that, by 1995, ABP had cut its staff by half. With 
respect to employment opportunities generated directly as a result of ABP's
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development activities in Kitenga and Kasambya, once again, these are 
unlikely to be have generated substantial employment given that, at least 
until the time of my visit in 1995, other than forming Credit and savings 
groups and training them on basic accounting skills, ABP had not had an 
economic programme. As such it had neither been involved in introducing 
new economic activities with greater value added, the promotion of non- 
traditional agricultural activities, or in facilitating access to 
productive assets, start-up capital or credit to beneficiaries. As a 
result of ABP's minimal involvement in the economic sphere, during my field 
research I found that most beneficiaries in Kitenga and Kasambya were still 
mostly involved in the same traditional agricultural activities which they 
had been involved in at the time of Buwekula's 1988 Baseline Survey (i.e., 
predominantly, the cultivation of Matoke, beans, or potatoes, with some 
farmers engaged in poultry and egg production.) The number of our 
respondents active in non-traditional agricultural activities (e.g., bee­
keeping, silk worm production, or flower growing, etc.) were conspicuously 
small and those engaged in non-agricultural economic activities of 
potentially greater value added (e.g., brick-making, bread-making, fruit 
juice or vegetable oil production, crafts-making, etc.) were even rarer.
It is possible to argue, on the other hand, that ABP's support to 
concentration farmers may have improved the income and therefore the 
employment capacity of some of these farmers (although existing 
agricultural adoption surveys show that there is no conclusive evidence of 
increased farmer income in Buwekula) and that ABP's community groups have 
themselves generated new employment (e.g., some of ABP's groups receive a 
modest salary or benefits (e.g., fees are paid to Literacy Instructors and 
bicycles are given to masons involved in Water Valley tank construction). 
Nevertheless, when we consider that membership in ABP community groups has 
been quite exclusive and that many ABP groups (e.g., motivators for new 
farming techniques and PDCs) work with no remuneration whatsoever, it is
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obvious that, even if some income or employment has been generated by ABP 
groups, it has been minor, unevenly distributed, and unlikely to be 
sustainable after ABP's departure. Moreover, the fact that some ABP groups 
received benefits which others did not may have exacerbated tensions 
between them and reinforced their dependence on ABP as many of the groups 
which had not initially receive funds from ABP began demanding them.
These limitations notwithstanding, there is no denying that, in a few 
instances, ABP has created general conditions or furbished community groups 
with skills which over the long-run may prove to be transferable into self- 
employment opportunities. For instance, employment prospects for teachers 
and nurses in Buwekula may improve in the future (or already may be 
improving though the data is still unavailable), at least indirectly, 
thanks to ABP's contribution to the revitalization of social services and 
infrastructure in the Buwekula DA. In addition, according to one ABP
manager knowledgeable about economic issues in Buwekula, some groups 
trained by ABP (such as Traditional Birth Attendants, for instance) were 
beginning to succeed surviving on their own even after ABP's shift towards 
an integrated methodology by beginning to charge fees to clients in 
exchange for services. Regrettably, many other ABP groups (e.g., HIV/AIDS 
Counsellors, Women's groups) who had not been furbished with skills that 
were as easily tradable in the market-place were finding it difficult to 
translate their skills into possible forms of income or employment 
And, in yet other cases, while ABP group members were taught skills which 
were potentially transferable to other areas (e.g., ABP's Water Committees' 
brick-making skills are easily transferable into home construction), 
because ABP passed on its construction skills mostly onto already-trained 
masons rather than to unskilled persons and brought much of the manual 
labour it used to build water wells from other zones, the project's brick- 
making training is unlikely to have improved the income or employability of 
previously unemployed local workers in the Buwekula DA. This is not to
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deny that a handful of masons did do well from the brick-making skills they 
acquired through ABP. Alas, as AAU managers concede, the NGO has no 
comprehensive evidence of improved employment or of the transfer of skills 
by ABP group members (masons or others) to persons beyond the group,
Finally, some AA in the UK in particular have argued that, even if 
ABP has not visibly improved income or employment in the Buwekula DA, its
activities would surely have at least enhanced the organizational and 
management skills of group members supported by ABP. I did attempt to
follow up on this possibility during my second trip to Uganda. However, 
after consulting with the relevant AAU staff, they remarked that while they 
themselves suspected that ABP's (and indeed other DAs') development 
activities may have enhanced the organizational capacity of beneficiary 
groups, AAU had never carried out studies to test this premise and that, as 
such, they had no conclusive evidence indicating that community groups 
supported by AAU had ever used the management and organizational skills 
they had learned from AAU to overcome other local problems. AAU's lack
of evidence of development impact in areas such as organizational capacity 
has undoubtedly been aggravated by AAU's tendency to focus its monitoring 
and evaluation efforts on concrete and quantitative outputs (e.g., number 
of schools built) rather than on longer-term impact indicators of process- 
based outcomes. Unfortunately, my own field research was much too short to 
measure organizational impact effectively. However, the above-mentioned 
setbacks were confirmed by our select survey of ABP groups which showed 
that, despite having become more adept at being part of groups and debating 
the causes of poverty in their communities, there were few known examples 
of ABP groups having seized on skills or opportunities given to them by ABP 
to launch major initiatives or actions of their own. This, of course,
brings us directly to the question of ABP's effects on the empowerment, 
self-reliance and long-term sustainability of its beneficiaries, all of 
which are core components of the SHD/PCD paradigm.
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Limited Long-Term Empowerment, Self-Reliance and Sustainability-
Determining the impact of ABP's SHD/PCD efforts in terms of the 
empowerment and self-reliance generated among beneficiaries and the long­
term sustainability of programme activities is not an easy task. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, AAU's deficient monitoring and evaluation 
methods have meant that the NGO itself lacks evidence on the long-term 
impact of its programmes' process-based outcomes. Determining the effects 
of ABP on empowerment, self-reliance and long-term sustainability in a 
conclusive manner probably requires spending much more time living in the 
Buwekula community and comparing AAU-RC/LC relations than I was able to do 
during my field work. Still, from my study of beneficiaries, it is 
possible to extract some clues about ABP's effectiveness in these areas.
With respect to the empowerment of poor Ugandans, for example, we 
have already noted that ABP has enhanced the capabilities of some members 
of the Buwekula community by passing on mulching and grafting skills to 
selected farmer households, providing training to local teachers, passing 
on better sanitation and maternal health care practices to Health Workers 
and Traditional Birth Attendants, showing Credit and Savings Groups how to 
keep financial records, and training PDCs to identify the causes of
poverty, community development needs and possible project solutions. We
have also seen that some ABP beneficiaries have started small initiatives 
using the skills they learned from ABP (see endnote # 130 for example). 
However, from the discussion which has ensued, we also know that such 
initiatives have not generated significant new income or employment and 
have proven unsustainable when beneficiaries have been left on their own.
At the same time though, my field visits to over 20 ABP groups and
select households have shown that ABP beneficiaries have had difficulties 
resolving problems and taking on new initiatives of their own. First,
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when beneficiaries were asked how the development problems which they 
currently faced could be resolved, most automatically assumed that ABP 
should resolve these ("we need loans from AAU", "AAU should pay school fees 
for orphans", "AAU should provide school books at subsidized costs", "AAU 
should provide the iron sheets needed to finish buildings", "AAU must open 
up an account for our group so as not to tempt our treasurer" .
Secondly, both during field visits and observation of ABP community 
planning sessions we noticed that ABP beneficiaries had serious 
difficulties identifying the root causes of poverty, deprivation and 
injustice in their communities and were still far from thinking in terms of 
their own rights or from identifying possible structural and institutional 
solutions to development problems ("we have not considered the possibility 
of obtaining more [secure] land as we do what we can with what we have" or, 
"we do not see how the community will obtain subsidized materials once AA 
leaves" . Instead, we found that ABP beneficiaries had become 
accustomed to tending to the symptoms rather than the causes of their 
underdevelopment and that, even then, they expected AAU to deal with these, 
("it is up to AAU to tell us how to solve things" or, "we fear that not 
having experts around may mean things no longer get done" ’•^°) . These 
findings are complementary to comments by development expert Stan Burkey 
who noted that AA "tells people what they need and then goes and provides 
it even though people need to analyze the causes of their own poverty".
In short, its would seem that dependence on AAU has become a more 
natural reflex among ABP beneficiaries than relying on their indigenous 
knowledge, or experience or ingenuity. This should not be too surprising 
given people in extreme poverty by definition lack the confidence ("we did 
not tell AA that we did not like the methodological changes because people 
lacked the courage"), time, energy or know-how ("people do not do not 
contribute new ideas"), organizational or leadership trajectory (e.g., 
"people do not want to help those in other areas or tribes", no one takes
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the promises of leaders seriously") to analyze complex and sometimes highly 
technical or sensitive poverty problems on their own and expecting them to 
do so without the support of experts may simply be unrealistic.
In addition to the above enquiries, I tried to ascertain the extent 
of the empowerment of ABP beneficiaries by asking them whether they 
generally felt more confident as a result of their participation in ABP and 
whether they believed that they would be capable of continuing to develop 
the area after ABP's planned departure from the DA in the year 2001. Some 
respondents did say that they would try to keep their skills and activities 
alive, albeit at a more modest scale, once ABP left Buwekula. However, 
during the interview process, some of these same respondents implored AAU 
to stay in the DA since they feared that, without the NGO's presence, the 
community would lack the funds and confidence needed to develop the area 
("if the community believes AAU is not attending to something, they will 
neglect it too"; "once AAU leaves, RC/LCs are unlikely to help our Parish 
unless bribed"; and "we would like AA to stay until infinity."
Judging from the responses given above, it would seem that, thanks to 
ABP's support, community members in Buwekula have indeed become adept at 
mobilizing the community, organizing meetings, discussing sensitive poverty 
issues (e.g., gender dimensions of development), and at carrying specific 
tasks (e.g., organizing PDC elections). These achievements should not be 
underestimated, especially since vivid debate is something which clearly 
distinguished AAU-supported groups from those supported by UNDP, for 
example. On the other hand though, there is little evidence from my 
research that ABP beneficiaries have become 'empowered' either in terms of 
launching their own initiatives, having gained a greater awareness of their 
own human rights or the structural causes of their poverty, or in terms of 
having gained new confidence to try to resolve some of their problems, to 
express voice with local politicians, and indeed, to hold ABP accountable
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to them. It is true that to expect an NGO to even begin to move a poor 
community in this direction is perhaps too much to ask. And yet, this is 
indeed what the 'empowerment' discourse pursued by SHD/PCD and DD thinkers 
assumes is possible and what NGOs such as AAU claim to be capable of doing 
in LDCs like Uganda. However, as we have seen, the reality is often 
something quite different. In the case of the Buwekula Programme, for
instance, AAU's presence in the area may have turned into a double-edged 
sword: on the one hand, ABP has undeniably passed on much needed skills to 
ABP beneficiaries. Yet, on the other hand, ABP beneficiaries have, in the 
process, become dependent on AAU funding and accustomed to AAU attending to 
their problems and have thus been artificially shielded from addressing the 
challenges of underdevelopment on their own. In fact, my interviews with 
ABP staff revealed that many of them struggled with what they termed the 
ABP community's "dependency syndrome" and worried that because AAU had done 
things for people for so long, they had become passive over the years.
Finally, my study of ABP offers some useful insights about the long­
term sustainability of AAU's development work in the Buwekula DA. First of
all, the autonomous and self-sufficient manner in which ABP has funded and 
managed its work in the Buwekula DA,and its reluctance to jointly plan or
implement with government or to link up with other development actors is 
making it difficult to create a sense of ownership in the DA or to find 
alternate sources of funding for ABP activities after AAU's departure.
An equally contentious issue is the long-term sustainability of the 
PDCs established by ABP in mid 1995. As previously mentioned, the PDC 
structure was conceived by AAU as a means of helping it realize its long­
term goal of ceasing to be operational in Buwekula and other DAs. The role 
of the PDC is to spearhead all community development undertakings in the 
Parish. As such, each PDC is charged with community mobilization, the 
coordination and supervision of all development activities, and the
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prioritization of PDC development activities, PDCs also serve as the major 
link between ABP and the community, are responsible for AA-related 
activities in the DA such as sponsorship, and serve as the budget holders 
AAU funds allocated to the community. In the case of ABP, 15 PDCs were 
established--one per Parish. Each RC/LC I village elected a man and a 
woman who was both a full-time resident in the village and had no less than 
primary 7 education to take part in their PDC. Below the PDC are supposed 
to be various Intermediaries including: 2-3 Community Development Workers
(CDWs) per Parish. CDWs are both recruited and supervised by PDCs and 
paid a monthly bonus of about 20,000 Ugandan Shillings--about US$ 20--to 
support the PDC's work and to eventually take over from ABP staff once AA 
leaves the area; Project Committees (e.g.. Water Groups, School Management 
Committees, etc.) in charge of proposing and overseeing projects; an Area 
Forum (i.e., a PDC Executive in each sub-county. All PDC members elected in 
a sub-County then select a PDC Executive composed of a Chairman, Vice- 
Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and 2 Committee members. The RC/LC III 
Chairman and ABP's Area Manager in the sub-County are ex-officio members to 
the PDC Executive); and a DA Forum which discusses longer-term strategic 
issues and is to be comprised of representatives from the community, 
government, and other players respected in the area, all selected by ABP 
on the basis of merit. The PDCs and their various intermediaries should 
work alongside the ABP Office and receive only minimal supervision from 
ABP's now smaller team of 15 FDWs--one per parish. It is expected that 
PDC members, intermediaries and RC/LCs will merge into one strong Parish 
structure by 2001, as shown in the diagram in Table 6.8.
As can be deducted from the above description, there are some serious 
shortfalls in ABP's PDC structure. The first is that the PDC structure 
duplicates and adds more layers of committees into what was already 
described in Chapter 4 as an overly complex RC/LC structure. The second 
weakness is that because the PDC gets its mandate, funding, and directives
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from AAU, its loyalties and accountability lies with a foreign agency that
will soon leave the area rather than with Ugandan institutions or
communities. The third caveat with the structure is that because, at least 
in the short run, ABP staff have kept tight control of PDC budgets, have 
been slow at getting the Area and DA Forums into operation, and have been 
the ones to determine the pace and content of most of the PDC's training 
and planning, the PDCs' dependence on AAU was very high while their links 
with RC/LCs and local actors other than AAU was minimal. Lastly, to 
assume, as ABP has, that all local institutions will merge into the PDC or 
that the various actors involved in the PDC structure will be capable of 
running such a complex and ambitious structure in a self-sufficient manner 
after AAU's departure from the area, may simply not be realistic given the 
limited time, money, legitimacy or skills of PDC members and the numerous 
committees already in existence throughout the Ugandan countryside.
Even though the PDCs are still new and I did not conduct in-depth 
research on ABP-RC/LC relations, the tensions which were beginning to arise 
from PDCs' duplication of many RC/LC roles were already becoming apparent 
during my last visit. Indeed, during our field research, several ABP
beneficiaries remarked that the PDCs were being seen mainly as agents of
AAU and that the community was having serious doubts about the 
motivation and capacity of PDCs to continue their development work after 
the termination of ABP's rigorous monitoring systems, technical expertise 
and training, subsidized materials and sponsorship funding--especially 
given that PDCs worked on a volunteer basis, had limited technical, 
management and evaluation skills, spare time, means of transport (e.g., 
most PDC members do not even have bicycles), or experience in working with 
communities in a participatory fashion. To the above, respondents added the 
problem of PDCs' questionable accountability to the community and their 
limited legitimacy other than their links to AA. As one group of 
respondents aptly put it: "PDCs derive their strength from all the money
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which AA puts into them. Once AA leaves, the PDC will collapse." 
Ironically, by refusing to (at least until the time of my visit) to allow 
PDCs to determine their own training needs, to manage their project and 
sponsorship moneys directly to establish permanent mechanisms to ensure 
the downward accountability of PDCs to communities or to make ABP's own 
plans and budgets transparent to PDCs, beneficiaries or the government, ABP 
has revealed a lack of trust in its own PDC structure. At present, 
although ABP tells beneficiaries how ABP generally uses its money, 
recipients do not receive periodic reports from ABP since ABP managers "do 
not think the community would understand these" nor, according to a 
senior AAU official in Kampala, does AAU plan to make its budget 
transparent to beneficiaries as "they would have difficulties accepting 
that over 50% of the budget goes towards administration".
Finally, although PDC and RC/LC membership overlap in some parishes, 
the fragile legitimacy of the PDC mechanism vis-a-vis the RC/LC system and 
ABP's past isolation was putting the two mechanisms at odds with one 
another. Hence, during my last trip to Uganda, ABP staff and PDC members 
both informed me that the PDC's planning and project formulation process 
was running into problems since, as the entities elected by all Ugandans 
and responsible for disbursing decentralized government funds, RC/LCs did 
not want to channel funds into PDC projects which were not their own. A 
senior ABP manager elaborated by noting that, because District politicians 
had decided to channel their funds directly to the Village level (RC/LC I) 
in order to win votes during an electoral year, they had, in the process, 
bypassed ABP's PDCs which operated at the Parish (RC/LC II) level.
iv) Community and Beneficiary-Level Constraints
Due to its close monitoring and regulation mechanisms, AAU has 
significantly diminished community-level problems associated with free-
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loading, shirking or embezzlement. Since most ABP-supported groups have 
clearly defined membership criteria, carefully monitored project and 
training activities, rarely involve the exchange of cash, it would have 
been difficult (and not particularly desirable) for opportunistic outsiders 
to join ABP-supported groups unnoticed or to use for predatory purposes. 
Similarly, because ABP staff members were closely monitored and were never 
given cash to purchase goods since these were directly procured by the 
project's inventory department, or in the case of petrol, were bought by 
presenting ABP coupons at the local gas station, there were few instances 
of rent-seeking behaviour by staff. However, ABP did encounter many of the 
other community-level constraints experienced by UNDP in rural Uganda.
The Differentiated, Exclusive and Self-Interested Nature of Community
One trait of rural Ugandan communities which proved to be a major 
hindrance to UNDP's implementation of SHD/PCD goals such as equitable and 
participatory development which was equally evident in the case of ABP is 
the highly differentiated, exclusive and self-interested nature of rural 
Ugandan communities. It is these phenomena which partly explain why ABP's 
concentration farmers had difficulties passing on their farming techniques 
to persons other than tribe or family members, why the poorest members of 
the Buwekula DA felt marginalized from ABP's development efforts as well as
from their own communities and why some ABP beneficiaries feared that 
PDCs too would end up favouring friends. The hierarchical nature of
Ugandan society is equally evident in the difficulties ABP-supported groups 
had forging links with other development actors or communities and in the 
remoteness of some PDCs from their communities. In an internal memo, AA-UK 
staff themselves express concern that local ownership of PDCs was never 
determined by AAU, that the participation levels in PDC meetings were low 
(about 50%) , and that PDCs' representability of the poor and their downward 
accountability towards the community was uncertain. The above all show
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how internal differentiation and tribal, elitist and self-interested 
community behaviour can obstruct otherwise sound development efforts. Yet, 
as John de Coninck points out in his evaluation of ABP, AAU has not 
"sufficiently taken into account differences within (Ugandan) communities" 
and wrongfully assumed "that these communities are homogeneous
Lack of Time, Skills, Transport, or Access to Key Inputs
During my field visits, the poorest members of Buwekula noted that, 
aside from being socially ostracized, they lacked money to pay for school 
fees or membership in ABP-supported groups ; had no access to fertile land 
and few surplus crops to sell in the market; and that many of them did not 
even have the good health or physical mobility to attend public community 
meetings Even better-off community groups in Buwekula worried that,
given their limited access to inputs or technical advice from ABP staff, 
they would continue making mistakes like introducing fish into the 
community's newly purified Water Tank or buying the wrong medicines since 
they could not read the labels the bottles. PDCs themselves cautioned 
that, without a bicycle to travel on or a free lunch after spending hours 
at project meetings, they could not continue volunteering for ABP.
On the basis of the above, a number of important lessons can be drawn 
about AAU's efforts to implement SHD/PCD approaches at the grassroots level 
in the Buwekula DA. The first lesson is that AAU's implementation of
SHD/PCD approaches in ABP has been afflicted by broader institutional, 
inter-organizational, intra-organizational and community-level constraints. 
However, by operating its own ship in a fairly autonomous fashion and 
putting in place a series of close monitoring and regulation systems, ABP 
has managed to contain most of the problems of malfeasance originating from 
the community-level and to bypass many of the worse cases of governmental 
opportunism and the turf battles faced by UNDP at the inter-organizational
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level. AAU's isolationism in its DAs is partly understandable once one 
considers that when projects like ABP started in Buwekula in 1989, there 
were few other development actors in the area and government services were 
virtually dormant. Regrettably, ABP's 'arms length' attitude towards 
government and other development partners and cautious distrust towards 
beneficiaries may have reinforced the dependence of ABP beneficiaries upon 
AAU instead of empowering them to be self-reliant. And, even though since 
1995 ABP has been trying to work in a more integrated and participatory 
fashion, the bulk of the evidence above shows that, SHD/PCD goals such as 
achieving greater equity, participation/empowerment, self-reliance and 
sustainability have often been displaced or met only to a limited degree.
VI. Conclusion; The Baroque Science and River Polluting Phenomena
Revisited: A Case of Dela Vu
As this chapter has shown, there are differences in the way in which 
AA and UNDP have implemented SHD/PCD. We have seen, for example, that AA 
is a much smaller, more operational and grassroots-oriented development 
agency than UNDP. For AA, this has implied a much stronger rural presence 
and greater proportion of technical staff based in the Ugandan countryside 
than UNDP. AAU's more autonomous and 'hands-on approach' to development 
has also meant fewer problems related to staff or community-level shirking, 
free-loading or corruption, fewer opportunities for capture by middle 
persons and politicians, and fewer hassles in dealing with turf-conscious 
fellow development actors. On top of this, AA's wise decision not to 
oversell the novelty of SHD/PCD, to impose definitions of the paradigm or
to shift its ideological position on it, saved AA from much of the
conceptual confusion and criticism UNDP was subjected to.
On a less uplifting note, AAU's directly operational, mostly service- 
delivery and rather solitaire and DA-based approach to development has cost
the NGO in terms of wider potential impact in both the economic sphere and
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at the broader policy and institutional level, especially within senior 
governmental decision-making circles in Kampala. Moreover, despite the 
finding that AA suffered from a lack of informed theory (while UNDP could 
be said to have suffered from too much emphasis on deficient theory), 
regardless of whether an agency engages in complex conceptual debates head 
on or not, in the end, neither AA or UNDP were able to escape the 
repercussions of the incomplete, vague, contradictory, and sometimes 
unrealistic and impractical nature of SHD/PCD goal. Neither agency, for 
instance, has been able to deal with the unknown nature of the links 
between the core components of SHD/PCD or the paradigm's lack of a clear 
prioritization of development interventions. Similarly, neither agency has 
been able to reconcile the difficulties of simultaneously achieving 
SHD/PCD's goals which may well be in tension with one another (e.g., 
advocating greater self-reliance while at the same time pushing a pre­
defined SHD/PCD agenda; or, influencing wider policies and institutional 
arrangements while at the same time achieving flexible and grassroots-based 
participation and fulfilling managerial donor demands for greater top-down 
regulation and concrete evidence of development). Nor, for that matter, 
has either agency been able to deal with the discrepancies which exist 
between the SHD/PCD paradigm's ambitious aspirations in theory and the 
reality of the constraints present in practice: e.g., implementing a
complex and holistic development paradigm in a participatory manner while 
relying on staff and beneficiaries with limited abstraction skills, 
experience in integrated planning and development agencies and conservative 
stakeholders with top-down management styles and reluctant to cede control.
The difficulties created by SHD/PCD's own internal tensions and the 
gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice afflicts both HQ and the field. 
However, as was the case in UNDP, it is the field level which was left 
carrying the burden of simultaneously carrying out SHD/PCD goals such as 
policy advocacy and grassroots participation and of putting the ambitious
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goals of the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice in the less than ideal 
conditions of the Ugandan countryside. All of the above would seem to 
confirm, that it may be fallacious to assume that development agencies like 
UNDP or AA have the necessary autonomy or organizational structures needed 
to bring about a major paradigmatic shift in development or that the 
necessary conditions exist in the wider system of international development 
cooperations or in poor communities such as Uganda to realize the more 
ambitious goals of the SHD/PCD agenda. The above findings also remind us 
that, as stated in the Baroque Science Phenomenon, lofty goals which seem
harmonious from afar and desirable in theory can be impractical when the 
gap between theory and practice remains too large. This gap is one which 
neither AA or UNDP have been able to close. The main difference is that 
while UNDP placed its emphasis on theory which turned out to be incomplete 
and out of touch with reality, AA's emphasized practice which was not 
informed by good theory and therefore lacked a conceptual framework to 
generalize and learn wider policy lessons from its field experience.
Empirically speaking, this Chapter shows that despite having 
contributed to Ugandans' well-being through its support of social service 
delivery and by training select community groups, like UNDP, AA has faced 
major difficulties realizing the more transformational goals of the SHD/PCD 
agenda, including influencing wider development debates, policies or 
institutional arrangements conducive to 'Sound governance'; introducing 
flexible, integrated and collaborative forms of development cooperation; or 
fostering North-South partnerships characterized by strong ownership, 
beneficiary participation, self-reliance and long-term sustainability.
As stated in the River Pollution Phenomenon, AA has seen its commitment to
SHD/PCD displaced by AA's tendency to attend to organizational interests.
In the case of AA, these organizational interests take many forms, 
including: a tendency to increase the NGO's profile, mandate and power
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base (e.g., getting AA involved in new forms of policy advocacy even though 
southern counterparts were not consulted; expanding AA's budgets by 
replicating blueprints such as REFLECT even though this went against 
principle of community self-determination; or keeping the money moving by 
imposing unrealistic planning and budgetary deadlines which undermine 
participation); a tendency to give into pressures from powerful 
stakeholders (e.g., AA's agreement to its Board of Trustees' restrictions 
on advocacy work even though the decision undermined AA's policy- 
influencing capacity); the tendency to do what is easiest and most feasible 
(e.g., by working with better-off beneficiaries rather than reaching the 
poorest; sticking to familiar projects and rules and targets rather than 
allowing beneficiaries to choose from a wider set of options; or avoiding 
rent-seeking problems by refusing to work with government or to give cash 
to beneficiaries even if such decisions inhibit the formation of North- 
South partnerships and local ownership); and finally, a tendency to hide 
shortfalls or the complexity of development (e.g., the reluctance of AAU 
staff to admit to the large proportion of AAU's budget spent on 
administration/logistics). Of the four organizational interests, the 
latter two prevailed at the programme/field level where the pressures to 
put SHD/PCD into practice were strongest, while the former manifested 
themselves more at the policy level and in AA HQ where the desire of AA's 
Board of Trustees to acquire profile and to please sponsors were strongest.
Of course, as was found to be the case in UNDP, not all of the 
difficulties of implementing SHD/PCD are attributable to organizational 
factors. In the case of AA, while organizational weaknesses and interests 
help to explain why the NGO did not pursue SHD/PCD goals to the fullest 
within its programmes, it is broader contextual factors (e.g., lack of 
access to knowledge, assets, or markets) and institutional constraints 
(e.g., in effective local government support) which largely explain why, 
even when agencies pursue SHD/PCD goals, their development programmes fall
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short of expectations. Moreover, organizational interests at AA were not 
homogeneous but varied depending on the group of actors one spoke to within 
the NGO; AA's decisions were not always guided by organizational interests 
(e.g., AA's decision to decentralize its operations went against the 
agency's tendency to do what is easiest and most feasible); nor did 
organizational interests at AA always run counter to SHD/PCD goals (e.g., 
AA's decision to become more involved in policy influencing work coincides 
with the SHD/PCD goal of promoting 'Sound governance').
Finally, this Chapter's findings have important implications for 
various existing literatures. For instance, my finding that NGOs like AA 
have difficulties reaching the poor, fostering partnerships, participation, 
empowerment, working in a sustainable fashion, or influencing wider 
policies, fit the writings of NGO experts like Tendler, Smillie, 
Edwards/Hulme and Sogge et al. The Chapter also brings to mind the work of 
Clay and Schaffer, Ferguson and Hancock in the International Development 
Cooperation Literature and Bardach and Sieber in the Implementation Process 
Literature, all of whom concur that organizations' tendency to expand their 
mandates, keep the money moving, set targets and deadlines, listen to the 
most powerful stakeholders, and cover up any errors, can displace initial 
policy and programme goals. My analysis of AA's implementation of SHD/PCD 
approaches also shows that, even when an agency has tight monitoring and 
regulation mechanisms to protect itself against high transaction costs or 
rent-seeking behaviour--the chief concern of the NIE, development problems 
rooted in undemocratic and top-down development--the main concern of DD 
thinkers) remain a constraint. Most importantly though, this Chapter 
elevates the existing SHD/PCD Literature to a new dimension by showing how 
the conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm can undermine its 
operationalization globally and nationally and how the romanticism of the 
SHD/PCD agenda and the persistent gap between reality and theory and make 
its implementation by even a small and grassroots-oriented NGO infeasible.
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search of more secure employment. In both cases the workers were women, 
thereby bringing the share of ABP's already low proportion of female FDWs down
to less than a third of field staff.
107. John de Coninck et al. Op. Cit.
108. Internal memo produced by Action Aid-UK, 1995.
At the time of my follow-up visit to the ABP DA, although PDC members
had already designed their own development projects, ABP staff were still
spending much of their time explaining basic development planning principles 
(e.g., what a development objective is, what a development indicator is, etc.)
109. Interview with FDWs, ABP Programme. Mubende, Uganda.
110. Interviews with AAU managers. Kampala and Mubende, Uganda.
111. Action Aid-ABP. Draft ABP Training Manual to Guide the Transition into the New Integrated
Methodology. Mubende : AA-Buwekula, Given to me by Margaret Logosi, ABP
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, July 1995.
112 . Action Aid-Uganda. Report o f  the Training Workshop on Community-Based Monitoring and 
Evaluation Systems. Training Session facilitated by Daniel Ticehurst (consultant) 
and Med Makumbi (AAU) in Bundibugyo, 8-12 May, 1995. Kampala : AAU, 1995.
113. John de Coninck et al. Pages 14 and 15. Op. Cit.
According to the above one assessment of ABP's development impact,
preliminary figures indicate that, in spite of the support provided over the
years by ABP, the rate of growth in school enrolment is virtually the same in 
ABP and non-ABP areas and that the drop outs levels remain very high in both.
114 . Action Aid-Buwekula. Monthly Report for Action Aid-Buwekula Project (ABP) .
Compiled by ABP staff. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, March 1995.
115. For example: Action Aid-Buwekula. Poverty Issues Which Need Consolidation as
Raised on 10.3.1995. Internal ABP Memo. Mubende : AA-Buwekula, 1995.
116. Action Aid-Uganda. Action Aid-Uganda 1996 Annual Report. Section 4.1.2 on the 
Buwekula Programme. Kampala : AAU, 21st February 1996.
117. Long after my departure from Uganda, ABP staff were still equivocating 
over whether to give credit to ABP's Credit and Savings Groups. (Informal 
conversation with former AAU staff member visiting the UK. 1996.)
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118. During my field visits I did witness a few instance of farming 
innovation (e.g., one ABP-supported concentration farmer had managed to breed 
a unique variety of passion fruit using the grafting skills passed on to him 
by ABP and was now constantly visited by buyers from Kampala) and some ABP- 
supported concentration farmers did claim that farming techniques taught them 
by ABP (specifically, weeding, better crop spacing, grafting, and the creation 
of contours to reduce erosion) had increased their crop yields and the price 
they fetched for crops in the market place. However, most farmers visited had 
no record of the improvements nor could they say exactly how much their 
income had increased due to ABP's support and advise.
119. Action Aid-Buwekula. Mubende Agricultural Adoption Survey: June 1993. Mubende: AA- 
Buwekula, Report by Med Makumbi, then Monitoring and Evaluation Officer for ABP, 1993.
120. ABP Manager. Mubende, Uganda.
121. John de Coninck. Page 18. Op. Cit.
122. During my last visit, AAU was considering granting credit still 
existing ABP community groups (e.g.. Women's Groups) in order to give them an 
economic boost and thus keep them in existence. (Interview with ABP Manager)
123. Interview with Action Aid-Uganda professional in Kampala.
124. Interview with ABP manager and professional from the AAU Kampala 
Office. Both interviewed in 1995.
125. Interview with AA professional from London HQ after my first trip to AAU.
126. As one AAU staff member noted, while AAU knew of cases in which, for 
instance, members of School Management Committees and Parent-Teacher 
Associations supported by ABP had ousted corrupt school masters, they had no 
evidence suggesting that such actions were a result of ABP training or that 
the action had been a collective one as opposed to an individual initiative. 
(Interview with AAU professional from the Kampala Office.)
127. During our field work we specifically asked ABP beneficiaries for
examples of ways in which they had been able to take advantage of ABP's 
training opportunities. From these conversations we learned that some of them 
had taken the initiative to use the brick-making skills learned in ABP's Water 
Committees to build their own homes, while others had tried to duplicate some 
of the small innovations they had witnessed during AAU-supported exchange 
visits (e.g., using metal pipes rather than wooden ones as bridges, using 
fuel-saving cooking stoves, and adopting basket-weaving techniques observed 
from other groups during exposure visits). Nevertheless, most of these 
initiatives were very small, involving an individual or a family rather than a 
large collectivity and, once we probed further about the results of these 
initiatives, most groups many conceded that they had not been able to take the 
initiatives too far once left on their own as they had soon ran into a series 
of structural problems (e.g., bad weather, lack of fertile land, inputs, 
tools, transport, to markets, or expert advice, etc.).
128. Interview # 121, 123, 133, 117, 124.
129. Interview # 127, 134.
130. Interview # 124, 131.
131. Interview # 76.
369
132. The above comments are derived from interview # 123 and three group 
discussions heard during a joint Community-ABP planning session in Kitenga 
sub-county. May 17, 1995. Kitenga, Mubende, Uganda.
133. ABP beneficiary responses from interviews # 118, 119, 130, 133.
134. Interview with ABP FDW.
135. See: Action Aid-Buwekula. ABP Methodology. Mubende : AA-Buwekula, January 
21, 1995/ And, Action Aid-Buwekula. Action A id Buwekula Project (DA2) Long-Term 
Perspective 1995-2001. Complied by ABP Staff. Mubende : AA-Buwekula, December 1995.
136. Interview # 122.
137. For example, a Women's Group in Kasambya noted that they had doubts 
about their PDC's honesty with money and about its accountability to the their 
community but noted that they had not told this to AA since they did not want 
to create a rift. (Interview # 121).
138. Interview # 133.
139. As one ABP manager explained, PDCs would not be given their own budgets 
but would instead have to present individual receipts to ABP for specific 
costs incurred and ABP would verify whether they were acceptable and would 
given them money on an item-by item basis.
140. At present ABP does not know how PDCs inform their communities of 
project decisions or whether this is done in a democratic fashion since formal 
mechanisms have not been created to ensure downward accountability from the 
PDC to the community. (Interview with professional from the AAU in Kampala.)
141. Senior manager from ABP. Mubende, Uganda.
142. Interview with Senior AAU Official. Kampala, Uganda.
143. Interview # 211.
144. Conversation with senior ABP Manager. Mubende, Uganda.
145. During our field work we learned that there were many reasons why
concentration farmers had been unable to pass on their newly-acquired farming 
skills to others. Concentration farmers themselves often blamed the 
disinterest and laziness of fellow farmers who, they argued, were unwilling to 
practice labour-intensive activities such as weeding. However, members of the 
Poverty Focus Groups we spoke to argued that better-off "concentration 
farmers" simply did not consider it convenient or worthy of their time 
teaching such skills to the poorest farmers. (Interview # 125 and 136)
146. Interview # 123.
147. Internal memo. Action Aid-UK. London, UK, 1997.
148. John de Coninck et al. Pages 17 and 18. Op. Cit.
149. Interview # 136.
150. Interview # 119 and 136.
Table 6.1: Action Aid's Vision and Mission:
ACTIONAIDà
ACTIONAID’s  V ision
ACTIONAID is an  
o rg a n is a t io n  d e d ic a te d  to  th e  
p ro p o s i t io n  th a t  a b s o lu te  p o v e r ty  
c a n  b e  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  r e d u c e d  a n d  
is u l t im a te ly  e ra d ic a b le  th ro u g h  
c o n c e r t e d  a c t io n ,  a n d  t h a t  it h a s  
a s ig n if ican t  p a r t  to  p lay  
in th is  p r o c e s s .
ACTIONAlD’s  M iss io n
ACTIONAID 
e x is ts  to  he lp  
ch ild ren , fam ilie s  
a n d  c o m m u n i t ie s  to  
o v e rc o m e  p o v e r ty  
a n d  s e c u r e  la s t in g  
im p ro v e m e n ts  in 
th e  qua lity  of 
th e i r  lives.
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MAP 1: Map of Action Aid's Development Areas in Uganda in 1995
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Table 6.2: Organizational Chart of Action Aid Headquarters in London (As of January 1997)
ACTIONAID CORPORATE STRUCTURE
C o rp o ra te
D ire c to rs
DIRECTOR - John Batten 1995-present
S T A FF SPINE
M a rg a re t
S to u r to n
N igel S a x b y - 
S p ffe
Nigel Tw oseColin
W illiam s
R avi
N a ra y a n a n
(a w a itin g
a p p o in tm e n t)
Managed from 
Zimbabwe
Managed from India
Latin America 
Coordinator
R o g e r Ing Richard Mosley-Willlams
Africa
Region
Asia
Region
Finance 
IT & Co. 
Sec.
Human
Resources
Marketing
UK General 
Manager
Programme
Development
R asponsib ia for UK HR. UK Adm in. Managed jointly by Action Aid-UK and
C entral P urchasing . UK s ite  m an ag em en t Ayuda Accioh in Spain.
Spou Source: Programme Development Division (FDD). Action Aid Headquarters. London, Uk. January 1997
Table 6.3: Action Aid Uganda’s Annual Budget for 1995
BUDGET IMS JANUARY TO DECEMBER 
ACTICNAO UGANDA
COOOSTE. UNO 
EXPENDITURE/INCOME «NALYSIS
TABLE E (2) 1095
1INo*S4 A B C 1 D E F G 1 J K L M N O P
OIIISPM HE ALL. REAIL- BUDGET BUDGET
OPENING BUDGET APP0TMEN1 SPONSOR- SPONSOR- FUNDRS’NG GOODS IN -OCATION •OCATION CLOSING CLOSING
DA/PROJECT RESERVES PROG. CENTRAL GROSS •SHIP -SHIP DIVISION OFFIQAL OFFICIAL LOCAL KINDS TOTAL NATIONAL FLEXIBLE RESERVES RESERVES
Ol-Jan-SS EXPEND. INDBECT EXPEND. OTHER INCOME FUND FUND 31-00045 (MTHSEXP)
No Nam* O-HEADS UK SPAIN UK SPAIN
DAI MITYANA ISO (344) (85) (439) 394 394 60 195 S43
0A2 BUWEKULA 213 (402) (112) (514) 499 23 822 222 5.18
DA3 BUNDBU6Y0 (17) (231) (64) (295) 153 180 333 21 0A3
0A4 APAC 0 (134) (37) (172) 84 22 88 48 38 0 0D3
NON DAI KAMUU 03 (810) 0 (810) 528 528 0 0.00
N0NDA2 MITEP 17 t49) 0 (49) 23 7 32 0 0.11
N0NDA3 TASO 70 (215) 0 (215) 85 152 237 92 9.14
NON 0A4 PUBUCPOUCY 41 (80) (19 (78) 0 42 5 0.78
NON DAS FPRINRQ 1 (11) (4) (15) 13 13 (P) (9.35)
NON DAS STRATEGIES FOR ACTIO 42 (84) (5) (99) 38 54 92 35 4.28
NON DAT OTHER INITIATIVES 6 (18) (3) (21) 14 14 1 0 J 7 ’
NON DAS MICRO PROJECTS 0 (15) (3) (18) 10 19 1 0.88
NONDA» OOAMPACT STUDY 4 (18) (18) 15 13 9 10 8J9
NON DA10 SINGLE SECTOR 1 0 (481 (8) (52) 18 18 7 42 IS 3J0
CENTRALLY INCURRED
INDIRECT OVERHEADS P41) 341 0
TOTAL PRO a COSTS 082 (2.803) (0) (2.803) 071 153 182 490 0 848 0 2.30? 07 130 507 2.75
NATIONAL FUND xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxXXXXXXXX 139 19 158 (158) XXXXXXXXX 0
FLEXIBLE FUND xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 139 xxxxxxxx 130 XXXXXXXXX (130) 0
ADMIN AND SPONSORSHIP (278) (278) 130 10 18 30 215, 81 XXXXXXXXX 0 0.01
1 .... , 882 (2.870) (0) (2.870) 1.388 191 200 489 0 548 0 2.814 0 0 507 Z49
ACTIONAID-Uganda
w-Jw
Table 6.4: Organizational Chart of the Action Aid-Uganda Office in Kampala
Ttotal Staff at Time of My Visit mid 1995: 39 Staff
16 'Itechnical/Professional Staff
23 Administrative, ---------
Support Staff
SINGLE
SECTOR
AMP
MICRO 
PROJ FO
MTP
EMERG
DRVS TECH OFF.MAIN 
CLEANER 
K.STAFF 
SECURITY
NGO
CORD.N
PDDlA
PA
P/A
3 FAFIN
VT
CSO
FPR
ABP
RECP
DAP M&B
AND
COMM
KLA ADMIN 
OFFICER
M L j
C D . . . ...COUNTRY DIRECTOR F C. . . ....FINANCIAL CONTTROLLER D D ..... .DEPUTY DIRECTOR
H R D ____ ..HUMAN RESOURCE DEV A C D ---- ...ASSISTANT TO COUNTRY DIR. A K p , ... .KAMULI
F I N--- ..FINANCE S F A . ... VT . , , ..VISION TERUDO
ABP. . . ...BUWEEKULA PROJECT C S O . ... MTP , ... ..MITEP PROJECT
R E CPT....RECEPTION K.STF. ....KITCHEN STAFF T A S O . .. .TASO NGO
DRV. . . ...DRIVERS S P N ____ ...SPONSORSHIP TECH,,. .TECHNICAL
AMP. . . ...MITYANA PROJECT F P R ____ I A .,,. .INTERNAL AUDIT
B A P ____ ..BUNDIBUGYO PROJECT M & E . ...MONITORING & EVALUATION P A. ..PERSONAL ASSISTANT
K A O .... ..KAMPALA ADMIN OFFICER
w
•tk
Source: Human Resources Department. Action Aid-Uganda. July 1995

MAP II: MAP of Projects/Groups Visited in the Buwekula Developnent Area (DA)
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Tcüsle 6.5: Key Features of the Buwekula Development Area 376
Programme Traits: Development Obj ectives : Highlight of Achievements:
Duration:
1988-2001
Annual Budget:
At time of Study in 
1995: £402,000 
(£159,000 in overhead)
Expected During 1997:
£565,000 Pounds 
(£96,000 in support 
costs)
Geographic Scope:
Kitenga & Kasambya 
Sub-Counties from 
Buwekula County in 
Mubende District
Target Beneficiary 
Population:
15 Parishes 114 
Villages with 
estimated Population 
of 74,490
Sectors Covered:
After 1995 Methodo­
logical Changes :
Education, Health 
(Includ. HIV/AIDS), 
Water & Sanitation, 
Agriculture, Savings 
and Credit, gender, 
some research
Chief Inputs:
Before Methodological 
Changes in 1994/5:
67 Staff; 45 Motor- 
cyles, 4 trucks, 1 
tractor, 1 bus, 2 
station wagons
At Time of Study in 
mid-late 1995: 41
Staff,31 Motorcycles,
4 trucks, 1 tractor, 1 
bus, 1 station wagon
Total Child Sponsors:
At Time of Study in 
1995: 6,200 Sponsors
Chief Development Objective:
To assist socially and 
economically disadvantaged 
communities to gain access 
to development opportunities 
& sustainable improvements 
in their living conditions.
And,
To have beneficiary 
communities that are fully 
integrated and collectively 
responsible for development 
activities in their area and 
capable of adjusting to 
changes in their macro and 
micro environment.
Specific Objectives:
The above is to be achieved 
through a strategy based on 
4 inter-linked objectives:
1. Community Capacity 
Building:
This consists in empowering 
communities to take charge 
of their own destiny by 
training them in development 
planning, implementation and 
assessment techniques.
2.Improvement in Social 
Services :
This involves continuing 
providing support in basic 
health and education, water 
sanitation & agricultural 
extension services
3.Infrastructure
This involves continuing to 
build and rehabilitate 
roads, clinics, schools and 
water tanks in the community
4.Economic Capacity:
This involves helping 
communities to improve their 
economic base and 
entrepreneurial skills 
through business training in 
credit & savings schemes.
Major Achievements:
Community Capacitv:
Over 300 PDC members & 200 
Implementation Committee 
members were trained in 
development planning & 
have produced own projects 
& indicators
Social Services:
ABP's cumulative 
achievements by the end of 
1995 included:
In education, built over 
200 classrooms, gave 
courses to over 140 
teachers & established 
over 70 literacy centres 
with 4000 taught (1)
In health, ABP immunized 
2, 918 children in 1994 
alone (2), held 320 health 
courses &trained over 200 
Community Health Workers & 
105 Traditional Birth 
Attendants
In Infrastructure;
ABP has rehabilitated over 
500 Kms of feeder roads & 
92 bridges, making 42 
villages accessible & 
built 50 water sources
Economic Capacity:
In agriculture, between
1989-1994, ABP started 69 
tree nursuries,trained 
over 800 farmers on 
environmentally-sound farm 
practices. By 1993, 30% of 
targeted farmers had 
adopted some new practices
In Business, ABP 
identified 80 groups for 
potential credit and 
savings scheme & trained 
35 groups on finanial 
management & accounting 
techniques
[ad)le Notes:
(1) This is believed to have contributed to improvements in the literacy rate for persons over 
14 years old from 32% in 1988 to 50% in 1993, a well as to local school enrollment from from 32% 
in 1988 to 50% in 1993.
(2) ABP's involvement in immunization of mothers and children is believed to have helped to 
increase the coverage of immunized children from 1% to 73% during the years in which AAU was 
involved in the DA.
Table 6.6: Organizational Chart of the Buwekula DA
ABP ORGANISATION STRUCTURE - 1995
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Current: 1995
TSUO P S FAD
PC
SPO NAREA IAREA II
P C  -  P R O JE C T  CO-ORDINATOR 
O P S  -  OPERATIONAL S U P P O R T
TSU  •  TECHNICAL S U P P O R T  UNIT
SPO N  •  S P O N S O R S H IP
FAD -  FINANCE AND ADMNI8TRATION
ABP ORGANISATION STRUCTURE TOWARDS END OF THE PROJECT
Projected: 2001
PC
TSU SPONFAD
I
Plus 7 infoimal Workers in 1995= 41 Ttotal ABP staff : ^^^^aüve^ogistL
  Staff member
ntOJECTEDSTAFT LEVELS '
i l
!
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
AREA! 6 6 6 2 2 0 0
AREA II 11 11 11 5 5 0 0
TSU 3 3 3 3 3 2
SPONSORSHIP 2 3 2 2 1 1 1
FAD 3 3 3 2 2 1 1
OPS 9 9 5 4 4 2
TOTAL 34 34 34 19 17 9 6
im im
Table 6.7: The Buwekula Programme*^ (ABP’s) Annual Budget for 1995
"(116 SIIS 'OOO'sJ
6UVEXULA PMJECT
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ACCOUNT KSCfilPllON JAN FE8 AAR APR HAT JUN JUL AUG SEP OCI NOV fttC
SALARIES UAT.STAFF H.A7Î 14.0Î3 14.093 14,093 14,093 14,093 14,093 14,093 14,093 14,091 14,093 11.112 169,1:2'
AllOI/NATIONAl STAFF S.liO 1.091 8.501 8,499 8.842 8,902 8,504 8.162 8,397 14,178 1*6,979
KECtUnXEUf COSTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 ft ft
TSA1N1N6 COSTS 1,02? 576 1,250 345 159 0 527 0 : 0 ft 0 3,379
FIELÏ/LDNCH ALLDVANCES 806 806 806 806 806 806 921 921 921 921 921 0 9,441
STAFF TEAS/IOHCHES m 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 474 5.688
StATUlTIES NAT.STAFF 801 307 1,099 0 1,268 2,829 2,673 3,243 737 1,264 0 1.328 15,555
STAFF m i C A l  SCNENE V4A 952 955 955 955 955 955 955 955 955 955 967 11,-467
STAFF CL0THIN6 1,AAI 185 630 0 1,204 0 0 0 * « 0 0 ft 3.467
CASUAL UtOOR 174 176 176 176 176 176 179 180 179 179 179 176 2.128
SECURITT EXPENSES 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 41; 482 5.762
CHRONIC DISEASE/AIDS COSTS 0 50 0 SO 0 50 0 50 0 8.050 0 5ft 8.300
PERSONNEL COSTS 20M 26,192 28,466 25,880 28,459 .28.767 28,808 28,560 26,473 34,715 25.332 31.769 342,020
F O a  COSTS 4.467 4,467 4,467 4,467 4,467 4,467 5,181 5,181 5,131 5,18: 5,181 181 57,838
VEHICLE REPAIRS 1.466 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,466 1,790 1,790 1.790 1,758 1,770 \Mft 19.531
RDTOR C»CLE REPAIRS Î.COO 1.000 ■ 1.000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1.043 1,043 1,043 1,043 1.813 ..0‘3 12,258
VEHICLE HIRE 51 53 S3 53 53 53 65 65 65 65 65 62 7)5
LICENCE,INSURANCE,ROAD TOILS 4,301 973 395 1,300 0 998 244 0 1,301 #83 656 ft ift,c95
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.336 0 ft 0 : 6
PEROIEXS/TKAVEL ALIOHANCES RIO 488 414 527 394 471 449 544 45# 544 452 539 6,072
LOCAL tr av el/p u i l k  fares 136 869 136 159 160 161 170 162 162 15* 154 159 2,565
TRANSPORT COSTS IC.233 9.316 7.931 8,972 7.540 8,616 8,942 8,785 9,992 10,592 9,331 0.7:5 lll.OfS
HATER 1 ElECTIICITT 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 :53 1.358
laiPHONE/FAX COSTS 450 450 450 45* 450 450 450 45* 45* 450 45ft 450 5.40ft
PDSTAEE/CDURIER SERVICES 10 434 434 1,510 10 1,278 10 434 434 10 1ft 433 5.107
PRINTING I STATGNERT 4.673 2.001 2.126 2,122 1,718 1,718 8 8 ft * ft ft 14,358
HOTEL/tUEST HSE EXPENSES TO 90 92 93 93 93 101 101 101 1*1 1*1 1*1 1.15?
IISC.OFFICE COSTS 251 251 251 ' 2 5 1 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 245 3.006
lANR CHARGES 350 350 350 350 350 350 358 358 35ft 35* 350 :5ft 4,20#
AUOIT FEES A EXPENSES 0 4,377 0 ■ « 8 0 8 8 8 ft 0 0 4.377
LEGAL FEES 1 EXPENSES 250 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ft ft 0 500
HOSPITAIITY/ENTERTAINXEWT EXP 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 Sit
REPATRS/FUSU/E6UIP 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 1,344
REPAIRS RUILOINGS 50 50 50 50 50 58 50 50 SO 50 50 50 600
RENT or m u m s 842 142 1,472 842 142 182 182 882 8:2 882 882 882 11,014
SPONSORSHIP PHOTOSRAPHT 101 1 0 108 188 8 149 8 8 109 180 . C 4ÎJ
GENERAL CONSULTANCIES 0 0 0 ê 8 8 0 * 0 ft ft ft 0
INVENTDRT (1 SO# 107 0 0 SO 0 0 0 0 0 ft ft 0 •i?
OFFICE COSTS 7,4M 9.405 5,535 6,128 4,174 5,382 2,553 2,828 2.82S 2,513 2.50: .■.81» 54,153
HAINTIIH RATA RASE 0 0 0 758 8 8 0 8 0 0 t 750
ESTAILISHHENT OF LIIRARY 0 # 14 8 285 59 0 8 14 0 ft 1: 335
HETHGSOIOGV STAFF TRAINING 0 405 0 8 56 0 0 0 0 0 56 5! 572
PSOGtAXHE REVEIOPHENT 241 0 0 8 8 0 0 8 8 8 ft W 241
ARP COXTT TRAINING IN 9EVT 2,307 2,721 349 101 557 335 557 I 335 8 8 0 7.769
Table 6.7....Continued....
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mEI ULA PXOJECT
tUG S H S  ‘0 0 0 ‘s)
ACCOUNT XESCKIPTION JAN EE» RAX AFK 8AT JUM JUL AUO SEf QCI MY DEC total
AlP CMTT AST DEVELOPPENT 249 212 108 385 0 384 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,360
IIP  EXTENSION OF ASPIC STILLS 347 0 0 0 0 298 0 0 300 0 0 0 945
A8P NOPEH TPÀIHIME IN 185'S D 0 0 68 0 0 0 0 0 68 0 0 134
A8P mPKOVE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 0 4.421 419 420 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.440
AlP LITEIACT 4 NON FORMAI EDUC 1.450 1,904 1,859 1,301 400 390 0 0 365 0 ) 345 8.034
AlP IMPROVE KOKEN EDUCATION 54 0 189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 243
AlP IMPROVE TEACHER SKILLS 789 0 735 730 344 754 364 0 734 0 0 0 4.454
AlP IMPROVE PKC SERVICES 420 1,105 1.070 959 1,723 1.442 1,001 27 598 444 27 135 9,171
AlP FEEDER ROAD MAINTANANCE 154 154 827 154 145 192 430 299 307 • 354 0 0 3.038
AlP lUILD t  IMPROVE SCHOOLS 793 798 1,343 1,393 1,775 2,048 1,182 887 407 60 50 0 10,961
AlP lUlLD/IMPROVE HEALTH UNITS 2.021 394 90S 1,565 282 282 180 403 422 422 ■ 0 0 7,074
AlP DEVP/PROTECT HATER SOURCES • 1.943 1,449 3,237 3,238 2,881 975 594 594 594 594 594 457 17.345
AlP lüILD/IMPROVE COMTT CENTRE 573 581 414 414 201 0 215 0 215 0 215 0 2,832
AlP IMPROVE FARM STRUCTURE 0 0 • 0 0 204 102 102 437 0 0 0 0 845
» T  IN OSE 9 0 0 0 0 0 ? . « 0 0 ' 0 0 --
-DIRECT COSTS 11.571 14.151 12,191 11,480 8,895 7,24: 4,429 2,849 4,493 1,944 944 1,225 81.837
/tIST Of EOUIPKENT 4,025 4.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1C.051-
CAPITAL COSTS 4,025 4,025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 î 10.450
^ T A L  COST CENTRE
s:::::::::::::::::::::::
45,«0? 43,089 54,123 52.460 49,048 .50,028 44,932 43,022 43.784 49,764 38.111 <4.548 599.045
CNECr TOTAL 45.909 43.089 54,123 52,460 49,048 50.028 <4.932 43.02? 43.784 49,744 38.111 44.548 599.045
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Table 6.8: The Buwekula Programmers (ABP’s) Community Structure in 1995 and 2000
Community Development structure 1995
/ " I N T E R - N ,
MEDIARIESDA ^ FORUM
D IR E C T  R E L A T IO N S H IP
W E A K  R E L A T IO N S H IP
COMMUNITY
IN D IR E C T  R E L A T IO N S H IP
PD C
^ A R E A ^
FOR U MA B P
Community Development Structure towards end of ABP (2000)
^ A Y E R ^ s
C O M M U N ITY
C ^ R I S H  S T R U O T U R ^
u b - o o u n t y \
^ T R U O T U R E ^
Source: Action Aid-Buwekula. Action Aid Buwekula Project (DA2) Long-Term Perspective 
1995-2001. Page 16. Compiled by ABP Staff. Mubende, Uganda. December 1995.
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Chapter 7; Conclusion; Letting the People Lead
"One great thought can change the dreams of the world" he said 
"I think I know that one already. Tell me another" I responded 
An imperceptible smile rose to his face.
"One great action, lived out all the way to the sea, 
can change the history of the world."
Ade to Azaro, the Spirit Child ^
I. Major Research Findings and of Lessons Learnt
This thesis has provided an in-depth account of how two different 
types of international development organizations (UNDP and AA) have gone 
about putting the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice in Uganda and beyond.
This last Chapter synthesizes the thesis' major findings, points to 
important lessons and insights which can be drawn from UNDP's and AA's 
experiences, and analyses both theoretical and empirical implications.
A) Core Empirical Findings and Insights
1 - This thesis has shown that both UNDP and AA have made genuine efforts 
to introduce SHD/PCD approaches at the conceptual, organizational and 
programmatic levels as well as to reorient their thinking and work in HQs 
as well as at the national and field level in Uganda. The previous 
chapters also illustrate that both UNDP and AA have contributed towards 
alleviating poverty in Uganda through the reconstruction of local 
infrastructure; the regeneration of rural service-provision; the provision 
of technical training and organizational skills; and, in the case of UNDP, 
through the financing of community-level income-generating activities. In 
doing this, both agencies have undeniably reduced peoples' suffering, 
enhanced their capabilities, and given Ugandans opportunities which would 
not otherwise have been available to them. Because the research did not 
generate sufficient data on cost-effectiveness, it is impossible to make 
definite assertions about whether NGOs are more efficient than UN agencies 
in the delivery of their outputs. If anything, the data gathered seems to
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show that both UNDP and AA spend vast amounts of money on administration 
and logistical costs. However, because AA generally hired fewer expensive 
international consultants and kept most of its offices and staff in less 
expensive rural areas, it is quite possible that AA delivers more 
grassroots-level community services per unit of money than UNDP.
The above contributions notwithstanding though, the bulk of the 
evidence in the thesis reveals that, both UNDP and AA have had serious 
difficulties moving beyond traditional service-delivery, technical training 
and agricultural extension, or palliative development interventions. 
Consequently, in the final analysis, both agencies have failed to realize 
core SHD/PCD goals such as producing development intervention which are 
integrated, flexible, and sustainable over the long-run; influencing wider 
institutional arrangements and policies conducive to 'Sound governance'; 
fostering greater equity and reaching the 'poorest of the poor'; 
strengthening collaboration between donors; reinvigorating North-South 
partnerships and creating a genuine sense of ownership within LDCs; and 
ensuring the full participation and empowerment of beneficiaries. On this 
point, it is useful to note that the evidence provided in the thesis 
suggests that because of its status as an inter-governmental organization 
and hence its access to global fora and nation-states, UNDP has generally 
proven more adept than AA at influencing wider development debates and 
gaining the attention of governments, especially at the global level. 
Because of its operational and grassroots nature, AA on the other hand, can 
be said to have performed better than UNDP when it came to working closely 
with and carefully monitoring project grassroots-level activities in the 
Ugandan countryside. In this respect, the two agencies' comparative 
advantages do seem to be complementary. Nevertheless, in the final 
analysis, the bulk of the evidence in the thesis shows that neither UNDP or 
AA have realized the more transformative elements of the SHD/PCD agenda or 
challenged the status quo and existing national and global power relations
383
to the extent which Diane Elson argues is necessary to make the transition 
from capability-building to actual capability use.
2 - A second empirical finding is that, due to its directly operational, 
grassroots-based, highly regulated, and autonomous approach to development, 
AA faced fewer inter-organizational conflicts rooted in the territoriality 
of different development actors or community-level problems related to 
rent-seeking among Ugandan government official or beneficiaries. UNDP's 
development interventions in Uganda, conversely, were much more urban- 
based, dispersed, technocratic, and politically-dependent, and, as such, 
the UN agency encountered more difficulties than AA in operationalizing 
SHD/PCD in a focussed manner and more conflicts with fellow UN donors and 
opportunistic behaviour by Ugandan government and community beneficiaries.
3 - Another significant finding is that, although both UNDP and AA partly 
adopted SHD/PCD approaches for similar reasons--i.e., to enhance their 
respective agencies' profile and competitiveness in the existing system of 
international development cooperation, the two agencies' conceptual 
approach to promoting SHD/PCD ideas did differ. AA HQ, for example, was 
considerably less interventionist than UNDP HQ when it came to conceptual 
matters. As a result, AA staff experienced less confusion resulting from 
the sheer abstractness, incompleteness and vagueness of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm and from the top-down imposition and shifting positions on SHD/PCD 
than was experienced at UNDP, where field practitioners felt particularly 
confused about the meaning of SHD/PCD ideas and pressured to find ways of 
operationalizing the complex SHD/PCD paradigm into practice in Uganda.
And yet, despite these differences and the fact that UNDP's woes are 
largely rooted in too much emphasis on imprecise theory that does not 
sufficiently connect to practice while AA's difficulties emanate from too 
much emphasis on practice that is not informed by theory, the available
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evidence shows that, in the final analysis, both agencies have had trouble 
filling the gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice. Both agencies, for 
instance, have found themselves struggling to understand the 
prioritization and exact nature of the links between core Human Development
components; grappling with the trade-offs and often contradictory nature of 
some Human Development goals:. For example, fulfilling the prerequisites of 
flexible learning and managerialism at once or simultaneously achieving 
wider policy influence and grassroots participation--especially difficult 
tasks for AA, or balancing the promotion of 'Sound governance' and the 
South's right to self-determination--a particularly delicate challenge for 
UNDP. Both agencies have also had to reconcile the idealism of SHD/PCD 
ideals with the reality of the constraints present in their own development 
agencies, the system of international development cooperation, and LDCs 
like Uganda. While problems of territoriality and recipient rent-seeking 
behaviour were the most prevalent constraints at UNDP in this latter case, 
isolationism and limited organizational clout were the major setbacks at 
AA. All of the latter are components of what in my thesis I describe as 
the Baroque Science Phenomenon. (Refer to Table 7.1 for a summary of the
manifestations of the Baroque Science Phenomenon at UNDP and AA)
4 - The last parallel between UNDP and AA's SHD/PCD experiences is that 
both agencies have found themselves displacing core SHD/PCD goals in favour 
of organizational interests whenever the two have been at odds with one 
another, (i.e., what I call the River Pollution Phenomenon) In both agencies,
furthermore, organizational interests have taken similar forms, including: 
a tendency to increase the agency's mandate, functions and power-base in 
order to keep the money moving and to ensure continued programme expansion; 
giving into pressures from the most influential stakeholders in order to 
avoid resistance; doing what is easiest and most feasible in order to show 
quick and concrete results and to adhere to agency regulations, deadlines
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and targets; and, concealing errors, not measuring impact, or 
underestimating contextual, institutional and organizational obstacles so 
as to sustain an image of success. Despite the fact that these four forms 
of organizational interests differ, they all share the same underlying 
cause : the need for organizational continuity and control.
Although the River Pollution Phenomenon is not meant to be a predictive
model, some general patterns of organizational behaviour are discernible 
from the research. For example, while the two first two types of 
organizational interests described above prevailed in UNDP and AA HQs where 
the pressure to expand the agency's niche and mandate and to satisfy 
powerful northern stakeholders was strongest, the latter two organizational 
interests seem to have manifested themselves more strongly in Uganda where 
field staff were under particular pressure to show that the ambitious goals 
of the SHD/PCD agenda were indeed implementable and could produce error- 
free results under tight time-lines and budgets. To the above one can also 
add that, as an inter-governmental agency accountable to over 170 nation­
states, UNDP is generally much more concerned than AA with pleasing its 
wide array of international stakeholders. On the other hand, as an 
operational agency, AA was generally much more concerned than UNDP with 
doing what is easiest in order to show results on the ground. As the 
previous chapters have shown, all of the above-mentioned organizational 
interests manifested themselves both within UNDP and AA. However, the 
available evidence also shows that, as an inter-governmental agency whose 
survival largely depends on its ability to balance conflicting pressures 
from northern and southern nation-states, UNDP was most influenced by the 
need to please powerful stakeholders. On the other, as a predominantly 
operational, highly regulated and autonomous grassroots NGO, AA was 
influenced most by pressures to adhere to agency rules and procedures and 
to do what is easiest so as to show quick and concrete results. (Table 7.2 
shows how organizational interests manifest themselves at UNDP and AA).
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The above having been said, a few qualifications are in order about 
the role of organizational interests at UNDP and AA. The first 
qualification is that there is no such thing as a single or a perfectly 
coherent organizational interest. In fact, the previous chapters showed 
that there were opposed interests in competition with one another, both 
within UNDP (e.g., northern donors promoting the 'Sound governance' agenda 
versus southern recipient governments safeguarding LDCs' national 
sovereignty) and AA (e.g., policy and professional development staff 
promoting advocacy work and participatory development versus the Board of 
Trustees and financial, marketing and sponsorship staff favouring 
alleviatory social service delivery). Within each agency, however, either 
the power (e.g., the power of AA's Trustees) or the noise of the resistance 
(e.g., the G-77 very public and embarrassing campaign against UNDP in the 
UN and the media) of a particular group can explain why some organizational 
interests can end up dominating and influencing agency decisions more than 
others. A second qualification is that organizational interests need not 
always be at odds with SHD/PCD. For instance, UNDP's and AA's interests in 
becoming more actively involved in 'Sound governance' debates is a good 
example of how UNDP's and AA's organizational goals can coincide with core 
SHD/PCD goals. Similarly, in the previous chapters, one also finds examples 
of instances in which UNDP and AA pursued alternate pathways by taking 
stances which in many ways ran counter to their organizational interests 
(e.g., the decision by UNDP and AA HQs to decentralize and cede more 
control over programme decisions to field staff and Ugandan recipients.)
B) Core Theoretical Findings and Insights
1 - Theoretically speaking, the first theoretical lesson to emerge from 
my thesis is that, a novel and promising idea on its own, however inspiring 
it may be, is not enough. As Ade points out to Azaro above, while ideas 
are the foundation of all human dreams, they change very little unless they
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can be operationalized into action. In the case of SHD/PCD, neither 
scholars or the international development community have sufficiently 
questioned the implementability of such ideas or assessed their development 
impact either globally or in particular LDC settings. Yet my own research 
suggest that, despite constituting a bona fide development paradigm which
transcends excessively economistic visions of development and past market 
versus state dichotomies, SHD/PCD is not easily implementable in a 
comprehensive form. This is theoretically significant not only because it 
opens up the whole debate about the feasibility of the SHD/PCD paradigm but 
also because it draws our attention to the realization that ideas alone are 
not sufficient to bring about improved human conditions.
A related conceptual insight emerging from the thesis is that good 
ideas can emerge anywhere and need not (and in fact often do not) originate 
from the grassroots level or the poor themselves. As such, they should not 
be judged on the basis of their pedigree but rather in terms of their 
potential to bring about social change and enhance peoples' lives.
At the same time though, my thesis also shows that how widely and openly 
ideas are allowed to evolve and the extent to which they are shared (rather 
than imposed) upon social actors is instrumental in determining whether 
national and local leaders, agency staff and beneficiaries develop their 
own understanding of ideas and decide to pursue them as their own.
A corollary to the above finding is that, because in addition to
being a paradigm which offers a unique understanding of how some aspect of 
the world works, SHD/PCD is also a doctrine which offers particular ideas 
about what should be done--i.e., a prescription for action SHD/PCD is 
probably too ambitious too be perfectly realizable. For these reasons, 
there is always bound to be a gap between theory and practice--no matter 
how well those ideas have been internalized or how well intentioned and
competent the actors put in charge of their implementation. By setting out
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to implement SHD/PCD, UNDP and AA have no doubt set themselves a Herculean 
task. After all, creating fully accountable service provision 
institutions, reaching the poorest 10% and organizing them to design 
programmes and influence major policies is something which even we, in 
advanced Western societies, have not been able to achieve. This means 
that, in my thesis, I am putting UNDP and AA to the toughest test possible- 
-a test which no other development agency has passed to date.
3 - Thirdly, my findings emphasize the centrality of the role of 
organizations in development processes. As the instigators of changes in 
the 'rules of the game', development organizations have their own momentum, 
power base, and agenda. During interviews, respondents from various 
international development agencies claimed that their biggest impediments 
were contextual (e.g., environmental decay, war, etc.) or broader policy 
constraints (e.g., structural adjustment policies, unfair terms of trade 
under globalization, etc.) beyond their sphere of influence.
What my own research reveals, on the other hand, is that 
international development agencies' own organizational interests and 
limitations are crucial determinants of development success and often at 
the root of development experiments gone astray. In fact, it is largely 
organizational imperatives and the pressure to continue to grow and to 
improve their agency's global profile and marketability which lead 
development agency managers and field staff to over-emphasize contextual 
and structuralist explanations for their under-performance; to often 
displace or dilute the importance of SHD/PCD components in their 
development interventions; to sustain a series of contentious assumptions 
about their agencies' presumed autonomy, organizational capacity or 
transformative capacity, the supposedly symmetrical and harmonious nature 
of the existing system of international development cooperation and North- 
South relations, the supposedly undifferentiated, solidaristic and
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omniscient nature of beneficiary communities in poor LDCs such as Uganda; 
and to generally overlook the conceptual deficiencies and limited 
operationalizability of the SHD/PCD paradigm. However, this does not 
dismiss other contextual or broader institutional and policy-related 
variables which affect the ultimate impact of those development 
interventions which UNDP and AA actually decide to pursue. Thus, I 
recognize that, in actuality, many of the problems facing UNDP and AA 
emanate from the nature of their stakeholder communities in the wider 
system of interactional development cooperation rather than from within the 
agencies themselves. I also recognize that Uganda's protracted civil war 
and the inequitable, tribalistic and clientelistic nature of rural Uganda 
are historical and cultural hindrances to development as is the Ugandan 
government's draining military expenditures, limited public investment in 
human development, and a still inefficient and sometimes corrupt civil 
service. My concern then, is with the interface het^fieen contextual factors,
wider institutional and policy factors and organizational ones.
Also on the topic of organizational factors, it is important to 
emphasize that, by showing how the implementation of SHD/PCD ideas is 
undermined by a combination of the conceptual deficiencies, internal 
contractions and romanticism of the SHD/PCD paradigm; broader contextual, 
institutional, and policy constraints; and organizational limitations and 
interests, the argument put forward in this thesis attempts to go beyond 
theories of organizational imperatives which place the burden of poor 
implementation on either the technical problems or organizational interests 
of agencies themselves. (Table 7.3 provides a 'wiring diagram' of the 
various factors hindering the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches).
4 - Fourthly, this thesis shows that, because of their need to fulfil 
their own interests, international development organizations may not be 
natural catalysts of paradigmatic change or challengers of the status quo
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either globally or nationally. Furthermore, contrary to the view that 
NGOs are more altruistic, solidaristic, and better at reaching the poorest 
or fostering participation, empowerment, and long-term sustainability, my 
findings show that, in Uganda at least, international NGOs like AA are as 
prone as multilateral agencies to stray from the more transformative goals 
of the SHD/PCD agenda. Moreover, as noted above, operational international 
NGOs like AA may be even be less adept than multilateral organizations at 
influencing wider policy debates, gaining access to decision-makers or 
collaborating closely with other development actors and their development 
interventions may be less sustainable over the longer-term as a result.
5 - Finally, I found that equity and democratic processes and issues of 
conflict and self-interest are all important considerations in 
international development. To adherents of the Democratic Development School
(DD) (for example, Robert Chambers, David Korten, Michael Chernea and Stan 
Burkey), the key to development lies in the ability of organizations to 
promote equity, participation and to empower the poor and marginalized in 
LDCs. My thesis confirms the validity of these concerns since socio­
economic inequity (especially lack of access to productive assets) and 
undemocratic and unaccountable political structures were shown to undermine 
the ability of the poor to launch their own economic activities or voice 
their needs, while paternalistic, top-down and rigid organizational 
structures within development agencies reinforced dependency on outsiders.
Nevertheless, I also show that there is much which the DD School of 
thought does not explain. DD thinkers do not, for example, explain why it 
is that, despite genuine efforts to do so, development organizations often 
prove unable to work in a flexible, participatory or democratic fashion, or 
to truly empower beneficiaries. They also do not recognize that broad- 
based participation is not easily achievable when the poor lack not only 
the resources but also the specialized knowledge, organizational skills.
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confidence or free time needed to take part in multiple community meetings 
requiring tireless consensus building and both complex and highly technical 
planning and decision-making. Nor for that matter, does the DD school of 
thought address the reality that genuine North-South partnership and 
community collaboration is difficult to achieve in the context of an 
international system of development cooperation which, far from being 
harmonious and egalitarian, is riddled with internal rivalries and 
asymmetrical relationships between donors and beneficiaries. Finally, the 
DD School assumes that beneficiary communities are naturally solidaristic 
and altruistic even though most of my evidence and much of the development 
literature suggests the opposite. This does not mean that there is no 
collaboration among the poor in Uganda. Quite the contrary, the Ugandan 
people could not have survived 30 years of repression and civil strife had 
it not been for the compassion and mutual support they have given one 
another. Nevertheless, my findings show that, far from elites having a 
monopoly on exploitative, rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour, the poor too 
can be elitist, exclusive of those outside tribal or family circles and 
exploitative of the weakest among them. This should not shock us. Given 
how poor some communities are in LDCs, it is to be expected that the more 
astute or better positioned to take advantage foreign aid opportunities 
will do so. What the neo-Marxist and Freirean-inspired DD School fails to 
take into account, is that opportunism is not restricted to elites.
The ideas of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) are instructive here.
To NIE thinkers (e.g., Ronald Coase and Douglass North in Economics and 
Elinor Ostrom, Samuel Paul and E.A. Brett in the field of international 
development), human self-interest is essential to understanding why 
development processes involve such high transaction costs and why donors' 
themselves may prove ineffective at ensuring that both staff and 
beneficiaries do not engage in shirking, free-loading or corrupt behaviour. 
What NIE thinkers fail to sufficiently take into consideration though is
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that much of the failure of development, and indeed the desperation of the 
poor, is itself propelled by the extreme inequities, authoritarianism, and 
the paternalism of LDC societies and the top-down nature and rigidity of 
development agencies themselves. Hence, it is only when insights from the 
two schools of thought are brought together--as they are in this thesis-- 
that we begin to understand that, in addition to the lack of resources and 
power (as emphasized by the DD School), SHD/PCD in LDCs is equally hindered 
by the rent-seeking behaviour of governments and the poor themselves (as 
noted by NIE thinkers) and reinforced by organizational interests. In 
short, there is no reason why participatory development work cannot be 
complemented with expert-led guidance. However, even then, the findings in 
this thesis reveal that the applicability of both the DD and NIE frameworks 
may be limited when applied to very poor LDCs such as Uganda, where both 
schools' assumptions that the society's political, legal and economic 
institutions are evolved enough to allow for a fairly equitable 
distribution or resources and knowledge, democratic and legitimate 
political structures and democratic processes, accountable social service 
providers and experts, and effective regulation and rule enforcement.
C) Empirical and Theoretical Contributions of the Thesis
1 - In this thesis, I have tried, perhaps for the first time, to examine 
the conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm and the tensions 
present between its aspirations and real-life constraints, (i.e. the Baroque
Science Phenomenon) . While my findings do not reveal much which is not
already known in the development community, they do confront SHD/PCD's 
conceptual limitations by drawing out their implications for the 
operationalization and long-term development impact of SHD/PCD.
2 - Secondly, my research links the promotion of SHD/PCD approaches to 
institutional and organizational factors and shows that the contentious
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assumptions which international development agencies make about development 
processes, the system of international cooperation, and about their own 
organizational capacity, coupled with their own interest, seriously hinder 
their ability to implement the SHD/PCD approach, (i.e., what in my thesis I 
call the River Pollution Phenomenon) . This, once again, is not new in either
the international development cooperation, implementation process or the 
institutional literatures. However, my work has traced how and why these 
interests have actually undermined the operationalization of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm and how organizational imperatives influence development agencies' 
adoption and interpretations of new ideas as well as the way in which such 
agencies deal with contextual and broader institutional and policy factors. 
I also show that this issue and the resulting implementation problems have 
not been sufficiently addressed in the SHD/PCD Literature. Still, it is 
important to remember, that the Baroque Science o r the River Pollution Phenomena are
do not, and indeed are not meant to, provide precise predictions.
3 - Thirdly, the comparative approach in my thesis allows me to compare 
how both a multilateral development organization and an international NGO 
go about putting these ideas into practice. My findings that neither type 
of international development agency is particularly effective at 
challenging the status quo is not too surprising since these constraints 
have been described in the recent NGO Literature. What is surprising is 
that few comparisons of the pros and cons of different types of development 
organizations exist and that so little of this accumulated wisdom has been 
taken into consideration by NGOs and donors eager to implement SHD/PCD.
4 - Fourthly, my thesis attempts to add value not only by complementing 
four different literatures (i.e., the International Development 
Coopérâtion/NGO Literature; the SHD/PCD Literature; a stream of the 
Implementation Process Literature; and two schools of thought from the 
Institutional Literature), but also by reconciling the claims of both the
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Democratic Development and the New Institutional Economics while at the same time
testing the empirical applicability of their assumptions to LDCs such as 
Uganda. Incorporating insights from a multiplicity of literatures has 
allowed me to show how an eclectic conceptual approach can be helpful for 
analyzing the implementation and impact of new development approaches.
5 - Finally, I was able to trace the operationalization of SHD/PCD from 
paradigm to policy as well as from policy to programme and thus to 
complement theoretical and empirical evidence at the global, national and 
grassroots levels as well as from a conceptual, policy, organizational and 
programme/project perspective. My review of the literature confirmed that 
much of the discussion about SHD/PCD approaches has remained at the level 
of generalities or has consisted of econometric dissections of the HDI, 
with no comprehensive study of both SHD/PCD theory and practice in 
particular organizations or country settings done to date. Although the 
inside information which I gathered on UNDP's and AA's SHD/PCD efforts 
globally and in Uganda will never be fully complete, this study makes a 
major attempt to begin to fill the existing void 'in the literature.
II. The Wider Applicability of the Thesis' Findings; Similarities and
Differences with Parallel Development Experiences
Of course, even if the above research claims are valid, we still have 
to ask whether they apply to other organizations, developing countries, or 
development experiences. The qualitative nature of my research means that 
statistical measures can not be used to prove that the agency and country 
examples I have studied constitute a microcosm representative of the 
international development community at large. For these reasons, I would 
never claim that the patterns I discovered in UNDP's and AA's 
implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in Uganda are bound to occur in the 
two agencies' development efforts elsewhere. Moreover, because I know of 
no other in-depth comparative studies on SHD/PCD completed to date, I can 
not say whether my thesis findings are generalizable beyond Uganda.
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However, I would argue that the bulk of the evidence available does 
suggest that the problems I identified in my thesis are in fact quite 
common in development and, on that basis, feel comfortable asserting that 
my findings are relevant to other cases. This claim can be substantiated 
in three ways. First, the one study found which does compare the impact of 
a UN development agencies and an NGO in Sri Lanka and in the area of 
humanitarian aid has begun generating results similar to my own.  ^ Second, 
the various independent assessments of UNDP and AA's work * and the 
literature on Uganda and international development cited int the thesis 
also supports my conclusion. Third, in this chapter, I complement my 
findings with those of UNDP's and AA's development experiences elsewhere.
A) The Wider Applicability of the UNDP Experience
My review of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts outside of Uganda reveals that 
some UNDP programmes have produced some relatively successful cases but 
many others have been undermined by the constraints I identified in Uganda.
i) Relatively Successful Cases o f  UNDP's Promotion o f  SHDIPCD
The Philippines, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Malawi are the four 
Country Programmes which UNDP cites as relatively successful examples of 
its efforts to implement SHD/PCD approaches. UNDP's assessments of these 
programmes suggest their success is explained by four sets of factors.
a) Firstly, exceptional leadership, analytical capacity and risk-taking 
by UNDP's RRs and other staff are important in determining the 
success of SHD/PCD initiatives in these countries.
[e.g.,] In Bolivia, UNDP's RR recruited dynamic young staff with 
strong analytical competencies in thematic and governance issues. 
[e.g.,] In El Salvador, the UNDP RR was a talented consensus-builder 
who won the respect of both the government and the guerrilla and 
acted as a 'neutral broker' between the two.
[e.g.]. In Malawi, the diplomatic community's esteem for UNDP's 
RR allowed him to establish a weekly forum attended by ambassadors 
and donors as well as influential fora on the democratic transition.
b) Securing access and the direct involvement and ownership of 
top-level national decision-makers and building on existing national
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initiatives while at the same time encouraging a process of wide 
consultation and meaningful debate on SHD/PCD are other criteria for 
effectively promoting SHD/PCD in these countries.
[e.g.,] In the Philippines, the Human Development Network formed in 
1992 served as a forum for development scholars, practitioners and 
NGOs and eventually formulated the Philippines Human Development Report. 
Although the forum was initially facilitated by UNDP, it later 
elected as its own convenor a respected former economic planning 
minister. The Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty was later made the major 
counterpart in the implementation of the Philippine Human Development Report 
and President Ramos himself was asked to launch it.
c) Designing a well-focussed SHD/PCD strategy which does not shy away 
from taking on the new areas of work and the most prescient 
development issues in the country, even if political, is another 
prerequisite for SHD/PCD success.
[e.g.,] In Malawi, UNDP identified ^Sound governance' as its priority 
and focussed its CP on democratization, decentralization and popular 
participation in districts and local areas even though traditionally, 
its work had been neither policy-linked or localized.
[e.g.,] In El Salvador, UNDP linked the need for better socio­
economic conditions and effective political institutions to the 
peace-keeping process, and became involved in political work by 
giving technical and institution-building assistance to the Human 
Rights Ombudsman*s Office, supplying UN Volunteers for the United Nations 
Observers Mission to El Salvador (ONUSAL) , and taking risky policy positions 
such as highlighting ex-combatants' need for access to land, credit 
and foreign aid, even though UNDP had spoken out on such problems.
d) Finally, new space and political will to change must be exhibited by 
recipients if SHD/PCD initiatives are to gain momentum.
[e.g.,] In Bolivia, the government had already passed the Law of 
Popular Participation giving civil society a greater role in shaping 
the country's new development vision.
[e.g.,] In El Salvador, the government had previously agreed to give 
the international community and UNDP a central role in the peace­
making process through the ONUSAL peace-keeping mission. ®
The above examples are instructive not only because they illustrate 
that UNDP has been more successful than it was in Uganda in implementing 
SHD/PCD approaches but also because much of the above evidence corroborates 
my own findings. It confirms, for example, that factors which were not 
present in Uganda--such as a well-focussed and politically audacious 
SHD/PCD strategy; strong national ownership of SHD/PCD ideas and efforts at 
all levels; collaborative and participatory development processes which 
incorporate a wide range of social actors; and recipient governments 
responsive to the will of the people, are core elements of effective 
SHD/PCD. When such conditions do not exist, it must be UNDP's priority to 
focus on creating such conditions as much as focusing on producing small
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concrete and identifiable outputs. It may well be, of course, that there 
are countries in which such conditions do not exist and where reactionary 
recipient governments are determined to resist any foreign or civil society 
efforts to bring them about. Under such circumstances, international 
development agencies like UNDP may have to recognize that SHD/PCD may not 
be viable at the moment and that it is preferable for it to contribute to 
traditional service provision rather than to abandon the poor in that LDC.
ii) Less Successful Cases o f UNDP’s Promotion o f  SHDIPCD
Yet, most evidence shows that UNDP's Uganda experience is not atypical
UNDP's own Series on Sustainable Human Development confirms that many of the
implementation constraints and mistakes I identify tend to repeat 
themselves elsewhere. The review of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts in Sudan, for 
instance, points out that the Area Development Scheme (ADS) pioneered by the
Government and UNDP to respond to harsh drought conditions in a 
participatory and integrated manner failed to ensure the meaningful 
involvement of communities since ADS experts often assumed that they knew 
the solutions to problems and imposed these in a top-down manner. * 
Similarly, UNDP's review of its efforts in Guinea confirms my own findings 
that the limits to the development community's knowledge about appropriate 
development interventions is much greater than what is openly recognized. ’
I was also able to obtain more revealing evidence on these issues in 
certain countries. Discussions from a Sub-Regional Seminar on Human Development in
Africa, for example, suggest that in other impoverished African countries,
UNDP has discovered that SHD/PCD efforts have often been UN-driven rather 
than demand-driven; that UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD has duplicated other 
national initiatives and overburdened UN and government personnel; and
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that, even in Malawi, a success story, coordination between development 
actors promoting SHD/PCD approaches leaves much to be desired. ®
In Costa Rica, evaluations of UNDP's and HABITAT'S Community 
Management Programme (CMP)--a Programme similar to the one I studied in 
Uganda--shows that even in an LDCs with much higher Human Development levels,
UNDP's community empowerment efforts have run into difficulties in creating 
a sense of ownership among local government officials and beneficiaries; in 
convincing the recipient government that CMP is more than a means of 
equipping and staffing their ministries; in altering paternalistic 
behaviour and reducing community-based conflicts and distrust; in reaching 
the poorest of the poor, the disorganized or uneducated; and in resisting 
the tendency to produce quick results and to absorb vast amounts of 
programme funds and staff time on administrative outputs and procedures 9
Finally, even in El Salvador where UNDP's political work is often 
depicted as a success story, independent assessments reveal that UNDP's 
close relationship with the government has meant that UNDP could not 
establish a sufficiently strong working relationship with Salvadorean civil 
society, including NGOs and the former FMLN guerrilla, both of whom played 
a central role in overseeing the country's peace accords. In addition, 
UNDP's fixed and slow-moving procedures and five-year planning cycles 
proved inappropriate for peace-keeping and peace-making work which requires 
flexibility and responding quickly. As in Uganda then, UNDP's rigid 
organizational structure and dependence on traditional governments 
stakeholders undermined its capacity to assume the role of social change.
B) The Wider Appliccüaility of the Action Aid Experience
A review of AA's wider experiences reveals that many of the 
implementation constraints I found are prevalent elsewhere as well.
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i) Relatively Successful Cases o f  A A ’s Promotion o f  SHDIPCD
With respect to AA's work in Uganda, it is true that AAU's newer DAs 
in Bundibugyo and Apach are smaller and less administrât ion-heavy than the
Buwekula DA. In Bundibugyo, furthermore, by building its interventions around
women's literacy circles, AA made a conscious effort to focus on one of the 
poorest groups in Uganda--i.e., illiterate women--from the start of the 
programme. In Apach, AAU has moved into new territory by not only 
allowing community beneficiaries to elect their own Community Development 
Planning Forums (COMFACI), by making COMFACIs accountable to a Beneficiary 
Forum (BENIFORA) and allowing beneficiaries to select community 
facilitators and to help evaluate AA's work in the DA from the start.
And, in the Kamuli DA, AAU was willing to work on behalf of a multilateral
organization and be part of the Ugandan government's PAPSCA initiative.
Evidence from other countries corroborates AA's claims that it has 
overcome many of the problems I found in Uganda. AA-India directly supports 
indigenous NGOs like SAMBHAV involved in political campaigns such as the 
human rights of bonded workers and has gone as far as to put SAMBHAV in 
charge of running a DA . In Kenya, AA works actively with existing 
community structures. “ And in Bhola, Bangladesh, AA has been praised for 
measuring the long-term socio-economic impact of its interventions through 
the Survive, Avoid Malnutrition, Attend School and Read Index (SAMISARI) which involves
beneficiaries in the collection of data on survival, nutrition and literacy 
indicators in the communities, as well as for transcending traditional 
service delivery as early as the late 1980s. The latter was achieved by 
extending credit and accounting skills to the poor through small savings 
and credit groups of five people {Shomitis) which keep their own accounts,
make their own financial decisions and rely on group pressure to ensure 
repayment of loans and rule compliance by the group. “
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Clearly then, in other Ugandan DAs and CPs, AA has been more 
effective at targeting the poorest of the poor, being part of larger 
governmental poverty-eradication efforts, and has made strides in resolving 
problems such as poor long-term impact evaluation, lack of interventions in 
the economic/financial area, duplicating existing community structures, or 
failing to involve other partners or beneficiaries.
ii) Less Successful Examples o f AA *s Promotion o f SHDIPCD
However, there is also ample evidence suggesting that the obstacles I 
identified still prevail in other AA DAs and CPs.
Within Uganda, senior AAU staff acknowledged that, when the COMFACI 
started discussing development priorities in the Apach DA, better-off
community members managed to promote their own interests (usually 
infrastructural and large construction projects such as schools) at the 
expense of the development concerns of the poorest who preferred projects 
with direct individual economic benefits since they knew that even if 
schools were built they could not afford school fees. “
In the Kamuli DA, while a Mid-Term Evaluation praised the programme's
rigorous record-keeping, accounting and computerized information gathering, 
the same report also noted that the preoccupation with rigorous monitoring 
and with meeting targets was also responsible for the heavy administrative 
burden felt by DA staff who complained that because they had to fill in 
forms for virtually everything they did, they in turn had no time to 
analyze the vast amounts of data gathered. The DA's top-down monitoring 
and management procedures were also found to have suppressed the 
sensitivity of staff towards community feedback. Rather than involving 
communities in decisions, members of the Kamuli evaluation mission observed 
that the DA's consultation meetings were sporadic, overly long, and assumed
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the form of 'one-way monologues' by staff. Finally, although in Kamuli AA 
worked through the District Development Committee, because there was never a wide 
enough range of influential local actors (e.g., women, chiefs, RC/LC 
chairs) actively involved in all phases of the programme, the D A 's chances 
long-term sustainability may still turn out to be quite limited.
In the Bundibugyo DA, AAU has faced problems similar to the ones I
found in ABP. According to a report by Daniel Ticehurst, because AAU had 
failed to implement Community-Based Monitoring Systems (CBMES) in Bundibugyo
from the outset and because CBMES was being externally imposed upon the DA, 
it was very difficult to ensure that beneficiaries had ownership of the new 
system of evaluation and that, at a time of cut-backs, the DA had 
sufficient staff with the integrated planning and evaluation skills needed 
to absorb the CBMES training. Ticehurst warns AAU against assuming that 
identifying indicators with communities is the panacea to more serious 
problems like weak communication between RCs/LCs and AA's PDCs.
Finally, an external evaluation of four of AAU's DAs {Kamuli, Buwekula,
Bundibugyo and Apach) carried out by Williams and Davis confirmed that the
interests of the poorest were not represented by AAU's PDCs and that, in 
addition to having been instigated by AA rather than communities, CBMES was 
placing strains on beneficiaries' already restricted time and resources.
In Kenya, a 1996 review of three of AA-Kenya's oldest DAs {Kibwezi,
Kyuso and Ikanga) reported that although PRA techniques were used to identify
the poorest of the poor during the initiation of the AA-Kenya CP, in the 
end, the NGO spread its interventions across several sectoral groups rather 
than concentrating on the empowerment of the poverty-focussed groups it had 
identified in its PRA exercise. The same study further notes that, since
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the beneficiaries in AA-Kenya's DAs were now dependent on AA; since 
institution-building in the DAs was still in its infancy; and since the DAs 
had not ensured that community leaders were trained in the management of 
the DA, AA-Kenya's DAs were not prepared for AA's upcoming phase out.
In a review of the AA-Nepal CP carried out between 1995-1996 AA 
acknowledges that, despite its contribution to improvements in 
infrastructure, service-delivery, and group formation and training, because 
of moving goal posts and the absence of detailed intra-household 
information on beneficiaries changing living standards, AA-Nepal had no 
evidence indicating whether its interventions had improved the well-being 
of poor Nepalese. With respect to participatory evaluation, the study 
notes that, "despite the use of participatory methods and the involvement 
of various sections of the communities in the process, impact assessment 
study had been undeniably managed and was owned mostly by AA-Nepal."
Finally, even in Bangladesh, one of AA's model CPs, an external 
assessment by Sarah White exposes a series of implementation constraints 
similar to my own. White claims that the Shomitis created by AA-Bangladesh
in Bhola have proven incapable of incorporating the poorest members of the 
community since they are incapable of paying group loans in time. The 
study further argues that, the profit made through the IGAs supported by 
Shomitis was minimal since loan levels and time-lines which are unilaterally
set and enforced by AA are insufficient. According to the study, this has 
created high turnover rates in Shomitis since members who need bigger loans
must leave the group to seek high interest loans from local lenders. 
Finally, although Shomitis varied depending on the conservativeness of the
area. White found little evidence of significant Shomiti involvement in
tackling wider social issues (e.g., female Shomiti members continued giving
profits to their husbands and sons, while exploitative lenders continued
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operating since Shomiti loans were too small to stop group members from 
having to simultaneous take out high-interest loans elsewhere.
The above examples demonstrate that although Uganda is a tough test 
for UNDP's and AA's implementation of SHD/PCD, the constraints which I 
identified in Uganda are not atypical and that my findings, therefore, have 
a wider applicability and relevance. However, these findings are based on 
limited evidence and more extensive cross-regional and multi-organizational 
studies are clearly required, given the seriousness of the problems found.
Ill. What is to be Done? Alternatives for Letting the People Lead
If we accept that the conceptual, institutional and organizational 
constraints to the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches exposed in my 
thesis are pervasive, we must then ask what is to be done?
i) Change at the Level o f Theory
To start, my thesis shows that the difficulties of implementing 
SHD/PCD go beyond organizational or technical matters since much of the 
problem lies with the idealism and conceptual deficiencies of SHD/PCD ideas 
and the fact that there will always be a gap between theory and practice. 
Still, there are rules of thumb, or what Bardach calls 'bumper stickers', 
which can mitigate the worse effects of SHD/PCD's conceptual shortfalls.
The first such rule is to become aware of the conceptual deficiencies 
of those theories or models which one intends to put in practice. As 
Daniel Moynihan wisely points out, in order to surmount a theory's internal 
ambiguities and contradictions, these must first be perceived. Luckily, 
says Moynihan, there are normally warning signs (e.g., development actors' 
confusion over SHD/PCD's theoretical origins and ideological position).
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The second rule is to avoid putting theories into practice on a large 
scale until they have been sufficiently tested and to avoid overselling 
such ideas or acting as though they are achievable in a short time span.
The third rule is to keep things simple. According to Bardach, this 
can be done by ensuring that experts do not design programmes which are 
overly complex or overly dependent on high levels of competence, 
coordination, or consensus building which are difficult to attain or at 
best unpredictable. To keep such programmes on track, programme designers 
and implementors may need to contemplate different scenarios and possible 
emerging constraints at each stage of the process as well as to develop 
indicators to constantly measure the programme's progress and impact.
The fourth rule is to bring theory and practice closer together by 
ensuring that theorists developing new ideas have access to newly emerging 
empirical evidence from the field and that practitioners (including front­
line staff and beneficiaries) give feedback on the feasibility of newly 
emerging ideas and are given ample opportunity to influence such ideas.
Finally, both theorists and practitioners should avoid over- 
optimistic projects, expecting impossibly high levels of participatory 
decision-making with no expert guidance or monitoring. They should also 
avoid, at least initially, implementing their programmes in agencies where 
'institutional gymnastics' will be required or in country settings where 
the cultural and institutional conditions make the implementation of such 
ideas especially difficult. In cases where extreme poverty means that 
there is no choice but to implement the ideas in such countries, it is 
imperative that theorists and practitioners do not romanticize the reality 
of the conditions in LDCs and that they be aware of the political problems 
of social action and the displacing effect of organizational interests.
405
However, changing the behaviour theorists and practitioners is not 
enough, major changes are also requires in at least three other realms.
ii) Change Within Development Agencies and 
the Existing System o f  International Development Cooperation
First, within development organizations and the system of 
international development cooperation in which they operate. As DD 
proponents such as Robert Chambers point out, such organizational changes 
should involve more flexible, participatory, and bottom-up decision-making 
within development agencies as well as more collaborative partnerships with 
southern counterparts and within the wider system of international 
development cooperation. My findings show that when ideas are imposed in a 
top-down fashion, when development actors constantly engage in turf- 
protection, and when field staff and beneficiaries are treated in a 
paternalistic fashion, they are less likely to understand or feel ownership 
of development efforts and their dependence and tendency to view outsiders 
are sources of easy money is more likely to increase as a result.
On the other hand, as NIE advocates such as E.A. Brett rightly point 
out, promoting participation, diversity, and flexibility is an expensive 
process, it is not as easily achieved as DD thinkers assume, and even then, 
it is not a panacea. In addition to democratic and participatory reforms, 
development agencies require highly skilled and competent staff which can 
provide guidance and leadership, effective regulatory systems to control 
rent-seeking behaviour, and rigorous monitoring and evaluation to gauge the 
progress and impact of interventions and to advise beneficiaries. The 
ideal then is to find a balance between some central control and local 
autonomy and to develop mechanisms of accountability between the two.
In short, the organizational prescriptions of DD and NIE proponents 
are complementary and should be carried out hand in hand. Michael Edwards 
has effectively combined proposals inspired by both NIE and DD thinkers by
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advising the British Overseas A id Group (BOAG) to not only become more democratic
in its development work but by suggesting that it introduce regulatory 
measures to closely monitor the international development profession as 
well. Among Edwards' most promising DD-related recommendations are his 
suggestions that NGOs shift from upward accountability to multiple 
accountability by allowing southern partners to become Board members of 
northern NGOs and that international development agencies open themselves 
to 'reverse evaluation' by allowing themselves to be evaluated by southern 
counterparts. As part of his NIE-related reforms, Edwards recommends the 
certification of all NGO workers before they are allowed to work in the 
field, social audits and the publication of a 'Good Donor Guide' to 
encourage good practice in development agencies, the establishment of an 
Advertising Standards Authority to monitor misleading charity advertising, 
and an NGO Ombudsman to arbitrate disputes.
The above recommendations are taken a step further by E.A. Brett who 
notes that, to ensure that development agencies serve the interests of the 
poor, programme beneficiaries must be put in a position where they can 
exert leverage on those assisting them. This implies creating 
accountability mechanisms which give beneficiaries access to full 
information about donor agency resources and expenditures. I also means 
giving beneficiaries genuine options for voice (e.g., creating mechanisms
and fora where beneficiaries can openly question programme parameters and 
influence the choice of targets, schedules or personnel without fear of 
loosing agency support) and exit (e.g., allowing recipient governments and
beneficiaries to choose between competing development agencies and 
alternative programmes without having to forego the assistance).
Unfortunately, all of the above is easier said than done, especially 
when one considers that the assumptions of DD and NIE thinkers rarely exist 
in the poorest LDCs and that no development agency I know of has been
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willing to give up their monopoly over development interventions, to open 
up agency files and accounts to outside scrutiny, or to be transparent 
about their development impact or cost-effectiveness. Nor for that matter, 
has the wider system of international development cooperation proven 
capable of introducing standards and incentives for greater accountability 
and collaboration in international development or of establishing 
mechanisms to monitor development agency performance and to guarantee civil 
society actors participation in international fora or development debates. 
At the same time, major strides have been made in the implementation of 
SHD/PCD and, if sufficiently pressured, international development agencies 
may carry out additional reforms, even if not in their immediate interest.
Hi) Change A t the National, Institutional and Policy Levels
However, one lesson which comes through strong and clear in my thesis 
it is that the international development community alone can not--and 
should not--single-handedly promote, let alone impose, SHD/PCD approaches. 
No amount of 'organizational tinkering' within development agencies or even 
within the wider system of international development cooperation can bring 
about the kinds of broader institutional and national policy reforms needed 
to create an enabling environment for the comprehensive implementation of 
SHD/PCD. This means that international development agencies need to look 
beyond their own backyards for solutions and be willing to take political 
risks in order to play a catalytic role in bringing about social 
transformation both globally and in LDCs. There is a growing consensus, 
even within inter-governmental financial organizations like the World Bank, 
that policy-level and broader institutional reforms are essential for 
bringing about development. Clear and enforceable rules of the game in 
institutional arrangements, open and competitive markets, democratic, 
tolerant and accountable government, and an inclusive and diverse civil 
society are all desirable elements of national and global institutions.
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In Uganda, significant advances have been made in terms of national 
reconciliation, democratization, liberalization, decentralization, and 
civil service reform. There is no denying, furthermore, that Ugandan 
democratic processes and freedoms are much more advanced than elsewhere in 
Africa. Nevertheless, the institutional foundations necessary for SHD/PCD 
still have far to evolve. To this day, the majority of Ugandans live in 
poverty with no access to reliable health care or affordable education, 
state patronage and corruption continue to undermine Uganda's economy and 
the Museveni regime's evasion of competitive elections by all parties on 
equal terms and its slowness in designing a national poverty reduction 
strategy has dwarfed the evolution of a strong civil society capable of 
speaking out, mobilizing en masse, and holding Ugandan leaders to account. 
It is these policy and institutional shortcomings which need to be 
addressed in Uganda. Of course, the World Bank has pointed out, the future 
of Africa must be largely determined by Africans. However, if the 
international community is serious about upholding the principles of Human
Development, it is legitimate for it to also attempt to influence both
developed and developing societies to move in that direction.
As an inter-governmental organization, the UN in particular has the 
legal basis and legitimacy for constructing a shared view of social justice 
in the world. As Chris Brown points out, "if diversity entails that 
states have the right to mistreat their populations, then it is difficult 
to see why such diversity is to be valued." Socio-economic norms
though can not be imposed by a few northern governments or development 
agencies. Instead, a genuine process of dialogue and negotiation must take 
place between North and South and consensus built around what ideas like 
SHD/PCD mean and what they imply for the future of international 
development assistance and for 'Sound governance' at the national level.
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At the global level, this may require the international development 
community to put in place an institutionalized mechanism for dialogue and 
coordination as well as incentives and sanctions which encourage the 
collective promotion of SHD/PCD rather than expansionist behaviour among 
donors or recipient government departments. This might be achieved, for 
example, by requiring all parts involved in international development 
cooperation to account to one global entity which is comprised of 
representatives from northern and southern governments and civil society 
and which, almost like the Court of International Justice, has the right 
to set development cooperation standards and monitor performance in areas 
such as North-South dialogue, coordination and conflict resolution. To 
have sanctioning power such an entity would have to have the right to 
penalize non-compliant actors and funds to reward good practice.
At the national level, the donor community may have to agree to be 
coordinated by one recipient government department using uniform foreign 
aid standards for all donors and with the right to make accountability 
demands from the donor community and to allow open bidding for or to reject 
particular development projects. Donors also need to be given incentives 
to create national fora or formal mechanisms which involve previously 
excluded southern politicians and civil society actors previously in 
SHD/PCD efforts early on in the process and to stretch the parameters of 
what are considered safe development interventions. The latter could be 
achieved by encouraging donors to constantly push traditional nation­
states to embrace the more transformative elements of the SHD/PCD agenda 
and to push themselves as donors to move beyond apolitical and time and 
budget-restricted development interventions. For their part, recipient 
governments will themselves have to be encouraged to support the more 
ambitious aspects of the SHD/PCD paradigm and to diversify their links and 
accountability to civil society. Rather than achieving this through direct 
conditionality, the donor community might consider offering substantial
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additional funds, not dissimilar to the Global Environmental Facility [GEF] 
to both donors, recipient governments, and civil society actors working 
with one another on innovative wider policies and institutional efforts.
iv) Counter-Hegemonic Resistance From Within Civil Society
And yet, he institutionalization of a liberal economy and competitive 
and accountable democracy are not sufficient conditions for creating an 
environment conducive to SHD/PCD either globally or in LDCs. As post- 
Marxist scholars have pointed out and as those of us living in pluralist 
democracies in the West well know, periodic elections, respect for the rule 
of law, and even the decentralization of power to local authorities do not 
necessarily address the inequitable and exploitative nature of existing 
economic and power structures in our societies or in the global system.
This is partly because neo-Liberalism and its logic of unfettered 
competition is in tension with the democratizing goal of social equity 
but also because, when neo-Liberalism and pluralist democracy are implanted 
in LDC societies plagued by extreme socio-economic differentiation, 
tribalism, and patronage, they perpetuate existing asymmetries. This 
occurs because, despite their political equality, neo-Liberalism and 
pluralist democracy are economically exclusive and leave the majority of 
the poor in LDC societies to rely on existing patron-client relationships 
to reduce their sense of alienation and gain access to benefits in the 
depersonalized and omitting world of modern global capitalist democracy.
In short, the neo-Liberal economy and pluralist democracy do not 
address the structural causes of disparity and marginalization or the need 
for a socially responsible and collective stewardship--if not for a 
redistribution--of wealth and power in society. My evidence confirms 
that neither the Ugandan state or international development organizations 
such as UNDP and AA have been particularly effective at challenging the
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inequality and injustice of existing economic and power relations either in 
Uganda or in the global economy. This means that the impetus for social 
transformation must emanate from a third realm: that of civil society and
especially social movements, networks and alliances of peoples's 
organizations which directly represent the poor.
A strong indigenous and global civil society has many potential 
benefits for the promotion of SHD/PCD approaches. First of all, as Laura 
Macdonald explains, personal empowerment of the type delivered by 
international development agency projects do not necessarily lead to 
participation in the wider political system or create the long-term 
conditions for a more participatory and egalitarian society. Secondly, 
it is only once individual capacity-building is complemented with 
collective action involving cross-sectoral linkages and national-global 
alliances, that the poor can begin to build up their ability to express 
voice and to press for social change. Finally, development efforts spawned
directly by people power are more likely to enjoy a local ownership and to 
be sustainable over the longer-term. In essence, social movements and 
peoples' organizations are key to keeping governments and international 
development agencies accountable and provide a much-needed counterweight to 
the politicking and organizational interests which have undermined SHD/PCD 
efforts thus far. It is important then, that international development 
agencies not only help the poor develop individual technical and 
organizational capacities, but directly help strengthen people-power.
It is for these reasons that post-Marxists like Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantale Mouffe argue that it is the 'new social movements' with their 
discourse on egalitarianism and citizenship rights (rather than the 
proletariat, as in days past) which will deepen the democratic revolution 
in the developing and developed world. As Ronnie Lipschutz elaborates, 
civil society is increasingly drawing strength from its heterogeneity and
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developing a power base in the various transnational political networks and 
global alliances it can tap into. This means that, in addition to 
promoting 'Sound governance' and strengthening civil society in LDCs, 
international development agencies can contribute by promoting global 
democratization within the system of international development cooperation.
Promoting global democratization and strengthening peoples' movements 
though, need not imply denying the importance of state action. According 
to political thinkers like Roniger, Held and Touraine, an enlightened 
civil society does not necessitate the demolition of the state, but rather 
its legal constraint and subjection to public accountability. Still 
there is no denying that a strong civil society may be destroyed by 
repressive governments since its goal is undeniably to change such regimes. 
As Robert Cox notes, forces in civil society have strong counter-hegemonic 
potential and aim to mobilize those people who seek an alternative. To 
thinkers like Cox, although the struggle for change and resistance in the 
next Millennium will take place primarily in civil society, international 
development organizations have an important role to play. Hence, Cox calls 
on the Janus-faced UN to not only link up with the state-system but to 
fulfil its dual role by becoming an interlocutor between the two. 
Furthermore, since the poor can not build counter-hegemonic forces without 
external support, Cox calls on all donors to not only provide technical 
support to those left at the margins but to create mechanisms to let the 
people lead and to directly support counter-hegemonic forces representing 
the poor by helping to build their technical, organizational and policy 
influencing abilities until they secure a seat at the table.
The agenda for change presented above is an ambitious one involving 
a series of theoretical, organizational, institutional, policy and civil 
society reforms In an ideal world, changes would occur in each of these 
realms. Yet, even if progress is made in one of them, there could be
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positive ripple effects on the others. My thesis has concentrated on the 
early years of SHD/PCD's implementation but the SHD/PCD paradigm is still 
young and running strong. There is ample time and opportunity for change. 
Whether changes occur in any of the realms described above will depend on 
the ability of international development organizations and recipient 
governments driven largely by the need for self-perpetuation, as well as 
poor of beneficiaries and other stakeholders to develop a longer-term 
vision of their interests. As shown throughout this thesis, this will 
not be easy nor is it these actors' natural inclination. However, there is 
no denying that much progress has already been made and with mounting 
pressure, the tide will be all that more difficult to roll back and change 
will become in the interest of the actors involved.
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Table 7.1: Manifestations of the Baroque Science Phenomenon (BSP) in UNDP & AA
Features of BSP 
in SHD/PCD
Manifestations of BSP 
at UNDP
Manifestations of BSP at AA
1.Abstracteness, 
vagueness in 
meaning of 
SHD/PCD
Overall; ***** Overall: **
HQ: ** HQ: *
Field: *** Field: *
Both agencies have problems understanding SHD/PCD but UNDP 
is more pressured to do so, especially in the field
2. Unknown 
links, weights 
& prorities 
between core 
components 
of SHD/PCD
Overall: ** Overall: **
HQ: * HQ: *
Field: * Field: *
Both agencies are unsure about linkages/weights/priorities 
of SHD/PCD's components or how they relate to work in the 
HQ and the Field.
3.Internal 
tensions & 
trade-offs 
between core 
components of 
SHD/PCD
Overall : ****
•Managerialism vs. * 
flexible learning 
•Policy advocacy vs. * 
grassroots participation 
•Conditionality on 
governance issues vs. ** 
self-determination
Overall: *****
•Managerialism vs. ** 
flexible learning 
•Policy advocacy vs. ** 
grassroots participation 
•Conditionality on * 
governance issues vs. 
self-determination
HQ:** HQ:**
Field:** Field:**
Both agencies face tensions between core SHD/PCD components 
UNDP faces most tensions between conditionality on 
governance issues and self-determination, while AA faces 
its most serious tensions between policy advocacy and 
grassroots participation and betwen managerialism and 
flexible learning. The tensions manifested themeselves in 
HQ and the Field
4.A gap between 
the theory of 
SHD/PCD and 
real
constraints 
found in 
practice
Overall: *********
•Unequal N-S partnership; * 
•Do it alone tendency * 
•Donor Territoritality; ** 
Ltd.org. capacity; * 
Ltd. org access/clout * 
•Recipient/beneficiary ** 
rent-seeking behaviour 
•Ltd. beneficiary skills * 
or free time
Overall: *********
•Unequal N-S Partnership; * 
•Do it alone tendency ** 
•Donor Territoritality * 
Ltd. org. capacity; * 
Ltd. org. access/clout ** 
•Recipient govt/beneficiary * 
rent-seeking behaviour 
•Ltd. beneficiary skills * 
or free time
HQ:* HQ: *
Field:******** Field; ********
Gaps between theory & practice occur in both agencies, in 
HQ and the Field. However, while UNDP suffers from too 
much emphasis on theory, AA suffers from too much en^hasis 
on practice. In both agencies, the Field carries the 
heavist burden of filling the gap and is affected most by 
Ugandan and beneficiary-level constraints
NB: * = degree of importance of the factor in question
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Table 7.2; Meuiifestations of the River Pollution Phenomenon (RPP) Within UNDP t AA Q
Features of RPP The RPP within UNDP The RPP within AA
l.A Tendency to 
do what is 
easiest & most 
feasible
Overall; *** 
•Accessible/trainable benef. * 
•Narrow range of options * 
•Follow rules/targets *
Overall: ****
•accessible/trainable benef. * 
•Narrow range of options * 
•Follow rules/targets **
HQ: ♦ HQ; *
Field: working with 
accessible/trainable ** 
beneficiaris and pre­
defining options at CMP
Field: esp. bypassing govt in 
order to make implemenation 
easier at ABP ***
Both agencies do what is easiest. Rules & targets are pushed 
from HQ but are internalized and have the hardest effects in 
the Field. As an operational agency, AA is most concerned with 
meeting targets--a pressure evident in the aborted training 
process in ABP's PDCs,
2.A tendency to 
increase the 
agency's mandate 
and power base 
for the sake of 
self-preservation
Overall: ** 
•Expand budget/keep$moving * 
•Add new functions *
Overall: ** 
•Expand budget/keep $moving * 
•Add new functions *
HQ:esp. add new functions *** HQ: esp. add new funtions ***
Field: esp. expand budget: * 
e.g., expansionism of 
intermediary NGOs in the Africa 
2000 Network/MPP
Field: esp. keep $ moving * 
e.g., AA's imposition of 
unrealistic deadlines upon 
PDCs or its quick replication 
of the generously World Bank- 
funded REFLECT Programme in 
order to keep the $ moving.
Both agencies enlarge their mandate & power-base. E3q>ansionism 
and pressures to expand budgets emanated largely from HQs but 
were also felt quite strongly in the Field which felt they had 
to spend the money quickly in order not to lose their budgets
3.A tendency to 
listen to the 
most powerful 
stakeholders who 
can exert the 
harshest 
sanctions
Overall: ***** Overall: ***
HQ: e.g., the influence
of the 6-77 on UNDP * * *
HQ: e.g, the influence of ** 
to AA's Board of Trustees 
on AA HQ
Field; ** Field: *
In both agencies, listening to powerful stakeholders was 
stronger in HQ where their Boards are based. The tendency was 
also stronger at UNDP which accounts more directly to nation­
states in the UN, fellow UN agencies, & recipient governments.
4,A tendency to 
simplify 
development 
complexities
Overall: ***♦ 
•Côver up errors
Overall: *** 
•Cover up errors
HQ: * HQ; *
Field:
e.g., MPP's cover up of *** 
embezzlement in its IGAs
Field: **
Both agencies idealized development. In both, the field was 
most active in concealing the difficulties of working with the 
poor as they dealt with them more directly. Because of its 
larger number of projects & lack of rigorous M&E, UNDP was more 
susceptible to error cover-ups.
NB: * s degree of inportance of the factor in question
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Towards a Wiring Diagram of the Factors Hindering the 
Implementation of the SHD/PCD Paradigm in Uganda and Beyond
At Conceptual 
Level
At the Policy & 
Programme/Proj ect 
Design Level
SHD/PCD Impact in 
at Large
The Baroque Science Phenomenon :
The abstract, unfinished, ambiguous and 
sometiems contradictory nature of the SHD/PCD 
paradigm and the gap between SHD/PCD ideals 
and the severity of the contraints present in 
the real work hinders lOs from fully 
understanding or operationalizing the SHD/PCD
paradigm into concrete 
development strategies
yet comprehensive
The River Pollution Phenomenon-.
Core SHD/PCD components in specific SHD/PCD 
programmes/projects are gradually displaced by lOs' 
trying to deal with the conceptual deficiencies of 
the SHD/PCD paradigm/ those tensions present between 
the pursuit of SHD/PCD goals and the pursuit of 
their own organizational interests; and their own 
contestable assumptions about
about development processes, the nature of the 
existing system of international development 
cooperation, and the their agencies' catalytic and 
organizational capacities.
Wider Contextual, Institutional and Policy 
Constraints ;
Even once in place, the effectiveness and actual 
development impact of SHD/PCD efforts can be 
undermined by wider contextual, institutional, and 
policy constraints operating in the political, 
economic and social realm and lOs' tendencies to 
underestimate the adverse effects of such 
constraints and to under-report setbacks resulting 
from them.
From Paradigm to Practice:
The Politics and Implementation of 
Sustainable Human Development in Uganda
By: Lilly Nicholls
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the Doctorate in Philosophy (PhD)
in International Development
Development Studies Institute (DESTIN),
London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London),
London, UK
September 14, 1998
Appendices :
Supervisors :
Dr. E.A. Brett, Development Studies Institute (DESTIN), LSE, London, UK 
Prof. Christopher Hood, Government Department, LSE, London, UK
POLITICAL
Pvic sy
Appendices :
Table of Contents:
Methodological Appendix
List of Informants Interviewed
Bibliography
Methodological Appendix:
I . Research Design and Data Collection Methods Utilized in the Thesis
A) Key Features of the Research Design Utilized in the Thesis
B) Data Collection Methods Utilized in the Four Phases of Research
II. Organization, Interpretation and Abstraction Methods Used in the Thesis
III. The Reach, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Methodology
A) The Strengths of the Research Methodology
B) The Weaknesses of the Research Methodology
C) Enhancing the Validity, Reliability and Generalizability/ 
Representability of the research data.
Methodological Appendix:
I. Research Design and Data Collection Methods Utilized in the Thesis
A) Key Features of the Research Design Utilized in the Thesis
My doctoral thesis relies on a 'qualitative research' methodology.
As consultants tro m  Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) point out,
"qualitative research is an attempt to present the social world in terms of 
the concepts, behaviours, perceptions and accounts of the very people is it 
about."  ^ As Bryman and Burgess explain in Analyzing Qualitative Data, 
qualitative research can not be reduced to particular techniques or stages. 
Instead, it is a dynamic process which links together problems, theories 
and methods; which often involves alternate interaction between conceptual 
and empirical work; and which sometimes incorporates both deduction and 
induction at the same time.  ^ In addition, notions of validity, 
reliability, generalizability and representability which are so central to 
quantitative research and scientific laboratory experiments, cannot be 
established to the same degree in qualitative research since the latter is 
not numerically-based. In qualitative research, the emphasis is on in- 
depth investigation of issues and, as such, the researcher tends to focus 
more on human perceptions, insights and interpretations as opposed to 
statistical correlations or calculations of probabilities or direct 
causality.  ^ This, however, should not be taken to mean that qualitative 
research has no structure or rigor. Quite the contrary. Because in 
qualitative research one is exploring deeply-held human convictions and 
perceptions which are difficult to get at, it is imperative that the 
researcher identify key guiding research principles and design a research 
framework which allows for the consistent collection of difficult to access 
data as well as for the constant meshing of empirical data collection and 
theoretical reflection which is so vital in qualitative research.
5In my own doctoral work, I have opted for a 'grounded theory' 
approach to qualitative research based on the work of Glaser and Strauss. * 
As Bryman and Burgess explain, grounded theory is essentially "the 
discovery of theory from data collected on a particular issue." From data 
categories established over time, the researcher attempts to reflect on 
major insights and to draw out associations and trends emerging from the 
data until he/she eventually comes up with an emerging theory which is 
itself tested out in the field. In actuality, the grounded theory approach 
is a reiterative process in which the researcher travels back and forth 
between data and theory as he/she tries to ensure that the emerging theory 
fits the evidence found and that the evidence available is itself properly 
grounded in existing theory. ® Although in grounded theory, much of the 
theoretical reflection occurs during or near the end of the data collection 
process, the researcher will usually have at least some theoretical 
insights about his/her subject matter before heading to the field. *
In my own doctoral research, I followed steps very similar to those 
utilized in grounded theory. First of all, following the advice of William 
Whyte, I did a considerable amount of conceptual reflection before starting 
my primary research. Hence, in 1994, even before conducting any 
interviews, I had read a considerable amount of the SHD/PCD, International 
Development Cooperation, Implementation Process, and Institutional 
literatures relevant to my research; had done a considerable amount of 
thinking about what the parameters and core research questions of my study 
would be; had selected which international development agencies I would be 
analyzing; and had generally identified the kinds of development issues and 
SHD/PCD variables which I was most interested in exploring. In similar 
vein, before commencing my fieldwork in Uganda in mid 1995, I already had 
developed a general idea of the schools of thought which were most relevant 
to my work and of the theoretical premises which would need to be tested 
once I was on the ground. For instance, even before departing for Uganda,
6I knew that the claims of what I have in my thesis termed the Democratic
Development School of thought and the New Institutional Economics would need to be
further tested and empirically substantiated once in the field. 
Nevertheless, as stipulated by the grounded theory approach, it was only 
after I had collected my first data sets in the UK, New York, Washington 
and Uganda, that I began to flesh out the initial hypotheses which later 
became the my thesis's core argument. Furthermore, it was only after re­
testing my initial hypotheses during a second set of field trips to New 
York and Uganda in late 1995 and early 1996 and receiving feedback on my 
initial ideas from my colleagues and supervisors that I was able to refine 
my initial theoretical insights. Clearly then, my doctoral research 
strategy borrows directly from grounded theory approach and has strong 
parallels with Bryman's and Burgess' framework approach' which was itself 
inspired by grounded theory. The specific steps I followed during my 
research process are described in detail in Table Al.
In addition to relying on qualitative research and a grounded theory
framework, my research design has a number of other features worthy of 
mention. The features of my research design are summarized in Table A2.
To start, it is worth noting that the thesis utilizes a multiplicity
of data collection and interpretation methods--i.e., what Bulmer and 
Warwick call 'methodological integration'. ’ Hence, while most of the data 
in the thesis is based on unstructured interviews, participant 
observation, focus group discussion and document analysis techniques 
commonly used in qualitative research, when appropriate, the thesis uses 
quantitative data such as official statistics on public expenditures and 
foreign aid flows, development indicators and data on development agency 
budgets, to get the point across. The multiple data collection methods 
used in the various research phases are discussed in the next section and 
summarized in Table A3.
7Other integral features of my doctoral research include reliance on 
'fieldwork', a strong 'action research' component and, a considerable 
amount of 'case study research' involving 'multi-site studies'.
When I speak of 'field work', I am referring to the process of 
engaging in primary and hands-on research at the site of my area of 
interest. In Anthropology and much of Development Studies, field work 
traditionally involves scholars based in the West investigating less 
developed societies unfamiliar to them. ® On the one hand, my fieldwork in 
Uganda, where I spent a total of five months (from April-July 1995 and 
later from November-December 1995) fits this conventional style of 
development research since, throughout this time, I was an outsider living 
among people from another culture in an effort to understand a society 
different from my own. On the other hand though, my doctoral fieldwork 
is atypical of much of that undertaken in Development Studies or 
Anthropology in that, on top of visits to Africa, my field work involved 
spending the summer of 1994 working within UNDP's Human Development Report Office
(HDRO) in New York in order to learn about the agency's organizational 
culture and to identify key players in the promotion of SHD/PCD, as well as 
additional field work in the UK, Washington DC. and New York, where I spent 
considerable time interviewing key respondents in academia, NGOs, the World 
Bank and the UN between 1995-1997. This combination of fieldwork at the 
global as well as at the national and local levels is what allowed me to 
fully trace the operationalization of SHD/PCD from its initial 
conceptualization in the headquarters of international development agencies 
down to its implementation in LDCs.
It is also important to explain that, even while doing conventional 
fieldwork in Uganda, my role differed from the sometimes extractive 
research role played by 'safari scholars' in LDCs since my fieldwork in 
Uganda had a strong 'action research' component. Alan Bryman defines
8'action research' as research in which the investigator and the client 
(i.e., the host organization) collaborate in the diagnosis of a problem and 
in which the research undertaken can then be put to use by the host 
organization. ® Admittedly, in the case of my own research, I maintained 
the upper hand in the preparation of the research design as well as in the 
interpretation of the data collected both at the global level and on the 
ground in Uganda. Nevertheless, throughout the research process, I made a 
conscious effort to incorporate a strong 'problem-solving' component into 
my work in order to ensure that the research findings proved directly 
relevant and useful to UNDP and AA. Furthermore, while on the ground in 
Uganda, I held various working meetings with UNDP and AA staff to ensure 
that their research interests were reflected in my own research design, to 
keep them informed about my research progress, and to obtain their feedback 
and suggestions on projects or persons to visit during the research.
Perhaps even more importantly, both UNDP and AA were given detailed end-of- 
research reports which either contained concrete recommendations' or 
identified general areas in need of improvement in each agency. Despite 
this collaboration though, both UNDP and AA granted me considerable 
autonomy and at no point ever subjected my research to the approval (or 
censorship) of the agencies.
Another feature of doctoral research was that it was organized around 
'case studies'. Case study research normally entails the investigation of a 
small number of cases. In my own research, my case studies consisted of 
two different types of development organizations : a multilateral
development agency--UNDP and an international Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO)--Action Aid. The logic behind using two organizational case studies 
was to test whether a smaller and more autonomous non-governmental 
development agency (i.e., AA) was better equipped to carry out SHD/PCD 
approaches than a much larger, more hierarchical and politically-dependent 
inter-govemmental development organization (i.e., UNDP). The reasons why
9UNDP and AA were chosen as case studies is explained in Chapter 1. In 
addition to studying two separate development organizations, my case study 
research in Uganda also involved 'multi-site studies' of development 
projects carried out by UNDP and AA in Uganda. Within UNDP, I carried out 
20 visits to project sites, beneficiary groups and individuals within three 
major development programmes : HYiq Africa 2000 Network, the Micro Projects Programme
to Combat Aids (MPP) , and the Community Management Programme (CMP). In the case
of AA, I paid visits to both the Kamuli and the Buwekula Development Areas
(DAs) but concentrated my multi-site studies on the Buwekula DA, where I
visited 20 projects sites beneficiary groups and individuals.
A final feature of my research design is that it relies on what the 
literature calls 'non-probability sampling techniques'. Unlike 
'probability sampling' where one calculates the exact chances of a person 
being selected to be part of a sample, in non-probability sampling, the 
researcher uses his/her own judgement and research interests to select of 
his/her chosen sample. This means that the researcher can neither 
guarantee randomness in the selection process or specify the chances of a 
particular person being chosen to form part of that same sample.
In my own research, I utilize two types of non-probability sampling. 
In the first technique : i.e., 'purposive sampling', the researcher selects 
those persons who will be studied or interviewed in the research on the 
basis of the chosen parameters or conceptual requirements of his/her study. 
For example, in my own research, I intentionally interviewed international 
development scholars and experts closely associated with UNDP's HDRO since 
I knew such persons were most likely to be familiar and to provide useful 
insights about SHD/PCD approaches. And, while in Uganda, I specifically 
selected nationally-based development scholars and experts respected for 
their in-depth knowledge of Ugandan development issues; donors known for
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either their clout or their commitment to SHD/PCD-type principles; 
government officials familiar with development efforts and the development 
agencies I was studying; and, beneficiaries known to have been participated 
in UNDP and AA SHD/PCD projects. Each of the above is an example of 
purposive sampling in that my choice of informants was determined by my 
chosen research focus and interests rather than on the basis of calculated 
probability as is more commonly the case in quantitative research. In the 
case of the second sampling technique: i.e., 'snowball sampling', the 
researcher relies on one individual informant to lead to another. This 
sampling technique was essential in my interviews with elite respondents 
such as top-level UN functionaries and government officials to whom access 
would have been unlikely without personal contacts or recommendations.
The key features of my research design are summarized in Table A2, at 
the end of this methodological appendix.
B) Data Collection Methods Utilized in the Four Phases of Research:
My doctoral research was carried out over four different phases and 
consisted of mainly four types of data collection methods commonly used in 
qualitative research. The data collection methods used during the four 
research phases are described below and summarized in Table A3.
i) Literature Review and Document Analysis
The first phase (October 1993-1994) of my doctoral research consisted 
mainly of a comprehensive literature review and of document analysis.
While my literature review and document analysis took place mostly during 
the first year of my research, I have reviewed old material and read new 
books and studies throughout the research.
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The purpose of my initial literature review was threefold: Firstly,
to familiarize myself with the various social science literatures which 
might offer theoretical insights for my own research (i.e., especially but 
not exclusively, the SHD/PCD, International Development Cooperation, 
Implementation Processes, and Institutional literatures); secondly, to gain 
a deeper understanding of the conceptual logic, theoretical underpinnings 
and ideological tenets of the SHD/PCD paradigm; and, thirdly, to obtain 
historic and empirical information on development trend and the impact of 
foreign aid and different development policies and interventions in LDCs.
In addition to studying various theoretical literatures and scholarly 
works, the first phase of my research also involved document analysis of 
more conjunctural and policy-related information, including analyses of 
international declarations such as the Declaration o f  the Copenhagen Social
Development S u m m i tof strategic reports such as the UN Secretary-General's
Agenda for Development; and of major policy statements by international actors
such as the G-77. I have also made a conscious effort to access internal 
agency documents (e.g., James Gustave Speth's Initiatives For Change, UNDP's main
mission statement for the nineties); internal consultancy reports and 
assessments (e.g.,the Centre for Development Research's evaluation of UNDP 
entitled : Assessment o f UNDP: Development Capacity for Sustainable Human Development) ; and
more general studies of development cooperation conducted by major donors 
(e.g., the European Centre for Development Policy and Management's and the 
Overseas Development Institute's study of international development 
cooperation entitled, European Union A id Agencies: Comparative Management and
Effectiveness) . The analysis of the above documents has been instrumental in
helping me gage the extent to which SHD/PCD ideas have penetrated 
development policy and practice.
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ii) Unstructured Interviewing:
'Unstructured interviews' were undoubtedly the cornerstone of my data 
collection methodology. While in a structured interview, the researcher 
asks mostly pre-set and close-ended questions, and while in a semi­
structured interview, the researcher may mix pre-set close-ended questions 
with pre-set open-ended questions the interviews I conducted during my 
own research were 'unstructured' in that they were based on a set of 
general themes and topics from which more specific questions would emerge 
in the course of the interview itself. The purpose of this interview style 
is to develop a rapport and to establish a situation of trust with the 
informant early on in the interview so that the researcher is able to delve 
into more sensitive issues relating to the respondent's' motives, 
perceptions and concerns further along the interview. It is for this 
reason, notes Robert Burgess, that some investigators regard unstructured 
interviews as "conversation with a purpose." “
In my own research, I carried out 211 unstructured interviews, most 
of them during the second (interviews with international-level informants 
from November 1994-January 1996) and third (Fieldwork in Uganda during May- 
July 1995 and November-December 1995) phases of my doctoral research, 
although select interview were also during the fourth phase of the research 
(Write Up and Last Follow-up work from 1996-1997).
During my unstructured interviews, I would walk into the interview 
with what has been referred to in the literature as an 'agenda of topics' 
or a 'topic guide' outlining the general set of topics/issues which I 
hoped to address during that particular interview. To facilitate matters, 
in my own case, I developed a generic topic guide for each of the general 
cluster of informants I intended to interview. * These topic guides were 
generally quite comprehensive and covered from 8-12 topics of interest.
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Just before each interview and depending on the respondent's known area of 
expertise and those issues for which I felt I still needed additional 
evidence, from the larger set of themes/topics, I would select a small sub­
set of possible themes/topics to cover with the particular informant I was 
preparing to interview. Then, during the interview process itself, I 
would focus on even a smaller set of questions with each particular 
informant. On this point, it is important to note that while I did pre­
select possible sub-set of topics for discussion before going into an 
interview, the actual interview was always left sufficiently open and 
flexible to give the respondent leeway in taking the conversation in 
directions which he/she deemed important. Lastly, although my topic guides 
were sometimes quite detailed and did often contain sample questions in 
them, for the sake of spontaneity, I would rarely use the questions as they 
were written in the topic guides during my interviews. Instead, the 
questions I had written in my topic guides mostly functioned as prompts or 
as a back-up should I draw a blank during the interview. For these 
reasons, each of my unstructured interviews has its own momentum and focus.
In terms of probing techniques, I followed one of two patterns: the
'investigative probe' or the 'in-depth probe'. In the investigative probe, 
the interviewer starts with a very general topic and from there branches 
out into various smaller but related topics. The pattern is very similar 
to that of moving from the tree trunk towards the branches of a tree. In 
the in-depth probe, the interviewer once again starts with a very general 
topic but rather than moving laterally into various other topics, he/she 
delves as deeply as possible into one particular issue. The latter process 
is akin to that of slowly peeling an onion until one gets closer and closer 
to its core. Both investigative and in-depth interviewing are based on 
unstructured interviewing techniques, it is only the type of probing and 
the focus of the topic being followed up which differs. In my own
interviews, the type of probing which I would pursue would depend largely
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on the kind of respondent I was dealing with. For instance, in cases where 
the respondent had been sought for his/her breadth of knowledge about the 
topic at hand (e.g., this was often the case in interviews with well-known 
international development scholars or experts), I would follow an 
investigative style of probing in which I moved laterally from topic to 
topic in an effort to tap into the broad range of interests and expansive 
knowledge of the informant. On the other hand, in those cases where I was 
interviewing someone mostly due to their familiarity with a very particular 
set of issues or group of actors (e.g., a development agency programme 
officer overseeing a specific project) , it was not unusual for me to cover 
a restricted set of topics and to explore a specific issue more deeply.
Finally, on the subject of security and academic discretion, it is 
worth noting that because unstructured interviewing involves exposing 
personal views and perspectives, the kind of data collected can be very 
sensitive. For example, during my own research, many UNDP and Action Aid 
staff revealed attitudes or behaviours (such as an aversion to honest and 
rigorous evaluation) within their organizations which are incriminating, 
while Ugandan government officials pointed to issues (such as runaway 
military spending) and tendencies (such as that towards corruption) which 
are extremely controversial. In both cases, the information revealed by 
the informants was critical to my research findings yet, had the 
information been directly attributed to the respondents, it may have put 
their jobs and, in some cases their safety, in jeopardy. It is for this 
reason that while most respondents were interviewed  ^on the record' 
some were given the option of having their responses quoted without direct 
attribution. Because of the sensitive nature of the information exchanged 
during some of the interviews, I opted not to tape record my interviews. 
Furthermore, given the rugged nature of my Uganda fieldwork, taping 
interviews in remote rural villages would have been logistically difficult 
and awkward for local villagers. To compensate for the lack of tape-
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recorded information, I have taken fairly detailed notes during interviews 
and kept such notes in personal interview books; in those cases where 
respondents have turned out to be key informants, I transcribed my 
interviews into orderly and computerized transcripts; and in those cases in 
which particular respondents have requested a written record of our 
interview, I have mailed them a summary transcripts of the interview so 
that they could carefully check for accuracy and provide modifications. In 
all, about half of my respondents received copies of summary interview 
transcripts and about a fourth of them returned them with detailed feedback 
and suggested modifications.
The situation was rather different in the case of my Uganda-based 
interviews, where Ugandan respondents themselves cautioned me against 
transcribing interviews into computerized form and mailing back such 
sensitive material to a country where mail still arrives to general Post 
Office Boxes and therefore there are few guarantees that the package would 
land in the appropriate hands. With respect to project beneficiaries, it 
made little sense to send interview transcripts to community members with 
no formal mailing addresses at all, especially since many of them had 
difficulties reading English. However, I have kept detailed hand-written 
accounts of all my Uganda-based interviews in special fieldwork books.
And, as mentioned above, both UNDP's and AA's offices in Kampala and all 
the programme coordinators who gave me access to their projects were sent 
copies of my end-of-trip evaluation reports to their agencies. Moreover, 
UNDP, AA, and key respondents were sent my first working paper based on my 
research and published by LSE's Centre for the Study o f  Global Governance.
Hi) Focus Group Discussions:
Most of the interviews I carried out during my doctoral research 
involved individuals. However, during the third phase of my research
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(i.e., my fieldwork in Uganda), about half of my meetings with project 
beneficiaries took the form of 'focus group discussions'. In some 
instances, these focus group discussions took place in the presence of an 
AA or UNDP staff persons while, in others, the discussions were led by 
myself, assisted by my research assistant. The main advantage of focus 
group discussions is that they allow the researcher to meet a much larger 
number of project beneficiaries and to witness community members 
interacting and engaging in discussion with one another and UNDP and AA 
staff. The caveat is that the researcher can not follow-up on the views 
of particular individuals during the sessions; that the views of the weaker 
members of the group may be muffled by more domineering group members ; or 
that, in some cases, government and development agency staff themselves 
take over the discussion. “ Interestingly though, getting a glimpse of 
these kinds of interaction problems was itself very useful for my research 
as it enabled me to observe first-hand the kinds of power relations and 
tensions which existed within beneficiary groups. Still, it is worth 
noting that focus group discussions are not completely natural or 
spontaneous situations, but rather events orchestrated especially for the 
benefit of donors or visiting researchers, as was the case during my 
visits. In fact, one of the most difficult things during my Uganda 
fieldwork was observing beneficiaries in their own natural setting. (This 
problem is addressed in section III, A, iv of the methodological appendix).
iv) Participation Observation:
The last data collection method utilized in my doctoral research was 
'participant observation'. I relied on participant observation to gather 
data during all three phases of my research. Generally speaking, I engaged 
in two different forms of participant observation: 'full participant 
observation' and ' semi-participant observation'. In both cases, my role as 
participant observer was open rather than covert.
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My role as a full participant observer took place during the my 
first phase of research, when I spent two months as a consultant in UNDP's 
HDRO in New York in the summer of 1994. During this period, although 
everyone in UNDP's HDRO knew that I was a doctoral student doing research 
on the topic of SHD/PCD, I played the role of full participant observer 
since as a full-time and UNDP-paid consultant, UNDP assigned me to 
research pre-determined topics and to establish contact with specific UN 
and UNDP Offices in preparation for the publication of the HDRO's 1995 HDR
on gender and development and expected me to partake in all of the daily 
activities of UNDP's HDRO. Yet, because much of the behaviour I was 
observing during this consultancy was directly relevant to my own doctoral 
research on SHD/PCD approaches, my greatest challenge during this period 
was to ensure that I wore my 'HDRO consultant hat' as opposed to my 
'autonomous researcher hat' during work meetings. Juggling the two roles 
(a public one as a consultant and a private one as a doctoral researcher 
engaged in full participant observation) proved very taxing at times, as I 
was frequently meeting key players in the promotion of SHD/PCD approaches, 
but had to restrain myself from interviewing these players for the time 
being. On the other hand, the advantage of my full participant observer 
position was that it allowed me to gather many documents relevant to my 
research; to directly observe how persons within the HDRO interacted with 
one another, with other development experts and UN officials, and with the 
field; and to gage how the HDRO was regarded by others within UNDP and the 
UN at large. In the process, I learned about the tensions and concerns 
plaguing UNDP and the HDRO and the constraints both faced in their efforts 
to push forward the SHD/PCD agenda. Lastly, working within the UNDP office 
in New York enabled me to make a number of strategic contacts in UN 
headquarters. I subsequently managed to interview many of these well- 
placed contacts and several became key informants.
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In contrast to the 'imsider role' I played from within UNDP's HDRO in 
the summer of 1994, my role I played during my fieldwork in Uganda in the 
third phase of my research (May-July 1995 and November-December 1995) was
much closer to that of a semi-participant observer. During my assessment
of UNDP's and AA's development efforts in Uganda, I was given considerable 
access to the work of the two agencies and enough flexibility to chat with 
agency staff freely, to eat lunch among them, and to walk in and out of 
both agencies' Kampala offices on a regular basis. Furthermore, during my 
field visits to remote rural projects, because I usually travelled to the 
countryside with UNDP and AA staff and shared with them the rigours of road 
travel and the proximity which comes from travelling together all day in 
remote areas, I was able to forge a personal rapport and to closely observe 
staff behaviour over time. This kind of access clearly enabled me to 
observe first hand the actors' behaviour, attitudes and the way in which 
they communicated with local community leaders and beneficiaries.
Nevertheless, unlike my consultancy work in the HDRO in New York, 
while I was in Uganda, I was clearly not considered part of the regular
staff and both UNDP and AA employees were well-aware that my chief role in
the field was to conduct my own research as opposed to having to do the 
same work which was expected of them--hence my description of my role 
during this phase as that of a semi-participant observer. As can be 
expected, because I was not entirely 'one of the gang', some UNDP and AA 
staff in Uganda viewed me suspiciously and, consequently, either held back 
information or tried to put the best foot of the agency forward during our 
conversations. However, as my field research progressed, I discovered 
that an equal number of staff persons saw me as a possible conduit for 
voicing staff concerns and, as a result, were willing pass a considerable 
amount of confidential information my way. In other words, being viewed as 
an 'outside researcher' by staff may have opened some doors as well as 
closed others.
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In the final analysis, the simultaneous inclination of some staff to 
'hide things' and that of others to 'reveal things' probably cancelled each 
other out êuid, in the end, allowed me to gather both positive and negative 
information and views about UNDP's and AA's work in Uganda. The main 
shortfall of the 'outside researcher' role I played in Ugauida was that 
while, on the one hand, I had considerable access to UNDP's and AA's work 
and was able to observe the behaviour of both agencies' staff fairly 
closely, on the other hand, I was not able to spend extended periods of 
time observing particular Ugandan communities or beneficiary groups. My 
status as an outsider and the transient nature of both UNDP's and AA's work 
with beneficiary groups meant that I rarely stayed in remote communities 
for an extended period of time or saw such communities when they were not 
making special preparations to receive 'outside guests'. Of course, the 
elaborately orchestrated receptions UNDP and AA staff and myself received 
upon our arrival in beneficiary communities were themselves very 
instructive and revealed the cultural gulf and power discrepancies which 
existed between development agency staff and project beneficiaries as well 
as the artificial forms which these agencies' development interventions 
sometimes took. It is because I am well aware of the restricted 
interaction I had with beneficiary communities during my Uganda fieldwork 
that, throughout my Uganda research, I made a conscious effort to seek out 
the views of local Ugandans officials and residents. I have also made it 
clear that my study of the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in Uganda 
is primarily intended as a study of the effectiveness of foreign assistance 
in that country as opposed to a study of Uganda at large.
Table A3 at the end of this methodological appendix summarizes the 
various data collection methods utilized during the four phases of my 
doctoral research.
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II. Organization, Interpretation and Abstraction Methods Used in the Thesis
As previously mentioned* one of the key features of my doctoral
research design is that it is based on qualitative research techniques. As
can be expected then, the techniques I used to organize, interpret and to
abstract from my data are techniques commonly applied to qualitative data.
The qualitative research techniques used to analyze my data included:
Ordering, clustering and grouping data to detect general issues. 
Patterning and categorizing data to detect specific trends.
Factoring: i.e., dividing data on the basis of certain factors. 
Synthesizing: i.e., grouping information in order to make key 
patterns stand out and to find sub-patterns within major patterns. 
Tracing Networks through charting: i.e., making flow charts to 
figure out how information and decision-making systems operate within 
certain organizations.
Mapping: i.e., drawing maps of agencies' areas of operation and 
projects.
Association: i.e., searching for associations between certain 
variables in order to detect similarities and differences between 
case studies.
Conceptualization: i. e ., thinking about new phenomena made evident
by the data.
Hypothesizing: i.e., conning up with novel explanations for new 
phenomena found.
Abstracting: i.e., reflecting about how the research findings relate
to existing theoretical frameworks.
One or several of the above qualitative techniques for organizing, 
interpreting and abstracting ffrom data were used at one point or another in 
my doctoral research. All of the techniques are part of the 'grounded 
theory' approach discussed earlier and are described further in Table Al.
III. The Reach, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Methodology;
A) The Strengths of the Research Methodology:
i) Analyzing SHD/PCD Approaches from an International, National and Local Perspective:
One of the greatest strengths of my doctoral research methodology is 
that it traces the translation! of SHD/PCD from paradigm into practice at 
the global, national and local levels. My doctoral thesis attempts to
21
achieve this by conducting research and interviewing international 
community actors in power centres like London, New York, êuid Washington 
DC., while at the same time carrying out national and local-level fieldwork 
in Uganda where, I not only interviewed Kampala-based development experts, 
donors, government officials, and UNDP and AA staff, but also assessed 
selected development programmes in the Ugandan countryside and spoke to 
those local residents and beneficiaries directly affected by UNDP's and 
AA's development efforts in remote rural areas. A multi-level analysis has 
allowed me to trace the evolution of SHD/PCD ideas from their inception as 
a new paradigm in the North, to its operationalization into Ugandan 
government policies, and its eventual implementation into specific 
development programmes and projects in local Ugandan communities. By 
carefully following this trajectory, I have been able to identify the 
various constituents and opponents of SHD/PCD approaches, crucial North- 
South frictions regarding the desirability of SHD/PCD approaches, and the 
key implementational obstacles hindering the promotion and implementation 
of SHD/PCD approaches at the global, national and local levels. The 
obvious drawback of such a multi-level approach is that the time spent 
interviewing elite informants in Western Universities, UN embassies and 
development agency headquarters, is essentially time not spent doing field 
work in poor Ugandan communities and vice-versa. In other words, in a 
multi-level analysis, the researcher makes significant gains in terms of 
widening his/her scope but must in return sacrifice some of the detail and 
time spent doing intensive community-level fieldwork. In my work, I have 
tried to balance these two elements by spending as much time doing national 
and local-level fieldwork as I have conducting global-level research.
ii) Methodological Integration Through the Use o f  Multiple Data Collection Methods:
As already noted above, another advantage of my research design lay 
in its use of an integrated approach to data collection. The first
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advantage of using multiple forms of data collection was that it allowed me 
to continually cross-check the reliability and objectivity of the 
information I was being given by key informants. In some cases, I did this 
by putting the same question to informants from different sectors or 
agencies (e.g., when a former AA manager in Kampala told me that AA tended 
to make major decisions on behalf of beneficiaries in a top-down matter, I 
raised the issue with an independent consultant who had carried out an 
assessment of AA's projects in Uganda but had no reason to have a personal 
grievance against AA the way the first informant had given his unpleasant 
departure from AA) . In other cases, I simply cross-checked informants' 
views by relying on another data collection technique altogether (e.g., 
while attending an AA training session for a Parish Development Committee (PDC)
in the Buwekula DA in Mubende District, through participant observation, I
was able to directly witness AA workers dominating decision-making meetings 
with project beneficiaries) . In each of the examples above, the use of 
multiple data collection methodologies gave me a way of cross-checking the 
reliability of my informants' information. The second advantage of 
methodological diversity in data collection is that it allows the 
researcher to fill information gaps which one type of data alone can not 
fill. (e.g., during my research, many respondents pointed out to that 
despite its cuts in administration and personnel, AA-Uganda's overhead 
costs remained very high. Although I suspected that this information might 
be accurate given the large fleet of cars, computer equipment and 
administrative staff which I had observed on he ground, it was only once 
an AA manager in Kampala unexpectedly gave me access to internal agency 
budgets and accounts that I was able to fill this information gap.
Hi) Going Beyond the Project Bias’:
Another positive aspect of my research design is that, in order to 
avoid what Robert Chambers has termed the 'project bias' ^°--i.e., the
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tendency to interview only project staff or beneficiaries during field 
work--I have made a conscious effort to talk to a wide range of actors not 
directly benefiting from UNDP or AA projects. I achieved this in two ways.
The first was by interviewing a range of development scholars and 
experts, donors, and both national and local government officials, an 
community residents often overlooked by project evaluators--as evident by 
UNDP's and AA's surprise at my spending much of my research time speaking 
to persons not directly associated with their projects. Talking to a range 
of actors not directly working for either UNDP or AA, gave me valuable 
insights into the way outsiders viewed the effectiveness of UNDP and AA, 
while putting senior staff in both agencies a position in which they had to 
recommend non-project persons to speak to, taught me a considerable amount 
about the restricted interactions which these agencies sometimes have with 
Ugandan civil society at large. It was my own responsibility, of course, 
to ensure that I confirmed any critiques of the agencies given to me by 
outsiders UNDP and AA staff. Despite UNDP's and AA's initial uneasiness 
about my speaking to outsiders, in the end, both agencies were grateful to 
learn about the way their agencies were viewed by other development actors.
The second way in which I went beyond the project bias was by 
informally soliciting the views of local residents in those Ugandan 
communities in which I visited UNDP and AA projects. Sometimes, these 
encounters involved impromptu conversations with store owners and local 
business women. But, in other instances, I would consciously seek out and 
formally interview local priests, school masters, or persons from 
neighbouring development projects about their views of UNDP and AA's 
contributions. Once again, local residents were initially surprised that I 
would be interested in their opinions but, once approached, would relax and 
offer useful insights into UNDP's and AA's relations with local dwellers 
who were not necessarily part of these agencies' beneficiary community.
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iv) Taking Advantage o f  Being Foreign, Young and Female:
The last advantage of my research was an aspect which was not pre­
planned : i.e., my status as a young foreign female. The main benefit of
being relatively young and female was that UNDP and AA managers and 
programme coordinators felt less threatened by my presence. This was 
further helped by my insistence that, far from considering myself a 
development expert, I was there to lea m  from Ugandans themselves. This 
attitude put to rest project managers' original fears that I was there to 
'correct their work', while being female made it easier to be less of an 
imposing figure as well as to bond with female Programme Coordinators and 
field staff, many of whom had been graduate students in England and 
appreciated company while on the road. Finally, being a woman may have 
made it easier to interact with and arouse the curiosity of project 
beneficiaries, many of whom posed questions about why 'my husband was not 
with me' and 'why I did not yet have children' . Answering lifestyle 
questions such as these not only served to break the ice and develop to 
develop a rapport with beneficiaries intimidated by the presence of an 
outsider, but it also ensured that the interview process was not too 
unidirectional. Interestingly, through community members' personal 
questions, I also managed to learn more about the concerns in the minds of 
poor Ugandans. Lastly, I found that being white and a foreigner (known in 
Uganda as a Muzungo) was overall beneficial to my research. As mentioned
above, being a Muzungo did mean that I could not visit communities without
disturbing every day routines or sit in local RC meetings without going 
unnoticed. Still, being a Muzungo also made it was easier not to become
embroiled in sensitive (and sometimes violent) community disputes at the 
local level and being a foreigner associated with a well-known British 
University proved to be an advantage in gaining access to senior 
government officials and well-known scholars in Kampala.
25
B) The Weaknesses of the Research Methodology:
i) The Language Barrier:
In the case of my Ugandan fieldwork, although most urban and middle- 
class Ugandans have a good command of English, I did need to rely on a 
translator when interviewing poor respondents in remote rural villages.
As Martin Bulmer rightly points out, when a researcher has to have 
questions translated into another language, the scope for error inevitably 
increases I compensated for this language barrier in two ways. One
was to lea m  some basic Lugandan (the language of the Baganda people and 
the most common dialect used in the region around Kampala). Although my 
knowledge of Lugandan remained basic, greeting community members and asking 
them basic things in their own language helped put respondents at ease.
The second manner in which I dealt with the language barrier was to work 
with Ugandan research assistants with work experience in remote rural 
areas. In the case of my AA research, my research assistant was himself a 
former AA field worker familiar with the region I was visiting, while in 
the case of UNDP, my research assistant had considerable experience doing 
community-level research in remote Ugandan villages. In both cases, using 
research assistants turned out to be helpful. For one, while my researchers 
translated my interview questions to community members, I had more time to 
think, to observe peoples' behaviour, and to write down my responses. 
Secondly, my research assistants furnished me with valuable cultural 
information about the communities we visited and provided useful feedback 
on my initial impressions and hypotheses.
ii) Time and Money Constraints:
One of the most constraining aspects of my research design was no 
doubt the limited amount of time an money available to conduct fieldwork
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either in New York/Washingtion DC., or in Uganda. In New York and 
Washington DC., the high coists of living in hotels in such expensive cities 
meant that my research tripis had to be restricted to 2-3 weeks each and 
that I had to be very selective in my interviews and to concentrate on 
respondents who were quite Jknowledgeable about SHD/PCD ideas and their 
promotion. In Uganda, although accommodation was cheaper, transportation 
costs, the payment of a research permit from the Ugandan government, and 
the salary and maintenance fees for research assistants meant that 
interviews had to be conducted even during weekends and that the research 
focus had to be on the effectiveness of international development agencies 
rather than on the history and evolution of Ugandan society at large.
Hi) Staff and Beneficiary Conjmion About my Dual Role as Consultant and Researcher:
Another disadvantage which I faced during my fieldwork in Uganda, was 
that very few of the rank atid file in UNDP and AA were properly informed 
about the exact nature of my mission. As such, although top-level managers 
in both agencies' offices in Kampala gave me considerable access to agency 
information and allowed me to carry out my research in a fairly independent 
manner, specific programme coordinators and field-level staff remained 
suspicious of my presence and fearful that I had been sent by agency 
headquarters to 'keep an eye on the field'. Ironically, the aloofness of 
the rank and file at UNDP and AA turned out to be partly beneficial for my 
research as it gave me the freedom to explore issues and to talk to people 
to whom field staff members would have been unlikely to point me to had I 
been relying more heavily on their guidance. On the other hand though, had 
UNDP and AA informed field staff and beneficiaries better about my research 
and encouraged them to become more involved, the research findings which I 
submitted to both agencies at the end of my work may have been more widely 
disseminated and discussed among field staff. Unfortunately, as an 
independent PhD student, I had no say over the way in which UNDP and AA
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incorporated field staff in my research and had to be careful not to 
influence too much the natural behaviour of the subjects I was studying.
iv) The Risk o f Affecting Results: Beneficiaries’ Funding and Leadership Expectations:
Another problem outside researchers face when studying poor 
communities is that project beneficiaries may expect them to provide the 
community with much-needed expertise and funding. During my visits to 
remote Ugandan villages, community members would blatantly ask for advice 
on complex technical matters. Under such circumstances, it was very 
difficult not to fall into the trap of playing the role of 'omniscient 
development expert' and, in the process, influencing the community's 
development process rather than merely observing it. When truly 
pressured, I would try to give as neutral a piece of advice possible; 
usually something to the effect that it was important to 'collaborate with 
one another'. " Even more problematic, when visiting poor communities, 
some group members would expect me buy their goods (baskets, clothing, 
artifacts, etc.) or assumed that I was coming to the community to 
distribute new project funds and prepared long written wish lists of the 
kinds of assistance and items the community needed. My main concern with 
being expected to either provide funding or advise communities during my 
field visits to local projects was that, simply by coming to the community, 
I was changing peoples' expectations and thus increasing the potential for 
bias in their responses. After all, if beneficiaries thought I had funds 
to give out, they might exaggerate their problems in order to increase 
their chances of obtaining additional funds. I dealt with this problem by 
explaining to respondents early on in our meetings that I was a student and 
therefore had no funding to provide. I did, however, emphasize to 
communities that I would be presenting an evaluation report to the 
development agency I was studying and that, by voicing some the community's 
opinion and concerns, that evaluation report might in influence agency
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policies and practices. Judging from the balance of both positive and 
negative comments given by respondents during our field visits, it would 
seem that my efforts to neutralize the worse biases of Ugandan 
beneficiaries were relatively successful.
v) Possible Observational Biases and Absorption o f Respondents' Impressions:
One of the most common critiques of qualitative research is that, 
because the researcher is collecting data about personal views and 
perspectives, he/she can end up absorbing the concerns and grievances of 
respondents. This problem of observational bias, observes Colin Robson, is 
especially rife when the researcher comes into the research situation with 
his/her own set of personal biases. Much to my surprise, during my 
research, I found that rather than being drawn to the views of 
international development experts whose own backgrounds and development 
roles were closer to my own, I developed stronger affection towards field- 
level development workers and community mobilizers who seemed to be the 
ones who went out on Mopeds and were willing to become drenched in rain and 
mud in order to reach remote communities, while at the same time receiving 
very little pay or say over strategic decisions made it their respective 
development agencies. To deny the admiration and respect I developed for 
Ugandan field development workers and community mobilizers during my 
research would be to deny that, as a researcher, one unavoidably develops 
emotional attachment to those persons one studies and sympathy for the 
difficult predicaments which many of them find themselves in. This, 
however, need not mean that the researcher loses his/her objectivity in the 
research process. In my own situation, for instance, because my role as an 
outside researcher so clearly separated me from the role played by field 
development workers and community mobilizers and because my being a Muzungu
never permitted me to fully partake in community meetings (such as Resistance
Council--RC/hC meetings, for instance) or the daily routines of poor
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Ugandans, I never found myself confusing my own role with theirs or
absorbing their grievances. In fact, when in my thesis I write about the
perspectives or concerns of UNDP or AA field development workers and
community mobilizers, I always specify that these sentiments are those of
my respondents and not necessarily my own. Furthermore, in order to 
counter what might have turned into a potential bias towards the field and 
the grassroots community level, throughout my research and in the text of 
the thesis itself, I have always juxtaposed those perspectives coming from 
the field with views expressed in agency headquarters as well as by Ugandan 
politicians and scholars. In each case, my goal has been to show that 
divergent views exist and to draw out the wider implications of such 
discrepancies, rather than to take sides.
vi) Sorting Out Vast Amounts o f  Wide-Ranging Data:
The last disadvantage of qualitative research is that it results in 
vast amounts of data: in my case, piles of academic articles and 
conjunctural documents, 211 sets of interview notes, and hundreds of pages 
of observations from primary fieldwork in the UK, Geneva, New York, 
Washington DC. and Uganda--all material which has had to be carefully 
recorded, summarized, re-read, organized and analyzed. To make things 
even more difficult, unlike quantitative research where research assistants 
can be hired to carry out surveys, input data into a computer and to 
subsequently analyze it using statistical packages, because in qualitative 
research one is looking for abstract conceptual insights rather than 
statistical correlations, qualitative material can rarely be analyzed by 
machine or by a researcher other than its chief designer. There is no 
denying that the process of recording, organizing euid interpreting the 
great amount of data gathered through my research was both a time-consuming 
and extremely difficult task. However, by following the steps of the 
'grounded theory' approach described above, I did manage to gradually
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identify important trends and hypothesis in my empirical data and to 
abstract conceptual and theoretical insights from these.
C) Enhancing the Validity, Reliability, Generalizability/ 
Representability of My Research Data:
As mentioned at the beginning of this appendix, the notions of 
validity, reliability and generalizability/representability which are 
central to determining the robustness of quantitative research can not be 
established definitively in qualitative research. This is partly because 
qualitative research is not numerical and, as a result, statistical 
correlations, probabilities and margins of error are impossible to 
calculate. But also because the most common form of qualitative research:
i.e., the case study, is geared towards generating conceptual insights and 
theory rather than identifying statistically-proven causal relationships or 
making generalizations about a wider population on the basis of case study 
findings. To do so, warns, Alan Bryman, would be to erroneously attribute 
statistical precepts to qualitative research. According to Bryman, 
qualitative researchers need not be apologetic about the limited 
generalizability/representability or predictive value of qualitative data. 
Instead, he recommends that qualitative research and case studies be judged 
in terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that they help to 
generate. As Bryman puts it, "The aim [of qualitative research] is not to 
infer the findings from a sample to a wider population, but to engender 
patterns and linkages of theoretical importance." Following this logic, 
in my own research design, I have placed the emphasis on identifying 
patterns and phenomena in development agencies' efforts to implement 
SHD/PCD approaches and on drawing out the theoretical implications of such 
findings rather than on pretending to find a statistically-proven 
"blueprint" for the successful implementation of SHD/PCD approaches or 
proving that the exact same pattern and phenomena will reproduce themselves 
everywhere. Having said this though, qualitative researchers should still
31
try to use techniques which enhance--although they can not guarantee--the 
validity, reliability, generalizability/representability of their data.
i) The Validity o f the Data Gathered:
The 'validity' of one's research is normally defined as the degree to 
which one's study actually measures what it claims to measure. In the 
research literature this is known as 'construct validity'. Also relevant 
to most studies is the degree to which the researcher himself/herself or 
other unusual circumstances influence results. This latter tendency is 
referred to as 'internal validity'.
In the case of my fieldwork in Uganda, my having been an outside 
researcher and a foreigner who community members saw as a potential source 
of funding may well have affected my study's internal validity. As I 
already pointed out though, throughout my research, I tried to dissuade 
community beneficiaries and local politicians and residents from 
exaggerating the development problems present in their communities or the 
effectiveness of their own development initiatives in the hopes of 
receiving additional funding by explaining to them that, as a student, I 
had little or no control over the funding decisions made by the 
international development agencies I was studying. As mentioned above, 
given the balance of both negative and positive views which respondents 
expressed about their communities' development auid the role of foreign 
donors, it is probably safe to assume that, in the end, we did obtain a 
fairly even-handed view of Ugandan communities' achievements and setbacks.
In addition to presenting myself as an independent (and fairly 
powerless) researcher in the eyes of respondents, during my research, I 
tried to enhance both the internal and construct validity of my data 
through what Robert Burgess calls 'triangulation'. Triangulation refers to
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the process of subjecting a research hypothesis or a set findings to a 
range of complementary testing methods. In my research, I enhanced 
both my study's internal and construct validity by using various forms of 
triangulation. The first form is what Burgess refers to as 'methodological 
triangulation', which essentially refers to the use of diverse yet 
complementary data collection methods--in other words, what I described 
above as 'methodological integration'.
The advantage of methodological integration when it comes to 
enhancing the validity of one's study is that it enables the researcher to 
measure phenomena using various data collection methods (e.g., in my case, 
via literature reviews and document analysis, participant observation, 
unstructured interviewing, and focus group discussions), thereby increasing 
the chances that one is indeed measuring the phenomena which one claims to 
be measuring. For example, during my consultancy in UNDP's HDRO, I noticed 
through participant observation that the interaction/communication between 
HDRO staff and staff in other UNDP Departments seemed to minimal. Yet, 
through sporadic observation alone, I had no way of knowing whether the 
staff relations which I had observed captured the full range of UNDP-HDRO 
interaction/communication which I claimed to be assessing (construct 
validity) or, whether the summer period which I had chosen to make my 
observations was a typical time to observe human interactions within UNDP 
(internal validity). It is because of these doubts that, when I returned 
to New York a year later, I decided to use another data collection method 
altogether (i.e., unstructured interviews with elite informants), to 
measure UNDP-HDRO interaction/communication. During these latter 
interviews, my earlier observations about UNDP-HDRO relations were 
generally confirmed and thanks to the use of an alternative data collection 
technique, I was able to add new dimensions to my understanding of the 
issue (I learned, for instance, that UNDP-HDRO interactions varied 
tremendously depending on the level of the staff or the strength of
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personal friendships involved ) as well as to ensure that I was measuring 
the desired phenomena much more in full and during a period which was less 
atypical than summer vacation.
I have also tried to enhance the construct validity of my data by 
using numerous indicators and several sets of questions to measure the same 
variable/ phenomenon. An example of this is shown below;
Variable Being Measured: Beneficiary Participation in UNDP and AA projects: 
Indicator 1: Proportion of community involved in UNDP/AA projects/groups: 
Multiple Questions Asked:
1. Has the community overall shown much interest in the project/group?
2. Who within the community has shown interest in the project?
3. Who within the community has not shown interest in the project?
4. How many community members attended project/group meetings last time?
5. How lively/active was the project/group discussion last time? How so?
Indicator 2: Degree of community access to project/group membership: 
Multiple Questions Asked:
1. Can anyone in the community join the project/Group?
2. What are the project/group's membership criteria?
3. What type of person makes up most of the project/group's membership?
4. Have some types of persons been reluctant/unable to join? Why so?
Indicator 3: Degree of democratic decision-making within the group :
Multiple Questions Asked:
la.How often are project/group meetings held? 
b.Who convenes meetings and how? (e.g., via public poster? word of mouth?)
2. Who decides the agenda of meetings and how?
3. Who does most of the talking at meetings?
4. How are decisions made at meetings? (e.g.,president decides,group vote?)
5. How is information about project/group decisions disseminated?
Indicator 4: Distribution of project benefits:
Multiple Questions Asked:
1. What benefits have been distributed by the project/group thus far?
2. Which group members received the first round of benefits?
3. On what basis did the project/group decide who would benefits?
4. Who is scheduled to receive the next round of benefits? On what basis?
The use up multiple indicators and research questions has helped the 
construct validity of my research by increasing the chances that I do end 
up measuring the phenomena/variables which I claim to be studying.
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H) The Reliability o f  the Data Gathered:
Martin Bulmer defines 'reliability' as the process of ensuring that, 
if repeated by the same or another researcher at a later point in time, a 
study would yield the same results on that second occasion. The 
reliability of one's results is normally highly dependent on the accuracy 
and consistency with which one's data is collected. A frequent criticism 
of qualitative and of case study research is that their reliability is low 
since so much of their findings depend on the capacity, personality and 
observations of the researcher. These setbacks notwithstanding, there are 
a number of techniques which the qualitative researcher can utilize to 
enhance the reliability of his/her research results.
The first technique I used to enhance the reliability of my data in 
my own research was to spend a lot of time carefully explaining questions 
which might not otherwise be clear to respondents whose first language was 
not English. Due to language and cultural differences, we did find that, 
in some instances, concepts which were of common usage in the West (e.g., 
notions of accountability and participation) were not necessarily clear to 
respondents in a rural Ugandan village. However, with the help of my 
research assistants who also served as translators, I made sure that I 
translated concepts into ideas more likely to be familiar to the 
communities we were visiting. For instance, after some trial and error, we 
were able to explain the notion of accountability to respondents as "a 
sense of responsibility towards someone" or as "someone they feel they 
should answer to" and to define participation as "the process of becoming 
actively involved" in something or "taking an active part in the making of 
certain key decisions." In both instances, the translation of a very 
abstract concept into easily understood actions was helped us get our 
questions across--an achievement later reflected in the thoughtfulness of 
the answers we obtained from our respondents. Although time-intensive.
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this ongoing process of clarification proved instrumental in reducing the 
chances of 'subject error' "--i.e., the chances of error occurring either 
because of respondents' own misunderstanding of questions asked or because 
of influence of exogenous events.
During my interviews in Uganda and in the West, I also tried to 
improve the reliability of my data by reducing the chances of 'subject 
bias'--i.e., the tendency of respondents to try to please the tester, a 
common problem in most studies relying heavily on interviews. I 
essentially discouraged respondents from trying to placate the interviewer 
with their answers by constantly emphasizing during my interviews that 
there were no right or wrong answers to my various questions and that I was 
instead trying to collect a range of impressions. Another method which I 
used in my research to limit potential damage from subject bias was always 
to talk to more than one respondent; preferably to respondents working at 
different levels, as well as from different groups or sectors. Hence, 
during my research, I not only made a conscious effort to interview 
scholars, donors, representatives from permanent missions to the UN, 
government officials, project beneficiaries and local residents, but, 
within each of these sectors, tried to talk to respondents with a range of 
personal traits: both men and women; Northerners and Southerners; top-
level managers and lower-level staff; intellectuals and practitioners; and 
groups, as well as families and individuals. Burgess refers to this 
practice as 'person triangulation'. The main advantage of interviewing 
a large and varied number of respondents is that the researcher does not 
rely too heavily on one informant whose information may be unreliable due 
to the informant's personal biases, or restricted perspective or access.
Throughout my research, I also made a great effort to reduce the 
possibility of 'observer error' --i.e.,the tendency of the researcher to 
allow carelessness to reduce the consistency and rigour of his/her
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interviewing and observation techniques. I protected myself against this 
problem by being as consistent and systematic as possible in my approach to 
collecting data. For example, even though I gave respondents the 
flexibility to delve into issues of special interest to them during my
interviews, I at the same time ensured that my interviewing methodology was
consistent and systematic in five ways; i) by asking a small set of common
questions (these are identified in my topic guides with an asterisk) and
pursuing the same core themes/issues with all respondents from a particular 
sector/group; ii) by ensuring that questions are put to respondents in as 
neutral a manner as possible; iii) by presenting myself to all respondents 
in the same fashion--i.e., as an independent researcher looking for 
different points of view rather than searching for 'the right answers'; iv) 
by taking consistent notes and writing summaries of each interview as well 
as keeping detailed field notes of observations made during meetings or 
field visits; and v) by applying the same rules of engagement in all 
interviews (i.e., leaving all questions open-ended whenever possible, 
avoiding leading answers, never revealing too much private information or 
personal points of view during interviews, controlling the use of body 
language or facial expressions which might signal approval or disapproval 
of certain answers, only sharing information from previous interviews when 
such information is crucial to the interview probing process, and, sending 
respondents thank you notes in which I explained the status and possible 
future uses of the material). Thus, even though my interviews varied from 
one another and were based on unstructured interviewing techniques, the 
methodology used followed consistent rules in a systematic fashion.
Finally, in the case of my interviews in rural Uganda where my lack 
of familiarity with the territory and culture left me vulnerable to 
'observer bias' --i.e., the tendency for the researcher to let his/her own 
assumptions and pre-conceived ideas influence his/her interpretation of 
events or action--as well as to the problem of subject bias described
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above, I compensated for these problems by making sure that I conducted 
all field interviews jointly with one of my research assistants. Robert 
Burgess refers to this technique as 'investigator triangulation' and notes 
that having more than one person investigate the situation enhances the 
reliability of one's data by permitting the chief researcher to check 
his/her findings and impressions against those of a second researcher or 
for the two researchers to collect parallel bits of information. In my 
case, although I conducted interviews together with my researchers, after 
the more formal part of our interviews, we would walk around the community 
observing peoples' behaviour on our own and, at the end of the day, we 
would discuss alternative explanations of what we had observed that day. 
During these post-interview chats, my research assistants proved to be 
particularly adept at asking locally-specific questions (e.g., about the 
nature of local RC meetings, etc.) which would have generated much more 
guarded responses had a foreigner asked them.
Hence, even though validity and reliability cannot be perfectly 
measured in qualitative research, it is possible to utilize a number of the 
techniques I have utilized in my own research to enhance these.
iii) The GeneralizabilitylRepresentabiliiy o f the Data Gathered:
The last important methodological issue addressed in this 
methodological appendix is the 'generalizability' (a.k.a. 'external 
validity') and 'representability' of the research findings; that is, the 
extent to which one's findings apply to a wider population beyond the 
specific sample or case study explored. Qualitative studies such as mine 
are predominantly based on case studies and non-probability samples have 
very limited generalizability and their representativeness is either 
uncertain or unknown. According to Colin Robson, there are mainly three 
reasons for this: The first is that the kind of purposive and snowball
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sampling on which my study is based is not statistically representative of 
a universal population. The second problem is rooted in the fact that the 
real raison d^ etre of qualitative studies is to explore peoples' inner-most
thoughts and to draw out new insights and plausible explanations of 
phenomena rather than trying to identify universalistic statistical 
correlations or to establish definite causality. And, thirdly, because 
qualitative studies such as the one I carried out rely on fairly small case 
studies and samples of fairly select informants, their generalizability and 
representability is inevitably restricted. It is with these
limitations in mind that Margaret Peil warns against over-generalizing 
from restricted qualitative studies:
Too often studies of one village or town are treated as 
if they represent all villages in the area or all towns 
in the country. But size, centrality, history, economic 
base and many other factors mean that each place is to 
some extent exceptional.
In my own thesis, I address issues of generalizability and 
representability by conceding that neither my choice of Uganda as a country 
example, of UNDP and AA as my organizational case studies or, of select 
UNDP and AA projects sites are statistically representative of a wider 
population. Furthermore, I never claim that the trends in my research are 
typical of all LDCs or all UNDP and AA programmes. At the same time 
though, I do know that my research findings are far from rare.
I have three ways of knowing this. The first way I have of knowing 
that my research results are not an anomaly rare is through what Colin 
Robson calls 'direct demonstration' --i.e., by having observed the same 
phenomena in different circumstances In my own case, for instance, I
know that obstacles such as operationalizing SHD/PCD approaches into 
holistic and multi-sectoral development initiatives, having difficulties 
influencing government policy, a proneness towards making decisions on 
behalf of beneficiaries, or carrying projects which are most likely to
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generate quick and measurable results, are not uncommon problems since I 
observed each one of them in two very different types of international 
development organizations (UNDP and AA) as well as in multiple UNDP and AA 
project sites, and while using different data collection techniques. 
According to Alan Bryman, by comparing one organizational case study to 
another and teasing out those factors within the two organizations which 
cause the differences (which is essentially what I have done by comparing 
my UNDP's and AA's SHD/PCD performance), the researcher is actually putting 
the replication logic to the test. Robert Burgess refers to this 
technique as 'space triangulation' --i.e., engaging in comparative analysis 
in order to test one's results in different contexts and thus adding 
generalizability/representability to one's data.
The second way in which I have tested the generalizability/ 
representability of my data is by consulting different sources of 
information to see whether my research findings are in fact applicable 
beyond my two organizational case studies or beyond Uganda. Hence, 
conversations with highly respected Uganda-based Development experts such 
as John de Coninck, Josephine Harmsworth Andama, Tarsius Kabwegyere and Joy 
Kwesiga were crucial in helping me learn that many of trends I detected in 
studies of UNDP and AA in Uganda also applied to other international 
development organizations based in Uganda. Similarly, my conversations 
with northern development experts like David Korten, Robert Chambers, and 
Roger Riddell, all of whom have research experience in a wide range of 
developing countries, were instrumental in helping me see that many of my 
research findings also applied to LDCs other than Uganda.
This, brings me to the third and final technique I used to test the 
generalizability of my findings and that was to explore the existing 
academic and empirical studies for comparable assessments of similar 
development problems in different contexts which either confirm or
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contradict my own research findings. In this respect, it is important 
to note that, far from being unusual, many of the development and 
implementational problems which I draw attention to in my research also 
feature prominently in the SHD/PCD, International Development Cooperation, 
Implementation Process, and Institutional literatures which I consulted 
before going to the field. Exactly how my own research findings 
reinforce, or in some cases, add to debates in these various theoretical 
literatures is discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. With respect to the 
non-academic literature, its worth noting that a series of studies and 
consultancy reports on the issue of international development cooperation 
at large have also produced findings which resemble my own. Especially 
useful among these were the studies carried out by the Overseas Development
Institute (GDI) and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECPM) on the
current estate of international development cooperation; a series of books 
produced by Save the Children Fund and the Transnational Institute on the role of NGOs;
a series of consultancy reports on UNDP's poverty reduction effectiveness 
in various countries, including those produced by the Centre for Development
Research and by Martin Godfrey et al; and a number of studies on AA's work
in other countries, including reports prepared by AA HQ and by independent 
consultants like Sarah White and Winki Williams and Rick Davis . These and 
other reports are cited throughout my thesis as evidence of both the 
credibility and wider applicability of many of my research findings.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that, in the conclusion to my thesis, I 
briefly discuss some UNDP Country Programmes (e.g., in Bolivia, Malawi and 
the Philippines) and AA Country Programmes (e.g., in Bangladesh and India) 
which do manage to transcend some of the problems I identify in my thesis 
and explain why my research findings are not as applicable in these cases. 
After all, being aware of the limitations of one's research findings is an 
important as being aware of its wider relevance and a crucial step towards 
identifying areas in need of further research and reflection in the future.
41
ENDNOTES :
1. Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR) , Special course on Qualitative Research 
and Unstructured Interviewing. London School of Economics and Political Science.
April 17-19, 1996. London, UK
2. Bryman, Alan and Burgess, Robert. Analyzing Qualitative Data. Pages 1-4. 
London: Routledge Publishers, 1994.
3. Bryman, Alan. Research Methods in Organization Studies. Chapter 1.
London: Unwin Hyman Publishers, 1989.
4. Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1967, as quoted in Robert, 
Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research, Chapter 8. New 
York: Routledge Publishers, Reprinted in 1991.
5. Bryman and Burgess: Pages 1-6, Op. Cit.
6. Experienced researchers such as William Whyte, writer of the acclaimed 
study. Street Corner Society, recommend that researchers have at least some 
'orienting theory' before going to the field. Such preliminary knowledge, he 
notes, not only provides a general reference point but also guides the 
researcher towards data that may prove useful later in the analysis. (Whyte, 
William. Learning From the Field: A Guide from Experience: Page 250. Newbury 
Park, California and London: Sage Publications, 1984).
7. Bulmer, M. and Warwick, D.P. (Editors), Social Research in Developing 
Countries. (See Chapter 1: Page 19). London: UCL Press Ltd., 1993.
8. The history of social science research in the Third World is part of the 
history of colonialism--a period once known as the era of the 'Safari 
Scholar.'(Bulmer, M. Page 21, in Bulmer and Warwick [Editors]. Op. Cit.)
9. Bryman, Alan. Page 178, Op. Cit.
10. On sampling techniques, see Robson, Colin. Real World Research: A
Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner Researchers. Chapter 5. 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.
11. Ritchie, J . SCPR. Quality Research & Unstructured Interviewing Course. Op. Cit.
12. Burgess, Robert. Page 102, Op. Cit.
13. Burgess, Robert. Chapter 5, Op. Cit. or, SCPR Quality Research and Unstructured
Interviewing Course at LSE, Op. Cit.
14. In all, I developed one generic topic guide for NGO Informants; one for 
Academics; one for UN officials; one for World Bank officials; one for 
Permanent Missions to the UN; one for UNDP staff; one for Action Aid staff; 
one for Ugandan government officials; one for local Ugandan residents; and one 
for project beneficiaries in Uganda. Copies of these topic guides are 
provided as part of the supplementary information pack accompanying this 
methodological annex.
15.Ritchie, J. Op.Cit.
42
16. There were only half a dozen interviews conducted 'off the record'. Some 
of these were exchanges which I left 'off the record' either because the 
respondent was a close personal friend or because the discussion which ensued 
was closer to an informal conversation than an interview. Unless otherwise 
stated, all respondents mentioned in the accompanying list of persons 
interviewed was interviewed 'on the record'.
17. Nicholls, Lilly. From Paradigm to Practice: The Politics and Implementation o f  Sustainable 
Human Development—The Example o f  Uganda. London: Centre for the Study of Global 
Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Nov. 1996.
18. Robson, Colin. Chapter 9, Op. Cit.; or, Burgess, Robert. Chapter 5, Op. 
Cit. for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Group Interviewing.
19. For a detailed description of these and other techniques used to analyze 
qualitative data, see Colin Robson, Chapter 12, Op. Cit.; Bryman, Alan and 
Burgess, Robert (Editors), Chapter 9, Op. Cit.; and the SC9"?. Qualitative Research 
and Unstructured Interviewing Course material. Op. Cit.
20. Chambers, Robert. Rural Development : Putting the Last First, Chapter 1:
Page 16. London: Longman Publishers, 1983.
21. According to Margaret Peil, foreigner researchers often receive a more 
cordial welcome than nationals of equivalent status, either due to courtesy to 
strangers or in response to the implied flattery of being sought out by 
someone from a distance. (See: Peil, Margaret. Page 75 in Bulmer and Warwick 
1993, Op. Cit.). In a country as poor as Uganda, the hospitality of some 
persons may have also been partly motivated by the expectation for funds, even 
though it was made clear to all respondents that I was an unpaid student.
22. During my Uganda fieldwork, I relied on two Ugandan research assistants 
who served as translators and as sources of cultural information and sounding 
boards for early interpretations of data. (See: Devereux and Hoddinott for a 
discussion on the pros/cons of using indigenous research assistants.
(Devereux, Stephen and Hoddinott, John [Editors]. Fieldwork in Developing 
Countries. Chapter 2. Hertfordshire, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf Pub., 1992.)
23. Bulmer, Martin. Page 207 in Bulmer and Warwick (Editors) Op. Cit.
24. During my follow-up visit to the AA-Uganda Office, I discovered that 
while the agency's top managers had widely discussed my end-up-trip Evaluation 
Report, very few field staff and no beneficiaries had had access to it.
25. Here I was following the advise of Margaret Peil who strongly advises 
against becoming the centre of attention or playing a leadership role if one 
wishes to remain an objective observer and learner during fieldwork. (See: 
Peil, Margaret with contributions by Mitchell, Peter and Rimmer, Douglas. 
Social Science Research Methods: An African Handbook. Page 164. London:
Hodder and Stoughton Publishers Ltd., 1985.
26. Robson, Colin. Chapter 8, Op. Cit.
27. In Analvzinq Qualitative Data. Alan Bryman and Robert Burgess rightly 
point out that because qualitative data is bulky and complex, there is no one 
singular formula for its analysis or distinct phases of analysis. Instead, 
they point out, the analysis is more likely to be a continuous process. (See 
Bryman, Alan and Burgess, Robert. Chapter 11, Op. Cit.).
43
28. Bryman, Alain. Page 173, Op. Cit.
29. Bulmer, Martin. Page 10, in Bulmer and Warwick. Op. Cit.
30. Robson, Colin. Pages 68-71. Op. Cit.
31. Robert Burgess bases his notion of triangulation on the work of Campbell 
and Fiske (1959). (See; Burgess, Robert. Page 143-144, Op. Cit.)
32. Bulmer, Martin. Page 10. In Bulmer and Warwick. Op. Cit.
33. See Colin Robson for a discussion of the kinds of errors/biases which
reduce the reliability of research. (Robson, Colin Pages 66-68, Op. Cit.)
34. Ibid.
35. Burgess, Robert. Page 143, Op. Cit.
36. Martin Bulmer, Page 11, in Bulmer and Warwick (Editors), Op. Cit.
37. Robson, Colin. Page 402, Op, Cit.
38. Margaret Peil, Page 81. In Bulmer and Warwick (Editors), Op. Cit.
39. For details on how a study's generalizability can be tested through 
direct demonstration, see Robson, Colin. Page 72, Op. Cit.
40. Bryman, Alan. Page 173, Op. Cit.
41. On the use of space triangulation, see:Burgess, Robert. Page 143, Op. Cit.
42. In his own work, Alan Bryman also recommends checking one's findings 
against other studies or the academic literature and sees this as a good way 
of testing the applicability of one's research results beyond the confines of 
one's own investigation. (See: Bryman, Alan. Page 165-167, Op. Cit.).
44
Table Al: Methods Used to Record. Organize, and Analyze Qualitative Data: 
(The Following Steps are Based on work by Bryman & Burgess 1994/SCPR 1996)
I.Data Recording & Familiarization Methods Used to Identify the Scope of 
the Reseach and General Topics of Interest in the Early Research Phase ;
e Make Impromptu conceptual, empirical and methodological mental notes
throughout research process (e.g., by writing notes on peoples' attitudes).
e Write systematic observations of specific events (e.g., by writing
detailed observations of training sessions & staff conferences).
• Systematically summarize/assess interviews carried out (e.g., by 
writing down a detailed account of each interview conducted as well as 
brief summaries & analysis of each).
II.Data Organization Methods Used to Identify Critical Research Issues:
• Begin identifying recurring themes/issues important to research by 
indexing interview material, (e.g., I wrote in key issues/themes by hand 
into each interview transcript and into margins of research field notes).
• Begin drafting typologies of emerging trends (e.g., by keeping an 
ongoing folder on 'emerging research insights' and making preliminary 
charts of emerging trends).
III. Interpretation Methods Used to Identify Emerging Trends, Concents and 
Insights:
• Begin to establish associations (i.e., similarities/contrasts) 
between case study results) and to detect key problems/possible solutions 
in the research topic.(e.g.,by writing cnsultancy Reports for UNDP & AA) .
• Begin searching for explanations to problems by toying with key 
concepts and hypothesis emerging from the research. (e.g., I presented my 
earliest analytical framework to LSE colleagues for feedback on its 
cohesion and convincing nature).
• Continue to check the emerging conceptual/analytical framework 
against the data collected thus far to ensure a fit between the two or 
explain the discrepancies.
IV. Abstraction Methods Used to Reflect on the Research's Theoretical 
Significance:
• Begin to link chosen concepts/hypothesis with debates in the broader 
literature on the topic and to identify ways in which my analysis 
confirms or goes beyond existing theories in the topic (e.g., I did
this by writing a major 'think piece' to generate discussion/feedback 
from my Supervisors after my first field trip to Uganda, by returning to 
key relevant theoretical literatures to support my findings and by 
drawing on new theories/ideas to fill remaining gaps.
V. Verification Methods Used to Test the Robustness and Empirical 
Accuracy of Analytical/Conceptual Framework, Hypothesis, and Research 
Methodology Used:
• Return to the field to test the robustness of the existing 
hypotheses, conceptual and analytical framework and to collect further 
needed information (e.g., I did this by carrying out second follow-up 
research trips to Uganda and New York)
• Modify hypothesis/analytical framework in light of the last empirical 
data gathered and engage in an additional stage of abstraction and 
conceptualization (e.g., I did this by drafting a major Conference paper 
after the completion of my research andincorporating the resulting 
conceptual/empirical critiques into my final analysis.
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Table A2: Kev Features of the Research Design for the PhD Thesis;
Key Features of the Research Design:
Qualitative Research 
Grounded Theory Approach 
Methodological Integration 
Field Research 
Action Research 
Case Study Research 
Multi-Site Studies
Purposive Sampling and Snowball Sampling
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Table A3 : Data Collection Methods Utilized During My Research
Research Phase Data Collection Methods Used
Phase I:
Background Research Preparation 
Oct.'93 - Oct. '94 in the UK
Intitial Literature Review
Document Analysis
Full Participant Observation
(During Consultancy in UNDP 
Headquarters, June-Aug.'94)
Phase II:
Interviews with International- 
Level Informants
(Nov.'94- April '95 in the UK & 
Jan'95 & Jan'96 in 
Washington DC, and New York)
Unstructured Interviews
(Used Topic Guides to Carry out 
Investigative & In-Depth 
Unstructured Interviews with 
Development Experts in UK & 
Officials in World Bank & UN)
Phase III:
Field Research in Uganda 
(May-July'95 & Nov-Dee'95)
Unstructured Interviews
(Used Topic Guides to Carry out 
Investigative & In-Depth 
Unstructured Interviews with Dvlp. 
Experts, Donors, Ugandan Govt. 
Officials, Local Residents, Action 
Aid & UNDP staff & beneficiaries 
in Uganda.)
Focus Group Discussions
(With selected UNDP & Action Aid 
beneficiaries in Uganda)
Semi-Participant Observation
(Within Action Aid and UNDP)
Phase IV:
Write Up & Last Follow Up Work 
( 1996 and 1997)
Final Follow-Up Work:
Last Unstructured Interviews
Publish, Disseminate, get 
Feedback & Polish Findings
Interviews with UK-Based International NGOs:
November 1994 - March 1996
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Interview Number 
& Organization: Respondent/Position: Place : Date:
#1 Catholic Institue of
International Relations 
(CIIR)
#2 CARE-UK
#3 Save the Children 
Fund (SCF)
#4 Agency for Cooperation 
and Research in 
Development (ACORD)
#5 Catholic Agency for 
Overseas Development 
(CAFOD)
#6 OXFAM-UK
#7 One World Action
#8 Christian Aid
Dr. Ian Linden, London
General Secretary
Mr. Patrick Sayer London
Overseas Director
Dr. Michael Edwards, London
Policy and Research 
Director
Dr. Nicholas Atempugre, London 
Research Officer
Ms. Cathy Corcoran, London 
Head of Projects Dept.
Dr. Kevin Watkins, 
Head of Policy Dept.
London
Mr. Andy Rutherford, London 
Programmes Coordinator
Mr. Paul Spray, 
Policy and Campaigns 
Director
London
Nov.3/94
Nov.9/94 
Nov.30/94
Dec.1/94
Dec.9/94
Dec.15/94 
Feb.17/95 
March 3/95
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Interviews with UK-Based Development Scholars & Experts
Interview Number & 
Development Scholar 
& Expert Inteviewed
Institutional Base: Place: Date
#9 Dr.Paul Streeten
#10 Dr.David Korten
#lla Dr. Diane Elson
#llb Dr.Meghnad Desai Prof
#12 Ms. Pat Holden
#13 Mr.John Knight
Expert,
Human Development 
Report Office (HDRO) 
UNDP, N.Y, N.Y. G 
Professor Emeritus, 
Boston University, 
Boston, MA, USA
Director, 
People-Centred 
Development Forum, 
N.Y., N.Y., G 
Former Professor 
at Harvard University, 
Boston, MA, USA
Lecturer,
Dept, of Economics, 
Univ.of Manchester, 
Manchester, UK
of Economics,
Director,
Centre for the 
Study of Global 
Governance, London 
School of Economics 
G Political Science, 
London, UK.
Expert, HDRO at UNDP, 
N.Y., N.Y., USA
Sr. Policy Advisor, 
Social Policy Div., 
Overseas Development 
Administration (ODA), 
London, UK
Sr. Researcher, 
Institute of 
Economics,
Oxford University, 
Oxford, UK.
Expert to the HDRO 
at UNDP,
N.Y., N.Y., USA
Washington DC Jan 16/95
Washington DC Jan 17/95
Manchester April 17/95
London March 8/95 
March 23/95 
April 25/95
London April 11/95
Oxford April 20/95
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Continued
Interviews with UK-Based Development Experts & Scholars
Interview Number & 
Development Scholar 
& Expert Inteviewed
Institutional Base; Place; Date :
#14 Dr.Frances Stewart
#15 Mr. Roger Riddell
#16 Dr. Amartya Sen*
#17 Dr.Hans Singer
#18 Dr.Robert Chambers
Director, 
International 
Development Centre, 
Oxford University, 
Oxford, UK.
Expert to the HDRO 
at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y. , 
USA
Research Fellow, 
Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI), 
London, UK.
Lamont Professor, 
Harvard University, 
Boston, MA, USA. 
Expert to the HDRO 
at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y., 
USA
Prof. Sc Co-Founder, 
Institute of 
Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, 
Falmer, Brighton, UK. 
Expert for the HDRO 
at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y., 
USA
Prof. & Fellow, 
Institute of 
Development Studies, 
University of Sussex, 
Falmer, Brighton, UK.
Oxford April 21/95
London April 25/95
London August 10/95
Falmer, October 18/95 
Brighton
Falmer, June 6/96 
Brighton
* The Conversation with Prof. Sen did not take a formal interview format but was
rather as an exchange of ideas.
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Interview Number, 
Informant & 
Position
Institutional Base Date Interviewed
Kev Informants Interviewed in the World Bank; 
(Washington D.C., USA)
#19 Mr. Petter Langseth, World Bank
Senior Public Sector 
Management Specialist
#20 Dr. Caroline Moser, World Bank
Senior Urban Social 
Policy Specialist
#21 Mr. Mike Stephens, World Bank
Public Sector Management 
Adviser
#22 Dr. Alison Evans, Advisor, World Bank
Education and Social Policy 
Advisor
[Interview off Record]
#23 Mr. Mamadou Dia, World Bank
Chief, Capacity Building 
Division & Africa Technical 
Department
#24 Dr. John Mitchell, World Bank
Public Relations Official
#25 Dr. Lisa Pachter, World Bank
Liaison Official,
World Bank-UN Relations,
#26 Ms. Carmen Malena, World Bank
Officer,
International Economic Relations 
Division, NGO Unit
January 4, 1995 
January 5, 1995 
January 6, 1995 
January 6, 1995
January 6, 1995
January 17,1995 
January 18,1995
January 18,1995
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Interview Number, 
Informant & 
Position
Institutional Base Date Interviewed
Kev Informants Interviewed in the UN System; 
(New York, USA)
#27.
#28
#29
#30
#31
#32
#33
#34
Ms. Caitlin Weisen, UNDP
SHD Coordinator,
Regional Bureau for Africa
Mr. M. Nizamuddin, UNFPA
Deputy Director,
Technical & Evaluation Division 
& Chief, PDPR Branch
Mr. Jan Vandermoordele, UNICEF
Director of the Office for 
Social and Economie Analysis 
Interviewed jointly with:
Ms. Eva Jespersen,
Programme Funding Office
Ms. Tina Zournatzi, UNDP
Uganda Desk Officer in 
Regional Bureau for Africa,
UNDP Headquarters 
[Interview Off Record]
Dr. Selim Jahan, HDRO/UNDP
Sr. Policy Analyst &
Human Development Report 
Office (HDRO) Deputy Director
Mr. Thierry Lemaresquier, BPPS/UNDP
Director, Social Development
and Poverty Elimination Division,
Bureau for Policy and Programme 
Support (BPPS)
Dr. Saraswathi Menon, HDRO/UNDP
Policy Analyst
Mr. Per Arne Stroberg BPPS/UNDP
Sr. Sustainable Human 
Development Officer,
BPPS
January 9, 1995
January 10,1995
January 10,1995
January 10,1995
January 11,1995
January 11,1995
January 11,1995 
January 12,1995
Continued.
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Interview Number, 
Informant & 
Position
Institutional Base Date Interviewed
Kev Informants Interviewed in the UN System; 
(New York, USA)
#35 Dr. Sethuramiah L. Rao
Chief, UN Liaison, External 
Relations & Executive Board Branch
UNFPA
#36 Dr. Uner Kirdar, UNDP
Special Assistant to the Administrator, 
Former Director, Development Studies 
Programme
#37 Ms. Janet Nelson, 
Chief, NGO Division
#38 Ms. Laura Mourino, 
Junior Statistician 
[Interview off Record]
UNICEF
HDRO/UNDP
January 12,1995 
January 13,1995
January 13,1995 
January 13,1995
Persons Interviewed During Second 
New York Research Trip:
January 7 - 20, 1996
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Interview Number, 
Informant & Position Institutional Base Date of Interview:
#39 Mr. Jean Claude Milleron, UN Secretariat
Under-Secretary General and 
Head, Department of Economic 
and Social Information and 
Policy Analysis
#40 Ms. Sakiko Fukuda Parr UNDP
Director, Human Development 
Report Office (HDRO)
#41 Ms. Marcia Castro
Area Officer and SHD Task Force UNDP
Member, Regional Bureau for 
Latin America (RBLA)
#42 Ms. Nadia Hijab UNDP
Senior SHD Officer, Bureau for 
Policy and Programme Support (BPPS)
#43 Ms. Ann Grant UN/UK Govt
Counsellor (Social and Economic 
Development), UK Mission to UN
#44 Ms. Sally Timpson UNDP
Chief, Bureau for Policy and 
Programme Support (BPPS)
#45 Ms. Sharon Capeling Alajika UNDP
Chief, Office for Evaluation 
and Strategic Planning (OESP)
#46 Dr. Inge Kaul, Director UNDP
Office of Development Studies,
Director of the HDRO until 1994
#47 Dr. Selim Jahan UNDP
Sr.Advisor 6 Deputy Director, HDRO
January 11, 1996
January 11, 1996
January 12, 1996
January 12, 1996
January 15, 1996
January 16, 1996
January 17, 1996
January 17, 1996
January 17, 1996
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Continued....
Persons Interviewed During Second 
New York Research Trip:
January 7 - 2 0 ,  1996
Interview Number, 
Informeuit & Position Institutional Base Date of Interview:
#48 Ms. Mitra Vaishid
Minister and Third Secretary, 
Indian Mission to the UN 
with Mr. S.P. Singh 
IAS, Deputy Secretary,
Ministry of Finance,
Department of Economic Affairs, 
Government of India
UN/Indian Govt January 18, 1996
#49 Dr. Mabub ul Haq
Special Assistant to the 
Administrator of UNDP &
Founder of the HDRO
#50 Mr.Odyek Agona
First Secretary, Ugandan 
Mission to the UN
#51 Mr.Jairo Montoya
Minister for Development 
Colombian Mission to the 
UN and Current Representatives 
of the Non-Aligned Movements
#52 Ms.Elizabeth Jacobsen
Second Secretary, Norwegian
Mission to the UN
with
Ms. Anne-Birgitte Albrectsen 
First Secretary, Danish Mission 
to the UN
#53 Mr.R.C. Sersale di Cerisano 
Minister Plenipotentiary, 
Economic Affairs, Argentinean 
Mission to the UN
UNDP
UN/Ugandan Govt
UN/Colombian Govt
UN/Norwegian & 
Danish Govts
UN/Argentinian Govt
#54 Mr. Nikhil Chandavarkar
Chief, Inter-Agency Coordination 
and External Policy Office,
Bureau for Resources and External 
Affairs
UNDP
January 18, 1996
January 18, 1996
January 18, 1996
January 19,1996
January 19, 1996
January 19, 1996
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Continued....
Persons Interviewed During Second 
New York Research Trip;
January 7 - 2 0 ,  1996
Interview Number, 
Informant & Position Institutional Base Date of Interview:
#55 Mr. John Hope
Advisor, Economic & 
Social Affairs,
US Mission to the UN
UN/US Govt,
#56 Mr. Rogatien Biaou UN/Benin Govt.
First Counsellor, Benin Mission 
to the UN and Chairs, Second 
Committee (Economic and Financial),
UN General Assembly
#57 Mr.John Ohiorhuan UNDP
Chief Economist and Chief,
Policy and Regional Programmes
#58 Mr. Jesus Domingo
Third Secretary, Philippines 
Mission to the UN which Chaired 
the G-77 in 1995
#59 Mr. James Gustave Speth, UNDP
Administrator of UNDP,
(1993-present)
UN/Philippino Govt
January 19, 1996
January 19, 1996
January 19, 1996
January 19, 1996
Interviewed in 
London, UK, 
February 2, 1996
56
Interviews with Action Aid Staff
in UK Headquarters:
Interview Number, 
Informant & Position:
Place of 
Interview:
Date of 
Interview:
#60 Mr. Robert Dodd, London
Head of Policy and 
Research Division 
Director
#61 Mr. David Archer, London
Education Advisor
#62 Ms. Susan Johnson, London
Economic Policy Analyst &
Formerly, Uganda Desk Officer
#63 Ms. Susan Johnson, London
Mr. Bob Reitemeier, Manager 
for Eastern Africa 
Mr. Nigel Twose, Head of 
the International Division
#64 Mr. Hugh Goyder, Kampala,
Coordinator, Evaluation 
and Impact Assessment 
(Fomerly Head for Western 
and Southern Africa).
Joint meeting with 
Mr. Shameen Siddiki,
Head of Monitoring and 
Evaluation in Action Aid 
in Bangladesh
#65 Lord Dubbs London
Member of the Action 
Aid Board of Trustees
#67 Mr. Rodney Buse, London
Chair, Action Aid 
Board of Trustees
#68 Mr. Ian MacFarlane, London
NGO Liaison Officer,
UNDP European Office.
Action Aid Staff 
Member seconded to 
UNDP-Geneva
December 14, 1994
Information Meeting: 
April 12, 1995
Working Meeting on: 
April 12, 1995
Feedback on First ABP 
Evaluation Report & 
Follow-Up Suggestions 
November 3, 1995.
December 2, 1995
March 29, 1996
April 29, 1996
November 7, 1996
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Continued....
Interviews with Action Aid Staff 
in UK Headquarters:
Interview Number, 
Informant & Position:
Place of 
Interview:
Date of 
Interview:
London
London
London
#69 Ms. Marion Jackson,
Head of Marketing 
(Corporate Strategy), 
Action Aid-UK
#70 Mr. Bob Reitemeier, 
Coordinator,
Africa Region, 
Interntional Division, 
Action Aid-UK
#71 Mr. Raj Thamotheram, 
Head,
Advocacy Department, 
International Division, 
Action Aid-UK
#72 Mr. Hugh Goyder, London
Coordinator, Evaluation and 
Impact Assessment,
International Division,
Action Aid-UK
#73 Mr. Nigel Twose, London
Director of the 
International Division,
Action Aid-UK
December 18, 1996
December 18, 1996
January 13, 1997
January 13, 1997
February 12, 1997
#74 Dr. Barara Harriss-White, Oxford
Former member of Action 
Aid's Board of Trustees
#75 Mr. Martin Griffiths, Geneva
Former Director of 
Action Aid
April 20, 1995
August 28, 1996
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Development Experts & Donors Interviewed in Kampala During First Trip
(May 1 - July 11, 1995) :
Interview Number, Date of the
Informant & Position Interview
#76 Mr. Stan Burkey,
Coordinator, May 8, 1995
Change Agent Programme,
Quaker Services-Norway
#77 Mr. Jamie Balfour-Paul
Deputy Country May 9, 1995
Representative,
Oxfam-UK
#78 Mr. Tim Lemont,
Economic Advisor, May 15, 1995
Ministry of Finance and 
Planning, Government of Uganda
#79 Mr. Harumna Kyamanywa,
Assistant Resident May 15, 1995
Representative,
UNDP-Uganda
#80 Prof. Joseph Opio Odongo,
Human Development Advisor, July 4, 1995
UNDP-Uganda
#81 Dr. John de Coninck,
Head, Community Development July 4, 1995
Research Network (CDRN)
#82 Mr. James Katarobo,
Professor, Makerere Institute July 6, 1995
for Social Research (MISR),
Makerere University
#83 Dr. Joy Kwesiga
Chairperson, Action for July 6, 1995
Development (ACFODE) and
Sr. Lecturer, Women's Studies
Dept., Makerere University
#84 Mr. Zie Gariyo,
Coordinator, July 6, 1995
NGO Policy Forum,
Development Network of 
Indigenous Voluntary 
Organizations (DENIVA)
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Continued....
Development Experts & Donors Interviewed in Kampala During First Trip 
(May 1 - July 11, 1995) :
Interview Number, Date of the
Informant & Position Interview
#85 Hon. Tarsis B. Kabwegyere
Director, External Relations, July 6, 1995
NRM Secretariat,
Republic of Uganda
#86 Dr. Babatunde Thomas,
Resident Representative July 10, 1995
UNDP-Uganda and 
Resident Coordinator,
UN System in Uganda
#87 Mr. Iradj Alikhani
Resident Economist, July 7, 1995
World Bank, Uganda
#88 Dr. John Mwesigwa,
NGO Support Officer, July 7, 1995
Development Division 
in Eastern Africa, ODA,
Uganda
[Formerly Deputy Director,
Action Aid-Uganda]
#89 Mrs. Sara Entiro,
Currently consultant on July 10, 1995
NGO-Government matters.
Formerly, NGO Coordinator 
in the Prime Minister's 
Office, Uganda Government
#90 Mr. Johan Veul,
Director, Netherlands July 11, 1995
Development Organization,
(SNV) in Uganda
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List of Action Aid Staff Interviewed 
in Kampala & Buwekula During My First Trip
staff Interviewed in Action Aid, Kampala:
Interview Number, 
Informant & Position
Date of the 
Interview
#91 Mr.Anthony Wasswa,
Director, Action Aid-Uganda 
with Mr. Joffrey Atieli,
Deputy Director,
Action Aid-Uganda
#92 Mr. Peter Kendal,
Former Financial Controller,
Action Aid-Kampala,
Currently, National Director 
of Inter-Aid-Uganda
#93 Ms. Sara Mangali,
Assistant Deputy Director,
Action Aid-Uganda & Head 
of Programme Development Dept. (PDD)
#94 Mr.Israel Wamala,
Advocacy and Research Officer,
PDD, Action Aid-Kampala
#95 Mr. Med Makumbi,
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, 
Action Aid-Kampala
#96 Mr. Nick Doyle,
Communications Officer,
PDD, Action Aid-Kampala
#97 Mr. Patrick Okuma,
Human Resource Development 
and Training Officer,
Action Aid-Kampala
#98 Mr. Mathew Kasuli,
Fundraising Officer,
PDD, Action Aid-Kampala
#99 Ms. Assumpta Tibamwenda,
Gender and Research Officer,
Action Aid-Kampala & Mityana
#100 Ms. Elizabeth Ongom,
Programme Assistant,
Strategies for Action (SFA),
Action Aid-Kampala
July 9, 1995
July 5, 1995
June 29, 1995
June 29, 1995
June 28, 1995
June 28, 1995
July 3, 1995
July 3, 1995
May 24, 1995
May 9, 19995
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Staff Interviewed in the Buwekula Project, Mubende District During my First Trip
Interview Number, Date of the
Informant & Position Interview
#101 Mr. Chris Kiwanuka,
ABP Coordinator, Mubende June 5, 1995
#102 Mr. Pascal Ntanda,
Area Manager, May 26, 1995
Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende, Kitenga Sub-County
#103 Mr. Francis Oruca,
Area Manager, June 5, 1995
Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende, Kasatnbya Sub-County
#104 Mr. Moses Mayende,
Water and Infrastructure May 26, 1995
Engineer, Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende
#105 Mr. Jeff Readman,
Management Advisor, May 26, 1995
Action Aid-ABP, Mubende
#106 Mr. Grace Kasirye,
Training Coordinator, May 22, 1995
Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende
#107 Ms. Samalie Tibenda,
Human Resource Officer and June 8, 1995
Administration Officer,
Mubende
#108 Ms. Margaret Logosi,
Monitoring and Evaluation June 13, 1995
Officer, Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende
#109 Ms. Mary Akiror,
Sponsorship Administrator, May 22, 1995
Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende
#110 Ms. Mary Nabisere,
Field Development Worker, May 26, 1995
Action Aid-ABP
Mubende, Kasambya sub-County
#111 Ms. Regina Nakayenga,
Field Development Worker, May 30, 1995
Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende, Kasambya sub-County
#112 Mr. Moses Madoyi,
Field Development Worker, May 23, 1995
Action Aid-ABP,
Mubende, Kitenga sub-County)
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List of Persons Interviewed in Mubende Town During %ny First Trip*
Interview Number, Date of the
Informant & Position Interview
#113 Mr. Isaac Mudoi,
District Executive June 21, 1995
Secretary,
Mubende District
#114 Reverend Kulabirawo,
Reverend, June 7, 1995
Protestant Church 
of Mubende Town
#115 Mr. Frederick Mukiibi
Headmaster, June 13, 1995
Kasenyi Secondary School,
Mubende Town
* In addition to the above interviews, informal talks also took place with shop 
keepers, teachers and other members of the public at large in Mubende town.
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Field Visits Carried Out During Field 
Research in Action Aid's Buwekula Project:
Buwekula/ Mubende, Uganda 
May 30 - June 21, 1995
Interview Number & 
Group Visited
Location of Visit: Date of Visit & 
Mobilizers
WEEK 1 :
#116 Credit & Savings 
Group
#117 PDC Group
Kitenga Sub-County 
Bugonzi Parish, 
Nsengwe Village
Kitenga Sub-County 
Bugonzi Parish, 
Kabunyonyi Village
May 30, 1995 PM 
Lilly St Edward 
Pascal St Teo
May 31, 1995 PM 
Lilly St Edward/ 
Teo N.
#118 Health Committee
#119 Water Committee
#120 Water Committe
WEEK 2 ;
#121 Women's Group
#122 2nd Women's Group 
#123 Agriculturalists 
#124 Women's Group 
#125 Agriculturalists
Kasambya Sub-County 
Kabo Parish,
Lulembo Village
Kasambya Sub-County 
Kibalinga Parish, 
Mikisa Village
Kasambya Sub-County 
Kirume Parish, 
Kyamuguluma Village
Kasambya Sub-County 
Kirume Parish, 
Tusitukirewamu 
Village
Kasambya Sub-County 
Kasambya Parish
Kasambya Sub-County 
Kirume Parish
Kitenga Sub-County 
Kagoma Parish, 
Bugalia Village
Kitenga Sub-County 
Kalonga Parish, 
Budibaga Village
June 1, 1995 AM 
Lilly St Edward/ 
Mary N.
June 2, 1995 AM 
Lilly St Edward 
Patrick M.
June 2, 1995 PM 
Lilly St Edward 
Patrick M.
June 6, 1995 AM 
Lilly St Edward 
Godfrey
June 6, 1995 PM 
Lilly & Edward 
Cranmer
June 7, 1995 AM 
Lilly St Edward/ 
Godfrey
June 8, 1995 AM 
Lilly St Edward/ 
Maria N.
June 8, 1995 PM 
Lilly St Edward/ 
Enoch
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Field Visits Carried Out During Field 
Research in Action Aid's Buwekula Project:
Buwekula, Mubende, Uganda 
May 30 - June 21, 1995
Interview Number & 
Group Visited
Location of Visit; Date of Visit & 
Mobilizers
WEEK 3 :
#126 Pastoralists
#127 PDC Group
#128 Water Committee 
#129 School Mgt. Cttee.
#130 Health Committee
#131 Credit & Savings
#132 Two Women's Groups
#133 School Mgt. Cttee.
WEEK 4 ;
#134 Pastoralists 
#135 Poverty Focus Group 
#136 Poverty Focus Group
Kasambya Sub-County, 
Bubanda Parish
Kasambya Sub-County, 
Kibalinga Parish
Kitenga Sub-County, 
Kagoma Parish
Kitenga Sub-County, 
Kagoma Parish, 
Senkulu School
Kitenga Sub-County, 
Kabyuma Parish
Kasambya Sub-County, 
Kigando Parish
Kasambya Sub-County, 
Kigando Parish
Kasambya sub-County, 
Kasasa Parish 
Muyinayina Village 
School
Kitenga Sub-County 
Bugonzi Parish, 
Buswakwera Village
Kasambya Sub-County 
Kasambya Parish, 
Bulonzi Village
Kitenga Sub-County 
Kalonga Parish, 
Bwakaggo Village)
June 12, 1995 AM 
Lilly Sc. Edward/ 
Patrick M.
June 13, 1995 PM 
Lilly Sc Edward/ 
Charles & Robyna
June 14, 1995 AM 
Lilly Sc Edward/ENOCH
June 14,1995 PM 
Lilly Sc Edward/
Maria N
June 15, 1995 AM 
Lilly Sc Edward/
Moses M
June 16, 1995 AM 
Lilly & Edaward/ 
Noelyn
June 16, 1995 AM 
Lilly Sc Edward/ 
Noelyn
June 16, 1995 PM 
Lilly Sc Edward/ 
Nathan
June 19, 1995 AM/PM 
Lilly Sc Edward/ 
Pascal/Teo
June 20, 1995 AM/PM 
Lilly Sc Edward/ 
Francis & Patrick M
June 21,1995 AM 
Lilly & Edward/ 
Maria N & Enoch
Interviews Conducted During 
My Second Uganda Trip:
November 6 - December 12, 1995 
Interviews Carrried Out Within Kampala At Large:
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Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#137 Ms. Josephine Harmsworth 
Andama,
Director, Human Rights Kampala
Network & Prominent 
Development Consultant
#138 Mr. Alex Loriston,
Head, Development Section Kampala
World Food Programme (WFP)
#139 Mr. Patrick Fine,
Head, General Development Kampala
Office, USAID in Uganda.
#140 Mr. Colin Glennie,
Senior Programmes Officer, Kampala
UNICEF in Uganda.
#141 Ambassador Taliwaku,
Head, Aid Coordination Kampala
Department, Ministry of
Finance & Economic
Planning, Government of
Uganda.
#142 Dr. Francois Farah,
Director, United Nations Kampala
Population Fund (UNFPA)
#143 Mr. Fleming West,
Counsellor for Development Kampala
DANIDA in Uganda
#144 Mr. Tim Lemont,
Economic Advisor, Kampala
Ministry of Finance &
Economic Planning,
Government of Uganda.
November 8, 1995
November 27, 1995
December 4, 1995
December 5, 1995
December 5, 1995
December 6, 1995
December 8, 1995
December 7, 1995
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continued....
Interviews Carrried Out Within Kampala At Large:
Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#145
#146
#147
#148
#149
#150
Mr. Peter Sebanjja,
Head of Services, Kampala
The Aids Support 
Organization (TASO).
Mr. Ismael Magona,
Economist, Social Sector Kampala
(Health & Water Sanitation),
Ministry of Finance &
Economic Planning.
Mr. Nyabongo,
Head, National Execution Kampala
Unit (NEX), Ministry of
Finance and Economic
Planning, Government of
Uganda
Ms. Mary Muduuli,
Commissioner for Economic Kampala
Planning, Ministry of
Finance & Economic
Planning. Government of
Uganda
Ms. Edna Baryaruha
Director for Gender, Kampala
Ministry of Community &
Gender Development, 
with
Ms.Jane Mpagi,
Commissioner for Women's 
Programmes, Ministry of 
Community & Gender Development.
December 7, 1995
December 7, 1995
December 6, 1995
December 7, 1995
December 11, 1995
Mr. Francis Wagaba, 
Coordinator,
Decentralization 
Secretariat,
Ministry of Local Government, 
Ugandan Government
Kampala December 11, 1995
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Interviews Within the UNDP-Uganda Office:
Interview Number# 
Informant# Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#151 Dr. Joseph Opio Odongo, 
SHD Advisor,
UNDP-Uganda
Kampala November 8, 1995 
& December 11, 1995
#152 Ms. Tamba Baldeh,
Deputy Resident Representive Kampala 
UNDP-Uganda Office
#153 Mr. Alex Rusita,
Head, Programme Resource Kampala
& Management Unit,
UNDP-Uganda
#154 Ms. Mutinta Munyati,
Programme Officer for Kampala
Community Management 
Cluster 1 (Economic 
Management & Governance),
UNDP-Uganda
#155 Mr. M.L.Motlana,
Assistant Resident Kampala
Representative 
& Head of Cluster 1 
(Economic Management 
St Governance) ,
UNDP-Uganda
#156 Ms. Jessica Kitakule,
Programme Officer for Kampala
Grassroots Enterprises,
Cluster 1 (Economic 
Management 6 Governance),
UNDP-Uganda.
#157 Mr. Sam Ibanda,
Programme Officer
6 AIDS/HIV Kampala
Cluster 2 (Environmental 
Development & Aids),
UNDP-Uganda.
November 8, 1995
November 10, 1995
November 13, 1995
December 4, 1995
December 4, 1995
December 4, 1995
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Continued...
Interviews Within the UNDP-Uganda Office;
Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#158 Mr. Haruna Kyamanywa,
Assistant Resident Kampala
Representative &
Head, Cluster 2 
(Environmental 
Development & Aids),
UNDP-Uganda.
#159 Mr. John Okello,
Resident Economist, Kampala
UNDP-Uganda
#160 Mr. Wilson Kwamya,
Programme Officer Kampala
For Employment &
Industrial/UNIDO.
Cluster 1( Economic 
Management & Governance),
UNDP-Uganda
#161 Dr. Ghambhir Bhatta,
Programme Officer (UNV)& Kampala
Coordinator, UNV Programme, 
UNDP-Uganda
#162 Ms. Andrea Bauer,
Programme Officer (JPO) Kampala
For Governance Issues 
Cluster 1 (Economic 
Management & Governance,
UNDP-Uganda.
#163 Dr.Babatunde Thomas,
Resident Representative, Kampala
& Resident Coordinator of 
the UN Sytem in Uganda,
UNDP-Uganda
December 6, 1995
December 7, 1995
December 7, 1995
December 6 & 8, 1995
December 8, 1995
December 12, 1995
Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:
Field Visit to the UNDP-Africa 2000 Network Programme, 
Fort Portal (Nov.14-17/95):
6 9
Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#164 Ms. Mary Jo Kakinda,
National Coordinator, Fort Portal
Africa 2000 Network
#165 Charles Malaga,
Regional Coordinator, Fort Portal
(Fort Portal)
Africa 2000 Network and Micro 
Projects to Combat Aids,
#166 Mr. Vincent Mubiru,
Coordinator, Joint Fort Portal
Efforts to Save the 
Environment (JESE),
Africa 2000 Network
November 14-17, 1995 
& December 12, 1995
November 14-17, 1995 
& November 15, 1995
November 15, 1995
#167 Ms. Margaret Bamuroho, 
Beneficiary, Model 
Farmer, JESE Project 
Africa 2000 Network
Fort Portal November 15, 1995
#168 Mr. Kamba, 
Beneficiary, Model 
Farmer,
JESE Project and 
RCV Member,
Africa 2000 Network
Fort Portal November 15, 1995
#169 Mrs. Baguma, 
Beneficiary, Model 
Farmer,
JESE Project,
Africa 2000 Network
Fort Portal November 15, 1995
#170 Mr. James Mkata, 
Assistant Chief 
Administrative Officer
Fort Portal November 16, 1995
#171 Mr. Elias Byamungu, 
Chief Administrate 
Officer, NGO auid 
Head, Women's Affairs
Fort Portal November 16, 1995
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Continued....
Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects;
Field Visit to the UNDP-Africa 2000 Network Programme,
Fort Portal (Nov.14-17/95):
Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#172 Godfrey Baziralle 
Ntawera,
District Agricultural Fort Portal
Officer
#173 Mrs. Gertrude 
Rwahouma,
Chairperson, Fort Portal
Ugandan Women's Efforts 
To Save Orphans (UWESO),
Kabarole Branch
#174 Chiraro Group,
Beneficiaries,
JESE Project Fort Portal
Sc Africa 2000 Network
beneficiaries
#175 Mr. George Kanene,
Beneficiary and Project Iganga
Coordinator, Community 
Association for Rural 
Development (CARD),
Africa 2000 Network
#176 Mr. David Nkanda,
Beneficiary, Iganga
Sustainable Agriculture 
Coordinator, Community 
Association for Rural 
Development (CARD),
Africa 2000 Network 
[Also RCI Chair & Mobilizer]
November 16, 1995
November 16, 1995
November 16, 1995
November 24, 1995
November 24, 1995
Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:
Field Visit to the UNDP-Micro Projects Progreunme to Combat Aids,
Mbale District (Nov.20-23/95):
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Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#177 Ms. Betty Babirye Ddungu, 
National Coordinator, 
UNDP-Micro Projects 
to Combat Aids
Kampala 
and in Mbale
November 20, 1995
#178 Mrs. Margaret Oruma, 
Beneficiary and 
Chairperson, Omukise 
Yetolere Grinding Mill 
Group. Implementors & 
Beneficiaries, Micro 
Projects to Combat Aids
#179 All Members,
Beneficiaries and 
Members, Busia Dabuni 
Women's Poultry Group
Hasyule Parish, November 20, 1995 
Mbale
Samya-Bugere
County,
Mbale
November 20, 1995
#180 All Members,
Beneficiaries,
Unity Group Women's 
Association & Sewing Group
#181 Edith Wakumire,
Beneficiary & Head,
Uganda Women CONCERN 
Ministry.
Aids Prevention Programme
#182 All Members,
Beneficiaries and 
Members, Nabweya 
Women's Sewing Group
#183 Mr. Henry Rwigyemera,
Deputy Resident 
District Commissioner 
(Formerly the Deputy CGR 
appointed by the 
President directly.
#184 Ms. Christine Kumiti,
Project Manager,
Child Restoration 
Outreach (CRO), a Dutch NGO.
Tororo Town, 
Mbale
Bunco Village, 
Mbale
Mbale
Mbale
Mbale Town
November 20, 1995
November 20, 1995
November 21, 1995
November 21, 1995
November 21, 1995
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Continued....
Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects
Field Visit to the UNDP-Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids, 
Mbale District (Nov.20-23/95):
Interview Number, 
Informauit, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#185 Reverend Isiah,
Reverend, Church of Uganda
#186 Mrs. Hadjati Janura 
Naleeba,
RCII Secretary for 
Women & Former RCIV 
& Member, District 
Micro Projects 
Selection Committee
#187 Selected Members, 
Beneficiaries and 
Members, Babulo 
Walanga Dispensary,
Church of Walanga
#188 Selected Members, 
Beneficiaries and 
Members, Double 
Production Farmers' 
Association
#189 Mr. Giles Kahika,
Assistant Chief 
Administrative 
Officer; Member 
of the District 
Micro Projects 
Selection Committee
#190 Mrs. Etna Duce,
District Project 
Coordinator, UNIDO 
Small & Cottage 
Enterprises Project.
#191 Selected Members, 
Beneficiaries &
Members, Bananyole 
Youth Development 
Agency (BAYADA) &
Carpentry & Joinery Project
Mbale Town
Mbale Town
Mbale
Mbale
Mbale Town
Mbale Town
Tororo, Mbale
November 21, 1995
November 21, 1995
November 21, 1995
November 21, 1995
November 22, 1995
November 22, 1995
November 22, 1995
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Continued....
Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries In Specific UNDP Projects:
Field Visit to the UNDP-Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids, 
Mbale District (Nov.20-23/95):
Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#192 Mr. Paul Wamala,
Regional Coordinator, 
UNDP-Micro Projects 
to Combat Aids.
#193 Selected Staff, 
Beneficiaries & 
Implementors Integrated 
Rural Outreach Programme, 
SALEM Brotherhood 
(A German Christian NGO)
#194 Selected Members, 
Beneficiaries and 
Members, Integrated 
Women's Development Centre 
Tailoring Project
#195 Selected Members,
Malaba Women's Group for 
Stone Quarrying
Mbale
Mbale
Tororo, 
Mbale
Mbale
November 22, 1995
November 23, 1995
November 23, 1995
November 23, 1995
Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:
Field Visit to the UNDP -HABITAT Community Management Programme, 
Mubende, November 28-December 1, 1995
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Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
#196 Dr. Phil Bartle,
Chief Technical Advisor, Kanpala
UNDP-HABITAT Community 
Management Programme
#197 Selected Members,
Beneficiaries & Members, Kisekende
Kisakyamaria Women's Parish,
Group for Mushroom Growing Mubende
#198 Selected Members,
Beneficiaries & Members, Kisenkende
S.S. Light School Parish,
Project Bageza
(Members include an Sub-Country
RCII Chair & an RCIII 
Vice-Chair)
#199 Business women of
Mubende Town, Mubende
Members,
Twekaribe Women's Group;
Tusubira Womens' Group;
Luka Baanaba Kintu 
Women's Group 
& Buda Buwekula 
Women's Association
#200 Mr.Godfrey Kuruhiira,
Regional Coordinator for Kampala
Mubende, UNDP-HABITAT 
Community Management 
Programme
#201 Mr. Joshua Ouguang,
National Coordinator, Kampala
UNDP-HABITAT Community 
Management Programme.
November 25, 1995
November 28, 1995
November 30, 1995
November 30,1995
December 11, 1995
December 11, 1995
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Action Aid-U^âiida Follow-Up Interviews and Visits:
Interview Number, 
Informant, Position:
Place of the 
Interview:
Date of the 
Interview:
Action Aid Staff Interviewed in Kampala:
#202 Mr. Anthony Wasswa,
Director, Kampala
Action Aid-Uganda,
with
Mr. Joffrey Atieli,
Deputy Director,
Action Aid-Uganda
#203 Mr. Joffrey Atieli,
Deputy Director, Kampala
Action Aid-Uganda
#204 Ms. Sara Mangali,
Assistant Director & Kampala
Head, Programme Development 
Department, Action Aid-Uganda.
November 10, 1995
December 12, 1995
December 12, 1995
Persons Interviewed in Mubende Town:
#205
#206
#207
#208
#209
#210
#211
Mr. Isaac Modoi,
Chief Administrative Officer Mubende 
Formerly the DES,
Mubende District
Dr. Emmanuel Mawajje,
LCV (Formerly RCV) Chair, Mubende
Mubende District
Mr. James Sebudde,
District Agricultural Officer Mubende 
Mubende District
Mr. Med Makumbi,
Monitoring & Evaluation 
Officer for 
Action Aid-Uganda
Mr. Jeff Readman,
VSO & Management Advisor, 
ABP Project,
Action Aid-Uganda.
Mr.Chris Kiwanuka,
ABP Project Coordinator 
Action Aid Uganda.
Parish Development 
Committee (PDC),
Member, Bugonzi Parish PDC 
Follow-Up Visit)
Mubende
Mubende
Mubende
Mubende 
Kitenga 
Sub-County
November 29, 1995
November 29, 1995 
November 29, 1995 
December 1, 1995
November 30, 1995
November 30, 1995 
December 1, 1995
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